


HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION
Modern and Contemporary

HISTORY OF
CIVILIZATION
MODERN
& CONTEMPORARY

HUTTON WEBSTER, *Stanford University*

JOHN B. WOLF, *University of Minnesota*



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Preface

HE who attempts to compress the history of civilization within a single volume may properly be expected to say something in the way of an *apologia pro suo libello*. So much must remain unchronicled, so much left in the ink pot. Yet, after all, brevity in a historical work is a purely relative matter. Gibbon required only six quarto volumes (in the original edition) for his survey of thirteen centuries of Europe, whereas Macaulay devoted four volumes to a period of sixteen years in the life of the English people. Granted the grandeur of the subject, even a brief treatment of it should enable the student to gain some conception of man's cultural development through the centuries, some appreciation of the contributions made by peoples widely separated in space and time to what is steadily becoming the common possession of mankind.

A history of civilization ought not to be "a post-mortem examination." We know too little of the past—we shall always know too little of the past—to discern in the historic process a movement predetermined and inevitable. The diverse cultures which have arisen in response to environmental influences and to human nature may be described and, whenever possible, the interactions between these cultures may be traced. That is all which, as historians, we can safely do. To do more is to make of ourselves philosophers.

My point of view is frankly that of an inheritor of European or Western civilization. Doubtless a similar work by a Chinese, for instance, would present matters somewhat differently. One cannot escape the limitations of one's age and clime.

The plan of the book is simple. Part I (Foundations of Civilization) begins with a general discussion of the nature of civilization or culture. This is followed by an account of the races and languages of man, the maker of culture. The next two chapters present the evidence for man's cultural growth in "prehistoric" times, as revealed by archaeological study of his handicrafts and arts and by

anthropological study of the beliefs and customs of existing "primitive" peoples. Part II (Centers of Early Civilization) follows a geographical rather than a chronological order and deals, in succession, with America before Columbus, China, India, and the principal countries of the ancient Near East. Pre-Columbian America remained in complete isolation from the rest of the world, and China and India, while not completely isolated, were cut off from many fertilizing contacts with other lands. Hence it is convenient to take them up at this stage and then to trace, without a break in the narrative, the gradual spread of civilization in the Near East and Europe until, a few hundred years ago, the Far East and America came within the purview of Europeans and under European influence. Part III (Classical Civilization) presents Greece and Rome as the two great civilizations which grew up, flourished, and declined in the Mediterranean area. Part IV (Medieval Civilization), save for two chapters on New Rome and Islam, is confined to western Europe in the Middle Ages.

I have not written this book from the primary sources of history. A lifetime would scarcely suffice for such a task. Nevertheless, they have been frequently consulted and quoted, especially in cases where the secondary authorities are not in agreement. The reader who misses here much of that "flower and perfume" of history which only the primary sources yield may be referred to my Historical Selections (Heath, 1929). It is a compilation of the widest scope, containing nearly six hundred extracts and dealing with the cultural development of humanity in all ages for which there are written records.

As regards the Bibliography, I have confined myself to books in the English language, and to those dealing with the particular topics in the chapter under discussion. The longer and more general works, which overstep the limits of the chapter, are not included. Recent books have been cited, wherever possible, in preference to older and often antiquated publications.

The manuscript has been read by Professor John F. Ramsey of the University of Alabama, Professor Lynn T. White of Stanford University, and Dr. Henry M. Adams, formerly at Stanford, but

now at Eastern Washington College. In addition, the proof sheets have been read, in whole or in part, by Professor A. L. Kroeber of the University of California, Professor Maxwell H. Saville of Stanford University, and Dr. W. C. Bark of the same institution. I feel greatly indebted to all these gentlemen for wholesome criticisms and profitable suggestions. Several maps have been taken, by permission, from Professor W. O. Ault's *EUROPE IN THE MIDDLE AGES*.

H. W.

STANFORD UNIVERSITY

PREFACE TO VOLUME II

IN preparing a revision of this book, I have attempted to keep in mind the fact that it will be used as a text in courses having as their primary object an explanation of the development of modern world society. We have found that if the student, in a first course dealing with the problem, can be shown how the driving forces of Western society have reached out to encompass the globe, he is then prepared for further study of the world in which he lives. We do not believe that any college course can give a student all the information he needs to make him an intelligent citizen. Indeed, our world is so complex and so shot through with contradictions and problems that he can but be appalled at the difficulties involved in understanding it.

This book makes the primary assumption that what we call world society is the result of the impact of Western civilization upon the world. In the first volume we have shown the diversity of preceding civilizations. In the second, which covers the modern and contemporary periods, we show the development of Western civilization and of its dynamic forces that have in our day created the idea of one world.

J. B. W.

Contents

PART ONE

THE RISE OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION TO WORLD HEGEMONY

I. Expansion Overseas	3
II. Religious Reform and Revolt	30
III. The End of the Medieval Synthesis	51
IV. The Development of the New States System	81
V. Commerce and Colonies	104
VI. Intellectual Enlightenment	129
VII. Literary and Artistic Movements	153

PART TWO

THE ERA OF BOURGEOIS REVOLUTIONS

VIII. The Era of the French Revolution and Napoleon	169
IX. The Compromises with the Revolution	200

PART THREE

THE IMPACT OF INDUSTRIALISM ON MODERN SOCIETY

X. The Rise of Industrialism	235
XI. Industrial Society before the First World War	267
✓XII. European Imperialism in Asia	298
✓XIII. European Imperialism in Africa	328
XIV. The Americas and Europe	341
XV. International Relations in the New Industrial World	360

XIII	Eighteenth Century Workers: Agriculture (From Diderot: <i>Encyclopédie</i>) Krupp Armament Works, 1860	576
XIV	Assembly Line Twentieth Century Workers: Iron (Southwark Foundry, Philadelphia)	577
XV	Atomic Experiment, Bikini Berlin, 1946	608
XVI	General Assembly of the United Nations at Flushing, New York	609

Maps and Plans

Medieval Travelers in Asia	5
Portuguese Exploration of the African Coast	9
Behaim's Globe	12
Portuguese and Spanish Explorations in the 15th and 16th Centuries	16
Extent of the Protestant Revolt (1524-1572)	43
Religions of Europe about 1648	50
Hapsburg Empire at the Time of Charles V	57
Western Germany about 1630	68
The Conquests of Louis XIV	85
The Growth of Prussia	88
The Growth of Russia (1300-1725)	91
Partitions of Poland (1772, 1793, 1795)	98
India in 1783	108
North America after the Peace of Paris, 1763	118
Maritime Exploration in the Eighteenth Century	126
Political Europe before the French Revolution	<i>facing</i> 170
The World Powers, 1815	<i>facing</i> 186
The Unification of Italy (1815-1870)	222
The Unification of Germany (1815-1871)	226
Industrial England in the 20th Century	257
Industrial Europe	268
Russia in Europe during the 19th Century	292
Dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire (1815-1914)	295
Extension of British Rule in India	304
Asiatic and European Civilization	307
The Trans-Siberian Railway	322
Africa in 1914	335
North America since 1783	<i>facing</i> 342
Exclusion of Spain and Portugal from South America	345
Bismarck's Alliance System before 1887	367
Bismarck's Alliance System, 1887-1890	368
Alliances and Ententes, 1902-1914	373

The World War in 1918	383
Territorial Changes in Europe, 1918-1923	394
British Empire and Commonwealth of Nations, 1921	417
States in Europe Defending the <i>Status Quo</i> of Versailles, 1929	421
Races in Central Europe, 1914	423
Density of Population in Japan	468
Distribution of Arable Land in Japan	468
Political Structure of the U.S.S.R. after 1936	493
Northeastern Asia: The Sphere of Japan's Primary Interests	513
German Moves in Europe, March 1936 to September 1939	533
Germany's Bid to Win the War	550
The War in North Africa	551
Japan's Greater East Asia, 1931-1944	556
Pattern of Victory in Europe	560
Pattern of Victory in the Pacific	561
The Structure of the United Nations	566
Discoveries in the Polar Regions	630
Indo-European Expansion	638
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE, 1394-1774	24
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE, 1775-1945	191

PART ONE

The Rise of Western Civilization
to World Hegemony

I

Expansion Overseas

The Great Discoveries

OF all the movements marking the transition to modern times the most significant is that revival of exploration which opened up ocean routes to the Far East and America; which revealed two continents, previously unknown, as areas for European settlement and the spread of European civilization; and which brought the peoples of Europe from the Mediterranean and other landlocked waters to the Atlantic as a new and grander central sea. At the very time when men were shaking off medieval restraints and were manifesting an increasingly secular attitude toward life, the veil from half the world was torn away, and before their astonished eyes arose the vision of new lands, incalculable in extent, abounding in riches, and offering the fullest scope for the enterprise of bold, adventurous spirits. The great discoveries made by Da Gama and Columbus at the end of the fifteenth century, followed by those of the sixteenth century, did more than stimulate commerce and provide fields for empire. They shifted the center of gravity of Western culture; they formed the most momentous step ever taken in man's occupation of the globe.

Geography in the Middle Ages

The Greeks and Romans had been familiar with a large part of Europe and Asia and with North Africa, but their learning was forgotten or perverted during the early Middle Ages. How much was lost can be realized from a comparison of Ptolemy's map (second century of our era) with such a map as the one preserved in the cathedral at Hereford, England (thirteenth century). The former, based on measurements of latitude and longitude, represents with some approach to correctness the three continents as known at the time; the latter exhibits the earth as surrounded by the ocean, with the terrestrial paradise at the extreme east and all the known regions grouped about Jerusalem as the precise


center of the world. A widespread belief located hell in the center of the earth (did not volcanoes prove the existence of infernal regions?) and purgatory upon a mountain rising out of the southern ocean. Only the north temperate zone was considered to be inhabited. There could be no people in the south temperate zone because of its inaccessibility; to reach it men would have had to cross the burning tropics. The monks, who were the chief map-makers of the medieval period, pieced out their ignorance of things geographical by a liberal use of the imagination. Remote regions were peopled with monstrous beings, one-eyed, headless, or dog-headed, while equally monstrous animals, such as the unicorn and dragon, kept them company. Sailors' "yarns" must have been responsible for the notion that the Atlantic, the "Sea of Darkness," boiled at the equator and that it contained serpents huge enough to sink ships. Thus geography ceased to be in any sense a science of practical value; it ministered chiefly to curiosity and the love of the marvelous.

Medieval Travelers

Cut off on the west by the illimitable, mysterious Atlantic and on the south by the Sahara, European peoples could look only eastward, to the lands of the morning sun, for opportunities to engage in commerce and to propagate the Christian religion among Moslems and idolaters. The crusades first extended geographical knowledge by fostering pilgrimages and missions to the Near East. Pilgrims and missionaries were soon followed by merchants, who sought to tap the profitable Asiatic trade routes.

What especially drew Europeans eastward was the belief that in the center of Asia existed a mighty Christian kingdom. According to one form of the story, the inhabitants of this kingdom were descendants of the Ten Tribes of Israel. Over them ruled a priest-king named Prester (or Presbyter) John. A forged letter from him, which was widely circulated, declared that "if indeed you can number the stars of heaven and the sands of the sea, then you may calculate the extent of our dominion and power." The popes made several attempts to communicate with this mythical potentate. In the thirteenth century his place was taken by the Mongol rulers, who, under the redoubtable Genghis Khan (1206-1227) and his successors, had conquered an enormous domain ranging across Asia from the borders of Russia to China and the Pacific. In 1245 the pope dispatched a Franciscan friar, Pian de Carpine, on a mission to the Mongols, and seven years later another Franciscan, William of Rubruck, went to them as an envoy from King

Medical Travelers in Asia



— Plan of Carpinus, 1245-1247
 --- William of Rubruck, 1253-1255
 - · - Marco Polo, 1271-1295

Scale of Miles
 0 200 400 600 800 1000

Louis IX (St. Louis) of France. Both these intrepid travelers reached the court of the Mongol emperor, the Great Khan, at Karakorum south of Lake Baikal. They were the first Europeans to cross in the Middle Ages the deserts and mountains of central Asia.

The most famous of thirteenth-century travelers were Nicolo and Maffeo Polo and Nicolo's son, Marco. These Venetian merchants made an adventurous journey through the heart of Asia to the court of the Mongol ruler Kublai Khan at Cambaluc, the modern Peiping. Kublai, who seems to have been anxious to introduce Christianity and European culture among his people, received them in a friendly manner, and they amassed much wealth by trade. Marco entered the emperor's service and went on several expeditions to distant parts of the Mongol realm. Many years passed before Kublai would allow his useful guests to return to Europe. They sailed at length from Zaitun, the modern Amoy, skirted the coast of southeastern Asia and India as far as Persia, and then proceeded overland to the Black Sea, whence they went to Constantinople and through the Mediterranean to Venice. When the travelers arrived home in 1295, after an absence of twenty-four years, their kinsfolk were slow to recognize in them the long-lost Polos.

Their story, as written at Marco's dictation, became very popular. No less than eighty-five manuscripts of *The Book of Ser Marco Polo* made before the invention of printing are extant. In this work Europe read of far Cathay (China), with its huge cities and swarming population; of mysterious and secluded Tibet; of Burma, Siam, and Cochinchina, with their palaces and pagodas; of the East Indies, famed for spices; of Ceylon, abounding in pearls; and of India, little known since the time of Alexander the Great. Cipango (Japan) Marco described from hearsay as an island whose civilized inhabitants were so rich in gold that the royal palace was roofed and paved with that metal.

The Polos were followed in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries by many other travelers. Their writings and oral reports provided detailed descriptions of the Asiatic lands and made Europeans more eager than ever to establish relations with the Far East, "golden, scented, silken, and spiced."

In 1291, four years before the return of the Polos to Venice, two brothers, Ugolino and Guido di Vivaldo, set out from Genoa in two galleys and sailed through the Strait of Gibraltar into the western ocean. Franciscan friars accompanied them, but the enterprise was primarily commercial in character. The hope of attaining the Far East by a sea route inspired these gallant mariners. They never came back and probably met shipwreck off the coast of Morocco. Apparently they were trying to circumnavigate Africa, though perhaps their idea

was that the Indies and Cathay might be reached by sailing westward. This bold enterprise may have suggested to Dante a famous passage in the *Inferno*, in which the poet describes the voyage of Ulysses beyond the Pillars of Hercules into the "deep open sea," where he perished, a victim to man's insatiable urge to uncover the secrets of the world.

Aids to Exploration

The new knowledge concerning the land routes of Asia was accompanied by much progress in the art of navigation. The compass was improved, especially by the sailors of Genoa, and with the aid of the "Genoese needle" the mariner could now find his bearings in murky weather or on starless nights. The astrolabe, which the Greeks invented and the Arabs perfected, came to be employed to calculate the latitude by observation of the height of the sun and stars above the horizon. A rude form of the log was used as a means of estimating the speed of a vessel and so of finding roughly the longitude. The charting of coasts became more and more accurate. The mariner might rely on the port guides (*portolani*), made by Italian sea captains, which outlined with surprising accuracy the bays, islands, and headlands of the Mediterranean and adjacent waters. Manuals were also prepared to give information about the tides, currents, and other features of water routes.

The crusades made it necessary to transport large bodies of men, horses, and freight across the eastern Mediterranean, and to this task Venice, Genoa, Pisa, Marseilles, and other ports devoted themselves. Gradually a new type of vessel developed, the caravel, of greater size and storage capacity than the medieval galleys propelled by oars and a single sail. Fitted with three masts, carrying five or six sails from stem to stern, and provided with a rudder hinged to the sternpost (superseding the lateral steering oar), the caravel could beat against any average head wind and hold its course even in heavy seas. These improvements in shipbuilding and ship-handling gave to man such a mastery of the ocean as he had never known before; they were comparable in importance to the introduction of steam power for navigation.

Motives for Exploration


What prompted men to set forth on voyages of discovery? In part, it was the spirit of curiosity, nourished by the new knowledge of the earth which came with the restoration of Greek science by the humanists. Ptolemy's work, including the maps, appeared in a Latin transla-

tion as early as 1410 and lit a beacon in the course of geographical study. In part, it was the crusading spirit, which had not died out in Europe, the desire to spread the "true faith" among heathen peoples and win uncounted multitudes to Christianity. In part, it was the hope, so often realized, of gaining riches, fame, and power which lured adventurers to unknown lands. They found patrons in the strong, ambitious rulers of western Europe, who were always ready to acquire valuable possessions overseas. Ferdinand and Isabella and their grandson, Charles I (afterward the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V), Henry VII of England, and Francis I of France were such rulers.

The economic motive assumed most importance, however. From the Far East came cinnamon, pepper, cloves, nutmeg, mace, and ginger, which were used so freely as condiments in medieval times, when people lived on salt meat during the winter and salt fish during Lent. The spices, together with drugs, perfumes, gums, dyes, precious stones, and textiles, were brought in sailing vessels or by caravans to ports of the eastern Mediterranean. Venetian and Genoese merchants took them to Italy for distribution overland or by water throughout western Europe. The demand for these luxuries steadily increased during the later Middle Ages with the increasing wealth of the upper classes; indeed, the demand threatened to outstrip the supply. Italians had reaped huge profits as middlemen, but now Portuguese and Spaniards appeared as competitors for this lucrative business. The Mediterranean being closed to them by the naval power of Venice, they tried to find an all-water route to the Far East, either around Africa into the Indian Ocean or directly across the Atlantic. The use of such a route would provide cheaper transport by avoiding various reloadings and by eliminating the excessive tolls, almost equivalent to blackmail, levied on Oriental goods in transit through the Arab and Turkish dominions. The supply of these precious wares would also be increased, since a single ship could carry more than several caravans. It is not surprising that the establishment of direct intercourse with the Far East became so important a matter for both Portuguese and Spaniards.

To the Indies Eastward

Prince Henry, commonly called Henry the Navigator (1394-1460), opened the way oceanward for Portugal. The son of a Portuguese king, he relinquished a military career and for more than forty years devoted his wealth, learning, and enthusiasm to geographical discovery. Under his direction better maps were made, the astrolabe was improved, and seamen were instructed in all the nautical learning of the time.



Portuguese Exploration of the African Coast

On Cape Sagres (now St. Vincent), the southwesterly tip of Portugal and of Europe, he established a regular school of navigation, with an observatory and a library in which might be read Marco Polo's book and the works of ancient geographers. Nearby was the harbor of Lagos, from which Prince Henry's ships embarked. It is improbable that he had definitely in mind the finding of a maritime route to the Far East; his spirit seems to have been partly that of a crusader. By rounding the extremity of Africa, which was supposed to extend not far below the equator, he planned to reach the Christian realm of Prester John (now believed to be located in Africa and identified with Abyssinia) and in alliance with that ruler to turn the flank of the Turkish Empire and recover the Holy Land. He also wished to reach by sea the "Black Country" south of the Sahara, to which the Arabs of Morocco, he learned, sent regular caravans for gold, ivory, and Negro slaves. The opening up of this new world beyond the desert, where Europeans generally believed all life came to an end, promised to make little Portugal a great and wealthy country.

Prince Henry began by sending his seamen to the Madeiras and later to the Azores. These islands had been previously discovered, but the Portuguese first colonized them and brought them into the circle of European influence. Then the sailors turned southward along the uncharted African coast. In 1434 they got as far as Cape Bojador, the

southernmost point known to Europeans, and eleven years later reached Cape Verde, so called from its luxuriant vegetation. Later voyages, after Prince Henry's death, brought the Portuguese to Sierra Leone; next, to the great bend in the African coast formed by the Gulf of Guinea; next, across the equator, without the scorching that the sailors had feared; and at length to the mouth of the Congo. The vast volume of water in that river disposed of the old idea that tropical Africa was a rainless, desert region. In 1487 Bartholomew Diaz, driven far out of his way by storms, passed the tip of Africa without ever seeing it, but on the return voyage rounded the jagged point which he seems to have named the Cape of Good Hope. The real length of the African continent was now known, and the feasibility of a passage around it to India was proved beyond all doubt.

The fruits of these discoveries were soon reaped by another daring seaman, Vasco da Gama. With four ships Da Gama set sail from Lisbon in July, 1497, and after leaving the Cape Verde Islands made a wide sweep into the south Atlantic. Five months passed before Africa was seen again. Having doubled the Cape of Good Hope in safety, Da Gama skirted the eastern shore of Africa, reached the Arab port of Malindi, and there secured the services of a pilot to guide him across the Indian Ocean. In May, 1498, he arrived at Calicut, an important port on the southwest coast of India. When Da Gama returned to Lisbon, after an absence of over two years, he brought back a cargo of spices and gems which repaid sixty times the cost of the expedition. The Portuguese king received him with high honor and created him Admiral of the Indies. For this memorable voyage, as for others equally or more memorable, history records only the name of the commander. Let us think, as well, of the common sailors and of the men who designed and put together the first ships which could stem the ocean currents and ride out the fiercest gales.

The Portuguese Colonial Empire

After Da Gama's voyage the Portuguese quickly established themselves on the sea route to the Far East. They lined the African coast with settlements and acquired Ormuz at the entrance to the Persian Gulf, Goa on the western coast of India, and Malacca at the end of the Malay Peninsula. The possession of these and other strategic points enabled them to expel their Arab competitors, who had long controlled the commerce of the Indian Ocean. The Portuguese also opened up trading relations with China, through the port of Macao, and with Japan, which was discovered by them either in 1542 or 1543.


Only their own merchants were allowed to bring goods from the Indies by the Cape route to Lisbon. The Dutch and English came there to buy them and took the place of Italian merchants in distributing them throughout western Europe. In 1581 Portugal was annexed by the Spanish monarch Philip II, who closed Lisbon to Holland and England, then at war with Spain. The Dutch and English consequently treated the Portuguese as enemies and during the seventeenth century secured almost all their possessions in the Far East.

More fortunate were the Portuguese in Brazil, which one of their navigators, Pedro Cabral, discovered in 1500. A region inhabited by savages and apparently without mineral riches offered few attractions to a country into whose coffers poured the wealth of Africa and Asia. It was not until Portugal, through the unfortunate connection with Spain, had lost a colonial empire in the Far East that the importance of the resources of Brazil came to be appreciated. The Portuguese ruled there until the nineteenth century, and their influence endures there in spite of the breaking of political ties. The language, literature, religion, and customs of Brazil are those of Portugal.

To the Indies Westward

Six years before Vasco da Gama cast anchor in the harbor of Calicut, another intrepid sailor, seeking the Indies by a western route, accidentally discovered America. It does not detract from the glory of Columbus to show that the way for his discovery had been long in preparation. In the first place, the theory that the earth is round had been familiar to Aristotle, Eratosthenes, Strabo, Ptolemy, Pliny the Elder, and other classical authors, and to educated men even in the darkest period of the Middle Ages. By the opening of the thirteenth century it must have been commonly known, for Roger Bacon refers to it and Dante plans his *Inferno* on the supposition of a spherical world. The humanist movement, resulting in the translation of Greek scientific books, called renewed attention to the statements by ancient geographers about the sphericity of the earth.

In the second place, men had long believed that west of Europe, beyond the Strait of Gibraltar, lay mysterious lands. This notion first appears in one of the dialogues of the Greek philosopher Plato, who relates what he declares was an old tradition concerning Atlantis. According to Plato, Atlantis had been an island continental in size, but more than nine thousand years before his time it sank beneath the sea. Medieval writers accepted the story and found support for it in traditions of other western islands, such as the Isles of the Blest, whither



Behaim's Globe

The outlines of North America and South America shown here do not appear, of course, on the original globe.

King Arthur, after his last battle, was borne to heal his wounds. A popular legend of the Middle Ages also described the visit made by St. Brandan, an Irish monk, to the "promised land of the saints," an earthly paradise far out in the Atlantic. St. Brandan's Island was marked on early maps, and voyages in search of it were sometimes undertaken.

The ideas of European geographers in the period just preceding the discovery of America are represented on a map, or rather a globe, which dates from 1492. This was made by a German navigator, Martin Behaim, for his native city of Nuremberg. Behaim shows the mythical island of St. Brandan, lying in mid-ocean, and beyond it Cipango, the East Indies, and Cathay. It is clear that he greatly underestimated the distance westward between Europe and Asia. The error was natural enough, for Ptolemy had reckoned the earth's circumference to be about one-sixth less than it is and Marco Polo had given an exaggerated idea of the distance to which Asia extended eastward. When Columbus set out, he believed that after quitting the Canary Islands, the farthest

Spanish land to the west, a journey of about twenty-three hundred miles would bring him to Japan. Had he known accurately the real distance between Europe and Asia by the western route, doubtless he would not have undertaken a voyage to which neither the nautical knowledge nor the shipping of the period was considered equal.

Christopher Columbus (1451?-1506) was a native of Genoa, where his father followed the trade of a weaver. At an early age he became a sailor. Columbus knew the Mediterranean by heart; he once went to Madeira and to the Guinea coast; he visited the British Isles; and he may have visited Iceland. After settling in Lisbon as a map-maker, he married a daughter of one of Prince Henry's sea captains. As he pored over his maps and charts and talked with Portuguese mariners, the idea came to him that much of the world remained unknown and that the distant East could be reached by a shorter route than the one which led around Africa. "It was in Portugal," his son afterward declared, "that the Admiral began to surmise that if men could sail so far south, one might also sail west and find lands in that direction." Columbus was a well-read man, and in Ptolemy and other ancient authorities he found apparent confirmation of his grand idea. He also owned a printed copy of Marco Polo's book, and from his comments, written on the margin, we know how interested he was in Marco's statements about Cathay and Cipango. If he ever went to Iceland, some vague traditions may have reached him there of the voyages of the Northmen to Greenland and Vinland. Such hints and rumors strengthened his purpose to sail toward the setting sun in quest of the Indies.

Columbus first applied to the king of Portugal for the necessary ships and equipment. The Portuguese monarch, though engrossed in finding a southern route around Africa, listened with interest to his proposals and laid them before a geographical council. The council reported adversely, and Columbus betook himself to Spain. The time was unpropitious, for Castile and Aragón were then in the thick of the struggle against the Moors. How Columbus triumphed over one obstacle after another and at length found a patroness in Queen Isabella, who is said to have pledged her crown jewels to defray part of the cost of the expedition, is a familiar story. A few months after the fall of Granada an agreement was finally drawn up by which the Spanish monarchs promised that Columbus should have the rank of an admiral and the power of a viceroy over the "islands and mainlands" he might find or acquire in the ocean, together with one-tenth of their wealth in gold and silver, precious stones, and spices. A crusading spirit animated Columbus, as it had Prince Henry, and he looked forward to the time

when, with the vast resources of the Far East at his disposal, he might lead the chivalry of Europe in a new holy war against the Turk.

Provided with a royal letter of introduction to the Great Khan and also with a sort of passport in which his route is described as being "toward the Indies," Columbus set out from Palos on August 3, 1492. He had three small vessels, with provisions for an entire year. The voyage was to be a venture into the open sea, not a coasting expedition such as the Portuguese up to this time had always made; therein lay its daring. The ships first stopped at the Canaries and then turned westward, sailing week after week over the Atlantic at its widest part, until in the early morning of October 12 the glittering coral strand of one of the Bahamas came into view. Columbus named the land San Salvador (St. Savior). Cuba, which he identified with Cathay, and Haiti, which he similarly took for Cipango, were sighted soon afterward. Columbus now returned to Spain, confident that he had reached his goal. The great Admiral made three other western voyages, in the course of which he explored the islands of the Caribbean, touched the mainland of South America near the mouth of the Orinoco, and sailed along the eastern coast of Central America. But no glimpse of the long-sought empire of the Great Khan rewarded his efforts, and he died without realizing that he had found, not part of Asia and the adjacent islands, but a New World.

This startling truth was first revealed by a Florentine navigator, Amerigo Vespucci, or Americus Vespucius, to give his name its Latin form. He claimed to have made four voyages across the Atlantic and in 1504 wrote an account of lands far to the southwest of Europe, lands which he described not as a string of islands but as "a New World, a new fourth part of the globe." His statements became known to scholars, and the suggestion was soon made and accepted that the southern continent should be called "America," after its presumed discoverer. The name referred at first only to South America, but eventually spread to the northern continent as well. The Spaniards preferred "the Indies" as the official designation of the New World and did not use the name America on their maps until late in the eighteenth century.

Circumnavigation of the Globe

Shortly after the return of Columbus from his first voyage, Pope Alexander VI, in response to a request by Ferdinand and Isabella, issued in 1493 several bulls granting these sovereigns exclusive rights over the newly discovered territory. In order that the Spanish possessions should be clearly marked off from those of the Portuguese, the pope


drew a line of demarcation in the Atlantic one hundred leagues (about three hundred miles) west of the Azores and the Cape Verde Islands. All new discoveries of non-Christian lands to the west of this boundary were to belong to Spain; all those east of it, to Portugal. In 1494 the two countries agreed by treaty to shift the dividing meridian two hundred and seventy leagues farther west. This arrangement proved to be a fortunate one for Portugal, since it gave her title to the eastern half of Brazil.

The Demarcation Line had a good deal to do with bringing about the first circumnavigation of the globe. So far no one had realized the dream of Columbus to reach Asia by sailing westward. Ferdinand Magellan, a Portuguese mariner in the service of Spain, believed that the Moluccas, or Spice Islands, lay within the Spanish sphere of influence and that a route to them through some strait at the southern end of South America could be found. Charles I, king of Spain, looked with favor upon Magellan's ideas and provided a fleet of five vessels for the enterprise.

After skirting the eastern coast of South America, Magellan sailed up the estuary of the Plata, until the freshness of the water showed that he was in a great river. He turned back, continued southward, and finally sighted the strait which now bears his name. Passage of this tortuous, dangerous waterway took him thirty-eight days. The new ocean upon which he emerged was so peaceful that he called it the Pacific (*Mare Pacificum*). The sailors now begged him to return, for food was getting scarce, but he replied that he would go on even were it necessary "to eat the leather off the rigging." He did go on, for ninety-eight days more, until the Ladrone Islands (the Marianas) were reached and provisions obtained for his starving crews. In their extremity they had consumed, not only all the leather, but also all the rats on shipboard. Only two small islands, both uninhabited, were passed during this long voyage across the Pacific. Magellan now proceeded to the Philippines and took possession of them in the name of Spain. Magellan was killed in a fight with the natives, but his men managed to reach the Moluccas, the goal of the journey. A single ship, the *Victoria*, commanded by Del Cano, carried back to Spain the few sailors who had survived the hardships of a voyage lasting nearly three years (1519-1522).

What a great voyage that was, in cockleshell boats over unknown seas, and how great were its results for geographical knowledge! Magellan had discovered, far to the south, the interoceanic strait for which navigators searched vainly in northern latitudes; he had proved that America, at least on the south, was not connected with Asia; he

Portuguese and Spanish Explorations in the 15th and 16th Centuries



had revealed the enormous extent of the Pacific Ocean; and he had succeeded, where Columbus failed, in finding the western sea route to the Far East. Henceforth Europeans knew of a certainty that the earth is round, and in the distance covered by Magellan and Del Cano they had a rough approximation as to its size. An entirely new picture of the world was thus presented to their eyes.

The Spanish Colonial Empire

The discoverers of America were naturally the pioneers in its exploration, conquest, and colonization. Columbus in 1493 left a garrison on the island of Haiti, but when he returned to the island, later in the same year, he found that the Spaniards had been exterminated by the Indians. Columbus established a second colony on a new site; it did not flourish, however, and in 1496 the explorer's brother, Bartholomew, removed the colonists to the site now occupied by Santo Domingo. This city, the capital of the republic named after it, is the oldest existing European settlement in the New World. It formed the center from which the Spaniards extended their authority over the West Indies. In 1513 Ponce de León, seeking in the unexplored seas to the north a great island called Bimini, where was a spring or river whose waters would restore youth to the aged, reached the mainland of North America at Florida. In the same year Balboa, from the Isthmus of Panama, sighted the ocean which he called *Mar del Sur*, the "South Sea."

The overthrow of the Aztec power in Anáhuac was accomplished by Hernando Cortés with the aid of Indian allies (1519-1521). As governor of Mexico by royal appointment, Cortés devoted himself to the organization of the wide territories which his sword had won. Mexico City, a new and Christian capital, rose upon the ruins of Tenochtitlán. Anáhuac, long devastated by warfare and slave raids, entered upon an era of peace and prosperity. European plants and animals were introduced and Spanish settlements were established as centers of civilization for the Indians. Cortés also pushed forward the work of exploration, so that the whole west coast of Mexico and the peninsula of Lower California soon became known to Europeans. In 1531-1533 Francisco Pizarro, with a handful of men, conquered the Inca realm of Peru. He founded the city of Lima to replace Cuzco as the capital of the country. In Peru, as in Mexico, the Spaniards seized a vast amount of treasure — wealth beyond the dreams of even those avaricious conquerors.

The Spaniards heard much of a fabled Indian ruler who, it was said,

used to smear himself with gold at an annual religious ceremony near Bogotá. The idea thus arose that somewhere in South America was a country marvelously rich in precious metals and gems. Many expeditions were fitted out to find the gilded man (El Dorado) and his gilded realm. The result was to open up the valleys of the Amazon and the Orinoco and the extensive forest region east of the Andes. The Spaniards also looked for El Dorado or its equivalent in North America. De Soto's expedition led to the discovery of the Mississippi in 1541 and Coronado's search for the "Seven Cities of Cibola" prepared the way for the Spanish occupation of the American Southwest.

The colonization of the New World by the Spaniards was well advanced before the middle of the sixteenth century. Lust for riches, martial spirit, and religious enthusiasm had carried them from island to island of the West Indies, over Mexico and Central America, along the Pacific coast of South America, across the mighty barrier of the Andes and down the Amazon to the ocean, up the Plata and its tributaries into the heart of the southern continent, and from Florida to California in the northern continent. Their discoveries and settlements created for Spain a colonial empire greater than the whole area of Europe. The empire lasted for nearly three hundred years. During this time Spain gave her language, religion, law, political institutions, economic system, and intellectual culture to half the New World.

French and English Explorations in America

Magellan's discovery of a strait leading into the Pacific aroused hope that a similar waterway, beyond the regions controlled by Spain, might exist in North America. In 1534 Francis I sent Jacques Cartier, a hardy mariner of St. Malo, Brittany, to look for it. Cartier discovered the Strait of Belle Isle, separating Newfoundland from Labrador, but no Northwest Passage to Asia. On a second voyage in the following year, he entered the gulf and river which he named after St. Lawrence and ascended the river until his progress was stopped by a rocky barrier, the Lachine Rapids. The French tried to plant a settlement near the present Quebec, but the venture was unsuccessful. They made no further effort to colonize Canada until the first decade of the seventeenth century.

England based its claim to the right to colonize North America on the discoveries of John Cabot (Caboto), an Italian mariner in the service of Henry VII. In 1497 Cabot sailed from Bristol, crossed the Atlantic where seas are stormiest, and made land somewhere between Labrador and Nova Scotia. Like Columbus he believed that he had reached

the eastern edge of Asia. A second voyage in 1498 only confirmed him in this belief. Because he found neither gold nor opportunities for profitable trade his expeditions were considered a failure. Fortune had not been kind to Cabot, who was the first to sight and explore the northern continent.

During the sixteenth century the English also entered on the search for a Northwest Passage. The names Frobisher Bay, Davis Strait, and Baffin Land preserve the memory of the heroic navigators who explored the channels leading into the Arctic Ocean. When it was finally realized how little was to be gained by voyages to the cold and desolate north, the English turned southward to warmer waters. Here they came upon the Spaniards, who had no disposition to share with foreigners the profitable trade of the New World. Though England and Spain were at peace, the English "sea dogs" did not scruple to ravage the Spanish settlements and capture the huge, clumsy treasure ships carrying gold and silver to Spain. One of these intruders, Sir Francis Drake, penetrated to the Isthmus of Panama, where he obtained his first view of the Pacific and vowed some day "to sail an English ship" in the South Sea. Drake's celebrated voyage around the world (1577-1580), the first to be made by an Englishman, was the result of this experience.

Four years after Drake's return to England another Englishman, Sir Walter Raleigh, sent out an expedition to find a good site for a settlement in North America. The explorers reached the coast of North Carolina and returned with glowing accounts of the country, which was named Virginia in honor of Elizabeth, the "Virgin Queen." But Raleigh's colonies in Virginia failed miserably, and the English did not again attempt to settle there until the reign of James I, early in the seventeenth century.

The Old World and the New

The New World contained two virginal continents, very rich in natural resources and capable of extensive colonization. The native inhabitants, savage or barbarian in culture, could not offer much resistance to invaders provided with horses, firearms, and armor of tempered steel who descended upon them. The conquest of a large part of America by Spaniards and Portuguese formed the first stage in the expansion of European peoples over so much of the globe. The conquest was not followed by a great influx of settlers from Europe to America in the sixteenth century, when Spain and Portugal had the New World practically to themselves. The Spanish immigrants during this period averaged not more than a thousand or fifteen hundred

a year, and the Portuguese immigrants were still fewer in number. They seldom brought women with them and hence found wives or concubines among the Indians. Inter-marriage between the two races became common, the result being the formation of a race of half-breeds. The Indian strain predominates in it, because almost everywhere the aborigines were much more numerous than the European settlers. The interbreeding of "red" man and white man has continued in Latin America without interruption to the present day. Never during historic times has any similar experiment in miscegenation been made elsewhere on so extensive a scale.

The Spaniards treated the Indians of the West Indies most harshly and forced them to work in the mines and on the plantations. The heavy labor, to which they were not accustomed, broke down their health; European diseases and European intoxicants worked great havoc among them; and almost the entire native population of the islands perished within half a century after the coming of the whites. The fate of the Indians upon the mainland was not so swift or so sweeping, but entire tribes sometimes melted away. The condition of the aborigines improved as time went on, for the Spanish government stepped in to prohibit their enslavement and give them the protection of humane laws. Much credit for these reforms belongs to Bartholomew de Las Casas, the "Apostle of the Indies" and the first priest ordained in America.

The Roman Church found in the New World abundant opportunity to display missionary zeal. Preaching, praying, and baptizing went hand in hand with the work of conquest. As Spanish influence extended over the more civilized tribes, each town, Indian as well as Spanish, was required to have a church, a hospital, and a school for native children. Missionary enterprise among the wilder Indians, in both the Spanish possessions and Brazil, did not really begin on an extensive scale until the seventeenth century. The Christianization of the aborigines involved the extirpation, so far as it could be brought about, of every feature of their heathen religion, and this meant in turn the well-nigh complete destruction of the native culture, in many ways so remarkable, developed by the Mayas, Aztecs, and Incas. How remarkable it was we are only now beginning to realize.

The New World provided Europeans with a source of the precious metals. The Spaniards began by plundering the Indians of their stored-up wealth in gold and silver, but the conquest of Mexico and Peru soon opened up for exploitation the great mineral wealth of those regions. After the discovery in 1545 of the enormously rich mines of

Potosí in Bolivia, the output of silver much exceeded that of gold. It is estimated that by the end of the sixteenth century the American mines had produced at least three times as much of the money metals as had been current in Europe at the beginning of the century.

The Spaniards could not keep all this treasure. Some of it went to pay the foreign creditors of the Spanish king and some of it to support his armies fighting abroad. Much of it left Spain in payment for imports of manufactured goods. The Spaniards had few industries and more and more relied on outsiders to supply their needs. The permanent gain from the treasure went rather to such countries as Holland and England, which were able to employ it productively as capital in agriculture, industry, and commerce. Spain thus acted as a huge sieve through which the gold and silver of America entered Europe. During the Middle Ages the money supply had been inadequate; from the beginning of modern times Europe has been better supplied with the indispensable medium of exchange.

America was much more than a source of the precious metals. Many commodities previously unknown found their way from the New World to the Old. Among them were maize, or Indian corn; the potato, which, when cultivated in Europe, became the "bread of the poor"; the sweet potato; all varieties of beans; the tomato; chocolate and cocoa from the seeds of the cacao tree; tapioca from the roots of the cassava or manioc plant; tobacco; Peruvian bark, or quinine, which provided a remedy for malarial complaints that had previously baffled medical skill; cochineal, a dyestuff; and various cabinet woods such as mahogany. Some of these new American products became common articles of consumption and so raised the standard of living in European countries. But the New World received from the Old more than it gave in the shape of useful plants: the various kinds of grain (wheat, barley, oats, and rye), sugar cane, coffee, and cotton came to America from the three older continents. The exchange of cultural elements also favored America in respect to fauna, for practically all the domestic animals of the New World are of Old World origin.

Results of the Great Discoveries

During the Middle Ages the Mediterranean and the Baltic had been the principal highways of European commerce. The discovery of America, followed immediately by the opening of the Cape route to the Far East, shifted commercial activities from these inclosed seas to the Atlantic. Trade became oceanic and not "thalassic"; the Atlantic-

facing ports were no longer outposts on an unknown sea but outlets for maritime intercourse with all the world. The Italian cities declined in importance and the Hanseatic League fell upon evil days. Venice, Genoa, and Lübeck, as trade emporiums, gave way to Cadiz and Lisbon, Bordeaux and Cherbourg, Antwerp and Amsterdam, Bristol, Plymouth, London, and Liverpool. The economic center of gravity was shifted to the western rim of Europe.

The political center of gravity was likewise shifted. The Atlantic-facing countries, first Portugal and Spain in the sixteenth century and then Holland, France, and England in the seventeenth century, took advantage of their geographical position to acquire colonial empires. Their trade rivalries and contests for possessions overseas have ever since been causes of European strife. Italy and Germany, less favorably situated and without centralized governments, could take little part in this movement and came off with empty hands. When, in the nineteenth century, they sought a "place in the sun," they found that the best regions for colonization in the temperate zone already belonged to other powers.

The expansion of the world could not fail to produce sooner or later an expansion of men's minds. The world was found to be far bigger than had been thought, out in the West loomed the outlines of a land-mass incalculable in extent; and farther to the west lay the waters of a vast ocean whose existence never had been suspected. Old geographical conceptions were completely discredited. Explorers not only settled the question as to the shape of the earth but proved that there were peoples living in parts of it where theologians had declared that none could exist. Europeans now had contact with the primitive cultures of America and with the age-old civilizations of the Far East, both with exotic and novel ways of living so unlike their own. Inevitably for Europeans life became fuller and richer; the coins of Spain, showing the Pillars of Hercules and bearing the legend *Plus Ultra* ("More is beyond") expressed the adventurous spirit of the age. Writing in 1776 Adam Smith, father of economic science, declared that "the discovery of America and that of a passage to the Indies by the Cape of Good Hope are the two greatest and most important events in the history of mankind." His words are still more true today than when they were written.

The sixteenth century in Europe was the age of that revolt against the Roman Church commonly known as the Reformation. During this period, however, Rome made her converts of the American Indians. What she lost of wealth and influence in Europe was partially offset by what she gained in America. Furthermore, the region now occupied

by the United States furnished in the seventeenth century an asylum from religious persecution, as was proved when Puritans settled in New England, Roman Catholics in Maryland, and Quakers in Pennsylvania. The vacant spaces of America offered plenty of room for all who would worship God in their own way. The New World was to be a refuge from the intolerance of the Old.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

A.D.	<i>Rulers and Dynasties</i>	<i>Political History</i>	<i>Cultural History</i>
	<p>1399-1461 English sovereigns, Lancastrian line Henry IV, 1399-1413 Henry V, 1413-1422 Henry VI, 1422-1461</p> <p>1461-1483 Louis XI, king of France 1461-1485 English sovereigns, Yorkist line Edward IV, 1461-1483 Edward V, 1483 Richard III, 1483-1485</p> <p>1485-1603 English sovereigns, Tudor line Henry VII, 1485-1509 Henry VIII, 1509-1547 Edward VI, 1547-1553 Mary, 1553-1558 Elizabeth, 1558-1603</p>	<p>1453 Constantinople captured by Ottoman Turks 1455-1485 War of the Roses</p> <p>1479 Union of Aragón and Castile under Ferdinand and Isabella</p> <p>1492 Conquest of Granada</p>	<p>1394-1460 Prince Henry the Navigator 1395(?) Greek first taught at Florence by Chrysoloras 1401 First public bank established at Barcelona 1414-1418 Church Council of Constance 1452-1519 Leonardo da Vinci</p> <p>1456 First large printed book issued from Gutenberg's press at Mainz</p> <p>1466(?)-1536 Erasmus 1471-1528 Albrecht Dürer 1475-1564 Michelangelo 1477-1576 Titian</p> <p>1483-1520 Raphael 1483-1546 Martin Luther 1484 Witchcraft Bull of Pope Innocent VIII 1484-1531 Huldreich Zwingli</p> <p>1487 Cape of Good Hope rounded by Díaz 1492 Discovery of America by Columbus 1493 Demarcation Line of Pope Alexander VI 1494 Second Demarcation Line 1497 North America rediscovered by John Cabot 1498 India reached by Vasco da Gama 1500 Brazil discovered by Cabral 1506-1552 St. Francis Xavier</p>

<p>1515-1547 Francis I, king of France 1516-1556 Charles I, king of Spain (as Holy Roman Emperor, Charles V, 1519-1558) 1520-1556 Suleiman II, the Magnificent, sultan of Turkey</p>	<p>1519-1521 Mexico conquered by Cortés 1526 Mogul Empire established in India by Baber 1531-1533 Peru conquered by Pizarro</p>	<p>1500-1564 John Calvin 1513 Discovery of the Pacific by Balboa; Florida discovered by Ponce de León; Machiavelli's <i>The Prince</i> 1516 Greek New Testament of Erasmus 1517 Luther's Ninety-five Theses posted 1518-1580 Palladio 1519-1522 Circumnavigation of the globe by Magellan and Del Cano 1521 Diet of Worms 1522 Complutensian Polyglot 1524-1580 Camoëns 1526-1594 Palestrina</p>
<p>1534-1549 Pontificate of Paul III</p>		<p>1534 Act of Supremacy; Society of Jesus founded by Loyola 1534-1535 Jacques Cartier in Canada 1536 Calvin's <i>Institute of the Christian Religion</i> 1543 Publication of Copernican theory and of Vesalius's treatise on human anatomy 1544-1595 Tasso 1545 Silver mines of Potosí discovered 1545-1563 Council of Trent 1547-1616 Cervantes 1549 <i>Book of Common Prayer</i> issued 1552-1599 Edmund Spenser</p>
<p>1556-1598 Philip II, king of Spain 1556-1605 Reign of Akbar in India</p>	<p>1555 Religious Peace of Augsburg</p>	<p>1561-1626 Sir Francis Bacon, Lord Verulam 1563-1635 Lope de Vega 1564-1616 Shakespeare</p>

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE *Continued*

	<i>Rulers and Dynasties</i>	<i>Political History</i>	<i>Cultural History</i>
A.D.			
1700	<p>1714— English sovereigns, Hanoverian-Windsor line George I, 1714–1727 George II, 1727–1760 George III, 1760–1820 George IV, 1820–1830 William IV, 1830–1837 Victoria, 1837–1901 Edward VII, 1901–1910 George V, 1910–1936 Edward VIII, 1936 George VI, 1936– 1715–1774 Louis XV, king of France</p> <p>1740–1780 Reign of Maria Theresa 1740–1786 Frederick the Great, king of Prussia</p>	<p>1702–1713 War of the Spanish Succession 1704 Battle of Blenheim 1713 Peace of Utrecht 1703 Founding of St. Petersburg (Leningrad) 1707 Act of Union between England and Scotland</p> <p>1740–1748 War of the Austrian Succession 1748 Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle</p>	<p>1694–1778 Voltaire 1697–1764 William Hogarth 1698 London Stock Exchange established</p> <p>1703–1791 John Wesley 1706–1790 Benjamin Franklin 1707–1778 Carolus Linnaeus 1711 Grand Lodge of Freemasonry formed at London</p> <p>1724–1804 Immanuel Kant 1729–1781 G. E. Lessing 1733 Kay's "Flying shuttle" patented 1739 Methodist revival begun</p> <p>1741 Bering Strait discovered 1743–1790 A. L. Lavoisier 1743–1826 Thomas Jefferson 1746–1827 J. H. Pestalozzi</p>

	<p>1746-1828 Goya</p> <p>1748 Montesquieu's <i>Spirit of the Laws</i></p> <p>1749-1832 J. W. Goethe</p> <p>1755 Samuel Johnson's <i>English Dictionary</i></p> <p>1756-1791 W. A. Mozart</p>	<p>1756-1763 Seven Years' War ("French and Indian War")</p> <p>1757 Battle of Plassey</p> <p>1759 Quebec captured by Wolfe</p> <p>1763 Peace of Paris</p>	<p>1746-1828 Goya</p> <p>1748 Montesquieu's <i>Spirit of the Laws</i></p> <p>1749-1832 J. W. Goethe</p> <p>1755 Samuel Johnson's <i>English Dictionary</i></p> <p>1756-1791 W. A. Mozart</p>
<p>1762-1796 Catherine II, czarina of Russia</p>	<p>1765 Stamp Act</p> <p>1767 Townshend Acts</p>	<p>1759 British Museum established</p> <p>1759-1805 J. C. F. Schiller</p> <p>1762 Rousseau's <i>Social Contract</i></p> <p>1764 Beccaria's <i>Essay on Crimes and Punishments</i>; Hargreaves's "spinning jenny"</p> <p>1768-1771 First edition of <i>Encyclopaedia Britannica</i></p> <p>1768-1779 Cook's three voyages in the Pacific</p> <p>1769 Arkwright's "water frame" patented, Watt's first patent of a steam engine</p> <p>1770-1827 Ludwig van Beethoven</p> <p>1770-1831 G. W. F. Hegel</p> <p>1771-1832 Sir Walter Scott</p> <p>1771-1858 Robert Owen</p>	<p>1759 British Museum established</p> <p>1759-1805 J. C. F. Schiller</p> <p>1762 Rousseau's <i>Social Contract</i></p> <p>1764 Beccaria's <i>Essay on Crimes and Punishments</i>; Hargreaves's "spinning jenny"</p> <p>1768-1771 First edition of <i>Encyclopaedia Britannica</i></p> <p>1768-1779 Cook's three voyages in the Pacific</p> <p>1769 Arkwright's "water frame" patented, Watt's first patent of a steam engine</p> <p>1770-1827 Ludwig van Beethoven</p> <p>1770-1831 G. W. F. Hegel</p> <p>1771-1832 Sir Walter Scott</p> <p>1771-1858 Robert Owen</p>
<p>1774-1792 Louis XVI, king of France</p>	<p>1772 First partition of Poland</p>		

II

Religious Reform and Revolt

The Protestant Revolt

THOSE Germans and Swiss who in the second and third decades of the sixteenth century denied the supremacy of the pope and repudiated many Catholic teachings and practices thought of themselves as reformers within the Roman Church, not as seceders from it. But what began as an agitation for the moral and spiritual regeneration of the church soon developed into a widespread schism, involving a large part of western Europe. To call this religious upheaval the Reformation is to use a partisan term, a question-begging term. The movement was a revolt, and as such it has a place among the other great movements which transformed medieval society and introduced the modern world.

The Protestant Revolt did not stand by itself, but formed part and parcel of all the changes characteristic of the sixteenth century. Centralized national states were rising to dominance; the middle classes were establishing themselves firmly in the seats of industry and commerce; the center of European interests was shifting from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic; a New World was rising out in the western ocean; the secular spirit was finding more and more an outlet in literature and the arts; education was spreading; and people were beginning to read printed books, to think for themselves, and to resent an ecclesiastical tutelage tolerable only when the clergy were really much superior in intellect, training, and character to the laity. An old order of things had begun to yield place to a new.

Almost from the start the Protestant Revolt was affected by political and economic interests. Politically, it expressed the opposition of European sovereigns to much of the civil or temporal authority wielded by the church in their dominions. Having triumphed over feudalism, they wished to bring the church as well under control. The state, national in feeling and jealous of outside interference, had now begun to

take shape and to resume those functions of government which had been abandoned to the church after the collapse of the Roman Empire. The sovereigns tried, therefore, to restrict the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts, to impose taxes on the clergy as on their own people, and to dictate the appointment of bishops and abbots to office. The result was constant friction between state and church in one country after another.

Economically, the revolt voiced a protest on the part of rulers and subjects alike against the accumulation of riches in the hands of the clergy. The church was a great landed proprietor, owning perhaps a fourth of all the soil of western Europe, and it enjoyed a vast annual income which was constantly swelled by the gifts of the faithful. To princes and nobles, chronically embarrassed for ready money, its wealth offered an opportunity for plunder and confiscation; to the masses, chafing under the payment of tithes, tolls, and dues, its wealth seemed a grave offense. Complaints against the luxury and extravagance of the clergy, especially of the papal court, were never louder than at the beginning of the sixteenth century.

Decline in Papal Prestige

Many of the problems of the church arose out of the decay that had afflicted the prestige of the papacy. At the opening of the thirteenth century the pope had become all-powerful, both in politics and in religion, but in the years that followed that power declined rapidly. The fourteenth century saw the papacy transplanted to Avignon and brought under the influence of the French crown. When there was an attempt to return to Rome, a great schism occurred. There were two popes, one at Rome and one at Avignon, and neither could defend the proud position that had been his heritage. With two popes, the political leaders in Europe could bargain for privileges in exchange for recognition, but the church suffered in the eyes of the world. It did no good for them to fulminate against each other; each new blast weakened the prestige of the papacy itself.

In an effort to cure the evil, a movement was started to appeal to a church council to heal the schism. The first council, held at Pisa in 1409, aggravated matters by electing a third pope who promptly died and was followed by a man of very doubtful reputation, John XXIII. There were now three men who claimed to be the successor of St. Peter. It was a scandal not to be borne any longer. A new council called by the emperor at Constance (1414-1418) finally healed the rift. The new pope, Martin V, received universal recognition.

But the new pope had been created by a council. This introduction of a democratic idea in the constitution of the church fitted ill with the great traditions of the papal monarchy, and it is not surprising that the energies of Martin's successors were devoted to the suppression of the conciliar movement. Eugenius IV had to recognize the councils of Basle (1431-1433) and of Ferrara-Florence (1438-1439), but he succeeded in gaining a victory that re-established papal supremacy. The pressure of the Turks on Constantinople led the Greek church to resume relations with Rome in hope of gaining aid against the Ottoman Turks. The pope managed to carry off the credit for the return of the Eastern schismatics and, with it, new prestige for his office. None the less, the possibility of a renewal of the conciliar movement was the nightmare of every pope after Eugenius in the fifteenth century. Much of the political action of the papal court can be traced to the popes' anxiety over the problem. They became Italian politicians and played the game of high policy to prevent a recurrence of the threat to their monarchical position. They succeeded in retaining the papal monarchy but in doing so they lost much in the opinion of Christian Europe and helped to prepare for the revolt against their rule.

Criticism of the Church


Many and grievous were the abuses in the church when the storm finally broke upon it. There was simony, the buying or selling of ecclesiastical offices; there was pluralism, the holding of two or more offices by one person (we hear of a prelate who held twenty-four, with no duties to perform); and there was nepotism, the bestowal of patronage because of relationship and irrespective of merit. Standards of education for the clergy were deplorably low; priests and monks were sometimes so ignorant that they could not understand or repeat correctly the Latin words of the ritual. Widespread moral corruption prevailed. Priests flaunted the law of celibacy by keeping concubines, and monks, friars, and nuns forgot their vows of chastity. Clerical delinquency in the church at large was perhaps not greater at this time than in earlier centuries, but the laity were now more conscious of it and less tolerant of it.

The spiritual prestige of the papacy had greatly declined when the sixteenth century opened. The "Renaissance popes" were worldly rulers, maintaining splendid courts, collecting manuscripts and works of art, and erecting magnificent palaces in Rome. "Let us enjoy the papacy now that God has given it to us," said Leo X. To pious Christians these popes appeared as before all else Italian princes, more con-


CYCLOTRON
AT THE UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA
(LIFE photograph
by Andreas Feininger.
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PLATE I





SCHOLAR WITH INSTRUMENTS OF NAVIGATION STUDYING SEA ROUTES
TO THE EAST (Bettmann Archive)



cerned with the interests of the States of the Church than with the welfare of the great organization over which they presided. Little or nothing was done by them to bring about that improvement in the lives of the clergy which the age demanded; they themselves were sometimes anything but models of the Christian virtues. The name of the Spaniard, Borgia, who purchased from the College of Cardinals his election to the papacy in 1492 and mounted St. Peter's throne as Alexander VI, has become a byword for iniquity.

All through the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries orthodox, distinguished ecclesiastics had repeatedly urged the crying need of church reform "in head and in members," that is, from the pope and his court downward. They attacked the worldliness of the church as reflected in the lives of many of its officers; they argued that its possessions were its curse. Criticism of this sort was especially common in Germany, France, and England. The many editions of Erasmus's *Praise of Folly* (1511), which showed not only kings and princes but also popes and bishops to be in bondage to folly, testified to the popular demand for a revival of the religious life. Another work, *Letters of Obscure Men* (1515, 1517), written anonymously by a German humanist and his friends, was a biting satire which spared neither priests nor monks. Erasmus and others like him were loyal sons of the church. Some critics went further, however, and demanded wholesale changes in Catholic belief and worship. These men were the heretics.

Heresies and Heretics

The intellectual stagnation which characterized the period following the barbarian invasions was not favorable to independence of thought, and little in the way of heresy disturbed the peace of the church during the Dark Ages. In the twelfth century, however, the rise of several heretical sects testified to the fact that some people were no longer satisfied to accept submissively every article of faith from their teachers, the clergy.

For the church, heresy was the worst of sins and for the state, it was the worst of crimes. The horror which it inspired and the feeling that its extirpation formed a Christian duty are understandable. By putting forth false doctrines the heretic imperiled his own salvation and that of his deluded followers. Granted a complete conviction that persistence in wrong belief entailed for him eternal torments after death, there was logical ground for any course of action which would compel him to recant. If he continued in his impious course, then the earth ought to be rid of one who was a source of danger to the faithful and an enemy

of God. To justify his forcible suppression the church could appeal to the example of the Hebrews, whose laws ordered anyone introducing idolatry or witchcraft to be put to death; it could also appeal to the example of the Athenians, who had put Socrates to death on a charge of impiety.

Executions for heresy occurred as early as the fourth century, but for a long time milder punishments were usually inflicted and then only after a formal trial and condemnation. The heretic might be exiled or imprisoned or deprived of his property and his rights as a citizen. The death penalty was seldom invoked before the thirteenth century. Since ecclesiastical law forbade the church to shed blood, it handed over the heretic to the lay government for punishment, most often death at the stake. He passed "through the transitory flames of this world to the everlasting flames of the next." His execution became a public show, carefully arranged beforehand and attended not only by the rabble but by people of rank and fashion, of intelligence and sensibility. There was no pity for a traitor to the church. When, in the sixteenth century, the victims multiplied, even gentle Erasmus could jest over the rising price of wood. It should be added that in many cases those burned were "relapsed heretics," second offenders who had recanted their recantations.

The first heresy to develop on a large scale during the later Middle Ages was that of the Albigenses, so called from the town of Albi in southwestern France, where many of them lived. Their own name for themselves was Cathari (the "Pure"). The doctrines and practices of the Albigenses are not well known, but they seem to have believed in the existence of two gods — one good, whose son was Christ, and one evil, whose son was Satan. They repudiated the Catholic sacraments and even set up a rival church, with priests, bishops, and councils. The failure of attempts to convert the Albigenses by peaceful means led Pope Innocent III in 1209 to preach a crusade against them. A series of desolating wars followed, in the course of which thousands of men, women, and children perished. "Kill them all, God will know His own," were the orders issued on one occasion when a city of the Albigenses was captured. But they did not entirely disappear for more than a century and only after numberless trials and executions for heresy.

The sect of Waldenses owed its origin to a wealthy citizen of Lyons, Peter Valdes (Waldo), who lived in the twelfth century. Having become convinced that individual ownership of property is contrary to the spirit of Christianity, he gave away all his goods to the needy and took to the preaching of the Gospel as he believed that Jesus and the apostles had preached it. Many men and women, chiefly of the lower

classes, followed his example. A campaign of evangelism began in southern France, spreading thence to Italy, Switzerland, Bohemia, and other European countries. The followers of Valdes made no effort to set up a new religion, as the Albigenses had done, but they denied the papal supremacy and departed widely from the tenets of Catholicism. For them the Scriptures were a sufficient guide to the Christian life, and so they translated the New Testament into Provençal (the first translation into a modern language) and allowed everyone to preach without distinction of age, rank, or sex. The Sermon on the Mount was central in their teaching; complete acceptance of it led them to condemn all warfare, law suits, and the acquisition of wealth. These "Poor Men of Lyons" endured much persecution, but their sect survived and now forms a branch of the Protestant Church in Italy.

Views very similar to those of the Waldenses were entertained by John Wycliffe (1320-1384), master of an Oxford college, a popular preacher, and an eminent scholar. Wycliffe also appealed from the authority of the church to the authority of the Bible. With the assistance of two friends he produced the first English translation of the New Testament and some of his followers did the same for the Old Testament. The work had a wide circulation, as we know from the large number of manuscript copies that have been preserved, but the government finally suppressed it. The time had not yet come when, instead of a Latin Bible interpreted by clerics and friars, there should be an English Bible which all could read and understand. Wycliffe managed to escape persecution, but thirty-one years after his death the Council of Constance denounced his teaching and ordered that his bones should be dug up and burnt, and the ashes cast into a stream. The church would have its way even with dead heretics.

Wycliffe had organized bands of missionaries to spread the "Bible truths" through all England. They went out, staff in hand and clad in long russet gowns, and preached wherever an audience could be found. The Lollards, as they were called, attacked many beliefs and practices of the church such as the doctrine of purgatory, the central mystery of transubstantiation, pilgrimages, and the cult of relics. They also demanded social reforms, declaring, for instance, that all wars were sinful and were but plundering and murdering the poor to win glory for kings. In 1401 the ecclesiastical authorities procured from parliament the passage of a statute for "the burning of heretics," the first English law to punish unorthodoxy with death, and under it the persecution of the Lollards began and long continued. Though driven underground, Lollardry did not disappear. It sowed in England the seeds of the Protestant Revolution.

The writings of Wycliffe early found entrance into Bohemia, where they attracted the attention of Jan Hus (Huss), a professor of philosophy in the University of Prague. Wycliffe's arguments confirmed Hus in his criticism of the clergy, his objections to the papal supremacy, and his assertion of the right of private judgment in religion. The sentence of excommunication pronounced against him did not shake his reforming zeal. Hus was finally cited to appear before the Council of Constance, then in session (1415). Relying on the safe-conduct given to him by the Holy Roman Emperor, he appeared before the council, only to be declared guilty of teaching "many things evil, scandalous, seditious, and dangerously heretical." He refused to recant. The emperor then violated the safe-conduct and allowed Hus to be burnt outside the walls of Constance. His ashes and even the earth on which they lay were thrown into the Rhine; there were to be no relics of the martyr. Yet his ideas could not be blotted out; they were embraced by many Bohemians; and a century later Luther could say, "We are all Hussites without knowing it."

The Revolt in Germany; Luther

Martin Luther (1483-1546) was the son of a German peasant who by industry and frugality had won a small competence. Thanks to his father's self-sacrifice, Luther received a good education in scholastic philosophy at the University of Erfurt, at that time the most celebrated of German institutions of learning. He took the degrees of bachelor and master of arts and began to study law, but an acute sense of his sinfulness and a desire to save his soul soon drove him into a monastery of the Augustinian monks. There he began theological studies in preparation for his ordination as priest, which occurred in 1507. A few years later he visited Rome, only to be shocked by the general laxity of life in the capital of the papacy. He returned to Germany and became a professor of Biblical literature in the University of Wittenberg, newly founded by Frederick the Wise, elector of Saxony. Luther's lectures and sermons attracted large audiences; students began to flock to Wittenberg; and the elector grew proud of the youthful teacher who was making his university famous.

Luther was soon to emerge from academic retirement and to become, quite unintentionally, a reformer. In 1517 there came into the neighborhood of Wittenberg a Dominican friar named Tetzel, distributing indulgences offered a few years previously by Pope Julius II, who had undertaken to rebuild St. Peter's at Rome on the site where the medieval church had stood. An indulgence is a remission of some or all of the

penalties, such as fastings or special devotions, imposed by a priest upon one who has confessed his sins and received absolution — the sacrament of penance. The ability of the church to remit penalties of its own imposition is unquestioned. The church, by Luther's time, also claimed the power of remitting through the indulgence system the penalties imposed on sinners in purgatory. One might obtain an indulgence for his own future benefit, so to speak, or for the souls of friends or relatives already suffering purgatorial fires. Indulgences were granted to crusaders and pilgrims and also to those who made contributions for some pious object. They brought large sums into the papal treasury. Many German princes opposed this method of raising funds, because it took so much money out of their dominions. Hus, Erasmus, and others had also condemned it on religious grounds. Common people who could not understand the Latin in which indulgences were written often believed that they wiped away the penalties of sin, even without true repentance.

Luther likewise pointed out that indulgences lent themselves to grave abuses when distributed by "pardon preachers" with a strong interest in the size of the contribution received. He went further, however, and asserted that penalties imposed by the church come to an end with death and hence that the pope had no power to release souls from purgatory; God alone could do that. These and other criticisms he set forth in ninety-five propositions ("theses") composed in Latin. He posted the theses on the door of the castle church of Wittenberg, the usual place for university notices. In accordance with the custom of medieval scholars, he offered to defend them against all opponents in a public discussion. This did not take place, but the theses, when translated into German and printed, were widely read and generally applauded. Their effect was so great that before long the disposal of indulgences in Germany almost ceased.

Publication of the theses aroused a storm of controversy. The Dominicans hotly resented an attack upon one of their own order and Luther as hotly defended himself; he shone as a disputant. Having denied the papal authority as regards indulgences, he soon began to deny it altogether — the position of the heretic Hus, with whose views he now became familiar. In a pamphlet addressed to the "Christian nobility of the German nation" he called upon the princes and nobles to set up a national church free from control by Rome. The pope, Leo X, had paid little attention at first to the indulgence controversy, declaring it a mere "squabble of monks," but in 1520 he issued a bull which condemned Luther's theological views and gave him sixty days within which to make a recantation. Failing compliance, he and his

adherents were to be excommunicated and treated as heretics. This ecclesiastical thunder did not frighten Luther or withdraw from him popular support. He burnt the bull, together with various writings of his opponents and the volumes of the canon law, in the market square of Wittenberg before a concourse of students and townsfolk. The dramatic action stirred all Germany.

The next scene of the church quarrel was staged at Worms in 1521 before an assembly, or Diet, of the Holy Roman Empire. Luther was summoned to appear before the Diet for examination, and the emperor Charles V (Charles I of Spain) gave him a safe-conduct. Luther's friends, remembering the treatment of Hus, advised him not to accept the summons, but he declared that he would go, even "though there were as many devils at Worms as tiles on the house-roofs." He did go and before the assembled princes and prelates refused to retract anything he had said or written, unless his statements could be shown to be contrary to Scripture or to "right reason."

The Diet passed, and Charles V signed, an edict proclaiming Luther a heretic and an outlaw, but Frederick the Wise had him spirited away to the electoral castle of the Wartburg, overlooking Eisenach. Here Luther remained in seclusion for nearly a year, engaged upon a translation of the New Testament into German. His masterly version was the first to be made from the Greek (he used the text as edited by Erasmus); later he also translated the Old Testament from the Hebrew. Though still under the ban of the empire, Luther now returned to Wittenberg and henceforth devoted himself to the reformatory movement, which had assumed the proportions of a revolution.

The movement made a wide appeal. To patriotic Germans it seemed a revolt against foreign powers — on the one side the pope, and on the other side the Holy Roman emperor Charles V, who, though a foreigner, half Fleming and half Spaniard, had just been elected to the imperial dignity. Men of pious mind found in the movement the attractions of an apparently simple faith based on the Bible. The princes and nobles saw in it an opportunity to despoil the church of lands and revenues. Luther's teachings met general acceptance in most parts of northern and central Germany, but southern Germany did not fall away from the pope and has remained Roman Catholic to the present time. Lutheranism also became the official religion of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, whose rulers closed the monasteries and compelled the bishops to surrender ecclesiastical property to the government. Iceland, likewise, became Lutheran.

The Peace of Augsburg

The young man who as Holy Roman Emperor presided at the Diet of Worms had assumed the imperial crown only two years previously. A namesake of Charlemagne, Charles V held sway over dominions even more extensive than those of the Frankish ruler. Through his mother, a daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella, he inherited Spain, the kingdom of Naples and Sicily (the Two Sicilies), and the Spanish colonial empire. Through his father he received the Netherlands and the Hapsburg realm in central Europe. Charles as a devout Roman Catholic felt no sympathy for the Lutheran heresy, and at Worms had declared his determination to suppress it, if necessary by a new crusade. But Charles was not to have a free hand with which to deal with the heretics in north Germany. His rule in Europe was challenged by the French king, Francis I, in alliance with the pope and the Ottoman sultan, Suleiman, as well as by the princes of Germany. The Turkish danger was the greatest of these three for not only did the Ottoman troops overrun Hungary and threaten to engulf central Europe, but also the Turkish vassals in North Africa, half pirates, half religious fanatics, swept the Mediterranean Sea and challenged Spanish control over the coasts of Italy and Spain. When Francis I made a treaty of alliance with these Moslem conquerors (1536), Charles' position was dangerous indeed.

The princes in north Germany were not slow to take advantage of the emperor's embarrassment. Their great fear was that he might extend the unifying process in Germany that the Hapsburgs had started in the preceding century. They saw what had happened to the great barons in France and elsewhere when the power of the king grew at their expense. If the German crown could have effected that unifying process, the German princes would have lost their sovereign power. The religious revolt gave them a weapon against this process. Not only did it allow the prince to confiscate the wealth of the church but also, because of Luther's doctrine, it allowed the prince to concentrate upon his person the spiritual loyalties of his subjects. In the sixteenth century religious loyalty was a means of social control similar to the national loyalties of our own day. Thus economics and politics joined hands to make the reformed religion attractive to the princes while the international picture made the emperor's intervention difficult. The Lutheran princes formed an alliance, the Schmalkaldic League, to defend their interests against the emperor's military pressure.

For over twenty years Charles had to put off any action against the Lutherans. Several times he was ready to send an army into Germany only to find that he had to make concessions to secure the aid of the

Lutheran princes against his other enemies in Europe. On one occasion his armies were used to besiege Rome itself rather than to put down the heresy. This period of enforced peace gave the heresy a chance to establish itself firmly in the institutional life of Germany, but in those twenty years Lutheranism lost much of its earlier revolutionary vigor. Luther identified his movement with the princes and the nobility; when the peasants, animated by religious and economic zeal, also tried to revolt, Luther condemned them bitterly and preached a crusade against them. By 1540 Lutheranism had made its conquests and had ceased to expand the area under its control.

By 1546 Charles had momentarily settled his difficulties with France and the Turks, and was finally ready to overthrow German Protestantism. With a Spanish army he entered Germany and in a great battle broke the Schmalkaldic League (1547). The Kurfurst of Saxony and the Landgraf of Hesse, leaders of the Protestants, were taken prisoners, and all Germany seemed about to be forced to submit to the imperial will. Charles hoped to heal the breach in the church by a council and to bring Germany to submit. The presence of Spanish troops, however, aroused fears among Catholic as well as Protestant princes that Charles would use his newly won position to overthrow German liberties and the federal constitution of the Holy Roman Empire. The pope, on his part, feared a church council as a return to the period when the papal monarchy was weak. To add to the difficulties, in 1551 the Turkish war reopened and forced the emperor to turn his attention southward. By 1552 Charles was again in serious trouble in Germany; he was at odds with the pope. The German princes had made a treaty with Henry II of France, and the Turks were again pressing his flanks. He had to withdraw hurriedly from Germany, and the fruits of his victory over the Schmalkaldic League were lost.

The struggle between the imperial forces and a league of Lutheran princes was ended in 1555 by the religious Peace of Augsburg. This was a compromise recognizing both Catholicism and Lutheranism as religions in Germany, but expressly excluding from its provisions persons who did not belong to the one or the other. The ruler of each state — Germany then contained over three hundred states, great and small — was to decide whether his subjects should be Catholics or Lutherans. Since emigration was allowed, those subjects who refused to accept the religion of their prince could move to the nearest state where their own faith prevailed. Faggot and stake as instruments of persuasion were abolished. Lutherans thus obtained security against persecution; Catholics gained nothing, since Lutherans had never put

them to death. While the Peace of Augsburg failed to establish complete religious toleration, it marked a step in that direction.

The Revolt in Switzerland; Zwingli and Calvin

Switzerland, at the opening of the sixteenth century, was a confederation of thirteen cantons practically independent of the empire. A real home of political liberty, it contained plenty of fuel for the spark which Luther had lighted. Religious agitation began there with Huldreich Zwingli (1484-1531), a humanist and a powerful preacher. Luther's writings became known to him and doubtless influenced him, though he never acknowledged the German reformer as his master. From the pulpit of the cathedral of Zurich he proclaimed the Scriptures as the sole guide of life and repudiated the claims of the papacy and the church. The Swiss cantons which accepted his teaching were soon at war with those which remained attached to Rome, and Zwingli fell in the struggle. When peace was made, each canton was allowed the choice of its own faith. Switzerland then divided religiously, with Catholicism mainly in the mountain regions and Protestantism in the towns and cities.

John Calvin (1509-1564), a Frenchman who settled in Geneva, made that city the "Protestant Rome." He was a lawyer by training, a moralist by disposition, and an able writer. His *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, first issued in 1536, set forth in an orderly, logical manner the main principles of Protestant thought, much as St. Thomas Aquinas three centuries previously had constructed a systematic theology for Roman Catholicism. Calvin also translated the Bible into French and wrote commentaries on nearly all the scriptural books. Convinced that the new religion could never hold its ground without an instructed ministry, he established at Geneva an academy (later transformed into a university), which attracted students from distant lands. And as Luther had done, he prepared a catechism so that even little children might be able to give reasons for their faith.


Calvin's influence was not confined to Geneva. The ministers whom he trained and on whom he set the stamp of his stern, earnest character, spread Calvinism over a great part of western Europe. In French-speaking Switzerland, in Holland, and in Scotland it became the prevailing type of Protestantism, and in France and England it deeply affected the national life. English Puritans in the seventeenth century carried Calvinism to New England, where it became the dominant form of Protestantism in colonial times.

The Revolt in England; Anglicanism

The separation of England from the papacy was the work of Henry VIII, the second king of the Tudor dynasty. His father, Henry VII, had put down the nobles and had created a strong monarchy supported by the middle class. There remained only one serious obstacle to the establishment of autocratic rule — the Roman Church. Henry showed himself at first a devoted Catholic, taking an amateur's interest in theology and writing with his own royal pen a treatise in refutation of Luther. The pope rewarded him with the title of *Fidei Defensor*, a title still borne by English sovereigns. Henry also chose as his chief adviser Cardinal Wolsey, the most distinguished ecclesiastic in the kingdom. The church at this time appeared still strong in England, though Wycliffe and the Lollards had lessened its hold upon the masses and Erasmus, Colet, and other humanists, by their criticism of ecclesiastical abuses, had begun to undermine its influence with the intellectual classes. In England as on the Continent the worldliness of the church prepared the way for a revolt against the church.

The break with Rome resulted from Henry's matrimonial difficulties. He had married a Spanish princess, Catherine of Aragón, the aunt of Charles V and the widow of Henry's older brother. The marriage required a dispensation from the pope, since canon law forbade a man to wed his brother's widow. After living with Catherine for eighteen years, Henry suddenly announced his conviction that the union was sinful and that a divorce (more accurately a decree of nullity) should be granted him. The king had grown tired of Catherine and had fallen in love with Anne Boleyn, a pretty maid-in-waiting at the court. He might perhaps have made her his mistress, in accordance with royal custom, but he wanted a legitimate son as heir, and of his children by Catherine only a daughter survived. Henry tried at first to secure papal consent to a divorce; the pope, however, did not like to set aside the dispensation granted by his predecessor nor did he wish to offend the mighty Holy Roman Emperor. Henry finally obtained the divorce from an English court presided over by Thomas Cranmer, archbishop of Canterbury. Anne Boleyn was then proclaimed queen, in defiance of the pope's bull of excommunication.

Henry's next step was to procure from his subservient parliament a series of laws abolishing the pope's authority in England. An Act of Supremacy in 1534 declared the English king to be "the only supreme head on earth of the Church of England." Another law imposed the death penalty on anyone who called the king a "heretic, schismatic, tyrant, infidel, or usurper." The suppression of the monastic estab-



Extent of the Protestant Revolt (1524-1572)

ishments came next. Henry declared to parliament that they deserved to be suppressed because of the "slothful and ungodly" lives of their inmates. How far the accusation was true is a vexed question; the fact that the monks supported the pope and had great possessions perhaps sufficiently accounts for the king's attitude toward them. The work of spoliation was well done. All things movable in the monasteries were taken away and only their walls left to serve as a quarry for the neighborhood. The monastic lands went to the king, who sold or leased them, at much less than their real value, to his favorites. The nobles who accepted this wealth became ardent supporters of Henry's anti-papal policy. The "Defender of the Faith" introduced no doctrinal changes, and at his death (1547) England was still attached, theologically, to Rome.

Henry was married six times. Jane Seymour, his third wife, was the mother of his only son, who at the age of ten years mounted the throne in 1547 as Edward VI. The king's guardians, Protestant in sympathies, allowed reformers from the Continent to enter England and spread

there the ideas of Zwingli and Calvin. In order that religious services might be conducted in the vernacular, Archbishop Cranmer and his co-workers prepared the *Book of Common Prayer*, partly by translating old Latin service books. The noble prose of this book is one of the monuments of English literature.

The accession (1553) of Mary, Henry's daughter by Catherine of Aragón, was followed by a return to the bosom of the church. Mary prevailed on parliament to secure a reconciliation with Rome, and she also married her Roman Catholic cousin, Philip of Spain, the son of Charles V. "Bloody" Mary persecuted heretics, nearly three hundred being burnt during her short reign, but did not succeed in stamping out heresy. She died childless (1558), and the throne passed to Elizabeth. The daughter of Anne Boleyn had been born under the ban of the pope, so that opposition to Rome and to Catholicism was the natural course for her to pursue. Parliamentary statutes now separated England once more from the papacy and gave to the Anglican Church the organization, ritual, and doctrines which it still retains. The church was intended to include everyone in England, and hence all persons were required to attend its services on Sundays and holidays. Refusal to do so was punished by the imposition of a fine. Liberty of public worship was denied to Catholics and to Protestant dissenters from Anglicanism.

Protestant Denominations

Lutheranism, Calvinism, and Anglicanism were the main varieties of Protestantism which appeared in the sixteenth century. They had several features in common. First, they were all national churches, becoming in each country where Protestantism triumphed what the Roman Church had been for all western Europe, politically powerful, wealthy, and intolerant of dissent. Protestantism thus took over unchanged the Catholic conception of the union of church and state. Second, they were all churches whose members claimed for themselves the right of private judgment in religion. Both Catholicism and Protestantism relied fundamentally on the Bible; for both it was the inspired, infallible authority in matters of faith and morals; but whereas Catholicism left the interpretation of Scripture to pope and council, Protestantism proclaimed the "universal priesthood" of Christian believers. Man was ushered, as it were, straight into the presence of his Maker, without the interposition of priests. The church formed no longer the only road to salvation, the only gate of heaven. While asserting the right of private judgment in religion, Protestants felt it necessary to prepare catechisms and articles of faith which prescribed how Scrip-

ture must be interpreted and which possessed, therefore, an authority superior to Scripture. Protestantism thus did exactly what Catholicism had always done: it kept the human intellect in fetters. Third, all these churches tried to restore what was considered to be the original form of Christianity in its simplicity and purity. Hence they rejected as medieval distortions a great mass of doctrines and practices — purgatory and prayers for the dead, some of the sacraments, particularly penance and extreme unction, images, invocation of saints, devotion to the Virgin Mary, the cult of relics, indulgences, pilgrimages, the monastic system, priestly celibacy, most of the saints' days, and, of course, the primacy of St. Peter and of the popes, his assumed successors. Catholics hold that some of these doctrines and practices, for instance the sacraments and the Petrine supremacy, really date from the age of the early church; as for the others, such as images and veneration of saints, these are regarded as a legitimate development of New Testament religion. Lastly, in all the churches worship was conducted in the vernacular languages instead of in Latin, while preaching and Bible-reading held a place of greater importance than had been assigned to them in the Catholic service during medieval times.

Both Lutheranism and Anglicanism had books of common prayer; both recognized the rites of baptism, confirmation, and matrimony; and both kept the Eucharist, though not the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation. The Church of England likewise retained the rite of ordination. The Anglicans and the Lutherans in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden preserved the episcopate. German Lutherans had "superintendents" instead of bishops.

Calvinism abolished the episcopate and had only teaching elders, the presbyters or ministers. Churches governed by bodies of elders were called Presbyterian; churches which allowed each congregation self-government were called Congregational. While Luther, a conservative reformer, had kept those elements of the medieval church which had seemed to him not repugnant to Scripture, the more radical Calvin abolished everything that found no express warrant in Scripture, such as images, vestments, organs, bells, and candles. Worship in a Calvinistic church was a simple service of Bible-reading, extemporaneous prayer, a sermon (often of great length), and hymns sung by the congregation. The Calvinists retained infant baptism, but only as an undertaking to bring up a child in a Christian manner, while the Eucharist, stripped of its miraculous nature, became for them merely a commemoration of the Last Supper.

In opposition to the Catholic doctrine that salvation is won by faith and "good works" done in accordance with the directions of the

church, Luther and those who followed him declared that faith alone is efficacious to salvation and that everyone who believes sincerely in Christ and tries to do Christ's will may be saved. This was the doctrine of justification by faith. Calvin held that only those persons can be saved who are predestined or elected by God to be saved. "We give the name predestination," said Calvin, "to the eternal decree of God by which he decided for himself what should become of every individual man. For men are not all created in the same condition. To some eternal life is preordained, and to others eternal damnation." If, as a result of Adam's fall, all men come into the world totally depraved, then only those can be saved upon whom divine grace is bestowed. Therefore God must deliberately select some persons as recipients of divine grace and as deliberately reject others, who are doomed to spiritual death. While retained in the creeds of Calvinistic churches, the doctrine of predestination is less emphasized today, largely because for modern theologians God is no longer an arbitrary sovereign who created man solely for his own glorification and self-exaltation.

Protestant Sects

In addition to the great Protestant denominations, the religious upheavals of the sixteenth century produced various smaller groups departing more radically from Catholic tradition; these may be described as sects. Such were the Anabaptists, who demanded that Christians should be rebaptized because Jesus had been baptized as an adult. Baptism, they held, was meaningless when administered to an infant. In Catholic and Protestant lands alike the sect endured severe persecution. It combined, to some extent, with the sect of Socinians, founded by an Italian humanist, Socinus (Sozzini). The Socinians were forerunners of the Unitarians, some of whom denied the divinity of Christ.

The Catholic Reformation

Luther "saved the church" by dividing it. There is truth in this generalization; the rapid spread of Protestantism spurred the church to put its house in order and perhaps to undertake a more thorough renovation than would otherwise have occurred. But the movement was only in part a counterreform, a mere reply to the Protestant challenge. Long before Luther posted his theses, Catholics in Italy and Spain were working for a betterment of clerical morality and a revival of clerical piety. The "Renaissance popes" had not seconded their efforts or those of church councils to amend even the most glaring abuses. With

the accession of Paul III in 1534 a change came, and the papacy turned from the cultivation of art and literature to the defense of the Catholic faith. The pope opened the cardinalate to ecclesiastics distinguished for virtue and learning (he even offered a red hat to Erasmus) and appointed a committee of cardinals to investigate conditions in the church. Its report, published a few years later, was an extensive program of reformation. Paul III also gave his sanction in 1540 to the Society of Jesus, which had been established in the year of his accession to the papal throne.

The Society of Jesus

The founder of this organization was a Spanish nobleman, best known by his Latin name (St.) Ignatius Loyola. He had seen a good deal of service in the wars of Charles V, but while recuperating from a wound his heart and mind turned to religion. He read devotional books, donned a beggar's robe, practiced austerities, and went on a pilgrimage to the Holy Land. Later he became a student of theology at Paris and there met the six young men who became the first members of his society. They intended to work as missionaries among Moslems, but when the plan fell through, they visited Rome and placed their energy and enthusiasm at the disposal of the pope. Loyola's military training deeply affected the character of the new order. The Jesuits, as Protestants called them, formed an army of spiritual soldiers, living under the strictest obedience to their head, or general, and through him to the pope. They were employed for the most difficult and dangerous tasks; they were the "shock troops" of the papacy. The society grew rapidly; before Loyola's death it included nearly a thousand members and in the seventeenth century it became the most influential of all the religious orders.

The Jesuits did much to roll back the rising tide of Protestantism in Europe and spread the Catholic faith among the heathen. As preachers, they reached the masses. As confessors, they served as spiritual (and political) advisers to princes and monarchs. As teachers, they raised up a body of virtuous, educated, and active priests; their schools were "fortresses of the faith." As missionaries, they worked with success in Poland, Hungary, Bohemia, and other countries where Protestantism threatened to become dominant, and then invaded the lands which the great maritime discoveries had laid open to European enterprise. In India, China, the East Indies, the Philippines, Africa, and the two Americas they made innumerable converts. In the seventeenth century the vast missionary operations of the church throughout the world were brought under a central direction at Rome.

Council of Trent

Paul III convened a general council of the church, the most important since that of Nicaea in the fourth century and the last to be held until late in the nineteenth century. It met at Trent, on the borders of Germany and Italy, and continued, with intermissions, for nearly twenty years (1545-1563). The members were mainly Italian and Spanish prelates, who voted as the pope pleased, so that the outcome of their deliberations was a great strengthening of the papal power. The council made no essential changes in Roman Catholic doctrines, which remained as St. Thomas Aquinas and other theologians had set them forth in the Middle Ages. It declared that the tradition of the church possessed equal authority with the Bible and reaffirmed the supremacy of the pope over Christendom. Its decrees corrected a multitude of abuses which both Catholic reformers and Protestants had condemned. The sale of ecclesiastical offices was forbidden, bishops and priests were required to attend more strictly to their duties, indulgences were not to be offered for money, and greater emphasis was placed on Bible-reading in the schools and on preaching in the churches.

No representatives of the Protestants took part in the deliberations of the Council of Trent, and nothing was done to bring them back within the fold of the church. Nothing could have been done, for the differences between them and the Catholics were irreconcilable. Catholics would not abandon the principle of authority in religion; to Protestants the right of private judgment seemed equally fundamental. The breach between the two now became as definite as that between Rome and the Greek Church five hundred years previously. While Rome, however, regards the Greek Church as schismatic but not heretical, she regards the Protestant churches as both schismatic and heretical. Protestants admit the schism; they do not admit the heresy.


The Index and the Inquisition

The council, before adjourning, authorized the pope to draw up a list of works prohibited to Catholics. Literary censorship did not form an innovation, for the church from an early day had condemned and destroyed heretical writings. The invention of printing, which gave wider currency to ideas considered dangerous, seemed to increase the necessity of controlling what people read. The "Index of Prohibited Books" still exists, and additions to it are made from time to time. It was matched by the strict censorship of printing long maintained in Protestant countries.

Still another agency of the Catholic Reformation was the establishment, under papal direction, of the Holy Office of the Inquisition for the suppression of heresy. This, again, did not form an innovation. In the thirteenth century one of the popes had set up inquisitorial courts. The judges were generally Dominican friars, whose zeal in ferreting out and punishing the unorthodox led to their popular designation of "Dogs of the Lord" (*Domini canes*). Their work was carried on almost everywhere in western Europe save in Scandinavia and England. The secrecy which veiled the investigation of heresy, the failure to provide the accused with legal counsel, and the use of torture to extract confessions gave to these inquisitorial courts an evil name which was fully deserved; it can only be said in palliation that the secular administration of justice was also cruel and barbarous throughout the Middle Ages. Still more terrible was the Spanish Inquisition, established by Ferdinand and Isabella. The dread tribunal found much to do, judging from the number of people fined, imprisoned, or executed by it during the earlier years of its existence in Spain. The papal Inquisition of the sixteenth century operated only in Italy. It operated with such success that Protestant dissent became a rare phenomenon in that country.

The Drive of the Catholic Reformation

In the years following the Council of Trent the Roman Church entered a period of aggressive counterattack against the reformed religion. The old church had numerous advantages in this battle. In the first place the power of Spain, backed up by the gold from the New World, spearheaded the attack. Charles V abdicated his Spanish crown and sought repose in a monastery. His son, Philip, was sincerely convinced that his mission in life was to restore the church in Europe to the position of honor and respect it had traditionally enjoyed. Thus the armies and the navy of Spain were at the disposal of the Catholic Reformation. That was on the military and political side of the picture; on the other side, religious and personal, the church also made important conquests. Relying upon the powerful effect of good works and spiritual comfort, it multiplied the number of orders of monks and nuns whose works of charity and preaching re-activated the faith and devotion which had been the strength of the Roman Church throughout the Middle Ages. Other orders opened schools for the training of men of affairs as well as clergymen so that a new generation of actively aggressive Catholic youths appeared on the scene at the end of the sixteenth century.



Religions of Europe about 1648

The reform of the papacy beginning with Paul III, who came to the papal throne in 1534, changed the worldly court of the Renaissance popes beyond recognition. New cardinals were appointed to the Sacred College because of their piety or their learning, and the old semipagan atmosphere of the court of a Julius II became austere, saintly, and learned. The popes, however, recognized the impossibility of rowing against the stream of the political life of Europe. They still maintained as the teaching of the church that the pope was a power above the temporal princes and that he could remove an unworthy man from the throne; but in practice they recognized that it was only by close political association with the princes, and, ultimately, recognition of each prince's right to political control over the church within his frontiers, that they could keep their hold upon the conscience of Europe. This association was not always beneficial to the church, but it did keep the virus of religious revolt from infecting what remained of Catholic Europe and provided a talking point for the conversion of Protestant princes in Germany.

III

The End of the Medieval Synthesis

The Rise of the Prince

THE medieval synthesis reached its fullest expression in the thirteenth century but before that century was over, signs of a rapid disintegration could be seen. The Holy Roman Empire, as a universal empire, disappeared; what was left became associated with the German crown and, properly, was no more than the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation even though there were subsequent emperors who pretended to the old glories. The papacy, too, lost prestige after Innocent III, and in the next century as a result of internal confusion within the church, could no longer aspire to its role as arbiter of Europe. In the vacuum left by these institutions the secular rulers established their power. The kingdoms of France, England, Spain, Portugal, Scotland, and Denmark, as well as many of the lesser princes in Germany, assumed more and more independence toward the twin officers of Christendom, pope and emperor, and at the same time undermined the position of their own vassals, the quasi-independent feudal barons. By the opening of the sixteenth century, the stage was set for the emergence of a new political order.

The kings were able to enlarge upon the powers allotted to them by the feudal contract as much because of changing conditions of power as because of the disintegration of the imperial and papal authorities. The growth of commerce in the later Middle Ages had created a town-dwelling, merchant class, whose interests, like those of the kings, were opposed to those of the feudal nobility. This "third estate" in parliaments or diets voted money and power to kings in return for royal attacks against the baronial impositions upon trade. At the same time changes in the art of warfare that brought foot soldiers with bows and arrows or pikes on the battlefield to challenge the feudal cavalry, and cannon to batter down the feudal castle walls, made this money count

heavily in political life. The *taille*, granted to the French kings as an emergency war tax by the States-General, became a gold mine for the royal treasury that brought soldiers from Switzerland, Scotland, and Germany to fight against the great ones in France and forced the country to submit to the royal will.

The geographical discoveries and the commercial expansion accelerated the process of state building. The medieval units were too small and too parochial in their outlook to meet the needs of the new economic system that emerged with the extension of the markets and the commercial revolution that moved the economic center of gravity from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic and the North Sea. The state, rather than a commercial city, became the politico-economic unit, and princes began to concentrate all their efforts toward the molding of the economic forces within their territory into a single unit. The program that we later shall designate by the loose term of mercantilism, was well marked out by these sixteenth-century monarchs, whose aim was to make their kingdoms independent of foreign goods at the same time that they tried to stimulate exports so that foreigners would have to send them gold and silver to pay for purchases. The exploitation of the mines in the New World assisted them in their efforts by providing gold and silver in abundance with which to lubricate the wheels of trade. At the same time this treasure brought about an inflation of European prices and impoverished the feudal nobility that had come to depend upon fixed monetary incomes. By undermining their economic position, the inflation forced them into a position of dependency upon the kings.

The Protestant revolt and the creation of national churches also aided the process of state building. The religious movement in Protestant Europe cut the lines between the Church Universal and the territory ruled by the king. This broke the most important bond in the medieval synthesis of a united Europe. Religion provided loyalties, and when religious as well as secular loyalty could be concentrated in the person of the ruler, the new state was well on its way to becoming a reality in the political life of Europe. In Catholic countries the sixteenth century saw the development of concordats or treaties between the pope and the king that brought the church's affairs into the king's hands. The popes were happy to work closely with princes so that the shadowy political power that went with their religious interests could be retained. In effect they gave the Catholic princes practically all the advantages that state churches gave to the Protestant and Reformed rulers.

The rise and development of the vernacular languages as vehicles for

literary as well as official expression also contributed to the power of the princes. The cultural empire of Latin went down to defeat at the same time that the spiritual and political empire of the pope and the emperor ceased to play the part it had acquired in the medieval world. A kind of nationalism, loyalty to king and country, was breaking up universalism. The unity of Christendom was disintegrating into the particularisms that were to dominate the modern world. In the emerging states the kings and their ministers were developing complexes of power in competition with each other: they expected loyalty and obedience from their subjects so they could present a united front to the world.

Machiavelli, a shrewd observer of the spirit of his age, proclaimed the maxim, "The state is an end in itself and owes allegiance to no law other than that of its own interests." This became the basic rule of princes in dealing with their own subjects or with other princes. Machiavelli provided them with a handbook, well illustrated and carefully documented, to assist them in translating his words into action. When the Middle Ages were quite gone and the modern world well established (c. 1648), Europe was divided into a group of states, some large, some small, living together in a condition of anarchy only slightly mitigated by a body of practice called international law.

Absolutism and Divine Right

The sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries are often called the age of absolutism; they might more accurately be called the age of consolidation of power in the hands of centralized governments. With the aid of the church and the third estate these governments had triumphed over the great lords, who in former days so often rivaled them in power and dignity. Feudal knights could not keep the field against their professional soldiers equipped with hand firearms; feudal castles could not hold out against their new artillery. Royal wealth grew apace with the development of state taxation, and the increase of commerce poured riches into their treasuries. At length they found it possible to dispense with their former allies and rarely summoned in session such national assemblies as the English parliament, the French States-General, and the Spanish Cortes. France, Spain, Portugal, the Two Sicilies, the Scandinavian countries, Austria and its dependencies, and most of the smaller states of Germany and North Italy into which the Holy Roman Empire had disintegrated were absolute monarchies. The only exceptions comprised the old republics of Genoa, Venice, and San Marino; the more recent confederacies of Switzerland and Holland; Poland, which was ruled nominally by a king but really by the nobles.

Of these states only Holland, which ended by accepting a strong central authority under a king, and Switzerland, where the mountain fastnesses and the martial habits of the nation acted as guarantees of freedom, were able to survive as effective political organisms. In England, after more than a century of Tudor and Stuart rule, two revolutions forced the king to share his authority with parliament but in no way did they slow up or reverse the process of centralization of power.

It is only natural that a political theory should accompany this political process. The fact that it was the king that acted as the centralizing agent inevitably concentrated the attention of the theorists upon the royal person. The additional fact that he had to establish his position in face of the pretensions of the papal authority, probably made it inevitable that the theorists should appeal to divine right for his authority. There was good precedent for basing the king's power upon God's will. Many primitive tribes regard their chiefs as holy men and give to them the control of peace and war, of life and death. Some Oriental rulers in antiquity bore a sacred character: the Chinese emperor was the "Son of Heaven" and the Egyptian Pharaoh was the "Son of the Sun." The Graeco-Macedonian kings of the Near East and the Roman emperors received divine honors from their subjects even in their lifetime. An element of sanctity also attached to medieval sovereigns, who, like the Hebrew monarchs, were the Lord's anointed. The "divinity that doth hedge a king" became in time so pronounced that he was believed to be able to cure some diseases by his simple touch, and in England and France touching for the King's Evil (scrofula) was one of the obligations of a monarch toward his afflicted people. This magical ceremony survived in England until the eighteenth century and in France until the nineteenth century. So long-lived may be a superstition.

Kings, then, were not men of common clay. With the growth of royal absolutism it was natural to draw the conclusion that they ruled by divine right and that their subjects had no other duty than passive obedience to them. To the tyranny of a king subjects might oppose respectful remonstrances and prayers for his change of heart; if these proved unavailing, nothing remained except "to give thanks for the evil which the king neglected to do." Revolt against him was unthinkable. A king, indeed, ought not to be a tyrant, but he could be one with perfect security. The theory of divine right was sometimes advanced in the later Middle Ages, for instance, by the reformer Wycliffe. The church always denied it and maintained that the pope, as the superior of every secular sovereign, could depose a king or even an emperor who failed to do justice and rule righteously. The theory gained a new importance after the Protestant Revolt, when kings were

reigning in defiance of the papacy. One of them, James I of England, summed it up neatly in a Latin epigram: *a deo rex, a rege lex* — "the king is from God, and law from the king."

These kings by divine right also made pretenses to absolute power. It is perfectly true that they could and did exercise controls over their subjects which would appear tyrannical today, but on the other hand it is also true that a modern government has powers undreamed of by these apostles of absolutism. The kings could bring their subjects before prejudiced courts, they could deny religious and political liberties, they could censor publications and imprison authors, but despite all these autocratic powers they could not make a fundamental reform in the taxation system or easily invade chartered rights that had been granted by their predecessors. These absolute kings lived in a contractual society in which provinces and classes rather than individuals held rights against the monarch. Their despotism was limited by these contracts, which formed the basic constitutions of their states. No absolute monarch could have reached into the pocketbooks of his subjects for money or into their homes for soldiers with the assurance of a twentieth-century government; but they could imprison the subject and punish him for his opinions as no liberal regime can do in our day. To identify their power with that of a modern dictator, however, is to misunderstand the limits of absolutism in the Old Regime.

International relations also were greatly influenced by the concept of divine right. If God were responsible for establishing a ruler on his throne, then a war of avowed conquest was obviously blasphemous. This fiction did not prevent an ambitious ruler from desiring to extend his realm or to round out its strategic frontiers. In our day the myth of nationalism has provided a moral basis for conquest; in those days inheritance or claims to inheritance gave right to conquest. In our day traditional boundary lines have been altered to conform to nationalistic principles or strategic necessity; in those days the great powers used dynastic claims as the basis for the same sort of alterations. Even a bare-faced steal like the annexation of Silesia by Frederick II of Prussia was buttressed by claims of inheritance. The partition of Poland in the late eighteenth century was the first great departure from the rule. That is what made it so shocking to men who had not seen the politics of a later age.

Divine right and royal absolutism were the slogans that allowed the princes of Europe to create the modern states system. Before the eighteenth century was over, grave doubts about the role of God in society and His support of the kings made men look for new right upon which to base authority. The problem of the right to rule, in distinction from

the power to rule, was to trouble the philosophers of every generation that has followed the collapse of the theory of divine right.


The Hegemony of Spain

The sixteenth century saw the first of a series of attempts to bring Europe back to the unity it had lost by the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire. The Spanish made the first; the French made the next; in our times the Germans made their bid and also lost. In many ways Spain was in an excellent position to bring unity to Europe and to re-establish the authority of a universal empire greater than that ruled by Charlemagne. The Hapsburgs, by an extremely fortunate series of marriages, had succeeded in inheriting half of Europe. Spain, most of Italy, the old Hapsburg complex on the Danube including both Bohemia and Hungary, the Netherlands, the Burgundian inheritance, and the crown of the Holy Roman Empire — all were concentrated in the hands of Charles V. Although his aunt married the king of England (Henry VIII), and his son Philip married one of her queens (Mary), England, Valois France, and the Protestant German princes of the Empire eluded his rule. Furthermore he was backed by gold from the New World and the trade of a colonial empire upon which the “sun never set.”

As we have seen, however, he met three vigorous enemies: the Ottoman Turks, the Valois kings of France, and the North German princes. To these was added a fourth, the pope, whose interests often led him unwillingly to join hands with the “infidel” in the East and the “heretics” in the North to block the schemes of the emperor, whose rise to power might well have reduced the pope to the role of imperial chaplain. Charles was forced to fight war after war in the thirty-odd years of his reign, and in the end the manifold nature of his task defeated his aims. He had too many things to do in the Danube basin, in the Mediterranean, in Italy, in Germany, and in the Lowlands to achieve the obvious goal that was put before him at the opening of his reign. The kings of France, like the North German Protestants, were able to withstand his blows and finally defeat his ambitions because he could not fight them and the Turk at the same time. When he abdicated his thrones to his son Philip and his brother Ferdinand, the Hapsburg inheritance was divided, but the idea of a Spanish-dominated Europe was not abandoned.

Philip II of Spain, even more than his father, was determined to bring Europe back to its inner unity. His upbringing had indoctrinated him with the belief that it was his mission to restore the religious unity of Europe and to make the power of Spain universally felt on the Con-

Hapsburg Empire at the Time of Charles V



Note:- The greater part of Hungary, including Transylvania, was in continual dispute with the Turks. The relation of the Hapsburg and Ottoman Empires is here shown as it stood in 1647

continent. Unfortunately for his ambition, Spanish culture was too narrow to encompass the culture of Europe, and Philip's own character made him unfit to be the builder of a European commonwealth. He worked at the task as hard as any of the empire-builders that were to follow him, but his inability to delegate authority as well as the narrowness of his vision as a statesman defeated him. He lost the opportunity to secure England when his wife, Mary Tudor, died without issue; he lost the Dutch Netherlands when his governors tried to impose Spanish rule upon the provinces; and he lost his chance to control France when his intervention in the religious wars of that country generated new loyalty to the legal king. Perhaps his failures were fundamentally due to the same forces that his father had encountered, for Philip also had to fight the Turkish power in defense of Christendom. His Atlantic navy failed to overcome England (defeat of the Armada) but his Mediterranean fleet did destroy the Turkish navy (Lepanto). Perhaps too, Spanish society was not strong enough to carry the load his rule imposed. As we have already seen, the New World with its gold was far from an unmixed blessing, for the inflation the gold caused undermined the Spanish economy. At the same time his identification of Spain with the Catholic Reformation led to the expulsion of Jews and half-converted Mohammedans, whose industry was important. To whatever we may ascribe his failures, Spanish power at the end of his reign was already in process of decay. It took another hundred years before the façade that had been erected in the sixteenth century was broken, but by 1600 Spain was rapidly becoming a hollow shell.

Philip II had consecrated the power of his realm to the defense of the old church. Spain burned up her energies and lavished her gold wherever it was needed to assist the Catholic Reformation. Perhaps the greatest reason for the failure of this movement lies in the fact that Spain was thus trying to push back the clock in the political as well as the religious life of Europe; for the re-establishment of the church universal undoubtedly would have been accompanied by the re-establishment of the universal empire and the consequent defeat of the ambitions of the men who were building the new states system. In the first half of the seventeenth century, the forty years of warfare that opened with the conflict in Bohemia (1618) and ended with the Treaty of the Pyrenees (1659) decided the issue by unconditionally affirming the sovereignty of princes and the rights of the Protestant religions in Europe.

Spain and the Rise of the Netherlands

In the Netherlands Philip encountered serious resistance to his ambitions that eventually resulted in the creation of a new state, the republic of the United Netherlands. In the sixteenth century these provinces had become one of the most important economic centers in Europe. From an economy based upon fishing and rather hazardous agriculture, the Dutch built up a trading and manufacturing business that was to make them a power in Europe. After Spain and Portugal discovered the East and America, Dutch shippers became middlemen between the Iberian ports and northern Europe. They brought North European furs, amber, fish, cloth, and other goods to exchange for the spices, sugar, cocoa, and Oriental and colonial wares sold by Spanish and Portuguese merchants. Their shipyards developed fast coasting vessels that later were to sail the blue oceans; their shops undertook finishing operations to turn the rawstuffs into more usable goods; and their merchants developed financial institutions to facilitate trade. The country became rich and its inhabitants learned to manage business and political affairs.

The Netherlands were too near Germany not to be affected by the Protestant movement. Lutheranism soon appeared there, only to encounter the hostility of Charles V, who introduced the terrors of the Spanish Inquisition. But there is no seed like martyrs' blood. The number of Protestants increased rather than lessened, especially after Calvinism entered the Netherlands. Indeed it was Calvinism rather than Lutheranism that took hold in these provinces because there were many elements in the religion of the Geneva reformer that especially appealed to the town-dwelling and merchant classes. Charles V tried to extirpate the heresy, but his cruelties were always tempered with his affection for the people of this land where he had been born. In spite of his treatment of heretics, both Flemings and Dutch remained loyal to the emperor, who had been born and reared among them and always considered their country as his own. Philip II, a Spaniard by birth and training, seemed to them rather a foreign master. The new ruler did nothing to conciliate his subjects, but governed them despotically through Spanish officials supported by Spanish garrisons. Arbitrary taxes were levied, cities and the nobility were deprived of cherished privileges, and inquisitorial activities were redoubled. Philip intended to exercise in the Netherlands the same absolute power he enjoyed in Spain. Thus both political and religious oppression combined to provoke a revolt of Catholics and Protestants alike against Spain.

The ten southern provinces of the Netherlands, Catholic in faith, finally effected a reconciliation with Philip and for over two centuries remained in Hapsburg hands. Modern Belgium has grown out of them. The seven northern provinces, where Dutch was the language and Protestantism the religion, formed in 1579 the Union of Utrecht, binding themselves together, "as if they were one province," to maintain their rights and liberties with "life, goods, and blood" against Spain. In 1581, by the Act of Abjuration, they declared that the Spanish king, by his tyranny and misrule, had forfeited his sovereignty over them and that they held themselves absolved from allegiance to him. Philip's governors tried repression as well as kindness in their efforts to re-establish his authority, but the fierceness of the persecutions and the violence of the soldiery drew a line of blood between the Hapsburgs and the Dutch. At the same time Philip, master of both Spain and Portugal, tried to subdue his revolting subjects by cutting them off from the trade that had created their wealth. The Dutch took to the sea and captured the goods of Spain and Portugal before they came to port. Their fast ships and daring captains were more than a match for the Spanish and Portuguese trading vessels. Eventually the Dutch pushed their campaign against the Spanish-Portuguese monopoly to India and the Americas, where they even supplanted their opponent as the principal European trading power and laid the basis for their own greatness in the seventeenth century.

The struggle for Dutch independence on land was long and desperate, and on more than one occasion they repelled the enemy by cutting the dikes and letting in the sea. William the Silent, their heroic leader, perished in a dark hour by an assassin's bullet. "As long as he lived he was the guiding star of a whole nation, and when he died the little children wept." England now came to the aid of the hard-pressed republic with money and a small army. Philip sent against his new antagonist the great fleet called the Armada. Its defeat interfered with further attempts to subdue the Dutch. The *de facto* independence of the United Netherlands was recognized in the first decade of the seventeenth century, when the Spanish king finally realized that he could not at the moment continue the war. It was not until 1648 that the *de jure* independence of this new state was fully organized by Spain.

The Union of Utrecht gave to the world the first written constitution of a modern state and the Act of Abjuration, the first declaration of independence on the part of a modern people. The Dutch established the earliest system of common schools supported by public taxation. They made their universities centers of original learning and original thinking. They abolished censorship of the press. They granted com-

plete religious toleration; Catholics in Holland were never persecuted. The little land of Holland became a refuge for liberty and for all that liberty could nurture and inspire.

At the same time the seventeenth century saw this new state rocketed into the ranks of the powers. Her merchant ships carried the Dutch flag to the East Indies and to both North and South America. Her navies fought the navies of Spain, Portugal, England, and France on equal terms, and her soldiers defended their country by land against all the troops that Spain and France could send against them. Amsterdam became the financial center of the European world with a position not dissimilar to that occupied by New York in our own times. It was not until the end of the seventeenth century that the smallness of her territory and her population forced her to play a secondary role in the high politics of the new states system.

Spain and England

At the death of Edward VI, Mary Tudor mounted the English throne. She was the hope of the Catholic Reformation inasmuch as she was a Roman Catholic and the wife of Philip II of Spain. Edward's brief reign had turned the English church toward Protestantism; upon his death it became possible to bring England back into the fold of the Catholic Church. Mary, like her husband, was convinced of her "mission." English history has rewarded her with the title "bloody" Mary. Neither her Catholicism nor her Spanish husband found any popularity in the country and when she died childless in 1558, her successor Elizabeth was welcomed to the throne. Elizabeth's religious policy was almost dictated by the facts of her birth. She was the daughter of Anne Boleyn and Henry VIII and, in the eyes of the church, born out of wedlock. Elizabeth is responsible for the compromises that created the Anglican Church and stabilized its constitution. Naturally her reign was a disappointment to Philip of Spain. He made the best of the situation by offering to marry her, as did many other princes, including the Grand Duke of Moscow. But Elizabeth was wary. She used her marriageability as a pawn in politics, but never committed herself to definite action. Finally, when English resources were being used to support the Dutch rebellion, and English seamen were attacking his ships and his colonies, Philip gave up the attempt to marry the English queen and made plans to conquer her country.

The Spanish plans for a descent upon England resulted in the attack of the Armada. Philip and his soldiers never really appreciated the problems of naval warfare in the Atlantic. Their thinking was condi-

tioned by their experiences in the Mediterranean Sea and their understanding of land warfare. The assault was crudely organized. The project was simply to transport an army of Spanish veterans, deposit them on the English coast, and then reinforce them by crossing the Channel and getting another army from the Netherlands. It seems not to have troubled the planners of this first serious assault on England since 1066, that there might be some difficulty landing the troops. They saw only the possibility that when the forces were once on English soil, the English Catholics would rush to their assistance. The Spaniards never had a chance to verify this belief; the decisive battle took place on the sea.

Philip had not completed his preparations before Drake sailed into Cadiz harbor and destroyed a vast amount of naval stores and shipping. This exploit, which Drake called "singeing the king of Spain's beard," delayed the expedition for a year. The Armada set out at last in 1588 and proceeded up the Channel to protect and assist in the transportation of a veteran army from Flanders to England. It is difficult to compare the fighting strength of the Armada with that of the opposing fleet. The Spaniards possessed more large ships, but the English excelled in speed, gunnery, and seamanship. The Armada suffered severely during a nine-days' fight in the Channel, but much more severely from the tempests encountered while returning to Spain by the northern route around Scotland. Less than half the fleet came back in safety.

England in the later Middle Ages had been an important naval power, as her ability to carry on the Hundred Years' War with France amply proved. During the sixteenth century, however, she was overmatched by Spain, especially after the annexation of Portugal added the naval forces of that country to the Spanish fleets. The defeat of the Armada showed that a new people had arisen to claim the sovereignty of the seas. Furthermore the defeat of Philip's great navy was a shattering blow to Spanish plans. Henceforth the Atlantic supply route for the Spanish army in the Netherlands could no longer be safe; it was necessary to use the overland route via the Mediterranean Sea, Milan, the Valtelline, and thence through the Alps into the Rhineland. This was one of the most important facts of military and political strategy in Europe from 1588 to 1648, when the Spanish ambitions in central Europe were finally blasted.

The Religious and Civil Wars in France

In the latter half of the sixteenth century a series of religio-political civil wars in France gave the Spanish king an opportunity to interfere

in French affairs, and at one time he seemed about to bring the country under his control. The problem in France grew out of the fact that, while the king remained loyal to the Roman Catholic Church, a sizeable minority of his subjects had been converted to the reformed religion of John Calvin. This presented a serious issue in the sixteenth century, for religious unity had the same meaning that national unity has in our own day. By repudiating the religion of their king, the Huguenots (a name of uncertain origin given to the French Calvinists) seemed to be breaking the fundamental unity of the kingdom. Furthermore since the religion was adopted by the townsmen of southern France whose separatist feelings were strong and whose aim seemed to be to create a republic within or outside the kingdom similar to the republic of the United Netherlands, the breach assumed political proportions. At the same time many of the nobles, disgruntled at the king's unwillingness to grant pensions for their services in the Thirty Years' War or anxious to despoil church lands to repair their fortunes or even obviously intending to emphasize the federal rather than the unitary nature of the constitution, joined the reformed religion. One writer has insisted, with considerable evidence for his thesis, that "religion was a cloak for rebellion" rather than the reason for the civil wars of the era. This does not mean, however, that the vast majority of the Huguenots were not honestly convinced of their religious views. In France as in Germany and elsewhere, religious emotion was used to achieve political ends.

The civil wars in France were violent and destructive in character. Uprisings and massacres, burnings and pillagings were the work of both Catholic and Huguenot; and as one great Huguenot historian regretfully admits, it was only the fact that the Catholics were more numerous that made their outrages more frequent. Both sides fought bitterly and treacherously. It would not be profitable to follow the dreary course of the conflict in any detail. Basically the situation can be explained by the fact that the last three Valois kings were either too young or too weak to rule for themselves and were forced to deal with the Huguenots, led by princes of the blood (the Condés and Bourbons), and with the Catholics, led by powerful nobles (especially from the house of Guise). The queen mother, Catherine de' Medici, tried to play one faction against the other. At one time she would favor the Huguenots; indeed the Edict of Nantes was foreshadowed by her attempts to win them over by toleration. At another time she would favor the Catholics; the infamous massacre of St. Bartholomew's Day is a horrible example of her attempt to root out the leaders of the Huguenots by fire and sword. It is not surprising that foreign powers

were able to fish in these muddy political waters. The Spaniard was called in by the Catholics; the English, the German, and the Dutch Protestants by the Huguenots.

Affairs reached a crisis in the 1580's when the Valois line obviously had to pass from the scene because there was no direct heir. The next in succession to the throne under the ancient Salic law was Henry of Navarre, the head of the house of Bourbon. But this Henry was also the leader of the Huguenot party and, as such, completely unacceptable to the Catholics. Backed by Philip of Spain, the Catholics organized a league under the leadership of Duke Henry of Guise. The last unfortunate prince of the Valois house, King Henry III, was caught between the forces of his presumptive successors. The *mêlée* that followed has been called the War of the Three Henrys. Henry, duke of Guise, was treacherously murdered by order of the king. In turn the king was murdered by a religious fanatic. This left the Huguenot leader, Henry of Bourbon, as the legitimate ruler of the land. But the Catholic league would have nothing to do with him, and, with the aid of Spanish troops, the league controlled Paris and most of Catholic France. It was Spanish interference, however, that paved the way for a reconciliation of the opposing forces.

Philip II tried to place a Spanish candidate upon the French throne, and the arrogance of his ambassador showed the Catholics that France would become an appendage to Spain if this were to happen. In the meantime a party had arisen, the *Politiques*, that argued the necessity of accepting the Huguenots' religion as a stubborn fact as well as of accepting the legitimate king. Henry of Bourbon, on his part, saw the necessity of rejoining the Catholic faith to make a compromise possible. He had been converted several times before, so that there is good reason to assume that religion meant politics in his mind. "Paris," he remarked, "is worth a mass."


The opposition of the league collapsed when he offered to buy off the leaders, and he became generally recognized as King Henry IV of France. A war with Spain cleared the northern provinces of foreign troops, and the peace of Vervins, signed in 1598, gave France her first real breathing spell since 1561. The Huguenots were appalled at the apostasy of their leader, but Henry reassured them by negotiating a treaty which guaranteed them their rights. This agreement, the Edict of Nantes, left the Huguenots in control of fortified places as well as military forces so that they could be assured of their position within the kingdom. It also guaranteed them equal treatment and opportunity before the king as well as the right publicly to practice their religion in specified towns and cities. In Germany the Protestant revolt had re-



A FAIR IN THE 17TH CENTURY (*Museum of Fine Arts, Boston*)

PLATE III

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sulted in a formula that gave the prince control over the religion of his subjects; this was possible because Germany was a federal state. In France it resulted in a formula that gave individuals control over their own conscience. It was either that or the disruption of the unity of the nation. The religious question in France, however, was not settled by the Edict of Nantes, for the Huguenots with their military forces still presented a danger to the unity of the state. In the seventeenth century the great builder of royal authority, Cardinal Richelieu, destroyed their military powers while his king, Louis XIII, bribed or browbeat their leaders to return to Catholicism. At the end of the century, Louis XIV revoked the rights of liberty of conscience that his grandfather had granted. Without military power, the Huguenots were powerless to strike back at the authority of the state.

The Hapsburgs and the Catholic Reformation in Germany

The Peace of Augsburg brought the outward appearance of tranquility to Germany for the following sixty years, but under the surface the tide of the Catholic Reformation was a disturbing threat. There was room for bitter disputes, especially over the ownership of church property that had been secularized by the Protestants. Both Catholics and Lutherans anxiously watched any change in the religious situation. Moreover in the Peace of Augsburg there had been no provision for Calvinism, and when the Calvinists made converts both the Catholic and the Protestant princes were uneasy. The Lutherans regarded the Calvinists as a sect of "Christian Mohammedans"; the Catholics held them to be an abomination. But neither the Catholic nor the Protestant party produced any aggressive princely leadership until the second decade of the seventeenth century. The Austrian Hapsburg house divided its inheritance among the several heirs according to the old Germanic law, and thereby prevented any one of the several Hapsburg princelings from having enough personal power to become an aggressive leader of the Catholic cause. The Bavarian house of Wittelsbach provided more effective leadership than the Hapsburgs. By placing cadets of the family on the thrones of the electoral bishoprics of the Rhine and by organizing a Catholic league and a Catholic army, they formed a spearhead for Catholic interests. The Protestants also were not well led. Lutheranism had lost its revolutionary zeal, and the Lutheran princes became time servers anxious to hold what they had gained but without the energy necessary to do much more than protect their petty interests. Among the Calvinists there was more vigor. The Electoral Prince of the Palatinate, a convert to Calvinism, showed an energy

among the Protestants similar to that shown by the duke of Bavaria in the Catholic camp. In response to the Catholic league of Bavaria, the Palatinate organized the Protestant union to defend Protestant interests.

In the second decade of the seventeenth century, however, the picture was changed dramatically. Ferdinand von Hapsburg, duke of Styria, inherited first one and then another of the Hapsburg provinces. He had been trained at the Jesuit college of Ingolstadt, and in his Styrian province had been a vigorous exponent of the Catholic Reformation. The new lands that came under his rule had had indifferent or tolerant princes; Ferdinand saw the revival of Catholicism as his obvious mission. Moreover, with the growth of his power came a growth in ambition; he could reasonably hope to re-establish the prestige of the Hapsburgs and, after his election, the power of the emperor in Germany. Moreover at this very moment a new favorite came to power in Spain whose policy was to support the German Hapsburgs. Ferdinand therefore could rely upon the Spanish army in Belgium that was being prepared to reopen the struggle with the United Netherlands and he could also count upon gold from the Spanish treasure ships of the New World.

The crisis that opened a period of thirty years of warfare in Germany and of forty years in Europe originated in Bohemia. Ferdinand was elected king of Bohemia to succeed his uncle, but the Calvinist party in Bohemia, whose existence had been assured by an Edict of Toleration, feared that he would introduce Catholic policy. They accordingly insisted that the election was invalid because it had been held under duress. After a long altercation that included the throwing of Ferdinand's representatives out of a second-story window, a new election in Bohemia named Frederick, prince of the Palatinate, to the throne. Frederick was a young man without too much political sense; he was also the son-in-law of James I, king of England, and titular head of the Protestant union. Frederick assumed the crown of Bohemia at the very time when Ferdinand was elected emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. A conflict was inevitable.

The Forty Years' War

The conflict that started with the battle of White Mountain (1620) in Bohemia was first treated by Europe and Germany as a local affair, a contest between the Hapsburg emperor and the prince of the Palatinate for the Bohemian crown. When the last phase of the war ended in 1659 with the Franco-Spanish Peace of the Pyrenees, it was obvious that this war, variously called the Thirty (1618 to the Treaty of Westphalia) or the Forty (1620 to the Peace of the Pyrenees) Years' War,


had shaken the entire continent. Like the conflicts of our own age, it did not settle all the problems that were behind its action and it brought forth new questions demanding solution. It did, however, settle many things, and first and foremost was the fact that the medieval synthesis of Christendom was forever gone and in its place a new states system was established.

The Bohemian phase of the war began when Frederick of the Palatinate accepted the crown of Bohemia, and ended when, after the battle of White Mountain, he was driven from Prague as a fugitive. Strong allies rallied to the cause of Emperor Ferdinand in this period. The French monarch helped his Hapsburg cousin by patching up a peace between the Protestant and the Catholic princes in Germany so that the army of Maximilian of Bavaria could safely invade Bohemia. At the same time the Lutheran ruler of Electoral Saxony also threw his forces against the unfortunate Frederick. But to get this much aid, the emperor had to promise Frederick's Palatinate on the Rhine to Maximilian. It was this promise that introduced the second stage of the conflict — the struggle for the Rhine.

The Rhine valley was of utmost importance at this moment, for the reopening of the war between Spain and the Netherlands made it the only highway of supply for the Spanish army occupying Belgium. Thus when the Catholic army of Bavaria and the Spanish army invaded the Rhineland to occupy the Palatinate, the military and political picture changed appreciably. Even though the French king was fighting the Huguenots and was threatened with a revolt of a coterie of important nobles, he could not regard this turn of events without fear of a new threat from Spain to his own lands. And the Protestant princes in North Germany could not miss the fact that the balance of power in the empire was shifting against them. Nor was that all. Emperor Ferdinand reorganized Bohemia, suppressed the revolters, and created out of the kingdom a solid basis for Hapsburg power in Middle Europe. He was almost ready to return to the ancient Hapsburg policy that had tried to unite Germany under a single rule. Lastly, the attempt to make a marriage alliance between a Spanish princess and the son of James I of England fell through after Charles' visit to Spain, and Anglo-Spanish relations deteriorated rapidly toward war.

Events in the seventeenth century moved more slowly than they do in the twentieth because transportation and communication were more difficult, but they could not be ignored even though they took time to develop. The new minister of the French king, Cardinal Richelieu, became the center of a core of resistance to the Hapsburgs. He sent French troops into the Valtelline to block the Spanish supply route

Western Germany about 1630



through the Alps, he supplied the Dutch with subsidies, and he persuaded the Danish king to come to the aid of the Protestant faction in Germany. But fortune seemed to be on the side of the Hapsburgs. Richelieu's position was undermined at home by Huguenot disloyalty and the threat of a revolt by the "great ones," princes and dukes of France, at the same time that a new army arose to support the imperial forces in Germany. Wallenstein, an adventurer from Bohemia, organized a huge military force under the banner of Emperor Ferdinand, destroyed King Christian of Denmark's armies, and invaded the Baltic. By 1629 Germany was under the control of the imperial forces, and the emperor was strong enough to compel the restitution of church property that had been illegally secularized. The French and English, at war with each other and in serious difficulties within their own states — because of the Huguenots in France and the parliament in England — were unable to interfere. It almost seemed that Germany would be united under the Hapsburgs and that Spain again would be able to control the Netherlands.

But the tide soon turned the other way. The rise of the emperor's power in Germany frightened the Catholic as well as the Lutheran princes; they saw that their "German liberties" were endangered, that their power might well be subordinated to the German crown. At the same time Richelieu finally broke the military power of the Huguenots and brutally crushed the great nobles' opposition to his policy in France. And the king of Sweden, Gustavus Adolphus, encouraged by France, was now ready to interfere in German affairs to defend the Lutherans and perhaps extend his own domains. The German princes forced the emperor to give up Wallenstein just before a new crisis arose in Germany. With French subsidies and a crusading spirit the Swedish king landed in North Germany and began a triumphal march to the Rhine (1630). In September, 1631, at Breitenfeld, his army won a great victory over the Catholics and imperials. All Germany seemed about to fall to the new conqueror; Gustavus Adolphus even considered the possibility of becoming Holy Roman Emperor. But the next year Wallenstein, recalled to power, organized an army that met the Swedish-Lutheran forces at Lutzen (November 16, 1632). The battle was indecisive, but Gustavus Adolphus was killed. The Swedes retired to the North of Germany where it was impossible for the imperials to expel them. By 1635 peace seemed about to be established. Wallenstein had been murdered and the emperor had reached an agreement with most of the German princes, but at this point France entered the war to prevent the Hapsburgs from consolidating their position.

The next ten years were harsh ones for central Europe. The destruction accomplished by the marching armies was probably not so universal as that accomplished by the bombers in the great war of 1939-1945, but wherever the soldiers went they left a trail of hunger, destruction, and plague. At least one-third of Germany was severely damaged by the conflict, and the remaining two-thirds suffered more than mere discomfort. To make peace required three years, 1645-1648, for the whole patchwork of the empire was up for revision, and the interests, often conflicting, of France, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Denmark had to be considered as well as those of the German powers. When the peace was finally made in Westphalia (Münster and Osnabrück), Europe had a new character and a new basis for her international life. The shadows of the authority of pope and emperor in the public life of the Continent were gone. In their place stood the sovereign states of Europe whose public life was to be regulated, in the last analysis, by force. The new "law of nations," the new diplomacy, and the principle of the balance of power on a continental scale partly concealed the fact that the nations were living in an anarchy in which the sword was the final judge of all disputes.

The war between France and Spain continued in desultory fashion until 1659, when the Treaty of the Pyrenees finally brought peace. This phase of the war showed Europe that there was now a new claimant for the role of leader in the world. Spain's century and a half old position as the first power on the Continent was gone. In her place stood France. At the very time that the international war was creating a new mode for Europe's public life, Louis XIII and his great minister, Richelieu, gave France a new inner strength that allowed her to claim leadership in the epoch after 1660.

The Rise of Rôyal Authority in France

At the opening of the seventeenth century France emerged from forty years of civil and religious warfare weakened and impoverished. The proud position that her kings had won for themselves was challenged at every point of the compass by powerful noblemen and entrenched religious groups. To get to his throne the first Bourbon king had to buy off the opposition of many of his governors and great nobles by grants of money and privileges that undermined the authority of the crown, and he had been forced to yield the Huguenots a status that practically created a Huguenot republic within the kingdom. No one in 1595 would have predicted that the grandson of Henry IV would rule France and dominate Europe as the absolute monarch that Louis

XIV actually became. It would have been just as easy to believe that France might develop, as Germany did, into a land of independent and quasi-independent princes under the shadowy authority of the crown.

Henry IV laid the foundation for the return of royal authority; his son and the great cardinal constructed the edifice of power, and his grandson became the arbiter of the destinies of Europe. Henry's work was difficult. He had first to restore order to a society that had lived in disorder for almost half a century. To make the highways comparatively safe for travelers, to rebuild bridges, repair roads, and re-establish the possibility of reasonably safe economic exchange of goods was a tremendous job. The public treasury was in a deplorable state. The king was heavily in debt, his revenues were pledged to creditors, and the payment of interest was from ten to fifteen years in arrears. Furthermore he had always to fear that a new revolt of the nobles would be used as a pretext for forcing him to buy the loyalty of his subjects with new grants of money and privilege.

It must not be assumed that Henry solved all these problems, but he did succeed in reducing the number of bandit gangs; in one case he even had to place an army in the field to fight a "Robin Hood" armed with artillery! He did keep the nobles from another rebellion, in part by playing one against the other, in part by his good humored, robust ways, and in part by force. He cut off the head of one of the most important soldiers in the kingdom when a plot was uncovered even though the victim, Marshal Biron, had been his friend and companion in arms during the civil wars. He also backed up his superintendent of finances, Sully, in the program of reducing expenditures and squeezing graft out of the tax collection. Sully's work greatly reduced the public debt, brought the payments of interest on the *rentes* (state bonds) to a point that inspired confidence, and freed some of the pledged revenues for the king's use. When Henry died, there was a "war chest" filled with gold in the Bastille and the kingdom's economy was on the way to recovery. Sully and Laffemas, Henry's most active economist, were responsible for restoring the routes of commerce and introducing new industries. Too much emphasis can be put on their work, however, for actually their main accomplishment was to repair the damages of the wars and to point the way for their successors who were to extend the economy of the French in the middle and latter seventeenth century.

Henry was murdered just before he could embark upon war against the Hapsburg interests in Germany. His queen, Marie de' Medici, became regent and tried to hold the government together until her son could assume power. Without a strong hand at the rudder, however, it was impossible to keep politics on the straight course set by

Henry. The fifteen years following his assassination saw the government fail in its attempts to buy the support and loyalty of the nobles even though that policy cost all the gold Henry had put aside. They also saw revolts by both the nobility and the Huguenots that clearly proved the king not to be master in his own house. By a *coup d'état* Louis XIII seized the government from his mother's hands, but he too was unable to bring order out of the chaos. Favorites first of Marie de' Medici and then of Louis XIII waxed rich but the royal authority lost prestige. It was not until 1624 that Louis found a minister capable of giving France the strong government he wanted to establish. His admiration for his father was boundless; when he found a minister who could carry out his father's program, he supported him against the court, his mother, and the powerful party of the Catholic Reformation. That strong minister was Cardinal Richelieu.

Richelieu is remembered in French tradition as a sickly man with a will of steel, as a sinister figure whose work united the nation under the king. He has his admirers and his detractors; he inspired fear and respect but never love. He came to power resolved to break the back of rebellion. This meant taking away from the Huguenots their military establishments and from the nobles the ability to revolt. He wanted to centralize power in the king's hands and to use that power to make France supreme in Europe. No French statesman has ever left a larger mark upon the institutions and life of the nation.

To accomplish his policy Richelieu did not hesitate to use force. The great nobles learned to their surprise that rebellions no longer ended by bribing the rebels. Richelieu sent members of the highest nobility of France to the block for treason that only a few years before might well have paid handsome dividends in money. After half a dozen men had been executed and a bastard son of Henry IV was allowed to die in prison and the property of others declared forfeited, the "great ones" of the land came to realize that France was being governed by a king and a minister who would not stand for revolt. Furthermore when the king destroyed the walls of the large towns and the castles of the nobility, revolt became less and less likely to succeed. Richelieu started the process of turning the nobles into courtiers. They had been soldier chiefs with ambitions and prides; he made them into slaves of the Crown. In Henry IV's or Marie de' Medici's reign for a noble to "leave the court" was to raise the flag of revolt. After Richelieu's time "to be sent from the court" was a sign of disgrace.

The Huguenots fared even worse than the nobility. They had had ambitions to emulate the Dutch republic and create a Huguenot republic within the kingdom. The Edict of Nantes left them with the mili-

tary power to make good their pretensions, and from 1615 to 1628 their leaders did not hesitate to challenge the king's authority. Richelieu waited until he could draw the line between religion and politics. He was willing to let the Huguenots believe in any God that they wished to serve, but he intended that they should obey the king's political rules. It was the city of La Rochelle that made the mistake of allying herself with England, and Richelieu set out to reduce that proud stronghold. The siege is a classic in the annals of warfare; the cardinal was the driving force behind the victory. For over a year a royal army besieged the town and beat off English aid. In the end it had to surrender. Its walls were destroyed, its privileges revoked, and the greatest of the Huguenot fortresses came completely under the Crown. By 1630 the other Huguenot centers had suffered a similar fate, and all possibility of another revolt from the reformed religion was removed. Richelieu then freely granted the Huguenots religious liberty.

The governors of provinces who had hoped under previous kings to establish quasi-independent status for themselves and their children were also brought under the Crown. Some of them lost their privileges and their heads in revolts, others had their positions bought from them, and all of them had their authority undermined by new royal officers, the *intendants*, who were given authority and powers that curtailed the governors' activities. It was humiliating for the men who had considered themselves to be the king's peers to find their position undermined by the king's government, but their children learned eventually to submit to royal power.

The popular institutions suffered no less than the aristocratic ones. Richelieu had been a member of the States-General that met in 1614. He was careful not to summon that body again, and neither did any of his successors until the ill-fated Louis XVI called it together in 1789. Richelieu often used a hand-picked body of men, the Assembly of Notables, as a sounding board for his policy, but he carefully selected the men who were called so that he could be sure of their submission to his policy. The parlements also were brought closer under royal supervision. The parlements were a combination of supreme court and executive board that had control over economics, censorship, religion, and a host of other matters. As the supreme court of the land, they pretended to exercise a sort of judicial review over the king's edicts. If they felt a measure to be ill considered or contrary to the constitution, they could protest and refuse to enforce it. Their power, however, was limited by the fact that the king could hold a "bed of justice" and force the registration of the law. Richelieu and Louis XIII did not hesitate to compel the parlements to register their edicts, and they

freely exiled judges who opposed their will. With such treatment, the parlements eventually became easy tools for the royal power.

It is unnecessary to go into all of Richelieu's work. He took over control of France at a time when the king's authority was weak. After he died, there was one last epoch of revolt, the Fronde, in 1648-1652, but that revolt was easily broken, for Richelieu had organized the government and the power of the king so well that a return to the old anarchy was impossible. At his death his favorite, Cardinal Mazarin, became the first minister, and the latter's diplomatic skill paved the way for the great prestige that France won from the forty years of war in Europe. Interior affairs were left in the hands of the secretaries of state. Before Richelieu's time the secretaries had been mere letter writers; after his time they emerged as ministers responsible for the direction of the affairs of the kingdom. Thus when Louis XIV assumed control of his government in 1661, his authority was well established and the institutions to make it function were running smoothly. France was ready to assume the hegemony of Europe that had fallen from Spanish hands.

The Power of the Central Authority in England

England's baronial civil war in the fifteenth century, the War of the Roses, ended with the accession of the Tudor dynasty to the throne in 1485. The new king, Henry VII, humbled the nobility and stripped them of their power to resist the royal will. His successor, Henry VIII, used the Reformation to center the authority and the loyalties due the church on the person of the king and at the same time, by the distribution of church lands, created a new nobility dependent upon himself. Elizabeth continued her father's work by fixing the religious compromise and firmly grasping the lines of power in the state in her own hands. These three rulers, despotic and willful as they were, were popular with the wealthy middle class and succeeded in developing a feeling in all classes closely akin to our modern idea of nationalism. They gave England order and prosperity and, in the war with Spain, reason to be proud of the kingdom's position in the world. Political liberty, which they restricted, was not so important to men faced with the evils of the sixteenth century. The age called for authority that would prevent the land from falling into anarchy such as visited France in the form of civil and religious disorder.

Like all western European countries, England had a traditional parliament. The States-General in France, the Diet in Hungary and the empire, the Cortes in Spain, and the parliament in England were the

heritage of the Middle Ages. But only in England did the parliament emerge into modern times as an active agent in the central authority of the realm. The English parliament in the thirteenth century had become a body representative of the three estates of the realm, and in the fourteenth century it had separated into the House of Lords and the House of Commons. Parliament enjoyed considerable authority at this time. The kings, who were in continual need of money, often summoned it, sought its advice upon important matters, and readily listened to its requests. Under the Tudors, however, parliament exercised little control over the government. Henry VII called it together on only five occasions during his reign; Henry VIII persuaded or frightened it into doing anything he pleased; and Elizabeth consulted it as infrequently as possible. None the less, the fact that both Henry VIII and Elizabeth used "controlled parliaments" to reinforce their policies gave parliament prestige that made it important in the next century.

The death of Elizabeth in 1603 ended the Tudor dynasty. James I (James VI of Scotland), son of Elizabeth's cousin the ill-fated Mary Stuart, Queen of Scots, inherited the English throne. Under this first of the Stuarts England and Scotland were joined in a personal union, though each country kept its own legislature, laws, and established church. The new king was well described by his contemporary, Henry IV of France, as the "wisest fool in Christendom." He had a good mind and abundant learning, but throughout his reign he showed an utter inability to win either the esteem or the affection of his subjects. This was his misfortune, for Englishmen were now growing weary of despotism. They were not prepared to tolerate in James, an alien, many things which they had overlooked in "Good Queen Bess."

The notions of divine right cherished by James I and his unmistakable purpose to rule as an absolute monarch almost immediately encountered the opposition of the House of Commons, whose leaders considered the royal authority to be strictly limited. When the king, always extravagant and a poor financier, came before it for money, that body refused to give him any unless its privileges were recognized and its grievances redressed. James would not admit any responsibility to parliament for his royal actions; he was accountable only to God. Parliament kept the purse strings tied and James got along as best he could by levying tariffs on imports, selling titles of nobility, and imposing excessive fines. This situation continued to the end of his reign.

A religious controversy further embittered the dispute between James and parliament. The king, a devout Anglican, made himself very unpopular with the Puritans, as the reformers within the church were called. The Puritans, strongly Calvinistic in their attitude, wanted

to abolish the episcopate and purify the church of certain customs which they described as "Romish." Among these were the use of the surplice by clergymen, of the ring in the marriage ceremony, and of the sign of the cross in baptism. Some Puritans also wished to get rid of the *Book of Common Prayer* and thus simplify the church service. Since the Puritans had a large majority in the House of Commons, it was inevitable that the parliamentary struggle against Stuart absolutism should assume in part a religious character.

The Puritan Revolution

The political and religious difficulties which marked the reign of James I did not disappear when in 1625 his son, Charles I, came to the throne. Charles was a true Stuart in his devotion to absolutism and divine right. When parliament did not grant him money, he levied forced loans on the wealthy, imprisoned those who refused to make such loans, and otherwise played the tyrant. Parliament responded by presenting to the king the Petition of Right (1628). One of its clauses declared that loans without the consent of parliament should be considered illegal; another clause declared that no one should be arrested or imprisoned except according to the law of the land. The Petition thus repeated and reinforced some of the leading provisions of Magna Carta. Charles agreed to it, but he had no intention of observing it. For eleven years, in fact, he managed to rule without calling parliament in session. Arbitrary courts, which tried cases without a jury, punished those who resisted the royal will. A rigid censorship of the press prevented any expression of popular discontent. Public meetings were suppressed as seditious. Even private gatherings were dangerous, for the king had swarms of spies to report disloyal acts or utterances.

Archbishop Laud, the king's chief agent in ecclesiastical matters, detested Puritanism and aimed to root it out from the Anglican Church. While the restrictions on Puritans were increased, those affecting Catholics were relaxed. Many people thought that Charles, through Laud and the bishops, was preparing to lead the Anglican Church back to Rome. They therefore opposed the king on religious grounds as well as for political reasons.

The struggle between Charles and parliament at length became a civil war. Around the king rallied nearly all the nobles, the Anglican clergy, the Catholics, a majority of the country gentry, or squires, and the upper classes generally. The royalists received the name of "Cavaliers." The parliamentarians, or "Roundheads" (so called from their closely

cropped hair), were mostly recruited from merchants in the towns and small landowners in the country. The working people remained as a rule indifferent and had little part in the civil war.

Fortune favored the royalists until Oliver Cromwell, the Puritan leader in the House of Commons, took command of the parliamentary forces. Charles was defeated decisively in the battle of Naseby (1645). He surrendered to the Scots, who turned him over to the English. Four years later he was brought to trial before a High Court of Justice. He refused to acknowledge the right of the court to try him and made no defense whatever. Then came his condemnation as "a tyrant, traitor, murderer, and public enemy to the good of the people" and his execution in London. This act went far beyond the wishes of most Englishmen. Had Charles adopted a less unyielding policy, had he been ready to surrender some of his cherished prerogatives, he might have kept his head and his throne.

Sweeping changes in the government of England followed the execution of its monarch. The kingship and the House of Lords were abolished, and the House of Commons was placed in sole control of legislation. England now became a Commonwealth, or national republic. This soon gave way to the dictatorship of Cromwell, supported by the army. Cromwell's reluctance to be a dictator led him to accept a so-called Instrument of Government (1653), drawn up by some of his officers and notable as the only written constitution that England has ever had in actual operation. It provided that Cromwell should be Lord Protector for life, but his authority was to be restricted by a council and a parliament, while his acts could be reviewed by the courts. The Protectorate lasted for five years. Cromwell tried at first to rule in accordance with the Instrument of Government, but the difficulties of his position led him to adopt an increasingly arbitrary policy. His death in 1658 left the army without a leader and the nation without a strong man at the head of affairs. Two years later parliament restored the monarchy, recalled the eldest son of Charles I from exile, and placed him on the throne.

The Restoration and the Glorious Revolution

Charles II pledged himself to maintain Magna Carta, the Petition of Right, and various statutes limiting the royal authority. The people of England wished to have a king but they also wished their king to be amenable to parliament. Charles, less obstinate and more astute than his father, recognized this fact and, when a conflict threatened with his ministers or parliament, avoided it by timely concessions. Whatever

happened, he used to say, he was resolved "never to set out on his travels again."

One of the most important events of the reign of Charles II was the passage by parliament (1679) of the Habeas Corpus Amendment Act. The writ of *habeas corpus* is an order, issued by a judge, requiring a person held in custody to be brought before the court. If upon examination good reason is shown for keeping the prisoner, he is to be given a trial; otherwise he must be either freed or released on bail. This writ had been long used in England, and one of the clauses of Magna Carta expressly provided against arbitrary imprisonment. It had always been possible, however, for the king or his ministers to order the arrest of a person considered dangerous to the state without making any formal charge against him. The act established the principle that every man not charged with or convicted of a known crime is entitled to his liberty. This principle is now incorporated in the laws of all English-speaking countries.

The reign of Charles II also saw the beginning of the modern party system in parliament. Two parties arose, very largely as the result of a religious controversy. The king, from his long life in France, was partial to Catholicism, though he did not formally embrace it until the moment of death. His brother James, the heir to the throne, became an avowed Catholic, much to the disgust of many members of parliament. A bill was now introduced in the House of Commons to exclude Prince James from the succession. Its supporters received the nickname of Whigs, while those who opposed it were called Tories. The former were successors of the old Roundheads, the latter of the Cavaliers. The bill did not pass the House of Lords, but the two parties continued to divide on other questions. They survive as the Liberals and the Conservatives of today.

James II lacked the attractive personality which had made his brother a popular ruler; moreover, he was Catholic and a staunch believer in the divine right of kings. James soon managed to make enemies of most of his Protestant subjects by "suspending" the laws against Catholics and by appointing Catholics to positions of authority and influence. He also dismissed parliament and supported himself with subsidies from another divine-right monarch, Louis XIV of France. Englishmen might have put up with James to the end of his reign (he was then nearing sixty) in the hope that he would be succeeded by his Protestant daughter Mary. However, the birth in 1688 of a son by his Catholic second wife opened up the prospect of a Catholic monarch on the throne. At last a number of Whig and Tory leaders invited Mary's husband, William Prince of Orange, Stadholder or governor general of

Holland, to take the throne. William was a descendant of that William the Silent who, a century before, had saved the Dutch out of the hands of Spain. William accepted the invitation, landed in England with a small army, and marched unopposed to London. James fled to France and parliament, declaring that his flight was equivalent to abdication, granted the throne conjointly to William and Mary. This sudden, bloodless revolution, the last which England has had, ushered in more than two centuries of orderly government, of personal freedom, and of growing democracy for Englishmen.

Bill of Rights and Toleration Act

Parliament took care to continue its authority and the Protestant religion by enacting in 1689 the Bill of Rights, which reaffirmed and strengthened the principles of political liberty formulated in Magna Carta and the Petition of Right. This measure required the sovereign to be henceforth a member of the Anglican Church. It forbade him to "suspend" the operation of the laws, to levy money, or to maintain a standing army except by consent of parliament. It declared that election of members of parliament should be free from interference; that they should enjoy freedom of speech and action within the two Houses; and that excessive bail should not be required, excessive fines imposed, or cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. Finally, it guaranteed the right of subjects to petition the sovereign and ordered the holding of frequent parliaments. Several clauses of the Bill of Rights reappear, almost unchanged, in the first ten Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

Nonconformists or dissenters (Presbyterians, Congregationalists, Baptists, and Quakers) had stood shoulder to shoulder with Anglicans in opposition to James II. Their reward was the Toleration Act of 1689. This relieved them from all penalties for failure to attend the Anglican Church and granted them the right of public worship in their own chapels. It did not otherwise modify the condition of nonconformists, who continued (along with Catholics, Unitarians, and Jews) until the nineteenth century to be barred from any civil or military office in the gift of the government. Catholics were not included in the benefits of this measure, but as a matter of fact they were allowed henceforth to hold their services without molestation. The Toleration Act commended itself to Englishmen in America, and it was generally re-enacted by the legislatures of the Thirteen Colonies.

Limited Monarchy in England

The Revolution of 1688-1689, often described as the "Glorious Revolution," struck the final blow at absolutism and divine right in England. Since then no English king has challenged the supremacy of parliament in legislation and finance. The revolution did not form a popular movement, however; it was a successful struggle on the part of the upper and middle classes — nobles, country gentry, merchants, and clergy, who were represented in the House of Lords and the House of Commons. Nor did the revolution establish responsible self-government. No law was made at this time requiring the king to be guided by ministers who enjoyed the confidence of parliament. The king continued to be the actual ruler of the country until the development of the cabinet system in the eighteenth century enabled parliament to execute laws as well as make them. But England had now adopted the device of a limited monarchy, and her example was later followed by many countries in the Old World. In the New World the American Revolution was to give rise to a government which had no need for kings.

It should be noted, however, that this rise of parliamentary power was not a disruptive force in English government. England, like France and other states in Europe, was developing a centralized authority that could and did compel all other institutions and individuals to submit. The Tudor kings had successfully broken the baronial power, just as Richelieu did in France. The revolutionary epoch in the seventeenth century successfully solved the religious question without giving any group, like the Huguenots after the Edict of Nantes, power to defy the government. Parliament shared authority with the king, but that authority was centralized in the government of the realm; it was not divided into segments that might attempt to re-establish the feudal, medieval synthesis of a previous age.

IV

The Development of the New States System

THE epoch after the forty years of warfare (1618-1659) that prepared the way for a new system of government in Europe might well be called the beginning of the contemporary era in world affairs. Many of the institutions of international control that have become commonplace in our day — from international law and permanent diplomatic establishments to standing armies and navies — first became common in this period. The states system that had arisen to fill the vacuum left by collapse of the concept of a united Christendom had to find its balances and its methods of general European control. It was also an era in which the horizons of Europe, both political and economic, expanded rapidly. New powers appeared in the eastern part of the Continent (Prussia and Russia) to give the term Europe a larger meaning in politics. At the same time the crumbling of the Ottoman Empire opened the way for reconquest of the Danube basin and the Mediterranean Sea from Islam. The rise and consolidation of colonial empires both in the Americas and in the Orient gave promise that European civilization would make the entire earth into "one world."

France, the Pattern for and the Leader of Europe

The young French king, Louis XIV, assumed control over his heritage in 1661, and for the next fifty-five years his person and his court were the center of the life of Europe. His government became the model more or less scrupulously copied all over the Continent. French styles of dress, deportment, architecture, and literature became the mode. French supplanted Spanish as the language of diplomacy just as the French ambassador demanded, and received, precedence in the courts of the world. In our own day we see the cultural patterns of the

United States and of the Soviet Union competing for adherence; in the last years of the seventeenth century France had no rival. Her soldiers set the standards for the art of war, her dressmakers dictated the fashions of the day, her builders dominated the architectural growth of Europe. The young king became the "Grand Monarch," the "Sun King." He ruled his lands with haughty magnificence and grand display. The palaces that he built (Versailles is the most gorgeous), the gardens that he laid out, the court that he ruled, all glittered with the grandeur that was associated with France.

There was a firm basis for Louis's magnificence in the organization of his government. He had as his economic adviser the foremost economist of his day, Colbert, who conceived of the economy that was emerging as a force by which a powerful state could be constructed. Under Colbert new industries were established and old ones encouraged by grants, tariffs, subsidies for exports, grants of monopoly markets, and other privileges that made economic activity profitable. France extended her hold on the trade and commerce of the world by establishing new colonies and privileged trading companies that brought Oriental goods from the East, sugar and other colonial goods from the islands in the Caribbean, and furs from Canada. At the same time the routes of internal trade were improved by dredging rivers, digging canals, and building roads and bridges. Mercantilism under Colbert was more than merely a policy to "stock the kingdom with gold and silver through trade"; it was state building in the broadest sense. Had Louis's wars and court extravagances not used up the wealth even faster than the expanding economy could create it, France undoubtedly would have experienced a golden age of prosperity, for her total production of wealth grew rapidly in this era.

On the other side of the picture, Louis's power in Europe was well founded. His great war minister Louvois was the first statesman in Europe to build up a modern standing army and to provide the material as well as the training to make the standing army into an instrument for power. Louvois was flanked by three great soldiers. The younger Condé and Turenne were the most famous field commanders of the era, while Vauban was one of the important military engineers of all time. Gone was the day when French commanders thought in terms of the petty battles of the civil wars. The last years of the great conflict during the first half of the seventeenth century brought out the military talents that introduced new methods of warfare. Vauban was the modern engineer who understood how to defend a fortification and, even better, how to take one by siege. In this era when the musket with a bayonet finally pushed the pike aside as the principal weapon of the

foot soldier, and when the cannon was beginning to show that it would be queen of the battlefield, the nation that had leaders able to grasp the meaning of the new tactics could command the hegemony of Europe if her ruler wished it.

The Wars of Louis XIV

Louis fought four wars that extended over half the years of his long reign. The first three were wars for the Rhine frontier; the fourth was a war for the control of all western Europe. The great Cardinal Richelieu had laid down the proposition that France's natural frontiers were the Alps, the Pyrenees, and the Rhine; his successors ever since have struggled to gain control of the banks of that great river that separates western from central Europe.


Louis XIV first tried to secure the Spanish Netherlands (Belgium) on the pretext that it was his wife's inheritance. It was awkward for rulers "by divine right" to embark upon a bold-faced war of aggression, for such a war would seem to indicate that God's will and man's will were at odds; but aggression to secure the fulfilment of rightful inheritance did not seem quite so much like a brazen land grab. This first war, "the War of the Devolution" in French textbooks, showed Louis that a new European order was about to come into existence. Hardly had his troops entered the Netherlands (1667) when England and Holland speedily ended their little "trade war" and, with Sweden, formed a Triple Alliance. Louis was unprepared for this rectification of the "balance of power," and speedily made a peace with Spain (Aix-la-Chapelle, 1668) that merely "adjusted" the frontier in the east to give France a number of fortified cities formerly belonging to Spain.

The "Sun King" blamed Holland for his rebuff, and the Dutch boastfully asserted that they had stopped the sun in its course. Louis's next war was with Holland, but this time he tried to prepare the way diplomatically by buying off the English and Swedish rulers. The Dutch, as a result of their sharp business deals, had few warm friends in Europe, and French subsidies to needy rulers was all that was required to isolate them. But the Dutch fought skillfully and ferociously when the French armies invaded their lands (1672); and when the French refused to make a peace that the Dutch could accept, their diplomats proved to be as skillful as their soldiers. The emperor, the elector of Brandenburg, and eventually the king of Spain entered the war against France, while the English parliament forced England out of her alliance with France and to the side of her enemies. The French armies were usually victorious, but at terrible cost. In the Treaty of Nimwegen (1678) the Dutch lost

none of their territory, but Spain gave up Franche Comté and several fortresses in the Spanish Netherlands. It was clear to many in France that her enemies were learning the art of war and politics from the "Sun King."

Louis, however, was not satisfied with the conquest; in the next decade, while he remained outwardly at peace, he actually annexed more territory than he did as the result of war. Treaties in the seventeenth century never drew exact boundary lines: provinces or cities "with their dependencies" were mentioned as frontiers. Louis set up Chambers of Reunion, courts of inquiry, to discover what could be made of such a situation, and discovered that, if he went back far enough in history, many square miles could be found to be "dependencies" of territory ruled by the French king. In feudal Europe there had been a legal chaos that could be exploited for the benefit of the French crown. Indeed France annexed at least twenty important towns in Alsace-Lorraine (legally part of the empire) without any serious military repercussions. The emperor was fighting the Turks; the German princes were apparently too demoralized to stop the encroachments of France. Eventually, however, resistance did begin to develop in the form of an anti-French alliance, the League of Augsburg, by which the emperor, Spain, Sweden, and several of the more important German princes agreed to defend the integrity of the empire against France.

The growing opposition to French pressure reached a climax just when the English so-called "Glorious Revolution" occurred (1688). James II, a Catholic, fled from England, and William of Orange with his wife Mary mounted the English throne. The war that followed has been called the War of the League of Augsburg, the War of the Palatinate (French armies just invaded the Rhineland, 1689), the War of the English Succession (Louis wished to put James or his son back on the throne), and, in America, King William's War. It was the first European war to be fought on both sides of the Atlantic rim, for although Germany and the Lowlands were the scene of most of the fighting, red men and white men fought each other in America while other white men fought in Europe. Commerce and colonies as well as provinces and the European balance of power were stakes in the game. The war ended in 1697 as much because the contestants were exhausted as because all of them became interested in the great question of the day, the Spanish succession. The Treaty of Ryswick (1697) forced Louis to give up much of the territory taken by the Chambers of Reunion but left him in complete control of Alsace. William remained on the English throne, and the Dutch garrisoned fortresses in the Spanish Netherlands as guarantee against French aggression.



The Conquests of Louis XIV

In the years immediately following the Peace of Ryswick the chief problem of Europe involved the succession to the Spanish throne. Charles II almost from birth had been expected to die; he had none the less managed to keep alive and on the throne ever since 1665, but he had been unable to achieve an heir. There were two claimants to his heritage: a prince of the Hapsburg family in Austria, and the grandson of Louis XIV. If the former were recognized, the empire of Charles V might again return to European politics; if the Bourbon heir came to the throne, all western Europe and the New World might be ruled from Paris and French hegemony would be assured. With such prizes in the play, European diplomacy became exciting and involved. England and Holland, with their colonial and trading interests, could not stand aside and see the decision made without them, nor could the German states be unmindful of the implications in the new situation.

After several years of complex negotiation by which "partition treaties" divided the Spanish heritage, it seemed that Charles II could

die without causing a war over his lands. But when he did actually die (1700), he left a will in which he bequeathed his entire inheritance to Philip of Anjou, the grandson of Louis XIV. The aged French king hesitated; his people were worn out by war and overburdened by taxes. But ambition finally overcame his scruples, and he heralded his grandson as the first Bourbon king of Spain. "The Pyrenees no longer exist!" Anticipating the reaction in Europe, Louis seized the "barrier fortifications" in the Lowlands, proclaimed James II, the Pretender, to be king of England, and hastily made alliances with Bavaria and Saxony.

The war that followed, the War of the Spanish Succession, lasted from 1702 to 1713. It was fought in America (Queen Anne's War), in India, on the high seas, and in Europe. This time the new methods of warfare that France had introduced were most effectively wielded by her enemies. Eugene of Savoy, the great Austrian general who had won his spurs in wars with the Turks, led the imperial armies; and Marlborough, one of the world's great soldiers, an ancestor of Winston Churchill, led the English. The French commanders had none in their company with the brilliance of Condé or Turenne; they were pale imitators of their great predecessors. France held off her enemies by a supreme effort; when her armies were defeated, the nation, rich and poor alike, made tremendous sacrifices to raise and equip new armies. Had her enemies been completely united in their purpose, it would probably not have been enough; but when Archduke Charles mounted the Austrian throne (1711), his allies were not too anxious to press the war to the end just to assure him the throne of Spain as well. The Western powers, England and Holland, were willing to compromise if they could be sure that the Spanish crown would remain independent of both France and Austria.

The Peace of Utrecht (1713) ended the last of Louis XIV's wars. Philip V was allowed to remain on the Spanish throne after he had renounced for himself and all his heirs all rights to the French throne. Charles of Austria secured Naples, Sardinia, Milan, and the Spanish Netherlands (subsequently called the Austrian Netherlands). England was awarded Newfoundland, Acadia, Hudson's Bay, Gibraltar, and Minorca as well as valuable trading concessions in the Spanish colonies. The Dutch recovered the "barrier" fortifications in the Netherlands and a trade monopoly on the river Scheldt. The elector of Brandenburg became "King in Prussia," and the duchy of Savoy became a "kingdom" and was given Sicily. The Peace of Utrecht was one of the great congresses of Europe in the line from Westphalia to Versailles. It ended the first period of French political and military supremacy; the rest of the eighteenth century was to stand under the hegemony of


England with new powers in eastern Europe playing a larger role in the politics of the Continent.

The Rise of Brandenburg-Prussia

To a man with inspired vision one of the most important facts of the Peace of Utrecht was the appearance of the electoral prince of Brandenburg at a European conference. The armies of Frederick I, now called King in Prussia, had not contributed very much to the decisions of the war, but it was recognized none the less that his realm in North Germany was something more than just a petty German state. Had a prophet told the men of 1713 that Brandenburg-Prussia would become Brandenburg-Prussia-Germany and strive to become Germany-Europe, it is improbable that they would have believed him. It was King Frederick's father, Frederick William, the Great Elector (1640-1688), who had started the Hohenzollern family and its state on the road to power. He had unified his realm under a central government much as Richelieu had unified France. He had freed Prussia from Poland and organized the first Prussian standing army. Like Colbert in France, he had used economic policy as a tool with which to build a state. Frederick I (1688-1713) crowned his father's work by securing recognition of the little state in Europe and of his family's pretensions to the title of king.

It was Frederick William I (1713-1740), the son of Frederick I, who may properly be regarded as the founder of Prussianism. He was a vigorous, ruthless, hardbitten ruler whose sole ambition was to make his kingdom strong. It was he who expanded and developed the Prussian bureaucracy into a tool of government by establishing civil service regulations and endowing the official with an honorable place in society. It was also he who gave the Prussian army its military organization and traditions. He built the army that his son used to make Prussia into one of the great powers of Europe. To men in the eighteenth century it was clear that a state was rising in northwestern Germany and that it was a "land hungry" state. More efficient than its neighbors, better armed and better organized to direct political and economic life, Brandenburg-Prussia was prepared to fill the vacuum that a century of warfare (the Thirty Years' War and the wars of Louis XIV) had left in Germany.

This land hunger was accentuated by the fact that the Hapsburg power in central Europe was distracted from Germany's problems by the French and the Turks. The Peace of Westphalia had broken the Hapsburg emperor's powers in Germany, and events in Hungary in the

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half century after 1648 drew Austrian attention toward the South. The Turks made one last attempt to conquer Christendom, and a Turkish army did reach Vienna in 1683. This was a last blow from a decaying empire; after the assault was repulsed, the Austrians mounted a counter-attack that reconquered all of Hungary, and by 1719 had driven the Turks out of Belgrade. At the same time that the Moslem power retreated, the Austrian Hapsburgs were engaged in wars with Louis XIV. This gave them little reserve strength to apply in Germany, where the new power was rising to challenge the traditional Hapsburg leadership in German affairs. Prussian expansion both in territory and in military power was fearfully and jealously watched by her smaller neighbors, but none of them could "bell the cat." In 1740 it became clear that Brandenburg-Prussia was ready to challenge the Austrians.


The year 1740 was fateful in central Europe because of the deaths of both the Hapsburg emperor, Charles VI, and the Prussian king, Frederick William I. The former's death left Maria Theresa as heir to the Hapsburg lands; the latter's introduced Frederick II, surnamed the Great, into the politics of Europe. Charles VI had no male heir, and he had tried to secure his whole inheritance for his daughter by the "Pragmatic Sanction" which set aside the Salic law (prohibiting female succession) and declared the Hapsburg realm to be indivisible. Most of the European states, including Prussia, had agreed to it after securing ample compensations. Her father hoped that this agreement, added to her youth, her beauty, and her sex, would assure Maria Theresa the right to occupy his throne. But the young Prussian king was not to be bound by a piece of paper and traditional international morality. He had an army and his country needed more land. He had vague and shadowy claims to part of Silesia; his army could secure more land by taking the province. Since there were other powers — France and Bavaria in particular — whose moral scruples matched those of Frederick II, a war, or rather two wars, broke out in central Europe over the succession. Prussia withdrew from the conflict as soon as Maria Theresa was willing to recognize its claim to Silesia; the war between Austria and the Franco-Bavarian forces continued until 1748, for it had become merged in a colonial war between England on one side and France and Spain on the other. With Silesia under his rule Frederick II could and did transform Brandenburg-Prussia into a great power; before the century was over, it had acquired a third of Poland and occupied a leading position in Europe.

The Rise of Russia

The other power to appear on the European stage in the eighteenth century was Russia. Like Prussia, she was destined to play a much greater role in European affairs than the men of the century could have foreseen. European Russia forms an unbroken plain, threaded by numerous rivers which facilitate communication between all parts of the country. While the rest of Europe, with its mountain ranges and deep inlets of the sea, tended to divide into many separate states, Russia just as naturally became a single state. Medieval Russia comprised only the grand duchy of Muscovy, centering about Moscow, but when the seventeenth century opened, the steady expansion of its people had already carried them northward to the Arctic, southward to the Caspian, and eastward beyond the Urals. Over this enormous and heterogeneous territory ruled the emperor who called himself "czar and autocrat of all Russia." The family of the czars, descended from the Scandinavian Rurik in the ninth century, finally became extinct and in 1613 the nobles met at Moscow to elect a new ruler. Their choice fell upon one of their own number, Michael Romanov by name, whose family was related by marriage to the old royal line. His grandson was Peter the Great (1689-1725).

Russia at this time did not rank as a great power. Compared with western Europeans generally, its people were little better than barbarians. The Mongols had conquered them in the Middle Ages and Mongol rule interrupted for several centuries the stream of civilizing influences that in earlier times flowed into Russia from imperial Constantinople. Deprived of seaports on the Black Sea and the Baltic, they could not engage in foreign commerce and enjoy stimulating intercourse with their European neighbors. Most Russians were ignorant, superstitious peasants who led secluded lives in small villages scattered over the fields and throughout the forests. Even the inhabitants of the few towns had not reached the cultural standards of the western peoples, whose ways they disliked and whose religion, whether Catholic or Protestant, they condemned as heretical. Such was the Russia which the reforms of Peter the Great turned into new channels.

Peter began his work by sending fifty young Russians of the best families to England, Holland, and Venice to absorb all they could of European arts and customs. Then he went himself and passed two years abroad, studying shipbuilding and navigation and collecting miners, mechanics, engineers, architects, and experts of every sort for the roads and bridges, the ships and palaces, the schools and hospitals which were



The Growth of Russia (1300-1725)

to arise in Russia. The westernizing of the country proceeded at a rapid pace. The long Asiatic robes of the nobles had to give way to short German jackets and hose. Long beards, which people considered sacred, had to be shaved, or else a tax paid for the privilege of being bearded. The sale of tobacco, previously prohibited, was now allowed. Women, once kept in semiseclusion, were permitted to appear in public without veils and mingle with men at dances and entertainments. A Russian order of chivalry was founded. The Bible was translated into the vernacular, printed, and sold at popular prices. Peter adopted the Julian calendar in place of the old Russian calendar, which began the year on the first of September, supposed to be the date of Creation. He also improved the Russian alphabet by omitting some of its cumbersome

letters and by simplifying others. These changes chiefly affected the upper classes. The peasants clung to their old ways.

Peter found in Russia no regular army; he organized one modeled upon that of Prussia. He found no fleet; he built one modeled upon that of Holland. He opened mines, cut canals, laid out roads, introduced sheep-breeding, and fostered by protective tariffs the silk and woolen industries. He instituted a police system and a postal service. He established schools of medicine, engineering, and navigation. He also framed a code of laws based upon the legal systems of western Europe. Some of these reforming measures met much opposition on the part of the clergy. Peter curtailed their power by converting the Russian (Orthodox) Church into a state church. All ecclesiastical authority was vested in a body called the Holy Synod. The members were bishops, but a layman, appointed by the czar, presided over it and dictated its decisions. From Peter's time to the Russian Revolution of 1917 the church was one of the main props of autocracy. The nobility, which also opposed the czar's innovations, was made over into a body of officeholders whose rank depended not upon their birth or wealth but upon their service to the czar. In place of the old assembly of nobles (Duma), Peter established a Council of State directly responsible to himself. In these ways he built up an absolutism as unlimited as that of his contemporary, Louis XIV.

Peter realized that Russia needed readier access to the sea than could be found through the Arctic port of Archangel. He made little headway against the Ottoman Turks, who controlled the Black Sea, but twenty years of intermittent warfare with the Swedes enabled him to acquire the Swedish provinces on the eastern shore of the Baltic. Here in the swamps of the river Neva, not far from the Gulf of Finland, he built a new and splendid capital, which he intended to be less Asiatic in character and more susceptible to European influence than Moscow. To it he gave the German name of (St.) Petersburg (now Leningrad). He had at last realized his long-cherished dream of opening a "window" through which the Russian people might look into Europe.

Russia under Catherine the Great; the Eastern Question

Shortly after the death of Peter the Great the male line of the Romanov dynasty became extinct. The succession now passed to women, who intermarried with German princes and thus increased the German influence in Russia. It was a German princess, Catherine II, who completed Peter's work of making Russia into one of the great powers of Europe. Catherine came to Russia as the wife of the heir-

apparent. Once in her adopted country, she proceeded to make herself in all ways a Russian, learning the language and even conforming, at least outwardly, to the Orthodox Church. Her husband was a weakling, and Catherine managed to get rid of him after he had reigned only six months. She then mounted the throne and for thirty-four years ruled as czarina (1762-1796).

The defeat of Sweden by Peter the Great left Poland and Turkey as the two countries which still blocked the path of Russia toward the sea. Catherine took the lion's share of Poland, when that unfortunate kingdom was divided by Russia, Austria, and Prussia, and thus advanced the western boundary of Russia into the very center of the Continent. Catherine also secured from the Ottoman Turks an outlet on the Black Sea, though she never realized her ambition of expelling them from European soil.

When in 1453 the Turks captured Constantinople, their European dominions already included a considerable part of the Balkan peninsula. The two centuries following witnessed the steady progress of the Ottoman power over southeastern Europe. In 1683 the Turks marched on Vienna, two hundred thousand strong, laid siege to it, and would have taken it but for the timely appearance of a relieving army commanded by the Polish king, John Sobieski. Poland at that time saved Austria from destruction and definitely stopped the land advance of the Turks in Europe. After 1683 the Crescent began to fall back before the Cross.

Catherine's wars with the Turks marked a further stage in the decline of the Ottoman power. Russia secured the Crimea, as well as the northern shore of the Black Sea. Russian merchant ships were also granted free access through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles to the Mediterranean. Catherine in this way opened for Russia another "window" on Europe. Turkey lost more than territory. Russian consuls were admitted to Turkish towns, and Russian residents in Turkey were granted the free exercise of their religion. Russia from this time interfered constantly in Turkish affairs. Turkey became the "sick man of Europe," and the disposition of its possessions among its envious neighbors would henceforth form one of the thorny problems of European diplomacy. What is called the "Eastern Question" arose to trouble European politics.

Colonial and Dynastic Rivalries

As we have seen, the death of Charles VI of Austria was the signal for an assault on the Hapsburg holdings in central Europe. Frederick II attacked and took Silesia. Bavaria, backed by France, attempted to gain control over the rest of Maria Theresa's heritage. These conflicts

were essentially contests for power in Europe; they were joined by chance to another contest for power that extended beyond Europe into the Americas and India.

After the Peace of Utrecht, Europe enjoyed some twenty-five years of comparative peace during which there was also reasonable prosperity. Both England and France experienced a violent inflation of currency values during the period; the principal result was the liquidation of the war debts of the preceding era under conditions that actually did not check the development of commerce. Both countries vigorously labored to build up colonies in America and commerce in India, and inevitably their interests clashed in both areas. But it was the Spanish Empire that offered the prize. Spain's power was obviously on the wane, and her empire was in danger of becoming a derelict to be taken by the first comer. The Peace of Utrecht gave the English the right to share the commerce of the Spanish-American colonies, a right which Englishmen hoped to build into real commercial control. The fact that there was a Bourbon king on the Spanish as well as on the French throne, gave Frenchmen hope that the "family compact" between the two nations would lead to French advantages in the Spanish colonies. Spain, of course, did not go under without a struggle. Her governors tried to curtail the effects of both English and French encroachment. In doing so, Spain drifted into a war with England in the late 1730's. In 1740 when France came to the aid of Spain against England and of Bavaria against Maria Theresa, the War of the Austrian Succession and the colonial war (King George's War to the American colonists) became merged in a world struggle.

The war lasted until 1748 and neither side had won any considerable advantage. Frederick II made peace, reopened hostilities, and made peace again during the war to assure his possession of Silesia; but beyond his conquest there were few significant gains made by any of the contestants. The treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748 provided essentially for a return to the *status quo* of 1740: the colonial conquests were returned and Maria Theresa retained her heritage with the exception of Silesia.

Between 1748 and 1756 Europe prepared to reopen the conflict. The colonial problems that had been responsible for the war between England and the two Bourbon kingdoms of France and Spain actually became more acute. In the Ohio Valley the French and their Indian allies tried desperately to cut the English colonies off from the hinterland of North America, while in India the French and British East India Companies fought undeclared wars for commercial advantages. The French leader Dupleix proved to be a remarkable governor; he made

agreements with the native states and at the same time organized the first large-scale army of natives under European officers. He was eventually checkmated by an equally crafty and skillful organizer, Robert Clive, who developed the British position in India so effectively that the conquest of the whole subcontinent could be started as soon as the French were cleared out and after the Afghans had destroyed the power of the Central Indian princes.

While this Anglo-French rivalry for colonies in India and America drifted toward open war, a diplomatic revolution was under way on the Continent. Maria Theresa's great foreign minister, Count Kaunitz, prepared a trap for Prussia. The rise of Prussia to great power status, the successful rape of Silesia, and the restless ambition of the young king Frederick II made Prussia's neighbors fearful for the future and anxious to strip the new eagle of his tail feathers before his flight brought further conquest. A new alliance was concocted that tied France, Austria, and Russia together. Frederick's sarcastic remarks about the "three cats" that "ran Europe" (Empress Elizabeth of Russia, Maria Theresa of Austria, and Madame de Pompadour of France) seemed to be coming home to roost. Actually, of course, it was the sensational rise of Prussia that had upset the balance and brought the envy and wrath of her neighbors upon that kingdom. As in 1740, the threatened colonial war and the threatened European war merged. England made an alliance with Prussia to counterbalance the Franco-Austrian-Russian alliance. It was a desperate situation for the young Prussian king, for outside of England and Hanover the whole Continent was against him.

The war that followed (1756-1763) is called the Seven Years' War in Europe and the French and Indian War in America. In both North America and India the British were victorious. A young man named George Washington got his first experience as an officer in the conflict in the Ohio Valley; Robert Clive showed how the French could be driven from India. But in Europe the struggle was desperate. Frederick II earned the surname, the Great, by defeating in turn an Austrian, a French, and a Russian army, although at terrible cost to his own soldiers. Somehow with English subsidies and with his own iron will he managed to survive both victories and defeats. When his magnificent army of 1756 was used up, he enrolled green peasant boys and even made officers of middle-class soldiers. In spite of his genius, disaster must have overtaken him but for the death of the Czarina Elizabeth (1762) just when the Russian armies were pressing in for the kill. The new czar, Peter II, regarded Frederick as his hero, and not only made peace with him but even prepared to join him against Austria and France. Peter, however, was strangled by court assassins (regicide

was almost a constitutional device in Russia), and his wife, who became Czarina Catherine the Great, backed out of the alliance, but ended the war. Frederick, no more exhausted than France and Austria, held his head above water until the next year when the Treaty of Paris (1763) ended hostilities everywhere.

The Treaty of Paris (1763) was a general settlement comparable to those of Westphalia and Utrecht as well as Vienna (1815) and Versailles (1919). It readjusted the political balances to recognize the fact that England had become the great colonial and maritime power in the world and that Prussia must henceforth be recognized as a power of the first magnitude. France gave up practically all her colonies except a few small naval stations, and England was recognized as master of the North American continent east of the Mississippi River as well as the principal heir to the chaos that had become India. On the Continent Frederick regained all his territory, including Silesia. It only remained for him to co-operate with Russia and Austria in the partition of Poland to give Prussia the territory necessary to support its new dignity.


The Treaty of Paris also set the stage for the foundation of another great power. When the French menace was removed, the English colonists in North America became more independent and less willing to hear about their obligations to the mother country. At the same time, the English government was free to take a larger interest in the affairs of those colonies. The War for American Independence, 1775-1783, like the first partition of Poland (1772), grew out of the new adjustments that were recognized in Paris in 1763. The success of both these events also was dependent upon the Treaty of Paris. Almost all Europe became involved — actively in the case of Spain, France, and Holland, and passively in the case of Prussia, Sweden, and Russia — on the side of the American revolutionary colonists. England's sensational advance had given her too strong a position in Europe to maintain the balance of power in the world, and her late enemies were anxious to bring her to a fall. The successful outcome of the American Revolution was largely dependent upon this European aspect of the war. Thus the thirteen American colonies became the United States of America about the same time that Prussia was recognized as a great power and, interestingly enough, also about the same time that Russia first appeared as a great power. Men in 1763-1775, however, could not have foreseen that Prussia would become Germany; Russia, the Soviet Union; and the United States, the industrial colossus of the western world.

The Polish Partitions

The first partition of Poland was the natural outcome of the new balance of power in Europe. It has been styled an act of brigandage largely because it was accomplished without war. It might better be called the first great breach in the ethical structure of European politics on the continent of Europe itself. Land had been annexed before but such actions, even in the case of Silesia, had always been based upon more or less defensible claims to rights of inheritance. Such rights were comparatively tenuous in connection with colonial areas, and the Treaties of Utrecht and of Paris handled them in rather summary fashion. In the case of Poland, the country was divided up simply because it was unable to organize itself as a modern state, and the aggressor states made no pretense that they had any right to the territory.

Between Russia on the one side and Austria and Prussia on the other side lay Poland, a great monotonous plain reaching from the Baltic almost to the Black Sea. The country lacked geographical unity: no natural barriers of rivers or mountains separated it from powerful neighbors. It was not racially compact, for besides Poles and Lithuanians the inhabitants included many Russians and Swedes, and a large Jewish element in the towns. Nor was it religiously united. The Poles and many Lithuanians were Catholics, the Germans and Swedes were Lutherans, while the Russians belonged to the Orthodox Church. Feudalism still flourished. The nobles owned all the land, and no large and wealthy middle class stood between them and their miserable serfs. The monarchy was elective, so that the kings were little more than puppets of the noble electors. In the national assembly, composed of representatives of the nobility, any member by his single veto — "I object" — could block proposed legislation. Few measures met the approval of the nobles except those which increased their privileges and power. The wonder is not that Poland disappeared but that it survived so long under this makeshift government.

Russia, Austria, and Prussia had often interfered in the choice of Polish rulers, and at length they began to annex Polish territory. They did not need to conquer the country, but merely to divide it like something ownerless and dead. Catherine II joined with Maria Theresa and Frederick the Great in the first partition (1772), by which Poland lost about a fourth of its territory. The suggestion for the dismemberment of Poland came from Frederick the Great, who with his usual frankness admitted that it was an act of brigands. In Catherine II Frederick found an ally as unprincipled as himself. Maria Theresa's scruples were easily overcome. "She wept indeed, but she took." No European power



Partitions of Poland (1772, 1793, 1795)

intervened to prevent this aggression on a weak state. Great Britain did nothing because Poland was far away and outside the orbit of British interests; France did nothing because of the alliance between French Bourbons and Hapsburgs. The second (1793) and third (1795) partitions came when the French Revolution distracted any opposition that France might have had to the extinction of the Polish crown. The Poles were probably better governed under their new rulers than they had been under the anarchy of their old constitution, but they had been a kingdom and a people too long easily to forget that they once enjoyed independence. The Polish Question, therefore, was to remain a European question down to our own times.

The Decline of the Ottoman Empire

One of the most significant facts of the latter seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries was the decline of the Ottoman power in Europe. For the preceding three hundred years the expansion of that empire had been a continuous menace to western Christendom. As we have seen, this expansion was a decisive factor in the political, religious, and intellectual development of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and it was the Ottoman Empire that turned the Hapsburgs' attention away from the problems created by Louis XIV in the seventeenth century. In the eighteenth century, the Empire showed that even in decay it could create problems almost as great as it did when its power was fresh and vigorous, for the "heirs" to the Ottoman lands were not always able to agree upon the distribution of them. By the nineteenth century, the disintegration became the most insistent problem of European politics.

The Ottoman empire had been founded and expanded upon the principle of military aggression. The sultans were politico-religious officers who combined the functions of caliph of Islam with those of the military arm of aggressive Mohammedanism. They had at their disposal the Janizary Corps, an army of ex-Christian slaves trained in the art of war, and a civil service of slaves recruited from the most intelligent boys in the Janizaries. The long line of vigorous sultans of the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries built an empire that extended from Persia to the Danube, from the Indian Ocean across North Africa to the Atlantic. The last great sultan, Suleiman the Magnificent, fought Charles of Spain in the Mediterranean and before Vienna and threatened to overrun all Europe.

By the last of the sixteenth century, however, decay set in. The Janizaries were allowed to marry and to enroll their children in the corps, the governors became more and more independent of their master, and the proud system of conquest was slowed down to a halt. The empire was still strong, but it had no longer the power to expand. Weak men occupied the throne of Selim I and Suleiman the Magnificent, and harem politics and intrigues passed for statesmanship. For over a generation the power of the Turks seemed to sleep. They could not even take advantage of the disorders caused by the Thirty Years' War in Germany.

In the second half of the seventeenth century a remarkable family of viziers, the Kuprili, awakened the empire and tried to return to the march of conquest. Internal reforms and reorganizations momentarily gave the sultans power that could be used against Christian Europe. A series of wars against the Poles, the Austrian Hapsburgs, and Venice

secured Crete and swept an Ottoman army to the very gates of Vienna (1683). But the old vim of the Janizaries was gone; instead of taking the city by storm, they settled down to a long siege, and a relieving army under Jan Sobieski, king of Poland, forced them to retire. This was the last high tide of Ottoman conquest; the disintegrating forces that had weakened the state after the death of Suleiman had done their work; the reforms of the Kiuprilis were unable to check their course. This does not mean that the Turkish empire collapsed; it merely decayed while Austrian, Polish, Venetian, and Russian forces pressed in to take advantage of its weakness.

During the first three-quarters of the eighteenth century Russia and Austria were able to co-operate in a series of wars against the Turks. Austria reconquered all of Hungary, and Russia established herself on the northern coast of the Black Sea. During these wars the Turks received some aid from France in return for concessions granted to French Catholic interests in the Levant, but it was not enough to assure the Ottoman empire stability in face of the pressure from the North. Under Catherine the Great, however, it became clear that Russian aims in the Balkans and the Levant were extensive. The Russians were obviously prepared to push their conquests right down to Constantinople itself so that they could control the straits and have a port of entry into the Mediterranean. When this objective became clear, the Turks found they had friends. The Austrians did not wish to see Russian interests outflank them to the south nor could they look with pleasure to the Black Sea's becoming a Russian lake. At the same time English commercial and naval interests in the eastern Mediterranean could not easily accept the intrusion of Russia into that area.

Thus, at the end of the eighteenth century, the elements of the Near Eastern Question of the nineteenth century were already shaping themselves. Russia's primary drive to possess the territory and the capital of the decaying Turkish empire threatened the interests of other powers. France, whose traditional interests in the trade and the religious institutions in the Levant still were strong enough to make her friendly with the Turks, and both Austria and England, fearful of Russia, were willing to say, "Turkey, barbarous as she is, is a necessary evil in the European system." All that had to be added after 1800 to make the Near East into the trouble spot of Europe was the nationalism of the subject Balkan peoples and their subsequent demand for independence.

Enlightened Despotism

The eighteenth century saw the rise of a new philosophy that inevitably affected the political organization of Europe. In the first half of the seventeenth century Catholics and Protestants hurled both words and weapons at each other, and tried to convince themselves that their political life was deeply connected with their religious beliefs. But the Treaty of Westphalia secularized politics; after 1648 the papal and imperial pretensions to universal authority were gone, and in their place stood the interests of the states. For a century more the kings pretended, and their priests and preachers usually supported them, that they ruled by divine right; in other words, that the king embodied the principles that pope and emperor had stood for in the Middle Ages. But during the eighteenth century this fiction became threadbare, and a new principle had to be discovered to justify the rule of kings.

It was an epoch in which men were making discoveries about the world. They were finding that the physical world was governed by natural laws that could be stated in mathematical terms, and they reasoned that the world of men, the social world, must also be subject to natural laws as real as the laws of motion and gravitation. It was therefore the task of the ruler not to make, but to discover, the laws and to apply them. At the same time, therefore, when men were questioning supernatural religion and doubting the divine origin of kings, the advanced thinkers of Europe gave rulers a new task and a new conception of their role in society.

Almost no one in the eighteenth century was willing to consider the possibility that the people should govern themselves. The masses were ignorant, brutalized, and unclean; it was inconceivable that they should govern themselves. But there was rising in Europe an ever-growing *bourgeoisie* whom the extension of commerce, the needs of armies for supplies, and the growth of cities were making rich. These people were sorely displeased with the way the landed aristocracy ran Europe, and they were willing to concentrate more and more power in the hands of rulers if those rulers would reorganize government so that the commercial classes could benefit and the nobility be curbed. Out of the new idea of the role of the king and the interests of the new *bourgeoisie* there arose the conception of the Enlightened Despot.

"Give me ten years of absolutism and the country will be free" was the idea of the new philosophers. A monarch, absolute in his power, could sweep away the irrational aspects of government, that is, feudalism, and erect in its place a modern rational state. He could relieve poverty, foster industry and commerce, build roads and canals, grant

religious toleration, codify and rationalize laws, provide education, and encourage the arts and sciences; in short, he could use his power to make the state modern.

It must not be assumed that the philosophers could or did convert rulers to their beliefs. Enlightened despotism, wherever it was successful, was also rooted in the traditions of the past. Frederick the Great, for example, is the most outstanding example of an enlightened despot: his Prussia became a model for philosophers and princes, and his rule was heralded as opening a new era. Actually it was nothing of the kind. He merely continued and expanded the paternalistic policies of his three predecessors. His fame rests upon his adapting his reforms to the spirit of the age just as his father and great-grandfather had adapted their reforms to the spirit of their age. Frederick granted toleration, built roads and canals, reorganized the administration, introduced education, fostered industry and commerce, and did all the things that enlightened despots tried to do; but he was careful not to move too fast and, indeed, he was unable to do many things he wished because the political and social structure of Prussia was not ready for them. If one looks at the history of Prussia from 1640 to 1788, it becomes clear that Frederick's Prussia was built upon paternalistic traditions that Frederick used and called "enlightened despotism."

This fact becomes even more evident when Frederick's rule is compared with the government of his Austrian contemporary, Joseph II. Joseph II was firmly convinced that it was his duty to reform his realm in the spirit of the new era. By a stroke of the pen he reorganized administration and laws so that his domain became a national whole. The feudal privileges, the regime of exceptions, provincial and town rights disappeared in favor of a rational legal system. But Austria did not have the paternalistic traditions of Prussia, and Joseph II tried to change everything at once. The result was revolt. Even the very people that he thought he was helping objected, and the old privileged classes would not tolerate the new order. At his death, most of his work was undone. He could not overcome the opposition, and his successor had no wish to try the impossible. In France Louis XVI hoped to be an enlightened despot, but it took the French Revolution to accomplish the task of reform. Just as Joseph II was unable to reorganize the Austrian lands, so Louis XVI and his reforming ministers discovered that they could not push through new political and economic measures in face of the resistance of those who had vested interests in the *status quo*. It required a thorough-going revolution to clear away the antagonism to the creation of the rational state in France.

There were other "enlightened despots" in the late eighteenth century. Catherine II of Russia posed as the patron of the new learning in the East, but actually her work, like Frederick's in Prussia, was a continuation of the westernizing process started by Peter the Great. French philosophers lived in St. Petersburg and sang the praises of the great czarina, and Russia did move one step closer to integration with the West; but no one should have any illusions about the fact that Russia at the end of the century was still backward from the Western viewpoint. In Spain, in Tuscany, in Portugal, and in several of the smaller German states, there were men who tried to apply the principle of enlightened despotism, and their work might well be considered as the foundation for the rational state of the nineteenth century.

Commerce and Colonies

The Mercantile System

EUROPEAN expansion overseas, begun by Da Gama and Columbus, at first redounded entirely to the benefit of Portugal and Spain, who by the Demarcation Line had divided the extra-European world between them. While France claimed Canada by virtue of Cartier's discoveries and England claimed "Virginia," neither country during the sixteenth century had been able to establish a colony in these regions. A map of 1600 would not show a single foreign possession of France or Holland and only one (Newfoundland) of England. Yet these countries now ranked as great powers. They could not be permanently excluded from a share in the spoils of empire by a little, weak Portugal and a Spain visibly declining in martial energy and control of the sea.

Most European governments at this time accepted the principles of mercantilism, or the mercantile system. Mercantilism is not a term capable of exact definition, but it may be described, broadly, as the economic policy which developed in the national states after the breakdown of feudalism. Autocratic rulers, holding all the reins of control in their hands, were now able to do many things in the economic sphere previously not done at all or left to local authorities and the guilds. The kings and their ministers sought to build up the national wealth, power, and prestige by the encouragement of manufactures and agriculture, the creation of a merchant marine, the establishment of foreign trading monopolies, and the acquisition of markets in undeveloped countries across the ocean. All this implied a close oversight of private enterprise by the public authorities. The state, as far as it could do so, arranged for each citizen what he might produce and how he might produce it, what he might earn and how he might spend what he earned. Mercantilism has sometimes been called Colbertism, after Colbert, the able minister of Louis XIV, who adopted its principles. Cromwell in England also stands as a prominent representative of mercantilism.

Some mercantilists, impressed by the fact that money is always in universal demand and that with money one may acquire all other commodities, argued that the prime business of statesmen should be to secure for their countries a sufficiency of silver and gold. Portugal and Spain received the precious metals directly from the mines in their colonies, but other European countries could obtain them only by means of commerce. If a country sold more to foreigners than it bought from them, then there would be a "favorable balance of trade," and this balance foreigners would have to make up in coin or bullion. As one mercantilist expressed it, the ordinary means "to increase our wealth and treasure is by foreign trade, wherein we must ever observe this rule: to sell more to strangers yearly than we consume of theirs in value."

Mercantilism and Colonial Policy

The possession of large and flourishing colonies was considered essential to the successful operation of the mercantile system. Colonies were regarded simply as estates to be worked for the advantage of the mother country. They would provide raw materials, markets for manufactured goods, and opportunities for the profitable investment of capital. The home government tried, therefore, to prevent foreigners from trading with its dependencies. Portugal shut out European competitors from commerce with the East Indies, and Spain long forbade any intercourse between her American colonists and foreigners under pain of confiscation of property and sometimes of death. The home government also either prohibited or placed serious restrictions on colonial enterprises that might compete with those of the mother country. Spain in this way discouraged not only manufacturing but also shipbuilding and even the cultivation of the vine and the olive by its colonists in America. Holland, France, and England, once they secured possessions overseas, adopted similar restrictive policies. Their efforts to break down trade monopolies and acquire rich territories at the expense of hated rivals led inevitably to international quarrels, and the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were as productive of wars beyond Europe as within Europe.

Trading Companies

The home government did not engage in commerce with its colonies or with foreign countries, but granted this privilege to private companies. The first form of association was the regulated company. Each member, after paying the entrance fee, traded with his own capital at

his own risk, and kept his profit to himself. Regulated companies were chartered in England originally for the Continental trade, for example, the Merchants Adventurers, a company which exported chiefly English cloth.

This loose form of association afterward gave way to the joint-stock company. The members contributed to a common fund by the purchase of shares and, instead of trading themselves, entrusted the management of the business to a board of directors. If the enterprise proved to be successful, the profits were divided among the stockholders in proportion to their interest in it. Capital was thus effectively mobilized for the pursuit of business enterprises on a large scale. Trading companies were very numerous. England, France, Holland, and other countries chartered East India companies. England, in addition, had companies for trade with the Baltic lands, Russia, Turkey, West Africa, and North America.

Colonial Empire of Holland

The Dutch, occupying a territory too small to maintain many people by agriculture, turned to the sea for support. They became the finest sailors of the time, exchanged "tons of herring for tons of gold," and built up an extensive transport trade between the Mediterranean and the Baltic lands. The prosperity which the Flemish cities had enjoyed during the later Middle Ages now extended to the Dutch cities, and Rotterdam and Amsterdam formed great centers of commerce, banking, and international exchange.


After the discovery of the Cape route to the Far East, Dutch traders met Portuguese merchants at Lisbon and there obtained the spices and other eastern commodities in such general demand throughout Europe. The rupture with Spain, which had annexed Portugal, turned to the commercial advantage of the Dutch. They now began to make expeditions directly to the Far East. In 1602 the government of Holland chartered an East India Company, a joint-stock association, with a monopoly of trade and rule eastward from the Cape of Good Hope to the Strait of Magellan. It was authorized to make laws and enforce them, to raise troops, build forts, declare wars, and conclude treaties; it exercised all the rights of sovereignty. The company operated chiefly in the East Indies. The Portuguese were driven out of the Moluccas, or Spice Islands; Java, Sumatra, Celebes, and other islands previously unclaimed by Europeans were occupied. Upon the dissolution of the company at the end of the eighteenth century, the home government took over the control of these possessions.

The Dutch East India Company began the colonization of South Africa with the founding of Cape Town in 1652. This settlement was intended to be no more than a way station or port of refreshment for ships on the long voyage across the Indian Ocean. Eventually numerous emigrants from Holland arrived there, together with French Protestants (Huguenots) who had left their native land after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes by Louis XIV. Cape Colony became a British possession during the Napoleonic wars, but the republics set up in South Africa by Dutch farmers (Boers) long remained independent of Great Britain.

It was an agent of the Dutch East India Company, the Englishman Henry Hudson, who in 1609, seeking a northwest passage to China, sailed up the river which bears his name to near the site of the present Albany. A few years later the government of Holland chartered the Dutch West India Company for commerce and colonization between the west coast of Africa and the east coast of the Americas. In 1626 the director general, Peter Minuit, with cloth, beads, and trinkets to the value of about twenty-four dollars, purchased Manhattan Island from the Indians and founded New Amsterdam. From this as a nucleus the Dutch settlement of New Netherland spread northward along the Hudson and southward to Delaware Bay. Possessing the best port on the north Atlantic coast and commanding a great waterway for the fur trade with the interior, the Dutch might have made their colony one of the strongest European settlements in the New World, but emigration to it was never large and it could not be defended against a land-grabbing England. In 1664 New Amsterdam became New York. Meanwhile, the Dutch West India Company had secured a large part of Guiana, as well as Curaçao and other islands in the West Indies. These possessions still belong to Holland.

Rivalry of France and England in India

European expansion in India was made possible by the decline of the Mogul (Mongol) Empire. That empire had been founded in 1526 by Baber, a Moslem Turk, and greatly extended by the sweeping conquests of his grandson Akbar (1556-1605). His successors ruled with great magnificence from their capital at Delhi, but never really unified the Indian peoples, who continued to be separated from one another by differences of race, language, and religious belief. No national feeling stirred them, and when the Moguls failed to preserve law and order the peoples were ready, with perfect indifference, to accept the rule of foreign overlords.

*India in 1783*

Neither France nor England began by making annexations in India. Each country merely established an East India Company, giving to it a monopoly of trade between India and the homeland. The French company, chartered during the reign of Louis XIV, had its headquarters at Pondicherry, on the southeastern coast of India. The English company, which received its first charter from Queen Elizabeth, possessed trading posts at Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta.

The French were the first to attempt the task of empire-building under Dupleix, the governor general of Pondicherry. He entered into alliance with some of the Indian princes and managed to create an army

by enlisting native soldiers (sepoys), who were drilled by French officers. The English afterward did the same thing, and to this day sepoys comprise the bulk of the Indian forces of Great Britain. Upon the outbreak of the War of the Austrian Succession the French captured Madras, but it was restored to the English at the conclusion of peace in 1748. Dupleix continued, however, to extend French influence in the south and east of India. A young Englishman, Robert Clive, not only checkmated Dupleix's ambitious schemes but by the victory of Plassey (1757) acquired Bengal, with its rich Gangetic delta and teeming population. Meanwhile, the outbreak of the Seven Years' War in Europe renewed the contest between England and France on Indian soil. The English were completely successful, for their command of the sea prevented the French government from sending reinforcements to India. France recovered its possessions by the Peace of Paris in 1763, but agreed not to fortify them. Thus England was to have a free hand henceforth in shaping the destinies of a region half as large as Europe.

New France

For sixty years after the failure of Cartier's attempt to plant a settlement in Canada the French were so occupied with the Huguenot wars that they gave little thought to colonial enterprises. With the opening of the seventeenth century they again turned to the New World, attracted by the fur trade and the fisheries, and began the colonization of Canada during the same decade that the English were colonizing Virginia. Their first permanent settlement was made in 1605 at Port Royal, Acadia (Nova Scotia). In 1608 Samuel de Champlain built a fort at Quebec and three years later, a trading post at Montreal. Champlain discovered the lake that bears his name, traced the course of the St. Lawrence River, and also came upon lakes Ontario and Huron.

During the reign of Louis XIV the exploration of Canada proceeded with renewed energy. The French hitherto had been spurred by the hope of finding in the Great Lakes a western passage to the East Indies. Joliet, the fur trader, and Marquette, the Jesuit missionary, believed that they had reached the waterway uniting the Atlantic and Pacific when their birchbark canoes first glided into the upper Mississippi. It was reserved for the greatest of French explorers, Robert de La Salle, to discover the true character of the "Father of Waters" and, in 1682, to descend it to the sea. He took possession of all the territory drained by the Mississippi for Louis XIV, naming it Louisiana. New Orleans, about one hundred miles from the mouth of the river, was founded in 1718.

Where La Salle had shown the way, missionaries, fur traders, and adventurers quickly followed. The French now began to realize the importance of the Mississippi valley, which time was to prove the most extensive fertile area in the world. Efforts were made to occupy it and to connect it with Canada by a chain of sixty forts reaching from Quebec to New Orleans. However ambitious was this program, it seemed not incapable of fulfillment. New France, a single royal province under one military governor, offered a united front to the divided English colonies. The population, though small compared with the number of English colonists, consisted mostly of men of military age who had the assistance of Indian allies.

These real advantages were largely offset by lack of home support. The French government wasted on European battlefields the resources which might otherwise have been expended in America. Furthermore, the despotism of Louis XIV and Louis XV hampered private enterprise in New France by vexatious restrictions on trade and industry, and at the same time deprived the inhabitants of training in self-government. The French settlers never breathed the air of liberty, whereas the English colonists were left almost entirely to themselves in political matters. It seems fair to say that the weakness of France as a colonial power was very largely due to the unfortunate policies of its rulers.

The English Settlement of Virginia and Massachusetts

The failure of Raleigh's attempt to occupy the region then called Virginia postponed further colonizing efforts by Englishmen until the seventeenth century opened. By this time the defeat of the Armada had overthrown the Spanish naval supremacy, and Englishmen could at length establish American colonies without interference from Spain. Raleigh transferred his interests in Virginia to a group of merchants and adventurers, who obtained from James I a charter for the incorporation of two joint-stock companies, one centering in London and the other in Plymouth. The charter claimed for England all North America from the thirty-fourth to the forty-fifth degree north latitude, that is, from Cape Fear to the Bay of Fundy. The London Company promptly took steps to settle Virginia. A party of one hundred and twenty men left England in 1607 and after four wearisome months on the ocean reached the capes of Chesapeake Bay. They entered the bay and, on a peninsula in the broad river which they named after the king who gave them their charter, founded Jamestown, the first permanent settlement of Englishmen in the New World.

Colonization in the seventeenth century formed a death-struggle with

nature, and the privations endured by the settlers of Virginia are a familiar story in American history. Of more than six thousand people who arrived during the first seventeen years of the colony four-fifths died of hunger and disease or at the hands of the Indians. The future of Virginia was not assured until the colonists turned to tobacco-raising, for which the warm climate and yellow soil were admirably suited. "The weed," as King James called it in derision, brought a high price abroad, and its cultivation quickly became the principal industry of Virginia.

The colonization of New England was begun by the Pilgrim Fathers, to use the name invented for them by modern historians. They belonged to the Puritan sect of Independents or Separatists, who rejected both Anglicanism and Presbyterianism and wanted each congregation to rule itself. Congregationalism developed from this conception of church government. Persecuted by Elizabeth and James I, many Separatists went to Holland, the land of religious freedom. The prospect of losing their English speech and customs among the Dutch did not please them, and presently the exiles began to long for another home, where "they might more glorify God, do more good to their country, better provide for their posterity, and live to be more refreshed by their labors, than ever they could do in Holland." One congregation dwelling in Leiden decided to emigrate to America. Having obtained from the Virginia Company (a reorganization of the London Company) a patent to colonize within the limits of Virginia, a party of one hundred and two men, women, and children set sail in the "Mayflower" in 1620. They intended to settle somewhere south of the Hudson River, but when they sighted land it was the peninsula of Cape Cod. After exploring the coast, the Pilgrims came to the sheltered harbor of Plymouth and there went ashore.

The Pilgrims found themselves outside the territory granted to the Virginia Company and hence could not use their patent for colonization. Before leaving the "Mayflower," therefore, they took steps to provide for the orderly rule of their little community. The adult men of the party signed their names to an agreement creating a "civil body politic," and they promised to obey all laws necessary for the "general good." Though in no sense a constitution for an independent state, the Mayflower Compact established a colony by the will of the colonists rather than by the will of a sovereign. That was an innovation, heralding the self-government to come.

To settle on the New England coast in midwinter was a grim business. More than half of the Pilgrims died before spring came, and after ten years they had increased to little more than three hundred. Yet

the Pilgrims did not despair, for they were determined to set up a religious asylum in the American wilderness. "Let it not be grievous to you," wrote their friends in England, "that you have been instruments to break the ice for others; the honor shall be yours to the world's end." Instruments they were. The Pilgrim settlement at Plymouth was the forerunner of that great Puritan exodus which in the third decade of the seventeenth century colonized Massachusetts.

The colonization of Massachusetts had its origin in the desire of the Puritans to establish a self-governing community far removed from Stuart absolutism in politics and religion. Some Puritan leaders obtained a grant of land in New England, together with a royal charter incorporating them as the Company of Massachusetts Bay. The "great emigration" began in 1630, and during the next ten years more than twenty thousand Puritans left England for America. This was the period when Charles I ruled without a parliament and when Archbishop Laud harried so cruelly all those who did not conform to the Anglican Church. The Puritans established themselves at Salem, Boston, Charlestown, and other sites on Massachusetts Bay.

The Thirteen Colonies

By the end of the seventeenth century Massachusetts had absorbed Plymouth and had thrown out the offshoots which presently became Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New Hampshire. The circumstances of the foundation of these colonies gave to the northern or New England colonies a distinct political and religious character. The southern colonies included Virginia; Maryland, which Charles I granted to Lord Baltimore as a great landed estate; the two Carolinas; and Georgia, established in the eighteenth century chiefly as a military outpost against Spanish Florida but partly as a resort for poor debtors who otherwise, under English law, would have spent their lives in the workhouse or in jail. The middle colonies were New York, New Jersey, and Delaware, all territories formerly included in New Netherland, and Pennsylvania, which Charles II granted to William Penn, the Quaker, as an asylum for his sect. With the acquisition of New Netherland and the settlement of Pennsylvania the American colonies now stretched without a break along the Atlantic coast. This solid mass of colonies was not yet a united nation, but it could become one.

New England and the South, though overwhelmingly English in blood, received numerous emigrants from Scotland and Ireland and some from France and Germany. The inhabitants of the middle colonies were much more mixed. Besides English and a sprinkling of Scotch-

Irish and Welsh, there were Dutch in New York, Swedes in Delaware, and Germans in Pennsylvania. By 1763 the American colonists numbered more than a million and a half, besides many Negroes. The population of the British Isles at this time did not exceed nine millions.

Transit of Civilization from England to the Thirteen Colonies

Each group of settlers brought its own speech, religious beliefs, laws, customs, and arts — in short, its cultural inheritance. Nevertheless, the civilization of England prevailed, because Englishmen constituted the vast majority of the colonists. The English language was spoken almost everywhere, not, however, without quaint modifications of spelling and pronunciation introduced by emigrants from different parts of the mother country. The ballads, fairy tales, and nursery rhymes of England were recited in the American wilderness, together with many proverbs and traditional sayings such as those printed by Benjamin Franklin in *Poor Richard's Almanac*. Nearly all the popular festivals of the colonists came from England, the only exception being Thanksgiving Day, which the Pilgrims began to celebrate immediately after their first harvest. And from England chiefly came many superstitions — the belief in unlucky days, the practice of astrology, the witchcraft delusion, and the like.

Almost every variety of Protestantism was represented in the colonies. The Anglican Church from the start had strongholds in Virginia, Maryland, and the Carolinas, and later in New York. After the Revolution it took the name of Protestant Episcopal Church, but kept the Anglican ritual. Congregational and Presbyterian churches flourished in New England. Baptists were numerous in Rhode Island, Quakers in Pennsylvania, and Catholics in Maryland.

The Puritans crossed the sea to escape an intolerant government and church only to show themselves equally intolerant. Anglicans, Catholics, Baptists, and Quakers were originally excluded from their colonies. Roger Williams, fleeing from them as they had fled from Charles I and Archbishop Laud, founded Rhode Island "as a shelter for persons distressed for conscience." Complete religious liberty prevailed in the colony, provided the "civil peace" was not disturbed thereby. Pennsylvania granted freedom of worship to all law-abiding persons who believed in God, thus including Jews as well as Catholics and Protestants. Lord Baltimore, a Roman Catholic, had opened Maryland to Anglicans and Puritans as well as to members of his own faith. Later, when the Protestants became a majority in the colony, severe anti-Catholic laws were passed. Re-enactment of the British Toleration Act

of 1689 by the colonial legislatures, including those of Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia, at length solved the problem of tolerance for all branches of Protestantism. But outside of Rhode Island and Pennsylvania, Catholics remained under various disabilities until after the Revolution.

A Massachusetts law as early as 1647 required every town of fifty families to appoint a schoolmaster to teach reading and writing. He was to be paid either by the parents of the pupils or by public taxation. Every town of one hundred families was further required to set up a "grammar school" where Greek and Latin were taught as a preparation for college. This law became the model for similar legislation in the other New England colonies. The middle and southern colonies paid much less attention to elementary education. A governor of Virginia could even thank God that it contained no free schools or printing presses. Learning, he believed, bred heresies, and books spread them. Massachusetts likewise led the way in providing for higher education, with the foundation of Harvard College in 1636. Before the Revolution colleges also existed in Connecticut (Yale), Rhode Island (Brown), New Hampshire (Dartmouth), New York (King's, later Columbia), New Jersey (Princeton and Rutgers), Pennsylvania (University of Pennsylvania, founded by Franklin), and Virginia (William and Mary). Their equipment and curriculum were meager, indeed, but they kept the love of learning alive. If they produced few scholars, they nourished some of the statesmen who founded the American republic and guided it during the formative years.

Economic Conditions in the Colonies

Small farms were generally found in New England and the middle colonies. In New York, however, there were extensive estates on the Hudson, originally granted to the Dutch colonists and by them subdivided and rented out to tenant farmers. No aristocrats in America so nearly resembled the feudal nobility of the Old World as the Dutch proprietors, or patroons. In Virginia and Maryland, which were well adapted to tobacco-raising on a large scale, the colonists settled in great plantations along the banks of the rivers. The white servants and Negro slaves who cultivated these estates had no rights in the soil. Similar conditions prevailed in the Carolinas and Georgia, where rice, indigo, and cotton competed with tobacco as staple crops.

There was a keen demand for labor — unskilled as well as skilled. Laborers were few and wages were high. On New England farms and those in the middle colonies the work was performed by the owner

and the members of his family, sometimes with the assistance of hired "help." Indentured servants, that is, workers bound to service for a specified term, also formed an important element in many colonies, particularly in Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania. The prevalence of slavery in the South made it difficult for them to find profitable and honorable employment after the expiration of their term of service.

The first Negroes arrived in 1619 — a fateful date in American history — from a Dutch ship which touched at Jamestown. Thus began the African slave trade, which was to be legally carried on until 1808. Slaves were brought to the colonies from the West Indies and afterward direct from West Africa. They were least numerous in New England, not because of any widespread moral sentiment against keeping them, but simply because New England had no plantations on which their labor could be profitably employed.

There were many household industries, especially in New England, for the manufacture of ironware, nails, pottery, wooden implements, shoes, and coarse textiles. The distillation of molasses into rum, much of which was sent to West Africa in exchange for slaves, formed a profitable business. Shipbuilding became a very important industry in New England, and that section had an extensive commerce with other colonies, the West Indies, and Great Britain. The development of colonial manufactures was retarded by lack of capital and credit, scarcity of labor, high wages, and the greater profits often to be gained from agriculture, lumbering, and the fisheries.

Political Development of the Colonies

All the colonists possessed the private rights of Englishmen. Free speech, a free press, freedom of assembly, freedom from arbitrary imprisonment as secured by the writ of *habeas corpus*, trial by jury — these and other rights were embodied in the common law and equity jurisprudence introduced into colonial America. After the Revolution they reappeared in the constitutions of the several states and in the first ten amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

The English principle of representation was also carried to colonial America. Each colony had an assembly modeled after the House of Commons. Virginia established the House of Burgesses, which consisted of deputies elected by the inhabitants of each settlement. It met for the first time in 1619 in the chancel of the little church at Jamestown. Representative self-government then began in the New World. A few years later the freemen of each Massachusetts town were authorized to send two deputies to act for them at the General Court of the colony.

New York, the former Dutch possession, was the last of the colonies to adopt the representative system.

The colonial assemblies in the eighteenth century more truly represented the great body of the people than did the British parliament at this period. In Great Britain a small number of persons — nobles, country gentlemen, and rich merchants — controlled elections to the House of Commons. In the colonies all free adult white men who owned a moderate amount of property had the right to vote. Religious qualifications for the suffrage existed only in Rhode Island and South Carolina, where the voter had to be a Christian; in Virginia, where no atheist could vote; and in Maryland, where Catholics were disfranchised.

No close political ties united the colonies. The differences between them in occupations, religion, manners, and customs prevented their effective co-operation. Yet there had been preparation for union and signs of its coming. As early as 1643 Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Haven (then a separate colony), and Plymouth entered into a league "for mutual help and strength in all our future concerns." This league, known as the United Colonies of New England, held together for forty-one years. Delegates from seven colonies met in the Albany Congress of 1754 and discussed Franklin's plan for forming a defensive union of all the colonies against the power of France in America. The plan fell through, but it set men to thinking about the advantages of federation.

Rivalry of France and England in North America

The eighteenth century was filled with wars between the great European powers. France and England were enemies in all these wars, as they had been during the later Middle Ages. The struggle between them extended beyond the Continent, for each one tried to destroy the commerce and annex the colonies of the other. By the Peace of Utrecht (1713), which followed the War of the Spanish Succession, England was confirmed in the possession of Newfoundland, valuable for its fisheries, acquired Acadia (rechristened Nova Scotia), and also secured the extensive, fur-bearing region drained by the rivers flowing into Hudson Bay. France kept, however, the best part of its American territory and still controlled the St. Lawrence and Mississippi waterways leading into the heart of North America.

The War of the Austrian Succession, a halfhearted affair, brought no advantage to either side, but the Seven Years' War, known in American history as the French and Indian War, proved to be decisive. Before it started there was a period of unauthorized fighting for possession

of the Ohio valley, wanted by the French in order to join Canada and Louisiana and wanted by the American colonists in order not to be shut out from the fertile region immediately beyond the Alleghenies. The Ohio valley was the key to the whole future expansion of the United States westward.

The Seven Years' War began with British failures, but these were quickly redeemed by British successes after William Pitt the Elder, the Whig statesman, became prime minister. Pitt kept the French armies busy in Europe by subsidizing Frederick the Great, blockaded the French fleets in their home ports, and meanwhile used the greater part of the British army in colonial expeditions. One French post after another was captured. The gallant Wolfe defeated the equally gallant Montcalm under the walls of Quebec, and the fall of that stronghold followed. What remained of the French forces at Montreal also surrendered. The British flag was now raised over Canada, where it has flown ever since. And with Canada went also possession of the Ohio valley.

By the Peace of Paris (1763) France ceded to Great Britain all its North American possessions except New Orleans and two small islands, kept for fishing purposes, off the coast of Newfoundland. Spain, which had also been involved in the war, gave up Florida to Great Britain, receiving as compensation the French territory west of the Mississippi. New France was now only a memory. Yet the Canadian province of Quebec is still chiefly French in language and Catholic in religion, while Louisiana, though shrunk to the dimensions of an American state, still keeps in its laws and in many customs of its people the French tradition.

The Peace of Paris marked a turning point in the history of the Thirteen Colonies. Relieved of the danger of attack by France and its Indian allies and free to expand both westward and southward, the colonists now felt less keenly their dependence on Great Britain. Close ties — the ties of common interests, common ideals, and a common origin — attached them to the mother country, but these were soon to be rudely severed by the American Revolution.

The American Revolution

Together with other colonial powers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Great Britain accepted the mercantile system and followed its precepts in dealings with the Thirteen Colonies. The home government discouraged the manufacture in the colonies of goods that could be made in Great Britain; the colonists, for instance, were forbidden to set up mills for making wrought iron or its finished products.



North America after the Peace of Paris, 1763

In order to favor British manufacturers, the export of woolens, not only to the British Isles and the Continent, but also from one colony to another, was prohibited. The exportation of beaver hats and their inter-colonial sale was forbidden for the same reason.

The home government also interfered with the commerce of the colonies. As early as 1651 parliament passed a Navigation Act, which allowed only English vessels or those with mainly English crews to import goods from Asia, Africa, or America into England. In 1660 a second Act provided that the chief colonial products (such as sugar, molasses, tobacco, cotton, indigo, and lumber) might not be exported direct from the colonies to foreign countries, but must first be brought

to England, where duties were to be paid on them. Still another Act in 1663 required all imports into the colonies from foreign countries to have been actually shipped from an English port, thus compelling the colonists to go to England for their supplies. The only use of American colonies, declared an English politician, is "the monopoly of their consumption and the carriage of their produce."

All this legislation was not so repressive as might be supposed, partly because it was so constantly evaded by smuggling and partly because Great Britain formed the natural market for most colonial products. The home government, moreover, gave bounties to encourage the production of food and raw materials needed in Great Britain; twenty-four colonial industries were subsidized in this manner. Colonial shipping was also fostered, for ships built in the colonies enjoyed the same exclusive privileges in the carrying trade as British-built ships. In fact, the restrictions imposed on the American colonies were light compared with the shackles laid by Spain and France upon their colonial possessions. It must always be remembered, finally, that Great Britain defended the colonists in return for trade privileges. As long as France threatened them, the colonies did not protest seriously against the legislation of parliament.

After the close of the Seven Years' War, George III and his ministers determined to keep British troops in America as a protection against outbreaks by the French or by Indians. The colonists, to whose safety an army would add, were expected to pay for its partial support. Parliament accordingly took steps to enforce the laws regulating colonial commerce and also passed a measure requiring the colonists to use special stamped paper, on which a tax had been paid, for legal documents, newspapers, pamphlets, licenses, playing cards, and even college diplomas. The protests of the colonists led to the repeal of this obnoxious Stamp Act, but it was soon replaced by the Townshend Acts, levying duties on certain commodities imported into the colonies. The commercial classes, whose interests were chiefly affected, then formed non-importation agreements, with the result that imports fell off greatly, as well as the duties on them. Parliament finally repealed this legislation also, except for a small duty on tea. This was kept in order that the colonists might not think that parliament had abandoned the assumed right to tax them.

The Stamp Act and the Townshend Acts thus brought up the whole question as to the extent of parliamentary control over the colonists. The colonists argued that taxes could be rightfully voted only by their own representative assemblies. It was a natural attitude for them to take, since parliament, sitting three thousand miles away, had little in-

sight into American affairs. The British view was that parliament "virtually" represented all British citizens and hence might tax them wherever they lived. This view can also be understood, for the Glorious Revolution had established the supremacy of parliament. The sovereign power must include the power to tax: that was as true in the eighteenth century as today. Whatever its legal justification, direct taxation of the colonists was clearly contrary to custom and, in view of the popular feeling which it aroused, very unwise.

The colonists were so opposed to the principle of parliamentary taxation that they refused to buy tea from British merchants and in Boston even boarded a tea ship and threw the cargo into the water. Parliament replied to the "Boston Tea Party" by closing the harbor of that city to commerce and by depriving Massachusetts of self-government. These measures, instead of bringing the stubborn colony to terms, only aroused the apprehension of her neighbors and led to the meeting of delegates from all the colonies, except Georgia, in the First Continental Congress. The Congress recommended a policy of non-intercourse with Great Britain until the colonists had secured their "just rights and liberties." The Second Continental Congress, which met after blood had been shed at Lexington and Concord, prepared for war and appointed George Washington to command the colonial forces. On July 4, 1776, after the failure of all efforts to reach an understanding with the mother country, it declared that "these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent states." The Declaration of Independence re-echoes the Act of Abjuration nearly two centuries earlier, with George III playing in it the same role of tyrant and oppressor that Philip II played in the Dutch state paper. As adopted by Congress, the Declaration differed only in details from the original draft prepared by Thomas Jefferson.

Some Whig statesmen in England espoused the cause of the colonists. Edmund Burke, the great Irish orator, pleaded for conciliation with them in two speeches that remain masterpieces of the forensic art. "Magnanimity in politics is not seldom the truest wisdom, and a great empire and little minds go ill together." William Pitt (now Earl of Chatham), while maintaining the right of parliament to legislate for the colonists, applauded their "manly wisdom and calm resolution" in resistance to arbitrary rule. But these were the voices of a minority, of a helpless minority. Parliament, then packed with the Tory supporters of George III — the "king's friends" — entered almost lightheartedly on a struggle which was to result in the one disruption of the British Empire.

War of American Independence

Independence had been declared. Could it be won? The colonists had no disciplined troops and little military equipment; the British had well-trained armies, supported by German mercenaries, and a powerful fleet which enabled them to shift their attack up and down the long Atlantic coast. The struggle was desperately unequal until the resources of France were thrown into the scale. France, still smarting from the losses incurred in the Seven Years' War, secretly aided the colonists with money and supplies for some time before their victory at Saratoga in 1777 led her to make an open alliance with them. Spain and Holland afterward entered the war, likewise to secure a slice of the British territories overseas. Great Britain needed all her reserve power to prevent rebellion in Ireland, defend Gibraltar, and keep her possessions in the West Indies and India. The contest in the colonies practically closed in 1781, when Cornwallis, blockaded in Yorktown by a French fleet and closely invested by the combined French and American armies, surrendered the largest British force then in the colonies. Nearly two years passed, however, before the contestants made peace.

The Treaty of Paris (1783) between Great Britain and the United States recognized the independence of the former Thirteen Colonies and fixed their boundaries at Canada and the Great Lakes, the Atlantic Ocean, Florida, and the Mississippi River. The Treaty of Versailles (1783) between Great Britain, France, and Spain restored to France a few colonial possessions and gave to Spain the Florida territory. Holland, which concluded a separate peace with Great Britain, was obliged to cede to that country trading stations in India and to throw open to British merchants the lucrative commerce of the East Indies.

The successful revolt of the Thirteen Colonies dealt a mortal blow at the whole policy of restricting colonial industry and commerce for the benefit of the mother country. The Americans continued to trade with Great Britain from self-interest, although no longer compelled to do so by law. The volume of British exports to the United States doubled within fifteen years after the close of the war. This was an object lesson in the futility of the mercantile system, at least for such a manufacturing country as Great Britain had now become. British laws fettering commercial intercourse were gradually relaxed, and before the middle of the nineteenth century Great Britain had adopted a policy of complete free trade. In time, also, British statesmen came to realize that colonies, once these reach a certain degree of maturity and power of self-defense, will no longer consent to remain mere possessions

of the mother country but demand full self-government and political equality with the mother country. Recognition of this fact has saved from further disruption the Greater Britain of the Seven Seas.

The successful revolt of the Thirteen Colonies also reacted almost at once on Europe. The Declaration of Independence, setting forth the "unalienable rights of man" and pronouncing governments to derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, provided ardent spirits in France with a formula of liberty which they were not slow to apply to their own country. The French Revolution was the child of the American Revolution. The stirring story of the foundation of a great republic in North America also reverberated in the Spanish and Portuguese colonies of the South, and from the United States came, in part, the impulse which led to the setting up of independent states throughout the vast area from the Rio Grande to Cape Horn. America was, indeed, teaching by example.

Formation of the United States

The Continental Congress continued to govern the states until after the adoption of the Articles of Confederation in 1781. The Articles established a mere league of states, like the United Colonies of New England in the seventeenth century and the still earlier Dutch and Swiss confederations. The authority of Congress was practically limited to war, peace, and diplomacy. It could not levy taxes or coin money, could not regulate interstate commerce or the foreign commerce of the several states, and had no power to enforce obedience on either a state or a citizen of a state. Every attempt to amend the Articles by legislative action failed, and the weak and clumsy government which they had set up threatened to collapse. Grave danger also existed of civil war, because of the conflicting claims of many states to the western territory ceded by Great Britain. Settlers had begun to push into it in ever increasing numbers, and there was obvious need of a central government able to apportion and administer all this region in the interests of the whole people.

Such were the circumstances under which the Federal Convention met at Philadelphia in 1787. To this body the states sent fifty-five delegates, including Washington, who presided, Franklin, James Madison, and Alexander Hamilton. Instead of merely revising the Articles of Confederation, as had been authorized by Congress, the delegates decided to prepare an entirely new constitution. "Let us raise a standard to which the wise and honest can repair," said Washington; "the event is in the hand of God." The convention met daily in secret

sessions and completed its task in little less than four months. Necessary though the Constitution was if the American people were not to face anarchy or warfare, it satisfied neither the advocates of states' rights nor the extreme democrats. Nevertheless, it was ratified by eleven states within a year. North Carolina and Rhode Island did not ratify it until after the inauguration of Washington as President in 1789.

Constitution of the United States

The Constitution contains little that is absolutely new and much, as has been said, that is as old as Magna Carta. In many features it reflects the political experience of the colonists and their familiarity with British governmental methods. Accustomed to legislatures of two chambers, the lower elective and the upper appointive, they kept the bicameral arrangement in the House of Representatives and the Senate, but made both chambers elective. The President's powers of military command, appointment, and veto resembled those of the colonial governors named by the king, but the presidency was also made an elective office. There was no provision for a prime minister or for a ministry responsible to Congress; the cabinet system had not been found in the colonies and at the time had not been fully developed in Great Britain. The Supreme Court had a prototype in the Privy Council of Great Britain, which sometimes annulled colonial laws on the ground that these exceeded the authority conferred by colonial charters or were contrary to the principles of the common law. The same power of declaring legislation unconstitutional and therefore void was also exercised by the judiciary in several states prior to the adoption of the Constitution.

Given the Constitution as the supreme law of the land and the Federal government with strictly limited powers, there must be some body capable of deciding whether a statute (state or Federal) or an executive action accords with the Constitution or contravenes it, and that body consists of the Supreme Court and the inferior Federal courts. If there is danger that judges may import their own views into legislation contrary to the will of the people the safeguards, in a democracy, are an instructed public opinion and recourse, if need be, to the device of constitutional amendment. The right of judicial review does not appear clearly set forth in the Constitution, but soon became established by the decisions of the first Chief Justice, John Marshall. Interpretation of the Constitution by the Supreme Court, coupled with the amendments to it, has given to that instrument a flexibility and power of adaptation to changed conditions which enables the government of the

United States to function in the twentieth century under the provisions of a document made in the eighteenth century.

The delegates to the Federal Convention were solid, substantial citizens, at least as solicitous for the rights of property as for the rights of man. The more radical Jefferson, whose influence, had he been present, would have been great, was absent as ambassador to France; absent also were such radicals as Samuel Adams and Patrick Henry. The Constitution, when it finally took shape as the result of compromise and mutual concessions, was essentially a conservative document, a bulwark of the middle class against the leveling tendencies of farmers and artisans. Instead of providing for the election of a President by direct vote of the people, it set up the awkward machinery of the Electoral College. Members of the Senate were to be chosen by the state legislatures. The process of amending the Constitution was made slow and difficult; as a matter of fact, there have been only twenty-one amendments altogether, and ten of these were adopted at one time.

The progress of democratic sentiment in the country at large since 1789 has made the government set up by the Constitution responsive to the popular will. The Electoral College, which was intended to exercise its own discretion in the choice of a President, now merely records the result of the voting in the several states; senators are now elected by the people; and amendments to the Constitution can be made quickly when public opinion generally favors them. The extension of the suffrage first to poor men, who were formerly excluded by a property qualification, then to Negroes (after the Civil War), and finally to women (in 1920) means that practically every adult citizen now enjoys the right to vote, not only in state elections, but also in Federal elections for senators, representatives, and presidential electors. Universal suffrage in the states secures democracy in the nation.

The concessions granted the opponents of the Constitution, to secure their adhesion to it, were set forth in the first ten amendments (1791). The First Amendment reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for a redress of grievances." While Congress is thus prevented from playing the tyrant, nowhere does the Constitution explicitly require that the several states shall not curtail these fundamental rights, and the Supreme Court has held that they may do so when there is "a reasonable apprehension of danger to organized government" and if the curtailment is by "due process of law." However, the first constitutions of the states,


adopted just before or immediately after independence, and nearly all the state constitutions adopted later contain an enumeration of rights possessed by the people and not to be infringed by their governments.

The next seven amendments set forth additional safeguards of human freedom, and these apply to the states as well as to the Federal government: the privilege of keeping and bearing arms; assurance against unlawful entry of the home or unlawful seizure of one's person or private papers; the requirement that no one should be compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself or be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; the guarantee that private property might not be taken for public use without due compensation; the right to speedy and public trials by an impartial jury for persons accused of crime; the prohibition of excessive bail and fines; and the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments. The Ninth Amendment declares that "the enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people"; and the Tenth Amendment, that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively or to the people." Imbedded in the Constitution and removable from it only by a vote of three-fourths of the states, the first ten amendments form a Bill of Rights, a palladium of liberty, for the American people.

Progress of Geographical Discovery

Great Britain was to have at least partial compensation for the loss of the Thirteen Colonies in the acquisition of Cape Colony (yielded by the Dutch in 1806) and the annexation of Australia, Tasmania, New Zealand, and many islands of the Pacific. That vast ocean, covering more than a third of the globe, remained very little known until after the middle of the eighteenth century. The unveiling of the Pacific was closely connected with search for the "Unknown South Land" (*Terra Australis Incognita*), which, from the time of the Greeks, had been supposed to lie to the southeast of the Indian Ocean. Efforts to find it were made by the Dutch after they became established in the East Indies. They seem to have been the first to sight Australia, or "New Holland." The two voyages (1642-1644) of the Dutch navigator Abel Tasman were most important, for by circumnavigating Australia he proved that it was indeed an island of continental proportions and not part of the supposed southern continent. He also discovered Van Diemen's Land, now more appropriately called Tasmania in his honor, and New Zealand. The Dutch took little interest in the regions which they

Maritime Exploration in the Eighteenth Century



found, and more than a hundred years passed before Tasman's work was continued by Captain James Cook.

This famous navigator, the son of a farm laborer, entered the British navy at an early age and by his unaided efforts rose to high command. Cook's three Pacific voyages (1768-1779) were epochal in the history of geographical discovery. The first voyage resulted in the exploration of the coast of New Zealand and the eastern coast of Australia. More than four thousand miles of habitable shoreline were accurately charted and thus opened up to European trade and colonization. The second voyage finally settled the question as to the existence of a southern continent, for Cook sailed three times across the southern Pacific without coming upon any extensive land mass. It was at this time that he rediscovered various Pacific archipelagoes visited by earlier Spanish, Dutch, and English navigators but never accurately surveyed. At the instance of George III, Cook undertook a third voyage to locate, if possible, a passage on the northwest coast of Alaska leading into Hudson Bay. On the way across the Pacific he rediscovered the Hawaiian Islands, which a Spanish navigator had probably seen but whose existence had long been forgotten. Cook then proceeded to Bering Strait and beyond it, until an unbroken ice field barred his progress. On the return journey he again visited the Hawaiian group, which he named after his friend, Lord Sandwich. His death there in 1779 at the hands of the natives closed the career of one who gave to Great Britain title to Australia and who, more than any other explorer, revealed the island world of the Pacific.

Cook's narrative of his journeys, translated into all the principal languages of Europe, aroused the utmost interest at the time and still provides a mine of information about the Polynesian peoples as they were before coming under the influence — to them so disastrous — of the white man's civilization. "Mr. Cook has done so much that he has left me nothing to do but admire his work," said the French explorer La Pérouse, who set out in 1785 to fill in the gaps left by the British navigator. La Pérouse explored the great area of ocean between northwest America and Japan. He sent back to France the journals of his voyage. It was well that he did so, for on the return journey disaster overtook the expedition and no one survived to recount its fate.

When Peter the Great mounted the throne, Russian trappers, traders, and missionaries had already spread over the length and breadth of the immense Siberian wilderness and had reached the Pacific. But whether or not Siberia was joined to the northern part of the New World remained unknown. The czar commissioned Vitus Bering, a Dane in the Russian service, to solve the problem. Bering's two voyages (be-

tween 1728 and 1741) led to the exploration of the sea and strait named after him and placed on the map a large section of the Arctic coast of Asia and the north Pacific coast of America. This was Russia's contribution to geographical knowledge, and a very significant contribution it was.

The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries thus added greatly to man's knowledge of the world. Cook's voyages, in particular, left the main outlines of the southern part of the globe substantially as they are known today, except for the discoveries in the south polar region. Systematic exploration for scientific purposes must be included, therefore, among the influences which made these centuries so conspicuously an age of enlightenment.

VI

Intellectual Enlightenment

Rise of Modern Science

THE humanists of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, by making accessible Greek works on mathematics, astronomy, physics, geography, medicine, and other subjects, enabled students to find out what the ancients had discovered and then to use the knowledge thus gained as a point of departure for fresh researches. Some of the artists contemporary with the humanists were careful observers, investigating the problems of vision, light, and anatomy. One of the greatest artists, the myriad-minded Leonardo da Vinci, ranks also as an eminent scientist and inventor. We have his sketches and models of the valves of the heart, of the human eye, of flying machines, of rifled cannon, and of breech-loading guns — to mention only a few examples of his tireless industry and marvelous powers. Leonardo seems to have been one of a small group of Italian thinkers who were more interested in observation and experimentation than in the opinions of Aristotle.

When maritime discovery had revealed new lands, new peoples, new animals, and new plants, men felt, as never before, the urge to observe nature in all her varied forms and to seek an understanding of her laws. The dissemination of knowledge that came with the printing press and the growth of a secular attitude toward life also prepared the way for the rise of modern science in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The period is often known as that of the Enlightenment. Far more than the so-called Renaissance it deserves a great place in intellectual history.

The Physical Sciences

Upon the very threshold of the scientific era stands Nicholas Copernicus (1473–1543). Born of a Polish father and a German mother, educated at the University of Cracow and at several Italian universities, and for many years canon of a cathedral in Poland, Copernicus had

the knowledge and the leisure to work out an entirely new system of astronomy, replacing the system elaborated by Ptolemy in the second century of our era. The studies of Copernicus were based only to a slight extent on observation of the heavens, but rather on the writings of ancient philosophers and scientists, among them, Aristarchus, who in the third century B.C. had been the first to maintain that the earth rotates on its axis and revolves around the sun. The book, *On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Bodies*, in which Copernicus announced the same conclusion, did not appear until 1543. A copy of it reached him barely in time to be laid upon his deathbed.

Publication of the book had been long delayed, for the great truth which it revealed was contrary to the teaching of the church. The fact that Copernicus dedicated his book to Pope Paul III did not prevent its condemnation by the Inquisition. Ultimately it was placed on the *Index* and was removed therefrom only in the nineteenth century. Protestants also were bitterly opposed to a theory which made the sun the center of the universe, relegated the earth to the modest role of a planet, and thus gravely shocked the pride of man; as much as Catholics they were geocentric and anthropocentric in their thinking. Copernicanism, moreover, ran counter to the best scientific opinion of the time and appealed at first only to a few students who could follow the mathematical reasoning on which it rested.

The Italian Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) made astronomical observations which confirmed the Copernican theory. Having constructed one of the first telescopes — it was scarcely more powerful than a field glass — he discovered that Venus had phases as had the moon, that the satellites of Jupiter revolved around their planet (a solar system in miniature), and, by watching spots on the sun, that the sun turns on its axis even as does the earth. No human eye had ever before gazed upon these celestial marvels; Galileo, in his account of the telescope, speaks of the "incredible delight" with which he witnessed them. His astronomical work finally cost him his eyesight, four years before his death; it also brought upon him the condemnation of the Inquisition for advocating Copernicanism. He was compelled to retract his views as being "false and contrary to the Holy and Divine Scriptures," and the book in which he presented them was placed on the *Index*.

Copernicus, following Aristotle, believed that since all perfect motion is circular, the planets must have circular orbits. Galileo's friend, the German Johann Kepler (1571-1630), showed that the planets move in ellipses with the sun at one focus. This was the second of the three laws of planetary motion with which Kepler's name is imperishably associated. One of his books, written to demonstrate the truth of the

Copernican theory, was condemned by the (Protestant) University of Tübingen as opposed to Bible teaching and therefore heretical.

The researches of Galileo and Kepler seemed to indicate that some force kept the planets and their satellites in regular orbits and prevented them from moving off in straight lines through space. The profound mind of Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727) found that force in gravitation, which, instead of being peculiar to the earth, affected every particle of matter from atoms to stars throughout the universe. The Newtonian law of gravitation declares that the attraction between any two bodies is directly proportional to their masses and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them. Were the mass of the sun doubled, it would attract the earth twice as strongly; were the distance between the sun and the earth halved, the sun's attractive power would be four times as great.

The law of gravitation cannot be properly tested in a terrestrial laboratory, for the force of attraction between bodies capable of being handled is so slight as to be almost imperceptible. Verification of the law must be sought in the laboratory of the heavens, in the remote depths of space. Newton did not try to account for gravitational action. No explanation is really required; all the mathematical astronomer needs to know is that the complex celestial motions depend on the relative masses and distances of the celestial bodies. Newton's *Principia Mathematica*, in which his truly sublime discovery was announced, appeared in 1687.

The new astronomy eventually produced a new cosmology, which replaced the medieval world scheme based on the speculations of Aristotle and Ptolemy and on isolated texts of Scripture. After Copernicus it was no longer possible to think of the earth as the immovable center of the universe, with the sun and all the host of heaven daily wheeling about it to lighten and warm it; an earth created for man's express benefit and in which he could feel at home. After Galileo it was no longer possible to deny the plurality of worlds, for the telescope in his hands began to reveal the infinite heavens and led to our present knowledge that the whole Milky Way system, to which the sun and planets belong, is only an island — one of countless islands — in the ocean of space. After Newton it was no longer possible to conceive of the universe as ruled by caprice, for now the movements of the heavenly bodies (indeed of all matter) were known to obey one simple physical law. The thoughtful contemplated this tiny planet and this little drama of humanity under a changed light; the earth had shrunk almost to nothingness, and the noise of man's concerns had become inaudible in the great silences. The thoughtful asked with the Psalmist, but more meaningly,

"What is man, that Thou art mindful of him? And the son of man, that Thou regardest him?"

Modern physics began with the great Galileo, whose work in this field had even more importance than in astronomy. Watching a lamp which swung by a long chain in the cathedral of Pisa, he noticed that, while the range of the oscillations might vary, their times were constant — the law of the pendulum. By dropping bodies of different weights from the Leaning Tower of Pisa, he showed that, if allowance be made for the friction of the air, they fall from the same height in equal times and with uniformly accelerated motion. His experiments with inclined planes made it clear that an unimpeded body, moving on a horizontal plane, would continue in motion forever, with uniform velocity, and in a straight line. Before Galileo the belief was general that motion required a continual force to maintain it; thus Aristotle, to keep the planets moving, postulated an "Unmoved Mover."

Galileo also discovered that sound is an undulation in the air and that air has weight and exerts pressure. He invented the first apparatus for the measurement of temperatures, soon to be developed into the true thermometer, and his pupil, Torricelli, invented the first barometer. Another seventeenth-century physicist, the Dutch Huygens, was the first to apply pendulums to clocks. Huygens made many contributions to optics and proposed the undulatory or wave theory of light. Newton, experimenting with the decomposition of white light, discovered that light refracted through a prism is broken up into seven primary colors. It thus became possible to analyze the sun's light and, with improved forms of the spectroscope, that of the most distant stars. Newton's contemporary, the Danish astronomer Roemer, showed by observation of Jupiter's satellites when eclipsed that light, instead of being propagated instantaneously, travels in a finite time, a time which was later to be determined with great accuracy. The speed of light is the one great "constant" of the universe.

One of Queen Elizabeth's physicians, William Gilbert, in his work *De magnete* (1600) demonstrated "by many arguments and experiments" that the terrestrial globe is a magnet. He was not the first to study the phenomena called by him "electric," for it had long been known that amber, jet, and some other objects have the power, after being rubbed, of attracting light objects. Eighteenth-century physicists discovered that the attracting power may be conducted from one body to another and also identified positive and negative currents of electricity. The Leyden jar, for the storage and discharge of electric energy, was invented in 1745. It became for a time a toy for kings; the soldiers of Louis XV were given shocks to amuse His Majesty when they jumped.

Benjamin Franklin put it to better use in 1752, when he flew a kite during a thunderstorm at Philadelphia and drew down from the clouds an electric current which charged the jar. Franklin also invented the lightning rod. His experiments to prove the "sameness of lightning with electricity" gained for him an international reputation as a scientist. The memory of a younger contemporary of Franklin, the Italian Volta, is perpetuated whenever an electrician refers to a "voltaic pile" or uses the word "volt."

Modern chemistry began with the Irishman Robert Boyle (1627-1691), who had studied under Galileo. Boyle's experiments on the compressibility of gases led to the discovery that the volume of a gas varies inversely with the pressure — the law that bears his name. Eighteenth-century chemists, by their work on the gases, disproved the old Greek idea of the four "elements," earth, air, water, and fire, out of which everything else was supposed to be made. Joseph Priestley not only isolated oxygen but also showed that it is essential to the respiration of animals, and that the green parts of plants are able in sunlight to decompose carbonic acid and to restore oxygen to the atmosphere. His invention of soda water perhaps entitles him to rank as a public benefactor. Priestley's contemporary, Henry Cavendish, isolated hydrogen and demonstrated that water is a compound of oxygen and hydrogen, and that air is a compound of oxygen and nitrogen.

The Frenchman Lavoisier (1743-1794) showed that fire results from the rapid combination of oxygen with the carbon and other elements of organic substances; previously objects were supposed to burn because they contained a combustible material called "phlogiston." To Lavoisier also chemistry owes the recognition of the fundamental principle of the indestructibility of matter: while the state of matter may be altered by chemical processes, its quantity remains always the same. The method of quantitative analysis, which Lavoisier perfected by his constant use of the delicate balance, was to make possible many future triumphs of chemistry. This most gifted man, renowned throughout Europe for his accomplishments, perished by the guillotine during the Reign of Terror; the Republic had "no need of scientists."

The story of the earth is written in the rocks, minerals, and fossils which form its crust, but that story long remained untold. Fossil bones were once supposed to be remains of giants and other fabulous creatures or freaks of nature. Leonardo da Vinci seems to have been the first to recognize that fossil shells now found on high inland mountains testified to the former existence of animals living in the sea and could not have reached their present position in the forty days of the Noachian Flood. Knowledge of mineralogy was greatly advanced by Georg

Bauer, known as Agricola, whose work, *De re metallica*, appeared in 1556. As a genuine science, geology began with the Scot James Hutton. In his *Theory of the Earth* (1785, 1795) he showed how the materials of the earth had been formed and were still being formed by natural processes, for which he found "no vestige of a beginning, no prospect of an end." The earth, instead of being a recent creation, thus appeared as the outcome of a gradual development through the ages. Hutton's views did not secure acceptance until the nineteenth century.

Scientific study of geography revived in the sixteenth century as the result of the interest then being taken in overseas discovery and exploration. A Fleming, Ortelius, issued in 1570 the first modern atlas, a collection of fifty-three maps of the world with an accompanying text in Latin. This work went through many editions. Mercator, another Flemish geographer and a contemporary of Ortelius, is best known for his method (named after him) of projecting the globe, or parts of it, on a flat map, with the parallels and meridians at right angles. Problems of the earth's size and figure, which had interested ancient geographers, received much attention in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Longitudes were accurately calculated, the length of a degree was determined, and by measurements of arcs in Peru and Lapland the earth was proved to be an oblate spheroid.

The Biological Sciences

Explorers brought back to Europe from America and the Pacific many new species of plants and animals, thus greatly encouraging biological study. The classification of plants by the Swede Linnaeus (1707-1778) helped to give to botany a more scientific character. The "Linnaean system" afforded, however, no clue to the relationship of genera and species and hence has been superseded. The Frenchman Buffon (1707-1778) did much to establish zoology as a science by publishing an encyclopedic work on the "natural history" of animals. Another Frenchman, Cuvier (1769-1832), laid the foundations of palaeontology and carried forward the study of comparative anatomy.

Magnifying glasses and spectacles had long been known, but the compound microscope, consisting of two lenses or combinations of lenses, seems to have been first made by a Dutch optician toward the close of the sixteenth century. Galileo quickly improved upon the original invention, and his microscopes soon enjoyed as much celebrity as his telescopes. With the little spyglass, he wrote, "one may contemplate endlessly the grandeur of nature, how subtly she works, and with what unspeakable diligence." In the hands of seventeenth-cen-

ture investigators it was to reveal the existence of a hitherto unsuspected realm of minute life in earth and air and water. A Dutchman, Leeuwenhoek, who knew how to make better microscopes than anyone else, gazed through one of his own lenses at a drop of water and saw it teeming with creatures which wriggled about, devoured food, and gave every evidence of being alive. He was the first to describe and represent in drawings the one-celled animals (protozoa) and the still more minute plants known as bacteria. Similarly, Robert Hooke, an Englishman, described and figured for the first time those "little boxes or cells" which modern biology has shown to enclose the protoplasmic matter which is the basis of all life.

The same year, 1543, which saw the publication of the Copernican theory, overthrowing Ptolemy's astronomy, was also memorable for the appearance of a book which overthrew much of the anatomy derived from Galen and accepted for fourteen centuries. This was a treatise on the human body by the Fleming Vesalius, a professor in Italian universities and later physician to Charles V and Philip II. Vesalius demonstrated that to a great extent Galen had studied the anatomy of monkeys rather than that of man; his own work was based on what he had found by dissecting the human body only.

As Vesalius made Galen's anatomy obsolete, so the English physician William Harvey made Galen's physiology obsolete by the publication in 1628 of his treatise on the circulation of the blood. This book, based, as Harvey said, on "repeated vivisections," was epochal. Galen had supposed that the arterial blood and the venous blood were two separate tides driven by the heart; Harvey showed that the blood leaves the heart by the arteries and returns to it by the veins. Since the life of every organ, every tissue, of the body depends on the blood that bathes it, no real understanding of bodily functions was possible before Harvey's discovery. The Italian Malpighi soon made use of the new-found resources of the microscope to discover the capillaries, by which the blood passes from arteries to veins. Scientists in the eighteenth century carried still further all this fundamental work and so paved the way for modern surgery and medicine.

Scientific Research

Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler, Newton, Lavoisier, Vesalius, Harvey, and their fellow workers built up the scientific method, which begins, if it does not end, with observation, experimentation, and mathematical analysis. Students in the Middle Ages had usually been satisfied to accept the statements of their authorities, the wise men of antiquity.

Now at length men learned to take nothing for granted. As Sir Francis Bacon, one of Shakespeare's contemporaries and a severe critic of the old scholasticism, declared, "All depends on keeping the eye steadily fixed upon the facts of nature, and so receiving their images as they are; for God forbid that we should give out a dream of our own imagination for a pattern of the world." The great success of the new scientific method was due in part to such inventions as the telescope, microscope, thermometer, barometer, pendulum clock, Leyden jar, and balance, which made close observation and careful experimentation possible as never before; it was also due to the remarkable development of the higher mathematics.

Scientific research, in earlier times carried on by lonely thinkers, now became more and more a co-operative and international undertaking. Investigators all over western Europe corresponded with one another, read one another's books, and discussed one another's discoveries, thus uniting in a common effort to raise the pillars of the temple of knowledge. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw the establishment of scientific academies, usually under royal patronage. Italy led the way with their foundation at Naples, Rome, and Florence. Similar institutions were founded at Paris by Louis XIV, at Berlin by the elector of Brandenburg (the first king of Prussia), and at St. Petersburg by Peter the Great. The Royal Society of London "for promoting natural knowledge" received a charter from Charles II in 1662. It is the oldest scientific organization in Great Britain. These academies did much to stimulate research by the regular publication of their proceedings. Mention should be made also of the museums, botanical and zoological gardens, and astronomical observatories which were established at this time for the increase and spread of scientific knowledge.

Thus were laid the firm foundations of modern science, the discoveries of which have molded the thought of men ever since the period of the Enlightenment. It should be noticed, however, that not much was accomplished in the way of applying the new knowledge of astronomy, physics, chemistry, geology, botany, and zoology to the problems of human welfare. "Pure" science had begun to come into its own; its practical applications were largely reserved for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Rise of Modern Mathematics

Elementary mathematics — arithmetic, algebra, geometry, and trigonometry — had been studied in European schools and universities during the later Middle Ages and the sixteenth century. The seventeenth

century was notable for the creation of many branches of the higher mathematics. John Napier, a Scot, devised logarithms, which greatly simplify computations. René Descartes, a Frenchman, by applying the processes of algebra to geometry, laid the foundation of analytic geometry. The "cartesian co-ordinates" are named after him. Another Frenchman, Blaise Pascal, by studying games of chance, did much to develop the theory of probability, on which, for instance, tables of mortality, life-insurance policies, and annuities are based. The high point of progress came when the German Leibniz in 1684 and Sir Isaac Newton three years later, working independently of each other, formulated the principles of the differential and integral calculus. By means of the calculus the movements of the heavenly bodies, light, heat, magnetism, and electricity are measured quantitatively and brought into the unified world of mathematics, while the whole of modern engineering likewise depends upon it.

The advancement of mathematics during this period was facilitated by the introduction of a compact and adequate symbolism, not only the common arithmetical signs, but also those indicating fractions, exponents, and square roots. Napier is probably to be credited with the first use of the decimal point — that most helpful device — for handling decimal fractions. The notation of the calculus is due to Leibniz. Such symbols are as useful to mathematicians as precise instruments of research are to scientists.

Rise of Modern Philosophy

Medieval philosophy, scholasticism, rarely looked beyond the Bible, the Church Fathers, and Aristotle — The Philosopher, as he was called. It accepted without question the theology of the Roman Church, and it aimed to provide a rational justification for the Catholic faith. The humanist movement of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries turned away from scholasticism in general and from Aristotle in particular; if humanists cared at all for philosophy, it was for that of Plato and of Plato's followers. The Protestant movement of the sixteenth century did little or nothing to encourage philosophy; the early Reformers were as much opposed to independent speculation as were their Catholic opponents. Luther denounced reason as the "Devil's harlot," and Zwingli and Calvin expressed the same judgment in less picturesque language. Modern philosophy was not the offspring of either humanism or Protestantism: it was the offspring of the Enlightenment. The extraordinary discoveries in science and mathematics during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries encouraged men to start out afresh on

the search for truth, to build new systems of thought on the ruins of the old.

The first modern philosopher was the mathematical-minded Descartes (1596-1650), a Frenchman by birth but a Hollander by residence for much of his life. In his *Discourse on the Method* he begins with the axiom, "I think therefore I am," that is, with self-consciousness as a fundamental principle, from which he concludes that whatever things we conceive very clearly and distinctly must be true. Descartes proved to his own satisfaction the existence of God and of the human soul. The lower animals, for him, were mere automata or machines and the physical world was a mechanism explainable by mathematical principles. "Give me extension and motion," he boasted, "and I will construct the universe."

Spinoza (1632-1677), by birth a Portuguese Jew but a resident of Holland, that asylum of bold thinkers, recognized no distinction between things natural and supernatural. To him the universe appeared to be infinite, perfect, self-existent, and eternal. These are attributes of God — hence All is God and God is All. Pantheism as a philosophy has a long history, reaching back to some thinkers of ancient India and Greece; in Arab thought it is represented by Averroës. Spinoza, that "God-intoxicated" man, made it a religion.

Leibniz (1646-1716), an eminent mathematician, believed in a personal God but denied the reality of space and time. For him there was no such thing as dead matter; the universe contained only souls or spirits of all degrees of development. Leibniz is famous for his optimistic view that the actual world is "the best of all possible worlds" — and "everything in it is a necessary evil," a later philosopher added.

One branch of philosophy especially prominent in modern times has to do with the theory of knowledge. How do we know? How much and how accurately can we know? These are fundamental questions. The Englishman John Locke (1632-1704), in his *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, held that our knowledge of the outside world, the world of matter, is confined to our ideas, which are not innate but the outcome of experience. The mind at birth is a "blank sheet of paper," on which experience inscribes characters (ideas) derived from sensations and then built up by reflection. Locke had thrown a little light on the mystery of knowing; the Irishman George Berkeley (1685-1753) sought to probe it more deeply. He argued that since the primary qualities of matter (extension, shape, and motion) as well as the secondary qualities such as color and taste are nothing but ideas existing in the mind, matter itself has no reality apart from the mind that perceives it. One cannot imagine a universe unknown to either man or

God. For Berkeley, as for Plato and other "idealists," reality exists in the realm of thought alone, the realm of ideas.

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), who passed a long and quiet life lecturing and writing at the Prussian University of Königsberg, produced books in almost every field of philosophy, as well as in theology and natural science. He found in man's moral nature the basis of belief in God, free will, and immortality. For Kant the noblest objects of contemplation were the starry heavens and the human conscience: both declared the glory of God, both showed forth His handiwork.

Rationalism and the Spirit of Reform

Scientists, mathematicians, and philosophers had found the universe of matter and mind to be subject to natural laws. From the stars in their courses to the thoughts in men's brains all was orderly and rational. Thinkers who professed to be "enlightened" began to ask whether natural laws did not prevail in human society as well, and, if so, whether man might not discover them by the exercise of his reason, live by them, and apply them to the improvement of social conditions. They felt that the time had come when many ideas and customs, once serviceable perhaps, should be discarded as useless and outworn. To them the chief obstacle in the way of progress seemed to be ignorance, prejudice, and excessive regard for the past. Systematic knowledge, they believed, would destroy this attachment to the "good old days" and would make it possible to create more reasonable and therefore better institutions.

These thinkers, the intellectuals or *intelligentsia* of the age, belonged mainly to the upper middle class, a class now economically independent, forward-looking, and equally opposed to the pretensions of the priesthood and the nobility. With some notable exceptions, clerics and nobles continued to be conservative in their attitude, appealing, the one to the oracles of religion, the other to the law, and both to what was traditional and authoritarian. Their attitude was natural enough, for they formed the two privileged classes in every European land. The uneducated masses remained scarcely affected by the spirit of reform.

Reform was sorely needed. Absolute monarchies claiming to rule by divine right; aristocracies in possession of privileges and honors; the common people excluded from any share in the government and burdened with arbitrary taxes and feudal dues; the innumerable restraints of the mercantile system, fettering industry and commerce; a barbarous penal code; a strict censorship of the press imposed by ecclesiastical or civil authority; religious intolerance on the part of both Catholics

and Protestants toward those who held beliefs other than their own; the prevalence of many superstitions, some like witchcraft dark and dreadful; bigotry and fanaticism in high places as in low — such were features of European society which aroused the scorn of reformers, which they attacked as irrational, and to whose eradication they addressed themselves.

Rationalism in Politics; the Social Contract

Before the rise of absolute monarchies a king and his subjects were supposed to be bound by mutual obligations, as were lord and vassal under feudalism; the king at his coronation swore to reign righteously and his subjects agreed to give him honor and service, provided that he kept his oath. With the growth of absolutism all restraints on the royal power disappeared, and the theory of divine right, bolstered by appropriate references to Scripture, replaced the medieval conception of government. •

It remained for an English philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, protesting against the Puritan Revolution and the execution of Charles I, to justify absolutism by an appeal, not to divine right, but to fundamental principles. In his *Leviathan* (1651) he developed the idea that by nature men are selfish, unsocial creatures, whose hands are always raised against their fellows. To avoid a condition of intolerable anarchy each man gave up to a sovereign the right of governing himself, but only on condition that every other man did the same. By this covenant or "social contract" the united power of the community was vested in the sovereign. The supreme authority may be exercised by one person or by several persons, but in either case all members of the community are bound to yield implicit obedience to it. Nor can the social contract ever be broken; to break the contract would mean a return to anarchy, which is worse than the worst despotism. The idea that political society originated in a voluntary agreement between the citizens goes back to Plato and Aristotle; Hobbes was the first to found upon it an argument for the supreme authority of the government over even the church and the individual conscience.

Another philosopher, Locke, also developed a theory of the social contract to justify, not absolutism, but the supremacy of the people over their rulers. In his *Two Treatises on Government* (1690) he starts, as did Hobbes, with the idea that men originally lived together without any authority over them and that they established political society by their voluntary co-operation. Unlike Hobbes, however, Locke did not picture the "state of nature" antecedent to all government as a

state of anarchy. Men are subject to the rule of reason, which impels them to sociability and respect for the natural rights of others. The natural rights are those to life, liberty, and the ownership of property which a person has created by his own labor. To preserve these rights and to punish the breach of them men have entered into a contract with one another, agreeing that the majority shall have power to make and execute all necessary laws. If the government, thus created, breaks the contract by violating men's natural rights, it has no longer any claim to their allegiance and may be legitimately overthrown.

To say that all government exists, or should exist, by the consent of the governed is to set up the doctrine of popular sovereignty. Locke used it to vindicate the Glorious Revolution which overturned James II and established William and Mary on the throne of England. The American colonists, in their controversy with George III and his ministers, used it to assert the right of rebellion, and there are passages in the Declaration of Independence reproducing Locke's own words. The doctrine of popular sovereignty was also to find a hearty reception in France among enlightened men now growing weary of royal despotism.

Rationalism in Economics; Laissez Faire

The seventeenth-century mercantilists founded political economy, or economics, which deals with the activities of mankind in the ordinary business of life. The eighteenth-century economists who flourished in France were known as physiocrats, because they believed economic life to be controlled by natural laws. Their leader was Quesnay, physician to Louis XV; and Turgot, at one time chief minister of Louis XVI, was the chief exponent of their views. In opposition to the mercantilists, who stressed the importance of manufacturing and commerce as sources of national wealth, some physiocrats declared that wealth comes from agriculture and mining. Manufacturers, said they, merely give a new form to raw materials, while traders do no more than transfer commodities from one person to another. Farmers and miners are the only productive members of society. This group of physiocrats did a real service in insisting upon the importance of the extractive industries, even though they erred in assuming that the land is the sole basis of national wealth.

Another group of physiocrats protested against the burdensome restraints imposed upon industry by the guilds and upon commerce by the governments. They believed that every person should be allowed to make what he likes and as he likes; that all occupations should be open to everybody; that trade between different parts of a country

should be unimpeded by tolls and taxes; and that tariffs should not be levied on foreign goods. A Scotch professor of philosophy, Adam Smith, who had visited France and knew the physiocrats, carried their ideas of economic freedom across the Channel. His famous work, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, appeared in 1776, the year of American independence. It formed a new declaration of independence for industry and commerce.

According to Smith, the state should limit itself to only three duties: "first, the duty of protecting the society from the violence and invasion of other independent societies; secondly, the duty of protecting, as far as possible, every member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it, or the duty of establishing an exact administration of justice; and thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining certain public works and certain public institutions which it can never be for the advantage of any individual or small number of individuals to erect and maintain." These three duties having been discharged, the state should not interfere any further with that system of natural liberty which leaves every man "perfectly free to pursue his own interest in his own way, and to bring both his industry and capital into competition with those of any other man or order of men."

These words form the classical presentation of the policy of *laissez faire* (a phrase first used by the physiocrats), the policy, as applied to governments, of letting things alone. Smith contended that even when the state acts with the best intentions it almost always serves the public worse than the enterprise of its citizens, however selfish they may be. He argued so clearly and persuasively as to make a profound impression upon businessmen and statesmen. His criticisms of guild restrictions, monopolies, bounties, and protective tariffs helped to break down the mercantile system and in Great Britain to secure the adoption of free trade. So true it is that "great thinkers control the affairs of men and by their discoveries regulate the march of nations."

Rationalism in Religion; Deism

England produced in the eighteenth century a school of rationalistic thinkers who extended to the spiritual world the conception of the reign of law in the physical world. The deists, as they came to be called, declared that the theology and ethics of Christianity should not be accepted on the authority of either the church or the Bible, but ought to be submitted to free inquiry. Some of them found in Christianity the most reasonable of religions; others questioned its claims to pre-emi-

nence and became champions of natural, as opposed to revealed, religion. They asserted that the tenets peculiar to Christians and over which Christians had disputed for centuries were really of minor importance; the essential thing was the doctrine common to all mankind — the existence of a personal God who created the world and governed it benevolently; a future life; and the laws of goodness, mercy, and duty impressed on all human hearts. According to these deists, any man, even the lowliest savage, could discover such a “natural religion” for himself by the exercise of his reason; hence it was, as they said, as old as the creation. Like the theory of an original social contract, that of an original natural religion was destined to be upset by the findings of anthropology in the nineteenth century, but it exerted considerable influence on contemporary thought, especially in England and France.

The French “Philosophes”

During the eighteenth century there flourished in France many thinkers and writers whose ideas fell like rain on the parched soil of the Old Regime. These *philosophes* were not pure philosophers; they were rather reformers who sought to throw the light of reason on the dark places of the social order. Some of them had lived for a time in Great Britain, to be confronted there with the astonishing sight of a people who controlled their king, paid no oppressive taxes, feared neither torture nor arbitrary imprisonment, enjoyed much liberty of speech and writing, and tolerated all sorts of dissenters from the state religion. The *philosophes* wanted to secure for their country an equal measure of freedom, not by revolutionary action, but by creating a public opinion which would compel the government to make and enforce enlightened laws. “It is the good legislator,” said one of them, “who makes the good citizen.” Their writings enjoyed an immense popularity not only in France but also throughout the Continent, for French had now superseded Latin as the language of intellectual Europe.

A nobleman, lawyer, and judge, Montesquieu, spent twenty years in travel and research before publishing his work, *The Spirit of the Laws* (1748). It is a classic of political science — or rather of sociology, since it deals with all the institutions of social life. Montesquieu passed in review each form of government — despotism, limited monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy — in order to determine its excellencies and defects and the causes of its rise, duration, and decay. He was particularly impressed by the parliamentary system of Great Britain and the constitutional guarantees of political liberty found in that country. To the old objection against popular government, that the people at

large are not competent to make decisions, he answers that they need not be competent provided they are interested. A free people will ultimately find the right road as the result of experience and discussion.

Montesquieu's most important contribution to the theory of politics was the doctrine of the "separation of powers," legislative, executive, and judicial, so that each serves as a check and balance upon the others. This doctrine greatly influenced the French revolutionists. It also found expression in the Constitution of the United States, partly because of Montesquieu's views, but chiefly because the framers of the Constitution were already familiar with its application in the colonial governments.

The foremost figure among the *philosophes* was Voltaire (1694-1778). For more than fifty years he poured forth a succession of poems, dramas, essays, biographies, and histories, so clearly written, so witty, and so clever as to win the applause of his contemporaries and make him in the eighteenth century what Erasmus had been in the sixteenth century, the literary arbiter of Europe. He knew either personally or by correspondence most of the social reformers of the day and devoted much energy to efforts in behalf of the persecuted and oppressed classes under the Old Regime. What Thomas Jefferson said of himself, Voltaire might also have said: "I have sworn upon the altar of God eternal hostility against every form of oppression over the mind of man."

There was nothing revolutionary in Voltaire's thinking; he believed in monarchy and favored reform by royal decree as the quickest and surest method. He made it his particular work to bring discredit on ecclesiastical authority. The church, as a privileged and persecuting organization, was for him an "infamous thing" devised by self-seeking priests. A typical deist, he insisted on the need of tolerance, for differences of opinion in matters of religion had caused more trouble on this little globe than plagues and earthquakes. Voltaire's exposure of bigotry and fanaticism helped to create the freer atmosphere in which religious thought moves today.

If Voltaire was the critic of the old, Jean Jacques Rousseau was the prophet of the new. This son of a Geneva watchmaker, who wandered from one European capital to another, made a failure of everything he undertook and died poverty-stricken and demented. The discouragements and miseries of his career found expression in what he wrote. Rousseau felt only contempt for the boasted civilization of the age. He delighted to picture what he supposed was once man's happy estate before governments had arisen, before the strong had

begun to oppress the weak, when nobody owned the land, and when there were no taxes and no wars. "Back to nature" was his cry.

Such fancies Rousseau applied to politics in what was his most influential book, the *Social Contract* (1762). Starting with the statement that "man is born free and everywhere he is in chains," he went on to describe a purely ideal society in which the people are ruled neither by kings nor parliaments, but themselves make the laws directly. The only way to inaugurate a social millennium was to restore the sovereignty of the people, with "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity" for all. The idea that governments and laws arise by voluntary agreements among men, who may overthrow them when necessary, was not original with Rousseau. His version of the social contract differs little from Locke's, but it acquired a tremendous vogue because, while Locke was a cool, detached thinker, Rousseau was an emotionalist who could put the red blood of life into theory and dogma. Rousseau proclaimed that the masses of men had lost their title deeds to freedom; the time was ripe to win them back and keep them. His countrymen read the *Social Contract* with avidity, and during the French Revolution they proceeded to put its democratic teachings into effect. It was well said of Rousseau that while he discovered nothing "he inflamed everything."

Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Rousseau were among the contributors to the famous *Encyclopedia*, which appeared in seventeen volumes of text and eleven volumes of plates after the middle of the eighteenth century. The editor was the versatile Diderot. It was more than a book of reference, a storehouse of all the scientific and practical knowledge acquired during the period of the Enlightenment. It sought to guide opinion as well as to give information. Among the abuses attacked by the contributors were the cruel criminal law, slavery, religious intolerance, and press censorship. They also criticized the inequitable system of taxation and absolutism in government. The *Encyclopedia* encountered much opposition in official quarters, and several volumes were suppressed as injurious to royal and ecclesiastical authority. Nevertheless it circulated freely in the French provinces and foreign countries and secretly in Paris, thus helping to set in motion a current of revolt against the Old Regime.

Humanitarian Movements

In the penal code of eighteenth-century Europe the scales were weighted heavily against a suspected criminal. Torture of an accused person in order to obtain a confession usually preceded his trial; if convicted, he might be tortured to secure evidence as to his accom-

plices. Only a few countries (Great Britain, Sweden, and Prussia) forbade this practice. On the Continent, where the jury system did not prevail, trials usually took place in private, the witnesses being examined secretly and separately by the judge. As a rule, the accused was not represented by counsel. Prisons were filthy and unsanitary. Prisoners, men, women, and children, were herded together, the hardened criminals with the first offenders. They had to pay for food and other necessities and to fee their keeper, for jailers and guards received no salaries. Branding, flogging, and exposure in the pillory formed common punishments for minor offenses. Death was the punishment for murder, arson, burglary, horse-stealing, theft, forgery, counterfeiting, and many other crimes. The British code at one time included over two hundred offenses for which the penalty was death. A man (or a woman) might be hanged for stealing as little as five shillings from a shop or for picking a pocket to the value of a single shilling. Transportation to America and later to Australia was often substituted, however, for the death penalty. Executions took place in public, on the mistaken theory that to see them would deter from crime.

These conditions aroused much criticism from reformers, among whom the Italian nobleman Beccaria holds an especially honorable place. His brief *Essay on Crimes and Punishments* (1764) had an immediate success, going through many editions in Italian and being translated into the chief European languages. It ought to have been printed in letters of gold, for it soon led to the general abolition of torture and of such ferocious punishments as burning alive, breaking on the wheel, and drawing and quartering. Beccaria argued that evidence wrung by torture is always suspect and may be worthless; further, that the process of wringing it is a monstrous wrong, since so many of its victims must be innocent. Beccaria's many constructive ideas for the proper treatment of crime and criminals entitle him to rank as the founder of scientific penology.

Prison reform may be said to have begun with John Howard, whose book, *The State of the Prisons in England and Wales* (1777), led to the establishment of the first British penitentiaries, where offenders were taught useful trades and inured to habits of industry. Howard also investigated the treatment of criminals on the Continent. His pioneer work had much to do with the improvement of prisons in both Europe and the United States.

Slavery had all but died out in Christian countries by the close of the Middle Ages. It was revived on a much larger scale after the era of geographical discovery, which opened up Africa as a source of slaves and America as a field for their profitable employment. Antislavery

agitation began in the eighteenth century with the Quakers, who excluded slave-owners from membership in their sect. Benjamin Franklin became president of the first American society for the abolition of slavery and Washington and Jefferson, though slave-owners, looked forward to the speedy disappearance of an institution so opposed to the "natural rights" of man.

Religious Toleration

The union of church and state in both Catholic and Protestant countries seemed to make conformity to the established religion essential for all citizens. Nonconformity appeared as a crime which the government stood ready to punish by fines, confiscation of property, imprisonment, and even death. The ideal was "one king, one law, one faith." Nevertheless, religious toleration gradually increased. The revocation of the Edict of Nantes by Louis XIV in 1685 was the last exhibition of wholesale intolerance in western Europe. The Huguenots were now denied freedom of worship and deprived of their rights as citizens. Many fled to England, Holland, and Prussia, and these countries, the chief Protestant foes of France, profited by the immigration of a large body of law-abiding, industrious workers.

Four years later the passage in England of the Toleration Act, by the same parliament that enacted the Bill of Rights, marked a permanent advance toward the goal of full freedom of religion. The eighteenth century saw that goal reached by Prussia, as it had been reached in the seventeenth century by Holland. Frederick the Great, a deist and the friend of Voltaire, declared that everyone should be allowed to get to heaven in his own way and backed up the declaration by putting Catholics on an equality with Protestants throughout his dominions. Another enlightened despot, Joseph II of Austria, did not go quite so far, but he admitted Protestants to civil and military offices and allowed them to have churches and schools of their own. Complete religious liberty, not merely toleration, was one of the good things which emerged in France from the fire of revolution. Finally, in 1791 the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States provided that Congress shall make no law prohibiting the "free exercise" of religion.

What led to the abandonment of the practice of compulsion in religion? In part, it was the failure of the majority to overcome by force the dissenting minority. People became weary of the continual civil strife, the wars, massacres, and expulsions which persecution produced. In part, it was the growing realization that a man could lead a moral life and be a good citizen — all that the state ought to require of

him — whatever faith he professed. And in part, it was the outcome of the rationalist spirit of the Enlightenment. Thus Locke, in his first *Letter concerning Toleration* (1689) and in three subsequent letters, argued that to persecute unbelievers only transformed them into hypocrites. Religious feeling is a state of mind, and the mind cannot be compelled to believe. If infidels were to be converted by force, it would be easier for God to do it “with armies of heavenly legions than for any son of the church, how potent soever, with all his dragoons.” That was another way of saying what the Roman emperor Tiberius had said: “If the gods are insulted, let them see to it themselves.”

Freedom of the Press

The invention of printing and the growth of the habit of reading which followed it gave rise to a literary censorship in every European country. Lists of prohibited books were issued in great numbers; printers were required to be licensed; and booksellers who disposed of forbidden works were made liable to heavy penalties. In Catholic Europe the papal *Index* guarded the orthodoxy of the faithful by banning not only Protestant productions but also those by deists and free-thinking philosophers and by some scientists. The governments of Spain, France, and Austria likewise maintained a censorship for both religious and political purposes.

The same conditions long prevailed in Protestant Europe. Holland, after seceding from Spain, had a practically uncensored press and became the great publishing center for liberal writers everywhere. Their books, unprintable at home or, if printed, burned by the common hangman, found publishers in Amsterdam, Leiden, and other Dutch cities. In 1695, a few years after the Glorious Revolution, parliament refused to continue the censorship of books, pamphlets, and newspapers, and England began to enjoy a free press as an essential accompaniment of a free government. Under Frederick the Great there was much liberty of expression in Prussia; as long as the king could do what he pleased his people could say what they pleased. Sweden abolished censorship in 1766. The French revolutionists, declaring that “the free communication of ideas and opinions is one of the most precious of the rights of man,” abolished it in 1789. And in 1791, by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States, Congress was forbidden to make any law “abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”

The greatest tyranny is unable to limit freedom of thought, but thought that cannot circulate cannot move men. To restrict or prohibit its expression, except so far as may be needful for preserving pub-

lic morals or public peace, is always to confess weakness on the censor's part, whether the censor be the civil or the ecclesiastical power. If an opinion is right, its suppression deprives people of a chance to exchange error for truth; if it is wrong, its advocacy gives people a livelier consciousness of the truth they hold. This argument for freedom of the press has never been presented more eloquently than by the Puritan poet John Milton, in his *Areopagitica* (1644). "Though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so truth be in the field, we do injuriously, by licensing and prohibiting, to misdoubt her strength. Let her and falsehood grapple: whoever knew truth put to the worse in a free and open encounter?" And Milton put freedom of the press first and foremost. "Give me," he said, "the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all other liberties."

Decline of Superstition; the Witchcraft Delusion

When the sixteenth century opened, the conception of uniformity in nature, of a universe which ran like a great machine without supernatural intervention, had been scarcely formed in the minds of even the wisest men. Miraculous events often took place, due to either divine or diabolical activity; hosts of evil spirits were seen or suspected on every side, swarming like microbes and producing fearsome natural phenomena, as well as sickness, insanity, and other human ills; sudden death which descended upon the wicked was a judgment of heaven — anything might happen in a pre-scientific age when men had not learned to regard some things as too strange to be true.

The advance of science gave a fatal blow to these and many other superstitious notions. The old idea that the stars and planets shed their "influence" on the earth became ridiculous to one who knew a little astronomy; Copernicus, Galileo, and, above all, Newton destroyed astrology for thinking men. When Newton's friend, the astronomer Halley, discovered that some comets, instead of visiting the solar system only once, revolved around the sun, these celestial objects, which had long been regarded as heralds of calamity, were removed to the domain of natural law. Halley's Comet, which he observed in 1682, returned in 1759 as he predicted, and again in 1835 and 1910. As astronomy disengaged itself from astrology, so chemistry parted company from alchemy. The time when it did so may be exactly dated by Boyle's remarkable book, *The Skeptical Chemist* (1661), in which he poked fun at the alchemists and all their theories. Finally, the period of the Enlightenment saw the decline and practical disappearance of the belief in witchcraft, which had sat like a nightmare on the European mind.

The belief in witchcraft, the "black magic" of primitive peoples, seems to be as old as humanity and as widespread. From the level of savagery it may be traced upward throughout barbarism and the early civilized world. It existed during the early Middle Ages but, despite their intellectual darkness, it was not prominent and not much feared. Laws of Charlemagne even forbade anyone to be put to death on a charge of witchcraft. During the later Middle Ages, when the spirit of religious persecution had begun to rage in western Europe, when heresies multiplied, and when the existence of the Devil and his attendant demons became ever more real to the popular mind, ideas of witchcraft revived in virulent form. Witches were now supposed to have sold themselves to His Satanic Majesty, receiving in turn the power to work evil by magic. They could change themselves or others into animals; they had charms against the hurt of wounds; they could raise storms and destroy crops; and they could convey thorns, pins, and other objects into their victims' bodies, thus causing illness and death. At night they rode through the air on broomsticks or three-legged stools and assembled in some lonely place for feasts, dances, and obscene rites. The Devil himself attended these "Witches' Sabbaths" and taught his followers diabolic arts, the "Black Mass," and blasphemous parodies of the Christian religion. Thus witchcraft and heresy came to be looked upon as nearly allied.

Pope Innocent VIII, by a bull in 1484, gave formal sanction to the delusion, and from this time to question its reality was to question the authority of the church. Protestants, relying on the scriptural injunction, "Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live" (Exodus xxii, 17), vied with Catholics in hatred of witchcraft and zeal in hunting it out. How many innocent men, women, and children were executed on the charge of being leagued with the Evil One can never be known; certainly tens of thousands perished. The accused were tortured until they confessed and confession was followed by death at the stake. Many pleaded guilty at once in order to avoid torture. In England, where torture was not allowable under the common law, there were various tests for witches, the most usual being the ordeal by water. This was based on the old notion that pure water would reject the wicked. Bound hand and foot, an accused person was flung into a stream, to sink if innocent and float if guilty; in the latter case to be hanged only for not being drowned. The witchcraft epidemic which broke out in the Thirteen Colonies during the seventeenth century and reached its height at Salem, Massachusetts, in 1697, when twenty persons suffered death, was simply a repetition on a small scale of what went on all over England at this time.

All honor to those courageous men who first dared to lift their

voices against the terrible delusion. An Englishman, Reginald Scot, wrote his *Discovery of Witchcraft* (1584) to expose it; King James I, that "wisest fool," ordered the book to be burnt and himself composed a work in rebuttal of Scot's arguments. A German Jesuit, Spee, who had accompanied many victims to the stake, published anonymously in 1631 a book in which he declared that "if all of us have not confessed ourselves witches, it is only because we have not been tortured." But no direct assault on the witchcraft belief ever made much impression. It disappeared in the eighteenth century only through the quiet growth and diffusion of the scientific spirit, which taught thinking men to regard the universe as governed by natural laws. That it has disappeared forever would be too much to assume. Only popular education in the realities of nature and human life can prevent the recrudescence from time to time of the most ancient and deep-set of superstitions.

Education and Educational Reformers

The schools in the Middle Ages were neither secular nor public nor free. Clergymen taught them, the church controlled them, and those who attended them were children of the aristocrats and wealthy townsmen able to pay for the education of their sons. The education of girls was neglected; even those of the higher classes received little formal instruction beyond reading and writing. Coeducation of boys and girls was almost unknown.

Broadly speaking, these conditions prevailed to the close of the eighteenth century. It is true that after the rise of Protestantism efforts were made to provide for elementary education supported by general taxation, in order that everyone might be able to read and interpret the Scriptures. Holland and Scotland set up schools in each parish, but the teachers were selected by the ecclesiastical authorities. In England, France, and Germany there were "charity schools" for the poor. England had also "Sunday schools," entirely free, where children received instruction in reading, besides lessons on religion and morals. Frederick the Great established schools in Prussia so that his subjects could learn at least to read and write. Catherine II, who posed as an enlightened despot, also maintained a few schools in Russia — "not for us," as she wrote to the governor of Moscow, "but for Europe, where we must keep our position in public opinion. But the day when our peasants shall wish to become educated both you and I shall lose our places."

Even in this barren period there were men with a vision of education for the masses. Such a one was the Bohemian Comenius, who gave his

long life almost wholly to teaching. He would provide in each country a national system of education, reaching from primary grades to the university. "Not only," he writes, "are the children of the rich and noble to be drawn to schools, but all alike, gentle and simple, boys and girls, in great towns and small, down to the country villages." In *The Great Didactic* (written between 1628 and 1632) he also argued for adding to the curriculum of the academies and grammar schools, where the classics formed the chief studies, such subjects as geography, world history, and science, as well as the vernacular languages. The ideas of Comenius had little influence at the time; he was too far ahead of his age. The English philosopher Locke, in *Some Thoughts concerning Education* (1693), also urged an enrichment of the curriculum by the addition of modern subjects.

The most influential of the educational reformers was Rousseau, a father who abandoned his own five children to the care of a foundling hospital. His *Émile* (1762), the story of a boy taken from his parents and the schools and educated by a wise tutor "according to nature," raised a protest against all that was artificial and conventional in the education of the time. Rousseau advocated "child study"; the acquisition of knowledge through the process of discovery, as when the pupil invents his own geometry; object lessons to give him first-hand familiarity with what he studies; and, in general, the kind of training which arouses his interest and stimulates him to find out things for himself. With Comenius, Rousseau held that education ought not to be a privilege of the gifted or the wealthy few, but a right of the many. The French revolutionists, declaring that "next to bread, education is the first need of the people," re-echoed Rousseau.

The Idea of Progress

The rationalistic thinkers, however much they might differ in their views, cherished the belief that man is perfectible and that human society is capable of indefinite improvement once the rubbish of the past has been swept away. With the great scientific discoveries there came a sense of man's power over his environment; Nature seemed to set no limits to his hopes; given good laws and institutions, he might march ever forward and realize all his possibilities. The idea of progress, contrasting so sharply with the theological doctrine of the fall of man, was something quite new in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The extraordinary development of mechanical invention and applied science during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was to make this idea a commonplace of popular thought.

VII

Literary and Artistic Movements

Classicism in Literature

IF there is any one "note" most characteristic of modern times it is secularization. Politics, law, science, philosophy, literature, and the fine arts, which during medieval times had been more or less subject to ecclesiastical authority, are now completely secular in their attitude and appeal. The secularizing process began when the middle class, well-to-do and comparatively well educated, first took a prominent place in European society. Equally removed on the one side from the aristocracy, lay and clerical, and on the other side from the workers in the fields and shops, its members became more and more the prime agents of cultural activity. Humanism in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and the rationalism of the Enlightenment were essentially middle-class, secular movements.

The great authors of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries sometimes belonged to the nobility, but they found their chief audience in the middle class and consequently reflected its secular spirit. As heirs of the humanists, they continued to be much influenced by the literary models which ancient Greece and Rome had set. This was indeed natural, for the universities and secondary schools, both Catholic and Protestant, made the classics the backbone of education and taught them so well that students could read Greek and Latin with ease and therefore with pleasure. And until modern men wrote books comparable in quality to those of Greek and Roman antiquity, classicism, meaning regard for the order, logic, reason, and form of the ancient writings, dominated the literature of the age.

Sixteenth-Century Literature

The sixteenth century produced two notable epic poems cast in the antique manner. One was the *Lusiads* of Camoëns (1524-1580), celebrating Da Gama's memorable voyage to India. Its popularity has done

much to keep alive the sense of nationality among the Portuguese, and even today the poem forms a bond of union between Portugal and her daughter nation across the Atlantic — Brazil. The other epic was the *Jerusalem Delivered* by Tasso (1544-1595), which has for its subject the First Crusade. Next to Dante, Tasso ranks as the most popular of Italian poets. A third epic, the *Faerie Queene* of Edmund Spenser (1552-1599), found its inspiration not only in classical mythology but also in the legends of the Middle Ages. Spenser's verse, so musical, so rich in imaginative ornament, so warmed with the love of beauty, has earned for him the designation of the poets' poet.

The *Don Quixote* of Cervantes (1547-1616) seems to have been intended in part as a travesty of the romances of chivalry, which had obtained so strong a hold on the imagination of his countrymen. The book is a vivid picture of Spanish life, with nobles, priests, monks, traders, farmers, muleteers, barbers, and beggars all passing before our eyes as in a procession. It became famous at once, and it is even more read today than three hundred years ago. Two other books remarkable for wide and lasting appeal are the *Gargantua* and *Pantagruel* of Rabelais (c. 1490-1555), the one named after a legendary giant and the other after his no less legendary and gigantic son. With buffoonery, with wild humor, often with "Rabelaisian" grossness of speech, the author satirized all the follies, pedantries, and bigotries of his time. He laughed many evils out of life and much good in. "Laughter belongs to man alone," said Rabelais.

Another Frenchman, Montaigne (1533-1592), lives today as the author of more than a hundred essays revealing his well-stored mind and genial if skeptical temper. Montaigne may be said to have established the essay as a definite literary form. He was followed by Sir Francis Bacon (1561-1626), Lord Verulam. The *Civil and Moral Counsels*, as Bacon called his essays, were designed to bring wisdom "home to man's business and bosoms." Jurist, philosopher, and scientist as well as man of letters, Bacon took all knowledge as his province. He wrote at length in both English and Latin to argue the claims of "inductive philosophy," or science, against scholasticism. No one did more than Bacon to turn men from scholastic disputation to observation of the world around them.

Literature in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries

The age of Louis XIV was the great age of the French dramatists, to be considered presently. Among its prose writers perhaps the first place belongs to the Duc de Saint-Simon, who described so well in his *Mem-*

oirs the pomps and vanities, the ceremonies, intrigues, petty tragedies, and petty comedies of what was the most splendid of European courts. Not less interesting are the *Letters* of Madame de Sévigné, who knew everybody worth knowing from the king downward and wrote about them all. The *Fables* in verse of La Fontaine and the prose fairy tales of Charles Perrault still enjoy wide popularity in France and outside France. But these are only a few of the authors that added luster to the long rule of the Grand Monarch.

Shakespeare and Bacon, who with Spenser were the chief literary ornaments of Queen Elizabeth's reign, did some of their best work during the reign of James I. In 1611 appeared the Authorized Version of the Bible, sometimes called the King James Version because it was dedicated to him. The simplicity, dignity, and eloquence of this translation have never been surpassed, and it remains in ordinary use among Protestants throughout the English-speaking world. The Puritan John Milton (1608-1674), great for his prose but still greater for his verse, felt the inspiration of both the classics and the Bible. *Paradise Lost* and its sequel, *Paradise Regained*, were composed during the reign of Charles II, when the author was blind and old and out of favor with the Restoration government — "On evil days though fallen, and evil tongues." In these poems Milton gave to English literature its noblest monument and took his rightful place beside Homer, Virgil, and Dante among epic poets. Only a few years after his death another Puritan, John Bunyan, wrote the allegory, *Pilgrim's Progress*, a book which gives an equal though different pleasure to children and men, to the ignorant and the learned.

The long line of eminent English poets was continued in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by John Dryden (1631-1700) and Alexander Pope (1688-1744). These writers left the emotions aside to write satiric and argumentative, that is, intellectual poetry, which appealed to men of the Enlightenment. Their easy, witty verse has perfection of form, but it leaves the reader cold. The poetry of Gray, Collins, Cowper, Blake, and, above all, that of Robert Burns (1759-1796) showed that the love of nature and the passions of the human heart had again found expression in English song. Prose literature was also well developed during this period by such authors as Daniel Defoe (*Robinson Crusoe*), Jonathan Swift (*Gulliver's Travels*), and Oliver Goldsmith (*The Vicar of Wakefield*). The essays of Joseph Addison and Sir Richard Steele in the *Tatler* and the *Spectator* were examples of simple, unaffected, and graceful writing. When Benjamin Franklin aspired to be an author, he gave his days and nights to the study of these essays.

The Drama

The modern European drama was rooted in the "miracles" and "moralities" of the later Middle Ages, but as a form of literature it found its earliest models in the plays by Latin authors. These were first presented in translation before the princely courts of Italy. Early in the sixteenth century the Italians began to compose plays of their own, and from that time the drama took a large part in the life of the people. The tragedies of Alfieri and the comedies of Goldoni — both eighteenth-century authors — are still presented on the stage in Italy.

The Italian playwrights, especially the tragedians, had followed strictly the classical tradition of long declamations, a chorus, and the division into five acts. In Spain the drama became much less conventional under the leadership of Lope de Vega (1563–1635), an astonishingly fertile genius, and author, it is said, of two thousand plays. Many were of the "cloak and sword" type, dealing with the life of the Spanish gentleman, a life of duels and amorous adventures. Vega's advice to would-be playwrights was short and to the point: invent a good plot and keep up the interest in it to the end. Calderón (1600–1681), the other great Spanish dramatist, wrote so many plays that he never troubled himself to collect them. Some of the best were the *autos*, one-act religious dramas presenting the central mystery of the Catholic faith — the Eucharist.

The English drama also reached maturity during the late sixteenth century and early seventeenth century in the "spacious days" of Elizabeth and the days, less spacious, of James I. The playwrights soon broke away from classical models, and with Marlowe, Ben Jonson, William Shakespeare (1564–1616), and their lesser contemporaries the drama took on its modern form. Of Shakespeare, greatest of all the playwrights, we know but little. Born at Stratford-on-Avon of a good family and educated at the village grammar school, where he learned "small Latin and less Greek," he went to London as a young man and became an actor, an actor-manager, and a writer of plays. He prospered, made money, and eventually retired to a country home in Stratford, where he died. His will disposes of his property, but makes no reference to his works. Besides two long poems and a long sonnet sequence, he wrote thirty-seven tragedies and comedies; of these perhaps five were in part by other hands. The plays were not collected and published until several years after his death.

Jonson, Shakespeare's friend, declared that he was "not for an age but for all time." Whole libraries have been written to account for the amazing extent of his knowledge, the depth of his understanding of

human nature, his fertility of imagination, and his unequalled gift of language. But it is as impossible to explain Shakespeare as to explain Newton. Who can calculate the orbit of genius?

The Globe Theater, where Shakespeare's plays were performed, was a small building, circular inside and roofless except above the stage. Aristocrats sat in boxes or on stools on the stage, while commoners stood in the open pit. A blanket served as a curtain; wooden imitations of houses, towers, and the like supplied the scenery; and a bulletin board announced a change of scene. Female parts were played by boys. It is a tribute to the intellectual caliber of Elizabethan audiences that with so few aids to the imagination and so little dramatic action plays of the quality of Shakespeare's should have kept the boards.

Corneille and Racine, writers of tragedies, and Molière (1622-1673), writer of comedy, flourished during the reign of Louis XIV. The tragedians eliminated from their work anything which seemed irregular or wild or elemental. Always coldly correct and restrained, they would have been shocked by the seeming extravagance of Shakespeare and his followers. Both Corneille and Racine conceived of a play as setting forth, not the development of a plot, but the conflict of passions or motives in some leading character. The problem they present is not what will happen to him next but what passion or motive will triumph in his breast. Consequently, the persons of French tragedy do little or nothing but talk, in order to explain themselves to the audience. French comedy was less bound by these conventions, and in Molière, a strolling actor turned playwright, it had an eminent representative. The bullies, the bores, and the boors, the snobs, quacks, misers, hypocrites, and humbugs of the world of Paris and Versailles are all immortalized in Molière's many comedies. He is the French Aristophanes.

Lessing, Schiller, and, in his earlier work, Goethe (1749-1832) were the great dramatists of eighteenth-century Germany. They led a successful revolt against the artificial French ideas then dominating the German stage. Lessing's *Emilia Galotti*, the first great German tragedy, *Minna von Barnhelm*, a comedy, and the dramatic poem, *Nathan the Wise*, a plea for religious toleration which included even Jews and Moslems in the mantle of its charity, are his best-known plays. Schiller's historical plays, such as *Maria Stuart*, *The Maid of Orléans*, and *William Tell*, have made him one of the most read of German authors. His friend Goethe wrote plays, as he wrote almost everything else, with a master's hand. In 1790 he published a dramatic fragment based on the medieval legend of Faust, the magician, who entered into a pact with the Devil (Mephistopheles), in order to obtain pleasure and power. The poem was later (1808, 1831) to be elaborated into the famous *Faust*,

an epic-drama of the soul's temptation and repentance, of the struggle between good and evil in the mind of man. It has a place not only in the literature of Germany but of the world.

History and Fiction

In Edward Gibbon the eighteenth century produced one whose comprehensive and accurate learning coupled with a style marked by wit, irony, and stately eloquence, has made the *History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (1776-1788) a masterpiece of historical writing. Gibbon proposed "to connect the ancient and the modern history of the world." The Roman Empire, whose declining fortunes he traced, was not that which in the West succumbed to the German invaders; it was the empire which lived on in the East for more than a thousand years thereafter, the mainstay of European civilization in an age of barbarism, and which fell at length before the turbaned warriors of the Crescent. Gibbon was in the best sense a cultural historian, dealing with the literatures, arts, religions, laws, and customs of the peoples whom he described. A little earlier than Gibbon, Voltaire had done much the same thing, though superficially, in some of his writings. Both men, moved by the rationalistic spirit of the Enlightenment, wanted to make history tell the whole story of social evolution, so that it might explain the past and thus account for the present.

Fiction in the shape of short stories (*novelle*), dealing mainly with the passion of love — illicit love — had been composed by Boccaccio and his Italian imitators during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. They established the vogue of the novelette of manners in Spain, France, and England. But it was not until the eighteenth century that the novel as we know it appeared and began to be a popular form of literature. Henry Fielding's *Tom Jones* (1749) was the first great work of English fiction. Fielding and his successors in England and on the Continent founded the novel on the observation of real life, made it depict character, and invented for it a definite plot. Its subject, as Fielding declared, "is no other than human nature," the whole life of man. That is a vast subject; hence the enormous production of novels in our times.

Scholarship

Many scholars carried on the work of the humanists in making available the ancient classics. Some were extraordinarily erudite, for instance, the Frenchman Joseph Scaliger (1540-1609), who to a knowledge of Greek and Latin added that of Hebrew, Syriac, Arabic, and

several other Oriental languages. He was the first to show that Greek and Roman history could not be understood apart from the history of the ancient Near East. The Englishman Richard Bentley (1662-1742) was another hero of learning, especially of Greek learning. Sir William Jones (1746-1794), a judge at Calcutta, did much to introduce the Sanskrit language and literature of India to the attention of European scholars.

Meanwhile, the vernacular languages were more or less standardized by the multiplication of grammars and dictionaries. The forty "Immortals" composing the French Academy, founded by Cardinal Richelieu in 1635, produced after half a century of labor the first edition of the official French dictionary. It is never finished; the academicians are always busy on it. The earliest English dictionary of any importance was that by Samuel Johnson (1755), on which all later English and American lexicography has been based. The first edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, a modest work in three volumes, appeared at Edinburgh (1768-1771).

The Periodical Press; Libraries

The rapid growth of the reading public after the invention of printing resulted in the multiplication of pamphlets and broadsides to meet the demand for news. In Germany, where printing began, these were followed in the seventeenth century by regular newspapers. Other countries soon imitated the German example. Newspapers naturally flourished most where discussion was least fettered by censorship, and in Holland and England they exercised great influence on public opinion. Besides weekly and semiweekly newspapers London by the end of the seventeenth century had several dailies. The *Times* was started in 1785. The "Thunderer," as the *Times* is called, holds the premier position among English journals and when it speaks all Europe listens. A new stage in the growth of the periodical press came with the establishment of monthly magazines. One of the earliest and best in England was the *Gentleman's Magazine*, founded in 1731 and published until 1868. Its two hundred and twenty-four volumes are a mine of wealth for the cultural historian.

The libraries founded by the Italian humanists in Rome, Florence, and Venice expanded greatly after the invention of printing, while many new collections were formed outside Italy as "cisterns in which to store the precious flood of knowledge." The patronage of Colbert, minister of Louis XIV, did much to enrich the royal French library, now the Bibliothèque Nationale, at Paris. The huge library of the

British Museum dates from 1753. The state libraries of Prussia, Austria, Spain, and Russia (the last-mentioned established by Peter the Great) have also built up enormous collections. Among European university libraries the Bodleian at Oxford, founded by Sir Thomas Bodley in 1598, is still pre-eminent. These institutions were accessible only to scholars, a favored few.

Baroque and Rococo Architecture

The classical spirit, which had animated so much of the art of Italy in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, continued to be dominant there and from Italy penetrated Spain, France, Germany, England, and other countries. It found expression especially in architecture, giving rise to the style known as Baroque. This developed in the sixteenth century and lasted for about two hundred years. Its leading exponent was the Italian Palladio (1518–1580), whose treatise, *Four Books of Architecture*, was translated into the principal European languages and widely used. Characteristic of Baroque are a preference for the curved instead of the straight line and a desire to give an impression of splendor by ornate and exuberant decoration. Ornament in architecture is not an element in itself; its true function is to emphasize structural features. Baroque architects disregarded this fundamental principle, with the result that much of their work appears ostentatious rather than noble, theatrical rather than sincere, and grandiose rather than grand. Yet every age has its own standards of taste in things artistic, and a judgment as to what is or is not true art must always be a subjective judgment. Certainly the magnificent churches in this style accorded well with the stately ritual of Catholicism and the equally magnificent palaces of kings and nobles, with the elaborate ceremonial of court life.

Outside of Italy, where Baroque architecture arose, it took in each country special characteristics suited to the tastes and temperament of the people. In Spain it became fantastically decorative; here structure was almost smothered under the profusion of ornament. This style passed over to Spanish America, being well exemplified by the cathedral of Mexico City. In France Baroque architecture was more restrained, more purely classical in expression. Outstanding examples of it are the Louvre, the chief royal palace until the time of Louis XIV and now a museum of the fine arts; the gigantic palace of Versailles; and the Hôtel des Invalides, where Napoleon lies entombed. The royal palaces of Munich, Dresden, Berlin, and Vienna, together with numerous churches, attest the popularity of Baroque in Germany and Austria. In England, where the Gothic style long prevailed, Baroque made little

headway. The greatest of English architects, Sir Christopher Wren (1632-1723), followed the Renaissance style in St. Paul's Cathedral at London, a building inspired by St. Peter's at Rome, though not copied from it.

The so-called Rococo, derived from Baroque, arose in France during the reign of Louis XV and became popular throughout the Continent in the eighteenth century. Scrolls, curves, and gilding, applied in great profusion to both wall surfaces and furniture, characterized this architectural style. It was less heavy and more elegant than Baroque and was often marked by gracefulness and charm. Examples are Frederick the Great's palace of Sans-Souci at Potsdam, Maria Theresa's palace of Schönbrunn at Vienna, and Catherine the Great's palace of the Hermitage at St. Petersburg. The Rococo was hardly known in England.

Sculpture

Some characteristics of Baroque architecture also appear in the sculpture of the period under consideration. It often excites admiration for the technical skill displayed, but its sentimentalism, artificiality, and pompous exhibition of material wealth in art appear unattractive to our eyes. The leading exponent of this kind of sculpture was Bernini (1598-1680), whose lifelike portrait busts, statues, fountains, and tombs of princes of the church were scattered about Rome and were widely imitated in Italy and other countries.

The taste of cultivated Europeans in sculpture was revolutionized during the eighteenth century by Winckelmann, a German antiquarian and art critic. In his *History of Ancient Art* (1764) he showed that the classical statues, preserved chiefly in Rome, were Roman copies of lost Greek originals and he urged that sculptors should go to them for examples of the simplicity, repose, and dignity essential to the finest monumental conceptions. After Winckelmann's time they did so, and imitations of Greek statuary, or of what passed as Greek statuary, began to fill the museums and art galleries all over Europe.

Painting

While Leonardo da Vinci, Michelangelo, and Raphael were carrying painting to heights never reached by their predecessors, other masters of the brush flourished in sixteenth-century Italy. Such were Giorgione, Correggio, Tintoretto, Veronese, and Titian (1477-1576), the latter equally at home in episodes from pagan mythology and Christian legend. His "Assumption of the Virgin" at Venice is one of the most

famous of paintings. The portraits which he made are unsurpassed for glowing color, and during his long life such personages as Charles V, Philip II, and Pope Paul III posed for him. Titian was the most eminent representative of the Venetian school, which, like Venice herself, was gay, pleasure-loving, and full of the joy of life.

Spanish painting, by way of contrast, expressed the mysticism, ecstatic piety, and religious fanaticism of the most Catholic of Catholic countries. It was largely in the service of the church. Titian's pupil El Greco, so called because of his birth in Crete, Ribera, and Murillo were among the distinguished painters who chose ecclesiastical subjects — Madonnas and saints, Christian martyrs, ascetic hermits, visionary monks. Velásquez (1599–1660), the greatest of Spanish painters, and in sheer power of craftsmanship one of the greatest of all painters, devoted himself chiefly to secular subjects, especially to portraits. The Spanish court and aristocracy of the seventeenth century live again on his canvases. The "Surrender of Breda," illustrating a scene in the long war between Spain and Holland, is a magnificent work, one of the treasures of the Prado Museum at Madrid. The powerful genius of Goya (1746–1828), satirist and realist, entitles him to rank as almost a second Velásquez.

The Netherlands, after their division into Belgium and Holland, the one Spanish in allegiance and Catholic in religion and the other independent and Protestant, produced eminent artists. Rubens (1577–1640), the leading representative of the Flemish school, was unparalleled in fecundity. More than twenty-two hundred pictures, many of them huge compositions containing a wealth of figures, stand to his credit. He was a facile craftsman and an expert colorist. There are those who enjoy his florid, sensual, earthy work, in which art, even when dealing with religious themes, exhibits so secular a spirit. Another Fleming, Van Dyck, who studied under Rubens, spent much of his artistic life in England, where Charles I made him court painter. His portraits of the king and members of the English aristocracy deserve all the praise that has been lavished on them.

The Holland of the seventeenth century, made prosperous by industry and commerce, supported numerous artists who worked for the guilds, civic bodies, and rich merchant class. Since Calvinism frowned on the decoration of churches, they painted comparatively small pictures for halls and homes, such as portraits, landscapes, and representations of Biblical subjects or of scenes from everyday life, all executed in a realistic manner. The greatest member of the Dutch school was Rembrandt (1606–1669), renowned as both painter and etcher. The "Night Watch," the "Anatomy Lesson," and the "Syndics," the last

picturing cloth merchants of Amsterdam, are some of his most celebrated works. Rembrandt's contemporary, Franz Hals, excelled in portraits and another contemporary, Ruysdael, in landscapes.

France in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had many painters but none of the first rank. Poussin's Biblical illustrations, Claude Lorrain's classical landscapes, Watteau's scenes of court life and elegant society under the Old Regime, and the sentimental compositions of Greuze are works of talent but scarcely of genius. England in William Hogarth (1697-1764) produced a great painter, one of her greatest. He was a satirist and a moralist, laying bare with his brush all the dark side of the age of the Enlightenment. The second half of the eighteenth century in England was remarkable for portrait painters, including Sir Joshua Reynolds, Romney, Raeburn, and especially Thomas Gainsborough (1727-1788). The Americans, Copley and West, who settled in London, deserve to be added to this list. Some of the artists, both French and English, worked in pastel (dry color) and in water color, two new methods of pictorial representation which developed at this time.

Music

Modern music owes nothing to that of the ancients; its foundations were laid by medieval men. In the ritual of the Church the priest intoned the Latin words of the services, while responses in unison were chanted by a choir. There was also choral music, with different voices rendering different parts, not very successfully, however. An eleventh-century writer compared the singers to drunken men, "who indeed find their way home, but do not know how they get there." Folk songs and minstrel lays, with or without an accompaniment, represent the secular music of the Middle Ages. A system of musical notation, including the staff of five parallel lines and signs for notes, was invented to replace singing by ear; soon after printing arose, printed musical characters were devised.

With the rise of Protestantism congregational singing became an important feature of the service in both Lutheran and Calvinist churches. Luther, himself devoted to music, collected and translated many old Latin hymns and added some of his own, for instance, the stirring *Ein' Feste Burg ist Unser Gott*—the *Marseillaise* of the Protestant Revolt, it has been called. Calvin had the Book of Psalms set to music for chanting. The Roman Church also began to give more attention to music and in the papal organist and choirmaster Palestrina (1514-1594) had a great composer of hymns and Masses. The oratorio, a religious drama set to music but without action, scenery, or costume, originated

in Italy at this time. It found its highest expression during the eighteenth century in the compositions of the German Bach (1685-1750) and his contemporary and fellow countryman Handel. Grand opera also arose in Italy, where the first opera houses were built. As a form of musical art opera was greatly developed in England by Handel, in France by Gluck, and in Austria by Mozart (1756-1791). Comic opera, still another Italian innovation, became very popular in eighteenth-century Europe.

The musical instruments of the Middle Ages included the organ, trumpet, bugle, flute, harp, guitar, drums, cymbals, triangles, and bells. These were often played together, but with no other purpose than to increase the volume of sound. There was not the slightest idea of orchestration. Modern instrumental music owes almost everything to the development of the violin, "king of the orchestra," and the piano. The violin seems to have been derived from some form of the medieval viol played with a bow; it reached perfection in the eighteenth century with the work of Stradivari of Cremona. Percussion action applied to the old-fashioned spinet or harpsichord produced at this time the instrument of weak and strong tones (*piano e forte*), the pianoforte. Its inventor was Cristofori of Florence. The new instruments and the improved old ones made possible the development of the symphony, a tone poem combining all musical sounds into a harmonious whole. Haydn and Mozart were the great symphonists of the eighteenth century, as Bach was its mighty master of organ music. Thus a new art arose to enrich the higher life of mankind.

Manners and Customs.

It was not only in politics, law, science, philosophy, literature, and the fine arts that European society became increasingly secular and "modern"; in numberless other ways people were becoming more and more like ourselves from generation to generation. Costume showed many changes after the medieval period. The cloak of men shrank into a coat and the doublet into a waistcoat, while long hose divided into knee breeches and stockings. Buckled shoes superseded high boots and three-cornered hats took the place of caps. The flowing robes of women gave way to corseted waists and billowy skirts. The starched ruff worn by both sexes in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries gradually evolved into stocks and lace collars. Cheap cotton textiles imported from the East led to the general use of undergarments. To the end of the eighteenth century, however, gentlemen continued to wear curly wigs or to sport pigtails, while fashionable ladies appeared

in vast and towering headdresses of powdered hair. Beards came in — we see them in Titian's portrait of Philip II and Van Dyck's portrait of Charles I — and went out again; the eighteenth-century man was clean shaven.

Among the upper classes many improvements in domestic life followed the cessation of feudal warfare and the increase of wealth. Gloomy castles and fortified manor houses were replaced, for instance, by the stately country seats of British nobles and in France by the exquisite châteaux of the Loire valley. In the cities the mansions of the wealthy had rich tapestry or mirrors on the walls, fine rugs on the floors, and furniture in great variety. The furniture associated with the names of Sheraton and Chippendale in eighteenth-century England and with the French cabinetmakers under Louis XV and XVI is still unsurpassed for elegance and sound construction.

It does not detract from the dignity of history to refer to the foods, imported from America, which enriched the European diet — especially "Irish" potatoes, now one of the great food staples of the world, and sugar, replacing honey as a sweetener. "Strong waters" came to be consumed in increasing quantities. These were principally the whisky of Scotland and Ireland, Dutch gin, and West Indian rum distilled from molasses or macerated sugar cane. Chocolate from Mexico, tea from China and India, and coffee from Arabia competed with alcoholic intoxicants for popularity; in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the coffeehouses, where people sat and talked and read newspapers, became in effect men's clubs, with neither initiation fees nor dues. Tobacco-smoking, learned from the Indians, quickly spread to England and thence throughout the Continent. Snuff-taking, by men and women alike, was another petty vice of the age. Such were some aspects of European social life during early modern times.

PART TWO

The Era

of Bourgeois Revolutions

VIII

The Era of the French Revolution and Napoleon

The Bourgeoisie vs. the Old Regime

THE political history of Europe from the French Revolution until the middle of the nineteenth century was largely concerned with the problem of transferring the power of government from the hands of kings and landed aristocrats into the hands of the *bourgeoisie*. The commercial expansion that followed the discoveries and the development of colonial and trading empires accelerated the expansion of cities and consequently a growth in the urban population. Merchants, bankers, lawyers, master craftsmen, and artisans increased in number and greatly extended their wealth and abilities. With wealth and experience came a desire for commensurate power and prestige. They were unwilling to remain in a secondary position in society, and the society that was organized around kings by divine right and noblemen by hereditary privilege had eventually to give way before their ambitions.

These new men appear at the end of the eighteenth century armed with both wealth and a revolutionary philosophy; within a hundred years they had stormed and conquered the citadels of power in the more advanced states of western Europe. Their political philosophy, however, turned out to have two faces, and in the course of events it often seemed that no single program could be worked out.


On the one side there were the men whom we may call traditional liberals. They believed that individuals should be given as much freedom as possible: freedom of speech, of press, of assembly, of religion, and of economic choice. Government, in their minds, was a sort of necessary evil; it should defend the frontiers, keep internal peace, and provide courts of justice, but beyond that it should not go. They also attacked all sorts of privileges based upon blood, and insisted that no

one should be asked who he was, but only what he could do. They wanted all to be equal before the law and the tax collector and insisted that every man should have opportunities of service in the government in accordance with his abilities. Their doctrines struck at the very roots of the Old Regime that was based upon privilege and traditional class distinctions.

The second group that appeared to challenge the Old Regime might be called radical democrats. From Rousseau they learned that government must carry out the "general will" of the governed and that sovereign power rested in the people as a whole. While the kings pretended to rule by divine right, these men said defiantly, "The voice of the people is the voice of God." It followed from their beliefs that the people had a right to unseat their governors if the "general will" were not obeyed. This "general will," however, was difficult to discover. Rousseau had warned that it was not necessarily the will of the majority, but more and more radical democrats came to insist that the majority should, indeed must, rule. These men differed from the liberals in that they did not consider guarantees, namely bills of rights, necessary or wise. They were confident that the people would not hurt themselves and therefore that the will of the people would always be both good and just. Consequently they stood for universal suffrage and representative government as a substitute for arbitrary rule from above. The sovereign people, they felt, was the true source for all laws.

As long as the men of the Old Regime were strongly seated in places of power, both of these revolutionary groups worked shoulder to shoulder. But once a breach was made in the old system, the differences inherent in the two ideas came to the front. The men of wealth, the upper *bourgeoisie*, tended to believe in the liberal solution for the problem of government. When the royal power was broken and the regime of privilege put to an end, they felt that government ought properly to be in the hands of men of wealth and education, and frankly excluded the poor from power. The petty *bourgeoisie* and the growing class of wage-workers who fought at the barricades and hopefully looked to government for consideration of their problems were dissatisfied with this solution. They saw the extension of the suffrage and of democratic principles of government as the only way to batter down the rule of wealth that replaced the rule of privilege.

Thus in 1789 the workers and *bourgeoisie* together stormed the Bastille and wrecked the rule of absolute kings, privileged noblemen, and corrupt clergy. But in 1848 the radical democrats in Germany, France, England, and Italy faced the liberals across both the barricades



and the council chamber. The latter won the victory in 1848, but they were forced later to come to a compromise solution of the problem.

Out of the heat of the revolutionary movement, another great idea was born: nationalism. There had been patriotic loyalty to national kings and sentiments of love of country in the preceding epoch, but it was not until the French Revolution that nationalism became a driving political force. First in France when the Revolution struck down all provincial differences and made all Frenchmen brothers, and later in the rest of Europe, this doctrine became a force of great moment for political life. Stated most simply it was an overpowering desire that people of like kind, interest, and culture should live under common political institutions. In central, eastern, and southeastern Europe it became a paramount political movement to alter the old arrangement of small states and heterogeneous empires.

These revolutionary doctrines were first unleashed as political forces on the Continent in 1789 when the French Revolution announced the slogan, "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity." They continued to affect the development of European civilization throughout the nineteenth century.

Preparation for the French Revolution

What is called the French Revolution refers to a series of events in France, occurring between 1789 and 1799, by which divine-right monarchy gave way to a republic, and class distinctions and privileges disappeared in favor of social equality. This revolution started in France, not because the misery of the people had become more intolerable there than in other parts of the Continent, but because France was then the most advanced of the Continental countries. French peasants and artisans were free enough and intelligent enough to be critical of their government. Next to Great Britain, France contained the most numerous, prosperous, and influential *bourgeoisie*. Members of this class furnished the Revolution with its principal leaders. Even the nobility and clergy included many men who realized the abuses of the Old Regime and wished to abolish them. In short, the revolutionary impulse stirred all ranks of French society.

That impulse came in part from across the Channel. Englishmen had put one king to death and had expelled another; they had established the supremacy of parliament over the crown. It was the example of parliamentary England which Montesquieu held up for imitation to his countrymen. It was the political philosophy of John Locke upon which Rousseau founded his doctrine of the sovereignty of the people.

That impulse also came in part from across the Atlantic. The Declaration of Independence, asserting that all men are created equal and are endowed with natural rights to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," served as an inspiration to the pioneers of freedom in France. After the close of the Revolutionary War, the French common soldiers, together with Lafayette and other officers, returned home to spread democratic doctrines. Very important was the work of Benjamin Franklin, who for nearly a decade represented the American government at Paris. His engaging manners, practical wisdom, and high principles won general admiration. "Homage to Franklin!" exclaimed an enthusiastic Frenchman; "he gave us our first lessons in liberty."

To understand the outbreak of the French Revolution it is necessary to go back to the long reign of Louis XV (1715-1774), the great-grandson of Louis XIV. France had never had, perhaps, so unkingly a king as this successor of the Grand Monarch. The frivolities and immoralities of his court at Versailles undermined the loyalty of Frenchmen, and his wars and extravagance added to the legacy of debt with which his predecessor had burdened the people. The treasury every year faced a deficit, which could be met only by resort to fresh loans, involving still larger outlays for interest charges. So long as the government refused to take proper measures of economy and continued to exempt the clergy completely and the nobility almost completely from taxation, little improvement of the situation was possible. France, the richest country in Europe, was threatened with bankruptcy.

Louis XV did his best to stifle the growing volume of complaints against the monarchy. A rigid censorship muzzled the press. Postal officials opened letters and revealed their contents to the authorities. Obnoxious books and pamphlets were burned and their authors were imprisoned. No man's personal liberty was secure, for the police, if provided with a sealed letter (*lettre de cachet*) signed by the king, could send anyone to jail. Suspected persons sometimes remained prisoners for years without trial. In spite of all repressive measures, opposition to king and court steadily increased.

Eve of the French Revolution

Louis XVI, the grandson of Louis XV, mounted the throne in 1774, when only twenty years old. He was pious and well meaning, but weak, indolent, slow of thought, and slow of decision. He did not know how to reign. At his side, presiding over the gay court of Versailles, stood Marie Antoinette, daughter of Maria Theresa of Austria.

The queen had many enemies in France because of her foreign birth, her constant interference in public affairs, and her lavish expenditure. She was the "Austrian woman," she was "Madame Deficit."

The youthful king began well by appointing a new ministry, in which Turgot held the most responsible position. Turgot was a friend of Voltaire, a contributor to the *Encyclopedia*, an economist of the physiocratic school, and a successful administrator. He drew up a comprehensive program of reforms providing for complete freedom of the press, a national system of education, recall of the Huguenots from exile, and admittance of the third estate to all public offices. Turgot's financial policy was summed up in the triple maxim, "No bankruptcy, no increase of taxation, no loans." Expenses were to be reduced by cutting off the pensions to courtiers, whose only merit was, in the words of a contemporary writer, "to have taken the trouble to be born." The taxes bearing most heavily on the third estate were to be replaced by a general tax on all landowners. Forced labor without pay (the hated *corvée*), performed by peasants on public highways and bridges, was to be discontinued. The old guilds, which hampered industry, were to be abolished. The vexatious tolls and duties on the passage of grain from one province to another were to be swept away.

Could such measures have been carried out, France might have had an orderly reformation rather than a revolution. They were not carried out. The privileged classes would not surrender their privileges, nor favorites their pensions, nor monopolists their unjust gains. Turgot's dismissal from office, after two years of power, removed the one man who could have saved absolutism in France.

The finances of the government went from bad to worse after the fall of Turgot. His successors in the ministry relied mainly on fresh loans to cover the deficits of the treasury. From the standpoint of French interests, Louis XVI committed a fatal error in intervening in the War of American Independence. America was freed; Great Britain was humbled; but the war forced up the public debt of France by leaps and bounds. When at last it became impossible to borrow more money, Louis yielded reluctantly to the popular demand for the convocation of the States-General. He appealed to the nation for aid, thereby confessing the failure of absolutism.

The States-General

The States-General, the old feudal assembly of France, met in 1789. It had not met for one hundred and seventy-five years. Suddenly awakened from their long slumber, the representatives of the clergy,

the nobility, and the third estate appeared at Versailles to take counsel with the king. The letters of complaint and suggestion (*cahiers*), drawn up in every part of the country for the guidance of each representative, set forth a long train of abuses to be removed. It is interesting to note, however, that none of them gave any indication of disloyalty to the king; they were demands or suggestions for the end of abuses, rather than appeals for a revolution. Not quite half of the twelve hundred-odd members of the States-General belonged to the two privileged orders. Of the deputies of the third estate, about two-thirds were lawyers, a few were nobles, and less than a dozen came from the lower classes. The leaders of the third estate were Count Mirabeau and the Abbé Sieyès, who had accepted election as its representatives.

The three estates in former days sat as separate chambers and voted as units. If this usage were to be continued, the clergy and the nobility would have had two votes to one for the third estate. The commoners insisted, however, that the States-General represented, not feudal France or social groups, but a new united nation. They demanded that it should form a single body in which every representative voted as an individual. Since the third estate had been permitted to send twice as many deputies as the clergy and the nobility combined, the proposed organization would enable it to outvote the privileged orders and carry any reforming measures desired.

After several weeks of debate the representatives of the third estate adopted a motion of Sieyès proclaiming themselves an "assembly of the nation," with the right to act for the nation as a whole. Louis opposed this action and posted troops before the doors of the hall which had been set apart in the palace of Versailles for the third estate. Finding their entrance barred, the undaunted commoners adjourned to a building near by which had been used as a tennis court. Here they took a solemn oath (the Tennis Court Oath) never to separate, but to continue to meet until they had drawn up a constitution for France. Their resolute attitude brought them allies in the representatives of the lower clergy (*curés*), who were inclined to the popular cause. Louis dared not use force against the commoners and their clerical supporters, especially after Lafayette and other nobles joined them. The king now gave way and ordered the two upper estates to unite with the third in the National Assembly, the first truly representative body that France had ever known. A fundamental alteration in the structure of the government was thus brought about.

Revolutionary Days

Soon came ominous news: the king had changed his mind about the National Assembly and had determined to dissolve it. Troops were massed near Paris, obviously for the purpose of intimidating the representatives of the people. It was then that the Parisians made the cause of the National Assembly their own. The population of Paris contained many poor and unemployed artisans, and their ranks were swelled at this time by crowds of peasants whom the bad harvests and severe winter of the preceding year had driven into the city. Here were all the elements of a dangerous mob. Rioting broke out among the populace, and for several days anarchical conditions prevailed. Reinforced by deserters from the army, the mob attacked and captured the Bastille, a fortress where political offenders had often been confined through *lettres de cachet*. The Bastille at this time held only seven prisoners, all there for just cause, but it stood for the tyranny of the Old Regime. The day of its fall, July 14, became the French national holiday.

The example set by Paris was quickly followed in the provinces. The peasants sacked and burned those local bastilles, the *châteaux*, taking particular care to destroy the legal documents by which the nobles exercised their manorial rights. Royal officials quitted their posts, courts of justice ceased to act, public works stopped, and people ceased to pay taxes. From end to end of France, confusion reigned.

The revolution in the provinces was followed by one of the most striking scenes of French history. On the night of August 4-5, while the National Assembly had under consideration measures for stilling the unrest in France, one of the nobles, a relative of Lafayette, urged that it remove the burdens still resting on the peasantry. Then, amid hysterical enthusiasm, noble after noble and cleric after cleric arose in his place to propose equality of taxation, the freeing of such serfs as were still to be found in France, the abolition of tithes, tolls, and pensions, and the extinction of all other long-established privileges. A decree "abolishing the feudal system" was passed by the National Assembly within the next few days and was signed by the king. The decree did little more than register accomplished facts. The Old Regime had already collapsed in France; it was now formally outlawed.

Times were hard in Paris. Employment was scarce and food was dear. The discontent grew in proportion, especially among market women, who had to stand in line many hours at a time waiting to purchase a few loaves of bread at the bakeries. Rumor accused the court and the aristocrats of deliberately causing famine, nay, of plotting to

overturn the Revolution by force. A newspaper published the statement, quite unfounded, that during a banquet of army officers at Versailles the red, white, and blue cockade of the people had been insulted and trampled underfoot. Here was the spark that caused the explosion. On October 5 a mob of hungry women, with every sort of weapon, even scythes and pitchforks, set out for Versailles to demand bread of the king. Early in the morning of October 6 some of the women made their way into the palace, killed the sentinels, and entered the apartments of Marie Antoinette, who escaped with difficulty. The women were finally quieted by the king's promise to remove to Paris with his wife and children. Louis lodged henceforth in the palace of the Tuilleries, where he found himself, in effect, a prisoner of the Parisians.

The National Assembly

The National Assembly followed the king to Paris and remained in session there for two years. One of its measures abolished titles of nobility, armorial devices, orders of knighthood, and all the other trappings of a feudalism that was now extinct in France. Another measure reformed the local government. The old provinces, varying greatly in size and each with special privileges, customs, and laws, were replaced by eighty-three artificial divisions (*départements*), approximately equal in size and population. Still another measure nationalized the church lands and provided for their sale in small lots to the peasants. The government agreed to pay fixed salaries to the clergy, but took all appointments to ecclesiastical positions out of the hands of the king and the pope. The monasteries and nunneries were suppressed.

The National Assembly also assumed control of national finances and passed a decree authorizing the issue of notes to the value of four hundred million francs (about \$80,000,000) on the security of the former church lands. To emphasize this security the notes were called *assignats*. If their issue could have been restricted, as Mirabeau desired, to less than the value of the property pledged to pay for them, they might have been a safe means of raising a revenue; however, the continued needs of the treasury led to their emission in enormous quantities. Then followed the inevitable consequences of paper-money inflation. Gold and silver disappeared from circulation, while prices rose so high that the time came when a basket of notes was needed to buy a pair of boots. In the end the *assignats* became practically worthless.

In 1791 the National Assembly completed a constitution for France. It set up a Legislative Assembly of a single chamber, with wide au-

thority over every branch of the government, and severely curtailed the powers of the king. The distrust which the bourgeois framers of the constitution felt toward the lower classes was shown by the limitation of the right of voting to taxpayers and the restriction of the privilege of holding office to property owners.

Prefixed to the constitution but drawn up originally in 1789 was a Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. This memorable document, which shows Rousseau's influence in many clauses, formed a statement of the principles underlying the Revolution. Every citizen, so ran the Declaration, has the right to participate personally, or through his representative, in lawmaking. All citizens shall be equally eligible to honors, public positions, and occupations, according to their abilities. No one shall be arrested or imprisoned except according to law. Any one accused of wrongdoing shall be presumed innocent until he is adjudged guilty. Every citizen may freely speak, write, and print his opinions, subject only to responsibility for the abuse of this freedom. No one shall be deprived of his property, except for public purposes, and then only after compensation. These were fundamental and inalienable rights, not of Frenchmen only, but of all men. What Great Britain had in the Bill of Rights, what the United States had in the Declaration of Independence and the first ten amendments to the Constitution, France had in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen.

Republican France

The new order of things was naturally most distasteful to Louis XVI, Marie Antoinette, the court party, and the former nobility, deprived of both titles and privileges. Many nobles had hastily quitted the country upon the outbreak of the revolutionary disorders. Headed by the king's two brothers, these *émigrés* gathered along the northeastern frontier of France and intrigued unceasingly against the government. To their influence was joined that of the clergy, whom the pope, incensed at the separation of the church from papal control, had forbidden to take the oath of fidelity to the new constitution. Nearly all the bishops and the great majority of the parish priests obeyed him. Up to this time the lower clergy had generally supported the popular cause. They now turned against it, carrying with them their peasant flocks.

Besides the reactionaries, who opposed the Revolution, there were the radicals, who thought that it had not gone far enough. They objected to the retention of the monarchy, the qualifications for voting and officeholding, and the control of public affairs by the *bourgeoisie*. The radicals formed political clubs to carry on an agitation and founded

newspapers in which to attack the rule of the well-to-do middle class. The most famous of their clubs was the Jacobin and the ablest of their leaders were Danton and Robespierre. The Jacobin Club had hundreds of branches throughout France, all engaged in radical propaganda, which it carried on not only by speeches and writings but also by pictorial satires and cartoons in great number. Pictures appealed effectively to the illiterate, who at this time numbered probably three-fourths of the population.

Continental monarchs had watched with growing dismay the progress of a revolution which threatened the stability of their own thrones. The overthrow of absolutism and divine right in France might be followed by a similar upheaval in Austria and Prussia. The Austrian emperor, a brother of Marie Antoinette, now joined with the Prussian king in a statement to the effect that the restoration of the old monarchy in France formed an object of "common interest to all sovereigns of Europe." That the two rulers intended to suppress the revolutionary movement by force is more than doubtful, but to the radicals in the Legislative Assembly the statement sounded like an ultimatum preliminary to an attack by autocratic Europe on France. They were eager to meet the expected aggression and to spread abroad by force of arms the gospel of freedom. In 1792 France declared war on the Austrian emperor, a war which also brought into the field his Prussian ally.

The French troops, poorly organized and disciplined, met severe reverses. Public opinion, in consequence, was further inflamed against the monarchy. Suspicion pointed to the king and queen as the traitors who were secretly revealing the French plan of campaign to the enemy. Suspicion passed into hatred when the commander of the invading army, as he crossed the frontier, issued a proclamation threatening Paris with destruction if harm befell the royal family.

At this juncture the Jacobins under Danton organized a popular uprising at Paris. The mob stormed the Tuileries, massacred the Swiss Guard, and compelled the Legislative Assembly to suspend the king from office. A new assembly, to be called the National Convention, was summoned to prepare another constitution for France. Then followed the "September massacres" of 1792, in which many suspected royalists were killed. Shortly afterward the National Convention held its first meeting and by a unanimous vote decreed the abolition of the monarchy and the establishment of a republic. A few months later (January, 1793) Louis XVI was put to death. After his execution nearly all the states of western Europe formed a coalition to overthrow regicide, republican France.

The National Convention

The peril of the republic from foes without and foes within emphasized the need of a strong government. The National Convention met this need by selecting twelve of its members to serve as a Committee of Public Safety, in which at first Danton, and then Robespierre, was the leading figure. The committee received almost unlimited authority over the life and property of every Frenchman. It proceeded to enforce a *levée en masse* — the earliest modern instance of general conscription — which placed all males of military age at the service of the republic. Carnot, a member of the committee, the “organizer of victory” as he came to be called, drilled and disciplined the new national armies and sent them forth to battle, singing a new patriotic song, the *Marseillaise*. The great coalition broke down under their attack, and France enlarged her limits to include the Austrian Netherlands and part of Germany lying west of the Rhine. Holland was also overrun by the revolutionary forces. It became a republic, nominally independent, but really under French control. The revolutionists were not less ready than their monarchs had been to aggrandize France.

In order to suppress the antirevolutionary elements within France the Committee of Public Safety resorted to a policy of terrorism. A law was passed which declared “suspect” every noble, every officeholder before the Revolution, every person who had had any dealings with an emigrant noble, and every person who could not produce a certificate of citizenship. Special courts were set up in Paris and the provincial cities to try the “suspects,” and usually to send them to the guillotine.

France endured the Reign of Terror for over a year (1793–1794). During this time seventeen thousand persons, it has been estimated, were executed under form of law, while numberless others were massacred without the pretense of a trial. Marie Antoinette was one of the first victims. The carnage spread beyond the clergy and the aristocracy to include the *bourgeoisie* and even many artisans and peasants. The Terror then began to consume its own authors. Danton, who had wearied of the bloodshed and counseled moderation, perished, and the fanatical Robespierre became the virtual dictator of France. He continued in power for a few months until his enemies in the National Convention, gaining the upper hand, hurried him to the death to which he had sent so many of his countrymen.

The Directory and Napoleon

With Robespierre's execution the Reign of Terror ended and a reaction against Jacobin tyranny set in. The *bourgeoisie* gained control of the National Convention, which now resumed its task of preparing a constitution for the republic. The new instrument of government provided for a legislature of two chambers and vested the executive power in a Directory of five members. Before the constitution went into effect in 1795 a revolt against the National Convention was crushed by the army. The artillery general, whose "whiff of grapeshot" saved the day for the forces of law and order, was Napoleon Bonaparte.

Napoleon Bonaparte was born at Ajaccio, Corsica, in 1769, only a year after that island became a French possession. He attended a military school in France and went through the course of study with credit; he did well in mathematics and devoted much of his leisure to reading history. After further training in Paris he entered an artillery regiment. Napoleon took a keen interest in the reform movement then stirring France. A devoted admirer of Rousseau's philosophy, he hated all privileges, all aristocracy, and for a time he became a Jacobin. The Revolution gave him his first opportunities. He served the republican government with distinction in southern France and rose to prominence by his defense of the National Convention in 1795. The following year Carnot, who divined Napoleon's genius, persuaded his colleagues on the Directory to entrust the young man of twenty-seven with the command of the French army in Italy.

When the Directory took office, France still numbered Great Britain, Sardinia, and Austria among her foes. Great Britain could not be assailed, because of the weakness of the French navy, but the other two countries were open to attack through northern Italy. Napoleon's brilliant strategy first separated the Sardinians from their Austrian allies and compelled them to sue for peace. Another year of fighting turned the Austrians out of Italy and brought the French within eighty miles of Vienna. The Hapsburg emperor, unprepared to withstand a siege of his own capital, then stooped to make peace with the victorious republican general. Great Britain remained the only country in arms against France. Napoleon determined to strike at British control of the Mediterranean and the land route to India by overrunning the Near East. The Directory gave him command of a strong expeditionary force which soon subdued Egypt but met reverses in Syria. Faced by the collapse of his Oriental dreams, Napoleon left his army to its fate and escaped to France. Here his highly colored reports of victory caused him to be greeted as a conqueror.

During Napoleon's absence affairs had gone badly for France. Great Britain, Austria, and Russia formed a second coalition, put large forces in the field, and drove the republican armies from Italy. This misfortune sapped the authority of the Directory, already despised for its weakness and venality, and turned the eyes of most Frenchmen to Napoleon as the one man who could preserve order at home and secure victory abroad. As Sieyès said, "France needs a head and a sword." With the aid of Sieyès and other politicians, Napoleon carried out a *coup d'état* in 1799. Three of the five Directors were induced to resign; the other two were placed under military guard; and the bayonets of Napoleon's devoted soldiers forced the legislative chambers to dissolve. It was the final scene of the French Revolution. Within little more than ten years from the meeting of the States-General the government had been transformed into a military dictatorship.

The Consulate

A constitution, which Napoleon proceeded to frame after the *coup d'état*, placed the executive power in the hands of three consuls, appointed for ten years. The office of First Consul was supreme, and Napoleon took it. To him belonged the control of the army and navy, the right of naming and dismissing all the chief officials, and the proposal of all new laws. Napoleon submitted the constitution to the people for ratification. The popular vote, or plebiscite, showed an overwhelming majority in favor of the new government.

The First Consul dropped the sword for a time and turned to the less spectacular but more enduring work of administration. In order to centralize authority at Paris, he placed a prefect over every department and also appointed the mayors of the towns and cities. This is still the French system of local government. The same desire for unity and precision in public affairs led him to complete the codification of French law. Before the Revolution nearly three hundred local codes — Roman, Frankish, feudal, and royal in origin — had existed in France, giving point to Voltaire's remark that a traveler there changed laws as often as he changed post-horses. The National Convention began the work of replacing them by a single uniform code. Napoleon and the commission of legal experts over whom he presided finished the task in about four years. The *Code Napoléon* embodied many liberal principles, such as social equality, religious toleration, and jury trial; very unliberal, however, was the introduction into it of the strict subordination of a married woman to her husband as regards the use of her own property. Many features of this code — Napoleon's best title to remem-

brance — reappear in the laws of Belgium, Holland, Italy, and western Germany.

Napoleon felt the necessity of conciliating French Catholics who remained faithful to Rome. Accordingly, an agreement, or Concordat, was drawn up, providing for the restoration of Catholicism as the official religion. Napoleon kept to himself the nomination of bishops and archbishops, and the pope gave up all claims to the confiscated property of the church. The Concordat formed a politic measure, for by confirming the peasants in their possession of the ecclesiastical lands it bound up their interests with those of Napoleon. It continued to regulate the relations between France and the papacy for more than a century. Nor did Napoleon forget the emigrant nobles. A law extended amnesty to those who had fled from France to escape the revolutionists, and as the result more than forty thousand families returned to their native land.

Napoleon founded the Bank of France. He established a system of higher education to take the place of the colleges and universities that had been abolished by the National Convention. He planned and partly carried out a vast network of canals and inland waterways, thus improving the means of communication and trade. He constructed a system of military highways radiating from the capital city to the remotest district, in addition to two remarkable Alpine roads, which connected France and Italy. He also had a taste for building, and many of the monuments which embellish Paris belong to the Napoleonic era.

Imperial France

Napoleon's victories in war and his policies in peace gained for him the support of all Frenchmen except the extreme Jacobins, who would not admit that the Revolution had ended, and the extreme royalists, who wished to restore the Bourbon monarchy. When in 1802 the people were asked to vote on the question, "Shall Napoleon Bonaparte be consul for life?" the answering ayes numbered over three and a half millions, the noes, only a few thousands. Another plebiscite in 1804 decided, by an equally large majority, that the First Consul should become emperor. Before the high altar of Notre Dame at Paris and in the presence of the pope, he placed a golden laurel wreath upon his own head and assumed the title of Napoleon I, Emperor of the French.

The new ruler set up again the etiquette and ceremonial of the Old Regime. Already he had established the Legion of Honor to reward those who most industriously served him. Now he created a nobility. His relatives and ministers became kings, princes, dukes, and counts;

his ablest generals became marshals of France. France, intoxicated with the imperial glory, forgot that she had come under the rule of one man. What hostile criticism Frenchmen might have leveled against Napoleon was stifled by the secret police, who arrested and imprisoned hundreds of persons. The censorship of books and newspapers prevented any expression of public opinion. The schools and the churches were made pillars of the new order, and Napoleon went so far as to prepare a catechism setting forth the duty of good Christians to love, respect, and obey their emperor. However "enlightened," Napoleon was as much a despot as was Louis XIV.

Napoleon and Europe

After preserving the Revolution at home by force of arms, the French had started to spread it abroad by the same means. When Napoleon appeared on the scene, France had already reached her "natural boundaries" at the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees. These territorial limits might have satisfied Louis XIV; Napoleon was not satisfied with them. The "successor of Charlemagne," who carried the Roman eagles on his military standards, dreamed of universal sovereignty. Supreme in France he would also be supreme beyond France. A boundless ambition, a passion for war, and a belief in the necessity of dazzling Frenchmen by brilliant victories drove him into constant acts of aggression. No lasting peace was possible with such a man, unless the European peoples submitted tamely to his will. They would not submit, and as a result the Continent for more than a decade was drenched with blood.

Great Britain was Napoleon's most persistent and relentless foe. That island kingdom, which in the eighteenth century had repeatedly warred with France for commerce and colonies, would never consent to the creation of a French empire restricting her trade in the profitable markets of the Continent and dominating western Europe. Great Britain formed coalition after coalition of states opposed to France. She used her money, her ships, and her soldiers unsparingly, and at length successfully, to preserve the balance of power.

Napoleon toppled over many thrones; he reorganized the government of one country after another; he built up a great empire, which included, with its dependencies and allies, all the Continent except Portugal, Sweden, Russia, and Turkey; he remade the map of Europe. Glittering but fleeting conquests! After his first abdication in 1814 the allied powers stripped France of every territory that he had won by the sword. After his second abdication in 1815, following the return from

Elba and the battle of Waterloo, France was reduced to her old boundaries before the Revolution.

The French emperor carried all before him until he came into conflict with nations instead of with sovereigns. The same love of country and willingness to die for her which had saved republican France, now inspired the British in their long contest with Napoleon; spurred the Portuguese and Spaniards to revolt against him; and strengthened the will of Austrians, Prussians, and Russians never to accept a foreign yoke. What the Hapsburgs, Hohenzollerns, and Romanovs failed to do their subjects accomplished. The national resistance to Napoleon, aroused throughout the Continent, destroyed his empire.

Napoleon lived until 1821, a lonely prisoner of Great Britain on the island of St. Helena. After his death France forgot the sufferings he had caused her, remembered only the triumphs of his extraordinary career. "Long, long will they talk of his glory under the thatched roof; in fifty years the humble dwelling will know no other history." Poets, painters, and singers created out of the "Little Corporal" a legendary figure. The world despot appeared as a crusader for liberty and a foe of tyrants; in this guise he found his way irresistibly to the hearts of the French people.

"Liberty, Equality, Fraternity"

The Puritan Revolution and the Glorious Revolution in England were carried out by men of the upper and middle classes who wished to limit the royal power and establish the supremacy of parliament. Even the American Revolution was guided by conservative statesmen. The French Revolution also began as mainly a middle-class movement, but it soon reached the lower classes and found expression in the "Principles of 1789" — in Liberty, Equality, Fraternity.

"Liberty" meant the recognition of the will of the people as expressed by their votes and embodied in a written constitution. Napoleon's plebiscites show that he at least paid homage to the principle of popular sovereignty. With political liberty went freedom of speech, of publication, of worship, and of the ownership of property. Of these "rights of man," which the revolutionists had proclaimed with such enthusiasm, the first two did not exist under Napoleon. "Equality" meant the abolition of privilege. The revolutionists made all citizens equal before the law; opened to everyone the positions in the civil service, the army, and the church; abolished serfdom and the obligations of peasants to their lords, thus destroying the last vestiges of the mano-

rial system; suppressed the guilds, thus releasing industry from medieval shackles; canceled exemptions from taxation; and introduced a new fiscal system which taxed people according to their means. Most Frenchmen were content to accept Napoleon's rule because he retained and extended these achievements of the Revolution. "Fraternity" meant, theoretically, a new sense of human brotherhood uniting all classes; practically, it meant national self-consciousness and a great outburst of patriotism which enabled the French to withstand Europe in arms and then to launch those tremendous campaigns which carried them to Berlin, Vienna, Moscow, Rome, Lisbon, and Madrid. They willingly followed the imperial eagles and supported Napoleon to the end.

The Principles of 1789 were not confined to France. The revolutionary and Napoleonic soldiers passed from land to land, bringing in their train the overthrow of the Old Regime. The effect was profound in the Netherlands, in western Germany, and in northern Italy, countries where the masses of the people had grievances and aspirations like those of the French. During the nineteenth century the revolutionary spirit spread to other European countries and led everywhere to demands for the abolition of the established privileges of wealth, birth, and social position. France was teaching by example.

The Wars of the Liberation

Indeed it was these very lessons that in no small part contributed to Napoleon's downfall. In Germany and in Spain the ideas carried on the point of French bayonets were turned against the conqueror when he overreached himself by an invasion of Russia.

Germany in 1789 was almost solely a geographical expression. There were over three hundred petty states with some two thousand conflicting jurisdictions living more or less in anarchy under the shadowy mantle of the Holy Roman Empire. A welter of laws, coinages, weights and measures, administrative and military machinery, tariffs, and taxes defied description. With sledge hammer blows the French armies smashed up the Holy Roman Empire, and the French emperor imposed his will upon the German people. But Liberty, Equality, Fraternity were words that could be translated into German; and patriotic poets, philosophers, statesmen, and soldiers were at hand to do the job. It was from Prussia that the impulse came in the reorganization of that kingdom after the defeat of Jena (1806). Laws were modeled after those of the French, a new army appeared, and administrators and soldiers prepared themselves to launch a national movement against their

conquerors. The great drive that was to make Germany the country with the most aggressive of all nationalisms came into existence as a reaction to Napoleon's impositions.

In Spain the rebels against the French regime had no administrative, military, or propaganda machinery comparable to that found in Germany. But there was a fierce resentment, a ferocious antagonism to French rule that defied all efforts to pacify the country. Defeated in the field, Spanish rebels took to the hills where the French military superiority was canceled by the terrain. Spain became a "running sore" that drained away troops and money from the body of Napoleon's empire. When his army turned toward Russia, English troops and supplies landed in Spain and finally freed the peninsula of French control.

It was, of course, the disaster in Russia that allowed the Continent to revolt. Like Hitler in our times, Napoleon was driven to attack Russia when his war with England reached a stalemate. Russia was potentially an English ally, and when she slipped out of Napoleon's orbit, there was nothing for him to do but force her to come to terms. The campaign of 1812 was a catastrophe for French arms. Napoleon reached Moscow but Russia would not make peace, and in the end his armies disintegrated in a disastrous retreat back to central Europe.


It was then that the last great coalition arose against the emperor. England, Russia, Austria, and Prussia joined hands and crushed him. The wars that culminated in the battles of Leipzig (1813) and Waterloo (1815) are known as the Wars of the Liberation. To the hard pressed peoples of Europe they were a great national effort, and they aroused in those peoples hopes of a new political order that would truly meet their needs.

The Vienna Settlement

When peace was made, however, it was the monarchs rather than the people who wrote the treaties. The rulers of England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia wanted primarily to create a Europe in which their states could live in tranquillity. To achieve this they returned to the principle of the balance of power that had been developed in the preceding centuries. It was manifestly impossible to restore the Europe of 1789 in 1814; twenty-five years of war and politics had buried the Old Regime in Germany, Italy, and the eastern borderlands of Russia beneath piles of debris. The Europe of the Vienna settlement had to be made with the materials at hand.

The most important treaties were those made with France: the Treaties of Paris (1814 and 1815). France was necessary to maintain

The World Powers, 1815



the balance of power in western Europe, and therefore she was not deprived of territory she needed to play a role in European affairs. The Napoleonic senate voted to restore Louis XVIII, the "legitimate sovereign," to the throne, and the victorious allies left France, even after Napoleon's "hundred days," with the frontiers of 1789.

The congress that met at Vienna had the problem of reorganizing central Europe. It was Prince Metternich, the Austrian chancellor, who had the greatest influence over the decisions and the policy of this meeting. As an Austrian statesman, he feared the principle of nationalism since his own state was made up of some fourteen separate national groups. As a European statesman he put his faith in the idea of confederation. He hoped to make a Europe that would be interrelated by overlapping confederations so that no part could possibly make war against any other part. This ideal was only imperfectly achieved because national interests were too strong in most of Europe. None the less the congress did create a German Confederation and it laid the groundwork for an Italian Confederation, both of which were interrelated through Austria. The Italian Confederation (*Lex Italica*) never came in existence, but the German Confederation (*Deutscher Bund*) was the framework of government in central Europe from 1815 to 1867.

The problem of Poland and Saxony almost upset the conference. The czar of Russia and the king of Prussia reached an agreement about these two unhappy countries that did not satisfy the other two victors. A crisis appeared in the congress that threatened to split the coalition; indeed M. Talleyrand, the French ambassador, was able to use it to gain prestige and a place at the conference table for France. In the end, however, Napoleon's return from Elba and Czar Alexander's brutal remark, "I have 200,000 soldiers in Poland; put me out who can," resulted in Russia's obtaining about what she wanted. Prussia did not get Saxony, but she was recompensed by extensive acquisitions in the Rhineland.

There were a number of territorial changes that were dictated by the conference's idea of the balance of power as well as by the ambitions of the victor states. For example, the king of Holland allowed England to keep Capetown and the Dutch possessions in South Africa. In return he received the Austrian Netherlands (Belgium), and Austria received the Italian provinces of Lombardy and Venetia as recompense. These changes made Holland a stronger buffer state between France and Prussia, and gave Austria a foothold in Italy where she could check France. In Italy the Bourbon king of Naples and Sicily returned after Waterloo and the king of Sardinia regained his territory of Piedmont as well as the former republic of Genoa. "Republics are no longer fashionable," remarked Czar Alexander. But this kingdom of

Piedmont-Sardinia was primarily organized to create a buffer state between France and Austria, like Holland between France and Prussia, rather than to find lands for the house of Savoy or to destroy the republic of Genoa. The pope regained his states in Italy, and a tier of small duchies, Tuscany, Parma, and Modena appeared in north-central Italy. Spain and Portugal were returned to their rightful monarchs, and England secured colonial advantages in the world beyond Europe.

The New Map of Europe, 1815

A glance at the map of Europe made at Vienna will show the reasoning behind the treaty. Russia was the greatest military power in Europe in 1815, but Russia had for neighbors Austria and Prussia, and these two states were tied together in the German Confederation. That confederation provided for joint military action against any aggressor that would attack central Europe, and, in 1815, the members of the confederation were about equal to, or even a little stronger than, Russia. Therefore the Russo-Prussian-Austrian frontier was safe. It remained intact for a hundred years. In the West, Holland stood between Prussia and France. Her power was presumed to be enough to throw the balance against either one of them if she joined the power that was being attacked. Holland and France were stronger than Prussia; Holland and Prussia, stronger than France. This frontier, therefore, also seemed safe. In the south, Piedmont played the same role between Austria and France that Holland played in the north. The system was so balanced that no power could make war upon a neighbor without grave risks to itself. To hold it together, there was the alliance of the four victor states: Austria, England, Russia, and Prussia.

The Treaties of Paris and Vienna and the new map of Europe were a distinct disappointment to many of the men who had fought Napoleon. The German confederation with its thirty-odd states was anything but the united Germany that had been promised. The confederation was strong for defense but practically powerless as an active governmental agency. The division of Italy was a disappointment to Italian nationalists who dreamed of a united Italian state, but they were powerless to do anything about it. Most of Europe, however, accepted the treaties because they brought to an end the twenty-five year epoch of war and revolution. In 1815, peace was the most important desire of men, and the vast majority of Europeans would accept any treaty that gave peace.

It was customary for a hundred years after 1815 to speak critically of the Vienna settlement. The kings and aristocrats who made the treaty did not foresee the tremendous importance of nationalism as a political

idea nor did they prepare the way for the liberal-democratic compromise that was to be made in the middle of the century. For this lack of foresight they have been severely criticized. None the less, the frontiers created at Vienna and the balances of power set up in 1815 gave Europe a hundred years in which there was relatively little fighting on the Continent. This was the longest period of comparative peace that Europe has known since Roman times. And when the Peace of Vienna was finally upset, it was because of the rise of new economic and military forms that the men of 1815 could not have conceived of in their wildest dreams.

The League of Nations of 1815

When Napoleon's army was cut to pieces at Waterloo, there were several plans for an association of the victor powers that would guarantee the peace. Two treaties were signed in 1815 that were intended to provide for the government of Europe in the period after the war. The first was the Quadruple Alliance proposed by the English foreign secretary, Lord Castlereagh; the second was the Holy Alliance, designed by Czar Alexander of Russia.

The Quadruple Alliance was a straightforward military agreement obliging England, Russia, Prussia, and Austria to put an army in the field in case of any attempt on the part of France to upset the peace settlement. But in addition it contained a clause that provided for the summoning of conferences of the great powers to settle any problems that might arise. A few years later at the Congress of Troppau the powers announced that they could and would intervene in the affairs of any state that threatened, because of revolution, to upset the tranquility of Europe. On the basis of this assumed right Austrian soldiers put down a revolt in Naples and French soldiers another in Spain.

The other treaty had no such teeth. Czar Alexander was the visionary of 1815; men have compared him with Wilson in 1919. He wanted a public declaration from Christian Europe that would proclaim the brotherhood of Christian nations. In mystic and high-flown language his Holy Alliance obliged its signators to act like Christian brothers, but it would be impossible to find, from the treaty at least, just what such action might be. This treaty was signed by all the states of Europe except the Turks, who were not Christians, the pope, who would not associate himself with a heretic and schismatic, and the English, whose king was in a madhouse and therefore incapable of signing.

With all their faults and crossed purposes these two treaties gave Europe a sort of international organization. Metternich tried to make

them the basis of a confederation to guarantee the Continent against further war. They failed to establish a general government of Europe largely because the men that ruled individual states were unwilling to recognize the fact that it has always been impossible to maintain a *status quo* for any considerable length of time. The Quadruple Alliance did, however, provide real benefits for its framers for it undoubtedly was one of the factors that prevented the outbreak of any general war during their lifetime.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

A.D.	<i>Rulers and Dynasties</i>	<i>Political History</i>	<i>Cultural History</i>
1775	1780-1790 Reign of Joseph II (Holy Roman Emperor, 1765-1790)	1775-1783 The American Revolution 1776 Declaration of Independence 1778 French Alliance 1781 Surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown 1783 Peace of Paris; Peace of Versailles 1781 Articles of Confederation	1776 Adam Smith's <i>Wealth of Nations</i> 1776-1788 Gibbon's <i>Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire</i> 1779 Crompton's "spinning mule" 1781 Uranus discovered by Herschel; Watt's second patent of a steam engine 1783 Montgolfier Brothers' balloon 1785 Cartwright's power loom patented; the <i>London Times</i> first published 1785-1788 Pacific exploration by La Pérouse 1788 English colonization of Australia begun 1789 First American tariff
		1787 Constitution of United States framed 1789 Adoption of the Constitution; Washington inaugurated president of United States 1789-1799 French Revolution 1789 Meeting of the States-General; fall of Bastille 1791 New constitution proclaimed; First French Republic 1793 Execution of Louis XVI 1794 End of the Reign of Terror 1795 Directory formed 1799 Overthrow of Directory; the Consulate formed	1791 First ten Amendments to Constitution of United States; Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen 1793 Eli Whitney's cotton gin invented
		1793 Second partition of Poland	

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE *Continued*

<i>Rulers and Dynasties</i>	<i>Political History</i>	<i>Cultural History</i>
A.D.	1795 Third partition of Poland	1795-1797, 1805 Mungo Park's exploration of the Niger 1796 Laplace's nebular hypothesis
1800	1801-1825 Alexander I, czar of Russia	1798 Jenner's discovery of vaccination 1798-1837 Auguste Comte 1799 Rosetta Stone found
1804-1814, 1815 Napoleon I, emperor of the French	1806 Dissolution of Holy Roman Empire	1802 First Factory Act 1802-1885 Victor Hugo 1803 Louisiana Purchase; Malthus's <i>Essay on the Principle of Population</i> (2d edition) 1804 <i>Code Napoléon</i>
1814-1824 Louis XVIII, king of France	1810-1826 Spanish-American colonies become independent 1812-1814 War between Great Britain and United States 1814-1815 Congress of Vienna 1815 Battle of Waterloo; German Confederation created; Holy Alliance	1807 Abolition of British slave trade, Prussian serfs emancipated; Fulton's steamboat, the "Clermont" 1808 Slave trade abolished by United States 1809-1882 Charles Darwin 1810 Berlin University founded
		1813-1883 Richard Wagner 1813-1901 Verdi 1814 Steam printing press; Scott's <i>Waverley</i> 1816 Davy's safety lamp; adoption of gold standard by Great Britain
		1818-1883 Karl Marx 1819 Second Factory Act; first steamboat crosses the Atlantic 1820-1903 Herbert Spencer

1825	1824-1830 Charles X, king of France 1825-1855 Nicholas I, czar of Russia	1821-1829 Greek War of Independence 1822 Separation of Brazil from Portugal 1823 The Monroe Doctrine	1821 First high school in United States (at Boston); Champollion begins decipherment of Egyptian hieroglyphics 1822-1895 Louis Pasteur 1824 British Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals 1825 Stockton and Darlington Railway opened
	1830-1848 Louis Philippe, king of France 1831-1889 Pedro II, emperor of Brazil	1830 July Revolution in France 1831 Independence of Belgium recognized 1832 First Reform Act 1833 German <i>Zollverein</i> formed	1828-1910 Tolstoy 1830 Liverpool and Manchester Railway opened 1830-1833 Lyell's <i>Principles of Geology</i> 1831 Faraday's electric dynamo
		1836 Texas becomes independent of Mexico	1833 Abolition of slavery in British West Indies; Third Factory Act 1834 McCormick reaper patented
		1839 Lord Durham's <i>Report</i>	1837 Dickens's <i>Pickwick Papers</i> 1838 Atlantic Ocean crossed by the "Great Western" 1838-1839 Schleiden-Swann cell theory 1839 Daguerre invents photography; Good-year discovers process of rubber vulcanization
		1840-1842 "Opium War" between Great Britain and China	1840 Transportation of convicts to Australia abolished
		1845 Texas annexed to United States	1840-1917 Rodin 1842 First operation under ether 1844 Morse's telegraph in successful operation; Young Men's Christian Association

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE *Continued*

<i>Rulers and Dynasties</i>	<i>Political History</i>	<i>Cultural History</i>
<p>A.D.</p> <p>1881-1894 Alexander III, czar of Russia</p> <p>1884-1911 Porfirio Díaz, president of Mexico</p> <p>1894-1917 Nicholas II, czar of Russia</p>	<p>bia, and Montenegro become independent</p> <p>1882 British occupation of Egypt; Triple Alliance formed</p> <p>1884 Third Reform Act</p> <p>1889 Brazil becomes a republic; Japanese constitution</p> <p>1894 Dual Alliance formed</p> <p>1894-1895 Sino-Japanese War</p> <p>1898 War between Spain and United States; Philippines acquired by United States</p> <p>1899-1902 South African War</p> <p>1900 Boxer uprising in China</p> <p>1901 Commonwealth of Australia</p> <p>1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance</p> <p>1904 <i>Entente Cordiale</i></p>	<p>1879 Incandescent electric light invented by Edison</p> <p>1882 Chinese Exclusion Act</p> <p>1883 Daimler's internal combustion engine</p> <p>1886 Canadian Pacific Railway completed</p> <p>1888 Abolition of slavery in Brazil</p> <p>1890 Pan American Union</p> <p>1891-1892 Discovery of <i>Pithecanthropus erectus</i></p> <p>1892 Weismann's <i>The Germ Plasm</i></p> <p>1893 World's Fair at Chicago</p> <p>1895 X-rays discovered by Röntgen</p> <p>1896 Marconi's first patent for wireless telegraphy; S. P. Langley's airplane; revival of Olympic games</p> <p>1898 Radium discovered by the Curies</p> <p>1899 First International Peace Conference at The Hague</p> <p>1900 Trans-Siberian Railway completed; Sir Arthur Evans begins excavations on the site of Cnossus in Crete</p> <p>1901-1902 Code of Hammurabi found</p> <p>1903 Successful flight of Wright Brothers' airplane; Henry Ford's manufacture of automobiles begun</p> <p>1903-1906 Northwest Passage navigated</p>

<p>1912-1926 Yoshihito, emperor of Japan</p> <p>1913-1921 Woodrow Wilson, president of United States</p> <p>1914-1922 Pontificate of Benedict XV</p>	<p>1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War</p> <p>1906 First Duma meets in Russia</p> <p>1907 Triple Entente; New Zealand becomes a Dominion</p> <p>1908 Young Turk revolution in Ottoman Empire; Bulgaria becomes independent; Bosnia and Herzegovina annexed by Austria-Hungary</p> <p>1910 Portugal becomes a republic; Korea annexed by Japan; Union of South Africa</p> <p>1911 Parliament Act; Chinese Revolution</p> <p>1912 China becomes a republic</p> <p>1912-1913 First and Second Balkan Wars</p> <p>1913 Treaty of Bucharest</p> <p>1914-1919 The World War</p> <p>1919 Treaty of Versailles</p> <p>1917-1918 Revolutions in Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Germany</p> <p>1919 German Constitution of Weimar</p> <p>1920 First meeting of League of Nations at Geneva</p> <p>1921-1922 Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armament</p> <p>1922 Fascist dictatorship in Italy</p> <p>1923 Turkey becomes a republic</p> <p>1925 Locarno Conference</p>	<p>1905 Concordat abrogated by France</p> <p>1905, 1915 Einstein's relativity theory</p> <p>1906 First successful flights of Zeppelin's airship</p> <p>1907 Second International Peace Conference at The Hague</p> <p>1909 North Pole reached by R. E. Peary</p> <p>1910 Trans-Andean Railway completed</p> <p>1911 South Pole reached by R. Amundsen</p> <p>1914 Panama Canal opened</p> <p>1915 Panama-Pacific Exposition at San Francisco</p> <p>1917 Orthodox Church disestablished in Russia</p> <p>1918 Equal Franchise Act passed by British Parliament</p> <p>1919 First non-stop Atlantic flight by Alcock and Brown</p> <p>1920 Woman suffrage in United States</p> <p>1921 Permanent Court of International Justice set up at The Hague</p> <p>1922 Tutankhamen's tomb found by Howard Carter</p> <p>1927 Lindbergh's non-stop flight across the Atlantic</p>
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CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE (PART IV) *Concluded*

<i>Rulers and Dynasties</i>	<i>Political History</i>	<i>Cultural History</i>
1933-1945 Franklin D. Roosevelt, president of United States Adolf Hitler, Chancellor of Germany	1928 Pact of Paris 1930 Independent Arab kingdom of Iraq 1931 Japanese protectorate of Manchukuo 1933 National Socialist dictatorship in Germany 1935 Constitution for India; Ethiopia conquered by Italy 1936-1939 Civil War in Spain 1937-1945 Japan's "undeclared war" with China 1938 Austria absorbed by Germany; Munich Accord 1939 Czechoslovakia acquired by Germany; Albania annexed by Italy; Poland overrun by Germany and Russia; Great Britain and France at war with Germany 1940 Russo-Finnish War; Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium, and France overrun by Germany; Bessarabia and the Baltic States under Russian control; destroyer-bases exchange between U.S. and Britain; Japan's extension into southeastern Asia; first African campaign 1941 German armies overrun Yugoslavia and Greece; Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria join the Axis; second African	1928-1933 First Russian Five-Year Plan 1929 World-wide economic depression begins; Lateran Treaty 1929-1930 First "finds" of Peking man (<i>Sinanthropus</i>) 1930 Pluto discovered; Bank for International Settlements (at Basel) 1934 National Labor Relations Act 1935 National Security Act 1939 Inauguration of regular air service between United States and Europe
1939- Pontificate of Pius XII		

		campaign; Germans invade Russia; Japanese attack Pearl Harbor	
	1942	The German Army reaches Stalingrad and El Alamein; Japanese conquest of Malaya, the Philippines, and Dutch East Indies	
	1943	Victory in the Atlantic over submarines; Allied landings in Africa, Sicily, and Italy; Russian offensive against the German Army; American Army opens offensive against Japan in Solomons	
	1944	Allied landings and liberation of France; Russian offensive in East reaches Poland and Hungary; liberation of Philippines, and destruction of Japanese sea power	
1945	Harry S. Truman, president of the United States	Surrender of Germany and the small Axis powers; surrender of Japan; founding of United Nations; death of Franklin D. Roosevelt	1945 The Atomic Bomb.
		1946 Writing treaties of peace with smaller Axis powers; Nuremberg trials; first year of U.N.; projects for independence of Philippines, India, Burma, and Java	

IX

The Compromises with the Revolution

Reaction and Authority

A FEW years after the settlements of 1815 it became clear that many men were dissatisfied with the solutions. There were two conflicting theories: the one might be called the principle of order and authority; the other, the principle of liberty and freedom. The revolutionary era had badly frightened men who believed that society should be organized from above along time-honored principles, and when they returned to power, they tried to establish governments that could hold the revolutionary elements in check.

The restoration of the dynasties was followed by a reaction against the democratic and nationalist ideals awakened in Europe since 1789. The kings and the princes and the aristocrats were once more in the saddle. Ferdinand VII had no sooner recovered his throne than he suppressed the Spanish constitution, modeled upon the French, because it denied divine right and asserted the sovereignty of the people. All the rulers who went back to Italy proceeded to govern without constitutions or parliaments. Louis XVIII also called himself king "by the grace of God," but he was shrewd enough to realize that to most Frenchmen royal absolutism had become intolerable and that the main results of the revolutionary and Napoleonic eras must be preserved. Accordingly, he kept the *Code Napoléon*, the Concordat with Rome, and the imperial nobility; he also renewed a constitutional charter granted by him in 1814, before Napoleon's return from Elba. This cool, cautious Bourbon wanted to enjoy his power in peace. Like Charles II of England, he had no desire to set out on his travels again.

Force of circumstances placed Austria at the forefront of reaction. Austria consisted of more than a score of territories, inhabited by uncongenial Germans, Magyars, Rumanians, North Italians, and Slavic-

speaking peoples. To keep them united under a single scepter, the Hapsburgs repressed all agitation for self-government or independence. The Hapsburgs felt it equally necessary to discourage every liberal movement which, starting in Italy or Germany, might spread like an infection to their own dominions. "My realm," confessed an Austrian emperor, "is like a worm-eaten house; if a part of it is removed, one cannot tell how much will fall."

The spirit of reactionary Austria seemed to be embodied in Prince Clemens Metternich, the real head of the Austrian government and the most influential diplomat in Europe. The rule of Metternich followed the rule of Napoleon. The German word *Metternichismus* has been coined to express the ideas which he championed and the measures that he enforced. For him absolutism and divine right were the pillars of stable government. Democracy could only "change daylight into darkest night." All demands for constitutions, parliaments, and representative institutions must be opposed to the uttermost. In order to stamp out the "disease of liberalism," let spies and secret police be multiplied, press and pulpit kept under gag laws, the universities sharply watched for dangerous teachings, and all agitators exiled, imprisoned, or executed. Such measures seemed to be quite feasible at a time when the great majority of Continental peoples were ignorant peasants, far removed from public life. Liberal ideas could find followers only among the workingmen of the cities and the *bourgeoisie*, both very weak when confronted by the powerful forces at the disposal of the monarchs. Metternich first set up his system in Austria and then by skillful diplomacy extended it to other parts of the Continent.

These political trends were supported valiantly by men of the pen and pulpit who preached that the revolutionary epoch had violated the laws of God as well as of man. A school of philosophers headed by Bonald and De Maistre arose to voice the universal ideals of authoritarianism. Sometimes they seemed to believe in authority for itself alone and to make the gallows and the policeman's club the sole pillars of society. The romanticists in France and Germany used their literary talents to reach the same conclusion. They found in the organic society of the Middle Ages an ideal that modern society could and should copy. Somehow these writers were able to identify the moth-eaten aristocrats that fled from France in 1791 and returned in 1815, with the knights of Charlemagne and King Arthur. It was a confusion that existed in their minds alone.

The Roman Church also emerged as a pillar of the authoritarian reaction. During the revolutionary era the church's power had apparently sunk to a new low, but at the very time that Napoleon made

a prisoner of the pope and seemed to threaten to wreck the church, Roman Catholicism was preparing to re-establish its place in the religious life of the Western world. The church offered spiritual solace to men with heavy burdens and, because it was an authoritarian institution, offered political support to the conservatives. There were a number of dramatic conversions to the Roman Church in both Germany and France, and both the philosophers and the romantic literary men hailed the church as a source of absolute truth.

Thus in politics, in religion, and in literature and philosophy there was a definite turn toward a doctrine of authority. Much of the anti-clericalism of the nineteenth-century liberals and radicals arose out of the fact that the old alliance between throne and altar was firmly re-established in the period immediately after the Congress of Vienna. The men of authority, with the police and the army on one side and the clergy on the other, were able to withstand most of the assaults of the liberals for over thirty years, and when they did have to give ground they were able to retain much influence in the compromise solutions that came into being.

Liberalism, Nationalism, Radicalism

Opposition to the settlements of 1815 and to the system of authority in the age of Metternich was neither united in its goals nor agreed in its methods. What the opponents had in common was a dislike of the existing situation; they were often completely at odds with each other when they discussed the new political order that should replace it. As soon as Europe recovered a little from the awful effects of the Napoleonic wars, these apostles of discontent made themselves heard and troubled the calm that the battles of Leipzig and Waterloo had given to Europe. In central Europe, Italy, Poland, Belgium, and the Balkans the idea of nationalism was the guiding principle for these men of liberty; in France and England political liberalism and democracy were most important. By the 1840's the new theory of socialism or social radicalism joined liberalism, nationalism, and democracy to disturb the political climate of the day.

It was natural that Germans, Italians, Poles, and Greeks should be infected with the ideals of nationalism. The demand for a new political order based upon the principles of culture, language, or race was a way of opposing the conditions that prevailed. In Germany student leagues, college professors, journalists, and others preached incessantly that only through the unification of the thirty-odd German states could the country achieve prosperity and free development. Some of these

groups, like the one led by Father Jahn, were early nineteenth-century manifestations of the Nazi storm troopers; others were thoughtful scholars whose research had convinced them that a nationalist solution of Germany's political problems would bring a full development of the country's possibilities. Naturally these men got in trouble with Metternich and the powers that believed the German Confederation of 1815 to be the only practicable solution of the problem. In Italy the nationalists created two interesting societies: the first, the *Carbonari*, which emphasized the necessity for violent revolution; the second, Mazzini's "Young Italy," a propaganda society committed to convert by persuasion. Both these groups had one solution for Italy's problems; namely, unite the country and Italy will be happy and prosperous. Napoleon had aroused the dream of a united Italy; these men refused to give it up. Greeks, Poles, Irishmen, Hungarians, and others who were ruled by men of a different nationality also found in nationalism an escape from a disagreeable political situation. The nationalist leaders called upon their fellows to help overthrow the existing order.

The same forces that had made liberalism and radical democracy politically powerful in France at the time of the Revolution, continued to operate in western Europe after 1815. To the demand for personal freedom and liberty of conscience, press, pulpit, and economic life, came to be added the demand for a share in the councils of government. The electoral laws governing the suffrage in England and France excluded the vast majority of the people from the right to vote so that in practice only the wealthy participated in the affairs of government. In England and in France the landed aristocracy and a few of the very rich *bourgeoisie* controlled the parliaments and the government. In France these men hoped to undo the work of the Revolution; in England they tried to prevent legislation that the rising commercial and industrial leaders demanded. It is not surprising therefore to find that in both countries men rallied under the banner of Liberty and Equality to demand reform. In England it was accomplished peaceably; in France it required violence.

At the same time there was an ever growing body of men who were convinced that democracy, in the form of universal suffrage, alone could cure the evils of the world. The rising tide of democratic thinking that insisted upon the essential goodness and wisdom of the masses could be found in Metternich's Germany as well as in Jackson's United States; in the first it was momentarily repressed, in the second it achieved great success. Democrats in England, under the name of Chartists, in France, of republicans, and in Germany, of radicals, denounced the political systems that gave only the wealthy the right to take part in

public affairs, and insisted that universal suffrage would assure a wise and just regime. After 1830 the democrats found at their sides another group who demanded not only the vote but also some kind of economic democracy so that the material goods as well as the political power of the world could be shared by all. The "socialists," however, had almost as many programs of action as there were socialists and so their importance was very slight. We mention them because in the last half of the century they did become important.

Revolutions of 1820-1823

Beginning in 1820 revolutions took place in Naples, Piedmont (part of the kingdom of Sardinia), Spain, Portugal, and Greece. An Austrian army quickly occupied Naples and restored "order" and absolutism. The revolutionary leaders there were hurried to the dungeon and the scaffold. Almost at the same time the uprising in Piedmont collapsed under the pressure of eighty thousand Austrian bayonets. French troops, acting for Metternich's coalition, entered Spain and put the tyrannical Ferdinand VII once more on his throne. The king then indulged in a reign of terror—exiling, imprisoning, and executing his opponents by the thousands. It is a sorry chapter in Spanish history. The revolution in Portugal so far succeeded as to compel its ruler to grant a liberal constitution. The revolution in Greece against the oppressive rule of the Turks received support from Russia, Great Britain, and France. Greece in 1829 became an independent state and the Greeks a free people for the first time since their conquest by the Romans in antiquity.

Revolutions of 1830-1832

As long as Louis XVIII lived, he kept some check upon the royalists, who wished to get back all their old wealth and privileged position. The accession in 1824 of his brother, with the title of Charles X, brought about a change. It was well said of Charles X that after long years of exile he had "learned nothing and forgotten nothing." A thorough believer in absolutism and divine right, he tried to rule as if the French Revolution had never occurred. A law was passed compensating the nobles for the losses they had suffered by the confiscation of their estates during the revolutionary period. The government raised the money for this purpose by scaling down the interest on the national debt. The bondholders, who saw their income suddenly reduced for the benefit of the aristocrats, became at once bitter enemies of the

Bourbon monarchy. The peasants were aroused by a proposal to restore primogeniture, or inheritance by the eldest son, in place of equal division among all the sons, of lands bequeathed by the father. The apprehensions of the nation were increased when the king's chief minister announced his decision "to reorganize society, to restore to the clergy their weight in state affairs, to create a powerful aristocracy, and to surround it with privileges."

The king's reactionary rule finally provoked a revolution. Paris in July, 1830, as in July, 1789, was the storm center of the movement. Workingmen and students, few in numbers but organized and armed, hastily raised barricades in the narrow streets and defied the government. After three days of fighting against troops none too loyal, the revolutionists gained control of the capital. Charles X fled to England, and the tricolor once more replaced the white flag of the Bourbons.

Some of those who had carried through the so-called July Revolution wanted to set up a republic. They found little support among the *bourgeoisie*, whose members feared that a republican France would soon be at war with monarchical Europe. Largely influenced by the aged Lafayette, the revolutionists agreed to accept another king, in the person of Louis Philippe, Duke of Orléans, who belonged to the younger branch of the Bourbon family. He had taken part in the events of 1789, had joined the Jacobin Club, had fought in revolutionary battles, and during a visit to the United States had become acquainted with democratic ideals and principles. To this "Citizen King," who reigned "by the grace of God and the will of the people," France now gave her allegiance.

The events in France created a sensation throughout Europe. The conservatives were thunder-struck at the sudden outbreak of a revolutionary spirit which they had tried so hard to suppress; the liberals were encouraged to renewed agitation for reform. A rash of revolutionary activity broke out from Italy to Poland. For the moment the forces of reaction seemed to be in retreat. It was the Netherlands, however, that took the center of the stage. The Congress of Vienna, disregarding of national feeling, had united the Belgians and Dutch into one state under a Dutch king. This arbitrary union of the two peoples produced acute friction between them. Encouraged by the success of the revolution in France, Belgian patriots raised an insurrection in Brussels. It soon spread to the provinces and led to a demand for complete separation from Holland.

This revolt in Belgium was the first challenge to the territorial settlements of 1815. France and England for reasons of their own were willing to see the Belgian people establish an independent state, but

the czar of Russia was by no means reconciled to the change. A Russian army might well have repressed the revolution in Brussels and marched on to re-establish Charles X in Paris, if the Polish revolt had not given Czar Nicholas' soldiers plenty to do at home. The other powers were willing to negotiate, and finally they reached an agreement that allowed the Belgian people to be free from Dutch rule. In 1839, after much negotiation, the little kingdom was neutralized, and its neutrality was guaranteed by the five great powers.

The efforts of "oppressed" nationalities in central and eastern Europe failed. The czar's troops brutally extinguished the revolution in Poland; Austrian soldiers in Italy re-established "order"; and in Germany the revolutions of 1830 simply sputtered and then went out. The results of the whole movement east of the Rhine and the Alps seemed to be completely *nil*.

In France, the new government of the July Monarchy bravely introduced some of the reforms that the liberals had demanded. The suffrage was increased to include some of the middle *bourgeoisie*, the church lost some of its privileges, the upper house was reformed, and the king became king of "the French" rather than "of France." It soon became clear, however, that the July Monarchy was no revolutionary regime. It was a government by, for, and of men of wealth, and it aimed primarily to please men of wealth. One of the leaders of the revolution, a professor named Guizot, blandly told his fellow countrymen "to enrich themselves" if they wanted political power. Another leader informed the country that there had not been a revolution but merely a change in government. To be sure, the regime was fruitful in many ways. It built roads and canals and started the railroad system. It laid the foundation for a public school system, and it rearmed and refortified France. But it was not flexible enough to give real satisfaction to a people that demanded democratic reforms, nor was it glamorous enough to catch the imagination of a nation that remembered Napoleon. At the end of the regime in the 1840's one statesman shouted, "France is bored."

Parliamentary Reform in Great Britain

On the Continent the demand for reform culminated in revolution; in England the most pressing demands were satisfied by an Act of parliament. The revolutions were far from successful as a program of effective action; the English Reform Bill of 1832 proved to be the foundation for the structure of parliamentary democracy that developed in Great Britain.

The Revolution of 1688–1689, the “Glorious Revolution,” overthrew absolutism in Great Britain, set up a limited monarchy, and assured the supremacy of parliament over the crown. A comparatively small body of landowners formed the governing class. The House of Lords, composed of nobles and bishops who sat by hereditary right or by royal appointment, continued to be a stronghold of the landed aristocracy. Even the elective House of Commons represented only a fraction of the people of Great Britain.

According to the system as fixed in medieval times, each county (shire) and most of the towns (boroughs) sent two representatives to the House of Commons. Some flourishing industrial places, which had grown up since the Middle Ages, were without representation. Other places — the so-called rotten boroughs — enjoyed representation long after they had so decayed that nothing remained of them except a single house, a green mound, a park, or a ruined wall. The electoral system was equally antiquated. In the counties only certain landowners could vote; in most of the towns a handful of well-to-do persons alone enjoyed the franchise. There were even some pocket boroughs, where a rich man, generally a noble, had the privilege of naming the representative.

The restricted franchise made it easy to corrupt elections. Not only were individual voters bribed, but rotten boroughs and pocket boroughs were often sold outright to the highest bidder. Thanks to the custom of open polling, voters were subject to intimidation by landlords, employers, and officials. The evils of bribery and coercion were increased by the drunkenness and disorder which prevailed during elections.

Efforts to improve these conditions began to be made in the latter part of the eighteenth century, but for a long time accomplished nothing. Sober people, alarmed by the events in France, coupled parliamentary reform with revolutionary designs against the government. After 1815, however, the Reign of Terror and Napoleon Bonaparte were no longer bogeys, and public opinion became steadily more hostile to a system which excluded so many educated, prosperous members of the middle class from political life. Great Whig nobles also took up the liberal cause and made it a party question. The Tories, on their side, stood rocklike against anything that savored of democracy. The Duke of Wellington, who had become prime minister, refused to make any concessions. His refusal caused the downfall of his ministry. In 1830, the year of the July Revolution on the Continent, the Whigs under Earl Grey returned to office, pledged to introduce a measure for parliamentary reform.

The bill introduced by Earl Grey failed to pass the House of Commons. Parliament was then dissolved and a general election called, in order to test the sentiment of the country. The Whigs triumphed, and the new ministry introduced another bill. It passed the House of Commons by a large majority, but the House of Lords, staunchly Tory, threw it out. During the next session yet another bill was put through the Commons. The Lords insisted upon amendments which the ministry would not accept. Meanwhile, popular excitement rose to a fever pitch, and in one mass meeting after another the Lords were denounced as a corrupt and selfish oligarchy. Earl Grey advised William IV (1830-1837) to create enough Whig peers to carry the measure in the upper chamber. The king refused to do so; the premier and his associates resigned; and the Duke of Wellington tried without success to form a Tory ministry. Earl Grey then resumed office, having secured the royal promise to create the necessary peers. This extreme step was not taken, however, for the mere threat of it brought the Lords to terms. In 1832 the long-debated bill quietly became law.

The First Reform Act suppressed most of the rotten boroughs and pocket boroughs, thus setting free a large number of seats in the House of Commons for distribution among towns and counties which were either unrepresented or insufficiently represented. It also gave the franchise to many persons who owned or rented buildings in the towns or who rented land in the counties. The number of voters was thus considerably increased by including particularly the middle class of merchants, manufacturers, and professional men — corresponding to the Continental *bourgeoisie*. Workingmen, agricultural laborers, and miners remained without a vote.

The events of 1832 proved that the Tory aristocracy, entrenched in the House of Lords, could not permanently defy the popular will; that "it was impossible for the whisper of a faction to prevail against the voice of a nation." The Lords yielded, however ungraciously, to public opinion. Their action meant that for the future Great Britain would progress by peaceful, orderly reform rather than by revolution. That country is the only considerable state in Europe which during the past century has not had a revolutionary change of government.

The Revolutions of 1848

Between 1830 and 1848 there was a surface calm in Continental politics that belied the deep undercurrents of discontent. In central and eastern Europe strict police controls kept outward manifestations of resentment at a minimum, but there was a large number of the educated

middle classes quietly preparing for a crisis. Many of these people—journalists, lawyers, businessmen, and professors—would normally have been mild reformers but the system of repression made them potential revolutionists. The economic life of the 1840's also helped to prepare for a rebellion: a great depression in the world markets threw laborers out of work and threatened with bankruptcy the small shopkeepers, petty manufacturers, and others. To add to the confusion a series of bad harvests made the price of bread rise out of sight just when those who depended upon bread for existence could least afford to buy it. For a generation or more the period was called the "hungry forties" by men from Ireland to Germany.

The spark for the revolutions of 1848 was kindled in Paris. After 1840 the July Monarchy settled down as a thorough-going conservative regime. Louis Philippe posed as a democrat. He liked to be called the "Citizen King," walked the streets of Paris unattended, sent his sons to the public schools, and opened the royal palace to all who wished to come and shake hands with the head of the state. It soon became clear, however, that under an exterior of republican simplicity he had all the Bourbon itching for personal power. Few Frenchmen, except members of the wealthy middle class, supported their sovereign. The royalists, who wanted to bring back the old monarchy, and the Bonapartists, who wanted to restore the Napoleonic dynasty, cordially hated him. The republicans, who had brought about the July Revolution and felt themselves cheated by its outcome, detested him still more.

The growing discontent produced a number of plots and insurrections, which were met with the time-honored policy of repression. All societies were required to submit their proceedings to the government for approval. Editors of outspoken newspapers were jailed, fined, or banished. Criticism or caricature of the king in any form was forbidden. Louis Philippe, like his predecessor, seemed determined that his throne should not be "an empty arm chair."

It was not that Louis Philippe's government failed to abide by the rules of the constitutional charter; indeed his ministers could always point to the fact that they had a large majority of the deputies behind them. But if men asked why the deputies gave their support, it became clear that the spirit of the constitution was being circumvented. The "majority" was literally bought and paid for by the government. By corrupting deputies and electors, the government could keep its comfortable majority and ignore the protests of the reformers.

The opposition tried every expedient to force the government out of its corrupt practices. At last a campaign of protest was organized. Reform banquets were held in the capital and in the provinces; after

being wined and dined, orators explained to a well-fed audience the evils that had crept into the government of France. It was embarrassing, but the banquet campaign was hardly revolutionary. None the less the government finally decided to stop the movement, and forbade the holding of a reform banquet in Paris planned for the 22nd of February, 1848. The reformers hesitated. The more timid were willing to forget the whole thing, but by that time a tougher element had taken an interest in reform. The banquet was called off, but when the police tried to break up a demonstration, a riot followed. The National Guard, a militia of citizen soldiers, was called out, but it soon went over to the people and the demonstration became a revolution. "Long live the republic" was the cry that swept Paris on the third day of the fighting. Louis Philippe lost his courage and left France under the name of Mr. Smith to seek asylum in England.

The men on the barricades in February, 1848, were workingmen, students, and bourgeois National Guardsmen. The republican elements were strong, and quickly produced a provisional government headed by the poet-historian-statesman Lamartine. In the following three months this government ruled France and organized the election of a National Assembly to write a constitution. But there were important decisions to be made, two of which proved to be veritable Pandora's boxes. The revolution of February developed the idea that "only an armed citizenry can be a free citizenry." Freedom and guns to enforce that freedom became synonymous. As a result the people of Paris, workingmen and *bourgeoisie*, were allowed arms from the state arsenals and formed citizen militia companies under their own officers. The second decision concerned the right to work. The economic crisis of 1845-1848 was severe, and the revolution did not help matters much. Bread was dear, work was scarce. In the heat of the crisis the provisional government accepted a petition of a group of obscure socialists and announced that the state would guarantee each man a job. The "National Workshops" were the answer, but in 1848 men did not understand much about the possibilities of such an experiment. As it actually worked out, the state paid men for digging holes, filling up holes, and finally for abstaining from both occupations. It was a complete fiasco, in part because it was directed by men unsympathetic to the idea and in part because there were no constructive plans.

When the National Assembly took over in May, 1848, it found (1) an empty treasury, (2) an army of workers demanding wages for their labor, and (3) a citizenry armed to the teeth. The obvious thing to do was to disband the National Workshops since there was no money with which to pay the workers. The men in the National Workshops

were offered the opportunity either to join the army or to go to the provinces where they might get work building railroads. Slavery or exile! at least that was the way it seemed to the Parisian workers. They had guns in their hands, and inevitably there was recourse to battle. The fighting of the so-called "June Days" made the February Revolution seem like a small affair. The half-starved, despairing Parisian workers fought the army, the bourgeois National Guard, and militiamen that came from the provinces. In the end the workers were forced to surrender and the victorious *bourgeoisie* took terrible reprisals.

From the June Days on, the French revolutionary movement cooled down. The Assembly wrote a constitution that provided for a republic, but when France elected her new president, Louis Napoleon, nephew and pretender to the throne of Napoleon, won an overwhelming victory. His name alone gave him hundreds of thousands of votes; many French peasants knew no other political name. His speeches and writings in which he promised order, justice, prosperity, and even socialism made him all things to all men. Stupid provincials somehow thought that they had elected an emperor; the more clever Parisians who knew everything, understood that he was to be just a president with a four-year term of office. In spite of their sophistication, the clever people were wrong; Louis Napoleon's election was the signal for reaction in France, and within four years he was to become emperor of the French.

Revolutions Elsewhere in Europe, 1848

France had once more lighted the revolutionary torch, and this time eager hands took it up and carried it throughout the Continent. Within a few months half the monarchs of Europe were either deposed or forced to grant reforms. No less than eighteen separate revolts marked the year 1848. Vienna, the citadel of reaction, was one of the first scenes of a popular uprising. Mobs, which the civic guard refused to repress, fired Metternich's palace and compelled him to resign office. Quitting the capital in disguise and with a price set upon his head, he made his way to England, there to compare experiences with that other exile, Louis Philippe. In Berlin the revolution won a quick victory. The king joined the movement and announced his intention to give Prussia a constitution and to join Prussia in a united Germany. Munich, Dresden, and the smaller capitals also fell to the revolutionaries; all Germany seemed about to receive a new order.

The big German problem was unification. It had been promised at the time of the Wars of the Liberation; it had been demanded by the

nationalists ever since 1815. The princes had failed to unify Germany; in 1848 the people hoped to accomplish the task. A German parliament, elected by universal manhood suffrage, met in Frankfort to give the German lands a constitution but, as elsewhere, the revolutionaries were in agreement in their dislike for Metternich's system but not in their vision for a new constitution. The parliament was the scene of learned debates but it could not reach a compromise. There were two big questions. The first concerned the size of the new Germany. Would the Austrian and Sudetenland Germans be included and, if so, what could be done with the Hapsburg state? One group urged that only purely German states be admitted into the new Germany; the other, spiritual ancestors of the pan-Germans, wanted all Germans to be united. The second question concerned the type of government that should be created. The liberals wanted a parliamentary regime buttressed by a Bill of Rights; the radicals wanted a pure democracy in which the people's will could prevail in all things. The debates went on but reaction, supported by the soldiers of Russia, set in and in the end the whole work of the Frankfort parliament came to nothing.

It was in the non-German lands of central Europe that the reaction against the revolution won its first victory. What had begun as a democratic movement among the Germans of Vienna speedily became a national movement among other peoples of the Hapsburg realm. The Czechs, the Slavic-speaking inhabitants of Bohemia and Moravia, demanded autonomy. The Magyars rebelled and established an independent Hungarian republic. Its first and only president was Kossuth, whose eloquence and energy gave him a prominent place in the revolutionary movement.

The Austrian Empire was saved from dissolution at this time by the bitter conflicts of its various nationalities among themselves, by the loyalty of the army to the Hapsburgs, and by foreign intervention. The insurrection of the Czechs first collapsed. The Magyars, however, resisted so sternly that Francis Joseph was obliged to call in the aid of his brother monarch and brother reactionary, Nicholas I, czar of Russia. The czar, fearing lest an independent Hungary would be followed by an independent Poland, joined his troops to those of the Austrians, and together they overwhelmed the Magyar armies. Kossuth escaped to Turkey; the other leaders of the revolution perished on the gallows or before a firing squad.

The revolts in Lombardy-Venetia against Austria, in the States of the Church against the pope, and in the kingdom of the Two Sicilies against its Bourbon ruler all collapsed. Equally unsuccessful were the revolutionary disturbances which broke out in most of the German states and

led to widespread demands for constitutions, parliaments, responsible ministries, a free press, and trial by jury. The kings, the princes, and the aristocrats, with their control of the armies, were too firmly seated to be overthrown.

Backed by Czar Nicholas of Russia and flushed with victory in Italy and Hungary, the Hapsburg government in Vienna insisted that the German states must return to the *status quo ante*. Under this pressure the more radical aspirations of the revolution collapsed. The German Confederation was re-established and reaction with a capital "R" returned to central Europe. The revolutions, however, did leave a legacy. First of all, the Prussian constitution granted in 1849 was retained; it was anything but democratic, but it was a step beyond the police government of the earlier period. And secondly, the Prussian leaders, or some of them at least, saw clearly that Prussia's place in Germany would always be secondary so long as Austria was powerful. This planted the seeds of the later conflict between these two states. In Italy the kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia also retained the constitution that the revolution had created. That constitution became the basic law of Italy in the period that followed.

Extension of the Suffrage in Great Britain

The revolutionary movement that swept Europe in 1848 had a counterpart in English politics. The failure of parliament to enfranchise the masses produced much popular discontent, and during the early years of Queen Victoria's reign (1837-1901) the movement known as Chartism made headway among workingmen and radicals. They demanded the so-called Six Points of a "People's Charter": (1) universal manhood suffrage; (2) secret voting; (3) equal electoral districts; (4) removal of the property qualifications for membership in parliament; (5) payment of members of parliament; and (6) annual parliamentary elections. All but the last of these demands, which seemed so radical at the time, have since been secured.

Enthusiasm for Chartism waxed strong after the February Revolution of 1848 on the Continent. Preparations were made for a great Chartist demonstration in London. Six million persons, it was announced, had signed a petition for the Six Points, and half a million men, many of them armed, made ready to carry it to parliament. The government took alarm and engaged a large force of special constables, under the command of the Duke of Wellington, to protect life and property. The government's firm attitude, coupled with a downpour of rain on the day appointed for the procession, dampened the spirits as well as

the bodies of the Chartists, and they dispersed. Their petition, upon examination, was found to contain less than half the boasted number of signatures, and of these many were fictitious. This exposure discredited the whole Chartist movement.

Nevertheless, the agitation for a more democratic Great Britain continued. The popular movement there owed much to the outcome of the American Civil War, which was regarded as a triumph for democracy. It began to seem anomalous that British workingmen should be denied the right of suffrage, when this was about to be secured by Negroes in the United States. Benjamin Disraeli, leader of the Conservative Party (formerly the Tory Party), was responsible for the passage of the Second Reform Act (1867). The measure gave the vote to many tenant farmers in the counties. In the towns all householders, whatever the value of their property, and all lodgers who paid ten pounds or more a year as rent were enfranchised.

The Third Reform Act (1884) was due to the Liberals (formerly the Whigs), under the leadership of W. E. Gladstone. It gave the vote to agricultural laborers and miners. Henceforth the United Kingdom enjoyed virtually universal manhood suffrage, such as had already been established in France, Germany, and the United States. In 1918 parliament passed the Equal Franchise Act, which granted limited rights of voting to women. Ten years later these rights were extended, and now the qualifications for the franchise are the same for both sexes.

After almost a century of gradual reform Great Britain thus definitely abandoned the old theory, rooted in feudal conceptions, of the franchise as a privilege attached to the ownership of property, especially land. The franchise became henceforth a right to be enjoyed by every adult citizen. A general election for members of parliament is now an appeal to a responsible people, and the will of the majority of the people must be carried out by parliament. Great Britain ranks among the most democratic of modern countries. The liberal democratic ideals finally triumphed without recourse to a revolution. Englishmen regard this fact as a proof of their political maturity.

Realpolitik and Nationalism, Liberalism, and Democracy

The reaction that set in all over Europe after 1849 seemed to undo the work of the revolutions. The romantic ideas that had motivated the so-called "graybeards of '48" were repressed, but their movement had a profound effect upon Europe even though it was not quite the effect they had hoped to achieve. In the first place new men appeared in almost every country to direct the political scene. And these new

men were to introduce a hard-boiled realism into politics. The idea of *Realpolitik* goes back to the era of Machiavelli, to the Roman Empire, and undoubtedly earlier, but no generation ever played the game of states' interest more vigorously than the men of the third quarter of the nineteenth century. Metternich and his contemporaries had been romantics in politics in that they tried to close their eyes to the realities of the world and to force men into political forms that the post-Vienna statesmen thought were good. The men of the period after 1848 boldly reckoned on nationalism, liberalism, and even democracy as realities that could not be ignored and used these movements to create new states and to organize new forms of governments. It was this generation that made the compromises that brought liberalism, nationalism, and democracy out of the ranks of revolutionary dogma and made them into supporters of the national states.

The Second French Empire

In the period after 1850 France reappeared for two decades as the political leader of Europe. Her recovery from the crushing blows she had received in 1815 must be attributed as much to the industrious character of the nation as to her leaders, but it cannot be overlooked that Louis Napoleon, the man who was elected president in 1848, played a most important role in it. He was an enigmatic person; he rose to power on the shoulders of his uncle's prestige, but even his enemies must admit that, once in power, he showed himself able and effective. No character in modern French history has aroused greater controversy than this adventurer-statesman of the 1850's and 1860's.

Louis Napoleon was the son of Napoleon's brother, the king of Holland; after the death of the emperor's only son, he became the pretender to the imperial throne. His early life had been a succession of adventures. Exiled from France at the time of the Bourbon restoration, he found his way to many lands, and in Italy even became a member of a revolutionary secret society. Twice he tried to provoke an uprising in France against the Orléans monarchy. On the first occasion he appeared at Strasbourg, wearing his uncle's hat, boots, and sword, but he was soon captured and deported to the United States. A second imitation of the "return from Elba" led to his imprisonment for six years. He then escaped to England and waited there, full of faith in his destiny, until the events of 1848 recalled him home. His election to the presidency of the Second Republic soon followed.

Louis Napoleon swore to remain faithful to the republic and "to regard as enemies of the nation all those who may attempt by illegal

means to change the form of the established government." Events soon showed how well the oath was kept. His uncle had progressed by rapid steps from the consulate to the empire; he himself determined to use the presidency as a steppingstone to the imperial throne. The recent adoption of universal manhood suffrage by the French made it necessary for him to enlist the support of all classes of the population. The army welcomed a Bonaparte at its head. The peasantry and the *bourgeoisie* felt reassured when he disclosed himself as a guardian of landed property and business interests. The workingmen, who had largely carried through the February Revolution, were conciliated by the promise of special laws for their benefit. So cleverly did the president curry favor with these different groups of public opinion, so skillfully did he strike all the chords of national memory evoked by the name of Napoleon, that it was not long before he reached his goal.

The republican constitution had limited the president to one term of four years. This fact was the wedge that finally placed Louis Napoleon on the throne. The assembly elected in 1849 represented a conservative reaction against the revolution of 1848 and the June Days; it was crowded with men anxious to undo the revolution and restore a monarchy. On the other side the radicals became bolder after 1849 and frankly talked about a new revolt. Louis Napoleon, as president, played a clever game. By using overwhelming military force he kept order in the streets when the radicals tried a revolt; he let it be known that he alone stood between the country and a "restored" king. But his term of office would end in 1852 and under the constitution he could not be re-elected. The country petitioned for a change in the constitution, but the assembly could not agree. The limitation could be set aside only by a *coup d'état*. On December 2, 1851, the anniversary of his uncle's coronation as emperor, troops occupied Paris, dissolved the legislature, and arrested his chief opponents. An insurrection in the streets of the capital was quelled and throughout France thousands of republicans were imprisoned, exiled, or transported to penal colonies across the seas. Louis Napoleon then made over the government in such a way as to give himself well-nigh absolute authority. It needed only a change of name to transform the republic into an empire. An almost unanimous popular vote in 1852 authorized the president to accept the title of Napoleon III, hereditary emperor of the French.

The new ruler kept the constitution, universal manhood suffrage, and the legislature — the forms but not the substance of popular sovereignty. Candidates for office were nominated and elected under the direction of the government. The legislature could consider only the measures presented to it by the emperor, could not question his ministers, could

not regulate the expenditure of public money, and could not publish its own deliberations. A General Security Act authorized the imprisonment or exile without trial of political offenders. Newspapers which criticized the government were, after two warnings, suspended or suppressed. In the universities instruction in modern history and philosophy was discouraged as revolutionary, and liberal-minded professors lost their positions. Political stagnation descended upon France. The country was a sickroom where no one might speak aloud.

France the more readily accepted this veiled despotism because under it material prosperity prevailed. The proletarians, hitherto neglected by the government, enjoyed cheap food, steady employment on great public works, and many holidays. "Emperor of the workingmen" admirers of Napoleon III called him. Businessmen profited by the remarkable development during his reign of banks, factories, railways, canals, and steamship lines. The progress made was strikingly shown at the first Paris Exposition in 1855, when all the world flocked to the famous capital to see the products of French industry and art. But this was only the beginning. The empire began an extensive program of public works. Paris, up to that time a ramshackle city with dirty, narrow streets, was rebuilt. Great boulevards to let "light, air, and infantry" into all parts of the city were laid out; beautiful new buildings replaced the rookeries that had stood there before. Paris received most attention but almost every city in France today owes much of its beauty to the work of Napoleon III. He also encouraged all kinds of economic activity. His regime completed the railroad network for France. It opened new banks to assist both agriculture and industry. It drained marshes and built roads, bridges, harbors, and canals. The prosperity of the country is attested by the fact that under Louis Napoleon the birth rate reached the highest point that it was to make in the whole period from 1815 to the present. The empire gave prosperity as a bribe so that the people would accept the loss of their liberty.

"The empire means peace," Louis Napoleon had announced shortly before assuming the imperial title. Nevertheless, he had not been two years on the throne before he brought France into the Crimean War (1854-1856) as an ally of Great Britain, Sardinia, and Turkey against Russia. He added Savoy and Nice to France as a reward for aid to Sardinia in its war against Austria (1859). He completed the conquest of Algeria (begun by Louis Philippe), acquired some Pacific islands, and laid the foundations of French Indo-China. When the United States was in the throes of the Civil War, he proceeded to intervene in the affairs of Mexico. French troops overran much of the country and set up the Archduke Maximilian, brother of Francis Joseph, as emperor.

After the withdrawal of the French in 1867, the Mexicans captured and executed the ruler who had been forced upon them, and the dream of "Napoleon the Little" of an empire in the New World was rudely shattered.

This series of limited wars and imperialist adventures had, as we shall see, important results in Europe and they also profoundly affected France. War meant taxes and recruits. The former fell heavily upon the *bourgeoisie*, the latter upon the peasants. These two groups had been Napoleon III's best supporters but wars made both of them grumble. The war in Italy led to the annexation of papal territory by the rising young kingdom of Italy, and the threat (afterward fulfilled) that the pope would lose Rome itself. This angered the clergy in France, and the clergy had been the third powerful prop of Louis Napoleon's throne. In an effort to readjust his supporters, Louis Napoleon, after 1860, began a series of reforms of the constitution. The last of these, in 1870, completely remodeled the government into a liberal-democratic empire. The Chamber of Deputies, elected by universal suffrage, controlled the destinies of the cabinet. The emperor gave up the right to rule; his role became similar to that of the king in England in our day. The press, pulpit, and lecture platform (public assembly) were cleared of restrictions, and unhampered elections were allowed. This was a real compromise with the forces that had been revolutionary in 1848. One of the old revolutionary leaders advised his young friends to go into business, for the era of revolution was over.

This advice was premature. The responsible government, in spite of Louis Napoleon's cautious advice, plunged headlong into a crisis in foreign affairs in 1870 and involved France in war with Prussia. No government in modern times has survived a crushing military defeat; the presence of German troops in the heart of France ended the empire and with it Louis Napoleon's experiment with parliamentary democracy.

The War in the Crimea

The first breach in the general peace of Europe after 1815 came in 1853. The Crimean War had for its origins a matrix of Near Eastern politics in which religion (Catholic *vs.* Orthodox) and politics (England and France *vs.* Russia) and personal prestige (Napoleon III and Nicholas I) all played their parts. Turkey, the Sick Man of Europe, was not yet dead but the heirs presumptive were anxious about the inheritance. In any event out of the welter of political problems a war developed. In many ways it was much more important for Europe than it was for the Near East.

The war itself was a stupid affair. England and France, supported by Turkey and Sardinia, attempted to fight Russia. When Prussia refused to allow Germany to become the battlefield by insisting upon the neutrality of the German Confederation, and Sweden declined the opportunity to use her territory to "save civilization," and lastly Austria succeeded in neutralizing Moldavia and Wallachia (present-day Rumania), there seemed to be no place to fight. At last someone suggested the Crimea, and the war was fought there. It almost seems that the great powers picked this (in 1854) out of the way spot so that their war would do as little damage as possible. The fighting was as stupidly organized as the war itself. Typhus, amoebic dysentery, and other diseases killed more men than did the bullets and explosives that were laboriously transported to the Crimea. By 1856 the Russians were driven from the peninsula, but all Russia then beckoned to the Anglo-French army with the promise that it would respond as it did in 1812.

The war was ended by compromise and diplomacy rather than by arms, and in this fact lies the influence that this struggle had on Europe. It was Hapsburg Austria that compelled the Russians to come to terms. The same Francis Joseph whose government had been saved in 1849 by Russian troops and whose controls in Germany had been secured by Russian diplomacy, allowed his ministers to threaten Russia with Austrian intervention if she refused to make peace. It should be said that Austria's hand was forced by France and England when they threatened to turn against her in Italy if she did not make this move, but the Russian czar could hardly be expected to forgive Francis Joseph's ingratitude under any circumstances. Austro-Russian hostility, already latent in the problems of the Near East, became a permanent fixture in European politics for the next two decades because of Austria's role in the Crimean War.

The Peace of Paris in 1856 brought little beyond prestige to France and England, but its effects upon Russia were important. The north coast of the Black Sea was neutralized; this meant that Russia was unable to fortify her territory facing Turkey and presumably therefore unable to reopen her drive toward Constantinople. This provision made her a dissatisfied power. Up to the Crimean War, Russian influence and the Russian army stood behind the *status quo* created at Vienna; after the Treaty of Paris, Russia was willing to see the Vienna settlement changed if she could regain control over her own southern frontier. The Treaty of Paris also internationalized the Danube, prepared the way for the union of Moldavia and Wallachia into the kingdom of Rumania, guaranteed Turkey's territory, and proclaimed a

series of rules regulating commerce on the high seas in time of war. But none of these things had the significance for the future that was to result from the changing of Russia from a *satisfied* to a *dissatisfied* power.

Disunited Italy

Only a few years after the Crimean War, the attention of Europe was directed toward the Italian peninsula. The Vienna settlement left Italy a mosaic of nine states and principalities. Of these, Sardinia (including Piedmont) formed an independent kingdom. Lombardy and Venetia belonged to Austria. Parma, Modena, Lucca, and Tuscany were duchies, all but the last being under rulers of the Hapsburg family. The States of the Church, and the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, though independent, looked to Austria for direction. Italy, in Metternich's contemptuous phrase, was only "a geographical expression." Centuries of misgovernment and civil strife had crushed the creative energies of the Italian people, while their material welfare steadily declined with the shifting of trade centers from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. Divided, dependent, impoverished, Italy had indeed fallen on evil days.

The Italians describe their national movement as a *Risorgimento*, a "resurrection" of a people once the most civilized and prosperous in Europe. It dates from the shock of the French Revolution. The armies of revolutionary France drove out the Austrians, set up republics in the northern part of the peninsula, and swept away many abuses of the Old Regime. Napoleon Bonaparte, himself of Italian lineage and speech, continued this unifying work. All Italy except the islands of Sardinia and Sicily was either annexed to France or made dependent on France. Throughout the peninsula the French emperor introduced personal freedom, religious toleration, equality before the law, and the even justice of the *Code Napoléon*.

The decisions of the Congress of Vienna were a cruel disappointment to patriotic Italians, who saw their country again dismembered, subject to Austria, and under reactionary princes. The great mass of the *bourgeoisie*, many nobles, and some of the better educated workingmen now began to agitate for the overthrow of Austrian power in the peninsula and for the formation of liberal governments in the different states. Unable to act publicly, they resorted to underground methods. Various secret societies sprang up and started the first unsuccessful revolts in 1820. Another revolutionary organization, Young Italy, was founded some years later by Mazzini, a native of Genoa. Its motto was "God and the people"; its purpose, the creation of a republic. At a time when the obstacles in the way seemed insuperable, Mazzini believed that

twenty million people could free themselves if only they would sink local interests and jealousies in a common patriotism. Young Italy accomplished no practical results, but it kept alive the enthusiasm for a free and independent nation. Many patriotic Italians who did not favor Mazzini's republican principles hoped to form a federation of the states under the presidency of the pope. Many more pinned their faith to a constitutional monarchy under the Sardinian king.

Sardinia was the only Italian state not controlled by Austria, and in 1848-1849 it had warred bravely, though unsuccessfully, against that foreign power. After the pope had shown himself unwilling to head the national movement and after Mazzini had failed to set up a republic in Rome, the eyes of Italians turned to the king of Sardinia, Victor Emmanuel II, as the most promising leader in the struggle for independence. Though not a man of brilliant mind, he had much common sense and personal qualities which soon won him a wide popularity. He was a devoted Catholic. He was also a thorough liberal. His father, Charles Albert, had granted a constitution to the Sardinians; he retained it in spite of Austrian protests, when all the other Italian princes were absolute rulers. Patriots of every type — Catholics, republicans, and constitutionalists — could rally about this king who kept his plighted word.

Unification of Italy

Victor Emmanuel had an able minister in the Piedmontese nobleman Count Cavour. Cavour knew England well, admired the English system of parliamentary government, and felt a corresponding hatred of absolutist principles. Faithfully supported by his royal master, he bent every effort to develop the economic resources of the kingdom, foster education, and reorganize the army. He made Sardinia a strong and liberal state, strong enough to cope with Austria and liberal enough to attract to itself all the other states of Italy. Cavour also concluded a military alliance with the ambitious Napoleon III, who promised, in return for the duchy of Savoy and the port of Nice (both largely French in population), to send an army to help the Sardinians expel the Austrians from Italy.

The Austro-Sardinian War (1859) lasted less than two months. The Austrians were defeated in the great battles of Magenta and Solferino and were driven out of Lombardy. At the critical moment when the main French army was engaged in Italy, the Prussian government mobilized its army on the Rhine. This abrupt threat of intervention made Louis Napoleon's position extremely hazardous, but fortunately for him it was as embarrassing to the Austrians as it was dangerous to the



The Unification of Italy (1815-1870)

French. Prussia was willing, indeed anxious, to save Austria but the obvious price was Prussian control in the German Confederation. Austria could not expect any help from Russia this time, for the Russians could not forgive her "treason" in the Crimean War. It was a clear cut struggle for power in Germany, and Prussia had the best cards unless Austria could free herself of the war in Italy. The Austrian government indicated a willingness to come to terms with the French, and Louis Napoleon grasped at the chance. His treaty with Cavour had promised that Austria would be driven from both Lombardy and Venetia and that an Italian Confederation would be created; but under the circumstances, it was impolitic to demand too much from Austria. The terms of the armistice, as incorporated in the peace treaty, ceded only Lombardy to Sardinia. Venetia remained Austrian. Victor Emmanuel and Cavour, left in the lurch by their ally, were obliged to accept this arrangement. But the first step in Italian unification had been taken.

In 1860 the people of central Italy, unaided, took the second step. Parma, Modena, Tuscany, and nearly all the States of the Church expelled their rulers and declared for annexation to Sardinia. Napoleon III sanctioned this action, after Cavour handed over to him both Savoy and

Nice just as if the French emperor had completely fulfilled his promise to free Italy "from the Alps to the Adriatic."

The third step was taken by Garibaldi, a sailor from Nice, a fighter for liberty, and a picturesque, heroic figure. This man, who had passed through the fire of many battlefields, who had been shipwrecked, wounded, imprisoned, and exiled, could not rest until all Italy was free. When in 1860 the Sicilians rose against their Bourbon king, Garibaldi went to their aid with one thousand red-shirted volunteers. It seemed — it was — a foolhardy expedition, but within a month Garibaldi and his Red Shirts conquered all Sicily. Thence they crossed to the mainland and soon entered Naples in triumph. Garibaldi's success made men in Turin fear that he might forget his love for Victor Emmanuel and create an Italian republic. To prevent this a Sardinian army invaded the Papal States from the north and joined the victorious army that had conquered Sicily and Naples. The Two Sicilies voted for annexation to Sardinia, and Garibaldi handed over all of his conquests to Victor Emmanuel.

The diplomacy of Cavour, the intervention of Napoleon III, Garibaldi's sword, and the popular will thus united nearly all Italy within two years. A national parliament met in Turin and conferred the crown upon Victor Emmanuel. The new kingdom was virtually completed by the annexation in 1866 of Venetia, which fell to Italy as her reward for an alliance with Prussia in the Austro-Prussian War of that year. The occupation of Rome followed in 1870, and a year later the City of the Seven Hills became the capital city. The States of the Church were extinguished and with them the temporal power of the papacy. The district about Trent in the Alps and the district about Trieste at the head of the Adriatic, though largely peopled by Italians, still remained under Austrian rule. The desire to round out the kingdom by adding to it this *Italia irredenta* was the most compelling reason which led Italy to side with the Allies in the first World War.

The constitution of Italy was an elaboration of the royal charter granted by Charles Albert of Sardinia in 1848 and between 1859 and 1870 extended by plebiscites to the entire peninsula. Legislative authority resided in an elective Chamber of Deputies and an appointive Senate. A ministry, responsible to the Chamber of Deputies, exercised executive authority. The constitution was obviously liberal and had possibilities of becoming democratic. Thus in the new kingdom of Italy, nationalism, liberalism, and democracy ceased to be revolutionary credos that would cause riots in the streets. The compromise of the unification opened the way for the evolution of a liberal democracy.


Disunited Germany

In Germany the reaction after the revolutions of 1848 brought profound disillusionment to the liberals and democrats. Poets, publicists, and professors almost with one voice called for a leader, a man who could bring Germany out of her difficulties. The German problem was a thorny one. At the opening of the French Revolution Germany was a patchwork of kingdoms, principalities, duchies, and free cities. These states — the heritage of feudalism — were independent. Each made its own laws, held its own court, conducted its own diplomacy, and had its own army, tariff, and coinage. Here, then, in central Europe was an area, large, populous, and wealthy, which lacked a national government such as had existed in England, France, Spain, and even Russia for centuries.

It is one of the ironies of history that Germany owed to Napoleon Bonaparte the first measures making possible her later unification. He annexed to France the German lands west of the Rhine and thus dispossessed nearly a hundred rulers of their territories. He afterward reorganized much of Germany east of the Rhine, with the idea of setting up a few large states as a barrier between France on the one side and Austria and Prussia on the other. This work survived the emperor's downfall. Germany in 1815 included only thirty-eight independent states, as compared with more than three hundred in 1789. Napoleon's dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire (1806) involved another breach with the past; henceforth that "superfluous political cobweb" no longer encumbered the German ceiling.

Love of Germany as the common fatherland had been deeply stirred by the struggle against Napoleon. "I have only one fatherland," said the German statesman Baron vom und zum Stein, "and that is called Germany." Arndt's famous war song, *The German's Fatherland*, which was on all lips when the people rose against the French emperor, expressed the same patriotic spirit. After the Wars of Liberation there were many patriots who wanted to bring all the states into a strongly knit union. Their hopes were dashed by the Congress of Vienna. Metternich feared that a united Germany would not serve Austrian interests, and the German rulers themselves had no desire to surrender any authority to a central government. The outcome was the creation in 1815 of the German Confederation, a loose association of the reigning princes under the leadership of Austria.


Germany, while still politically divided, became economically unified. The tariff duties levied by each member of the confederation against the goods of every other member greatly hampered commerce



AN 18TH CENTURY RESEARCH LABORATORY (*Bettmann Archive*)



CARPET WEAVING IN THE 18TH CENTURY (*Bettmann Archive*)



A PILLORY IN AN ENGLISH VILLAGE (*Bettmann Archive*)



A FRENCH BALL (*Bettmann Archive*)


and industry. To meet this difficulty, Prussia led the way in forming in 1834 a Customs Union (*Zollverein*), which finally included all the German states except Austria. Free trade prevailed between the members. This gave the Germans their first opportunity to develop economically, and at the same time provided a school in which to teach the advantages of unity. Since the *Zollverein* was founded under Prussian leadership it maintained a low tariff policy so that Austria would not join.

The Prussian kingdom seemed to be, indeed, the natural center of a movement for unity. Its population, except the Poles, was entirely German; it had led Germany in the struggle against Napoleon; and since 1850 it had possessed a constitution, which, if not democratic, at least established some measure of parliamentary government. The interests of Austria, on the other hand, were divided between its German and numerous non-German peoples, and the government was thoroughly autocratic. Neither nationalists nor liberals could expect help from the Hapsburgs. As for the central and southern states — Saxony, Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, Hanover, and the rest — not one was large enough or strong enough to attempt the work of unification. But if the Hohenzollerns undertook it, how would they carry it through? Would they serve Germany by merging Prussia in a German nation, as Sardinia had been merged in Italy, or would they give Germany a federal constitution that would recognize the rights of the German states?

Unification of Germany

The movement for unity found a leader in Otto von Bismarck. Bismarck was a member of the Prussian landed aristocracy, well educated, and trained in statecraft by service as ambassador at foreign courts. In 1862 he became the chief minister of the king of Prussia, William I. Bismarck was convinced that Germany could be unified only by force, or, as he phrased it, by "blood and iron." Supported by the king, the able generals Roon and Moltke, and the people generally, Bismarck bent every effort to strengthen the Prussian army and make it, as in the days of Frederick the Great, the most efficient fighting machine in Europe. How well he succeeded events soon showed.

To put Prussia at the head of Germany meant a conflict with Austria, for that power would never willingly surrender her leading place in the German Confederation. The conflict broke out in 1866. Austria received no help from Russia this time; the Crimean War made Russia unwilling to defend the *status quo*, and particularly unwilling to



The Unification of Germany (1815-1871)

help Austria. France played "godfather" to an Italo-Prussian alliance, so there was no help there either. Thanks to the careful organization of the Prussian army and to Moltke's brilliant strategy, the Austro-Prussian War became a Seven Weeks' War. The Austrians met a crushing defeat at Sadowa (Königgrätz) and Francis Joseph had to sue for peace. Bismarck did not humble Austria by imposing too severe terms; he wanted Austria as a future ally. Austria was obliged, however, to consent to a dissolution of the German Confederation.

Bismarck now proceeded to annex several small states to Prussia, in order to consolidate the scattered Prussian dominions. Henceforth these dominions stretched without a break from Russian Poland to the frontier of France. All the remaining states north of the river Main were then (1867) required to enter a North German Confederation controlled by Prussia. The four states south of the Main (Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, and Hesse), which had fought on the side of Austria, did not enter the new confederation. They secretly agreed, however, to place their armies at the disposal of Prussia in the event of a war with France.

For Bismarck a Franco-Prussian War "lay in the logic of history." He believed it inevitable, in view of the traditional policy of France of keeping Germany disunited in order to have weak neighbors across the Rhine. Napoleon III, on his side, had now begun to regret his neutrality in the Austro-Prussian War. He had completely misjudged the

politico-military situation in central Europe; the alliance between Italy and Prussia had been his idea for he hoped to see a long war with a military stalemate from which France could draw advantages. The victory of Sadowa (Königgrätz) was a surprise and a shock to him. It meant that the balance of power in Europe and the hegemony of the Continent was shifting into Prussia's hands. To save his own prestige, he asked for compensations: the French-speaking provinces of Belgium, Luxembourg, and perhaps the Rhineland. After two years of negotiation he got none of these, and then tried to form an anti-Prussian alliance with Austria and Italy. At this juncture the crisis of the Spanish candidature broke on the European political scene. The Spanish government offered the throne to a Prussian prince. When the French protested, the young prince withdrew his candidacy, but the new French government (the cabinet of the parliamentary empire) foolishly provoked a war with Prussia to gain a diplomatic victory.

War came, but not as the French hoped it to come. The Russian government, with Bismarck's promise that the Black Sea could be re-fortified, forced Austria to remain neutral by threatening to invade her if she declared war on Prussia. The Italian government asked for the right to take Rome from the pope as the price of Italian aid, a promise the French could not give. The English upon hearing of Napoleon III's designs upon Belgium gave their blessings to Prussia. The war that followed was a complete disaster to the French. Their armies were beaten in one engagement after another; Napoleon III was made a prisoner; and Paris, after a four months' siege, had to capitulate — to cold and hunger rather than to the enemy. The Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871) then ended.

By the Treaty of Frankfort, France agreed to pay an indemnity of one billion dollars and to support a German army of occupation until this sum was forthcoming. She also ceded to Germany Alsace and a large part of Lorraine. As far back as 1815, Prussia had tried to acquire these two provinces in order to secure a more defensible frontier for her Rhenish possessions. Prussia took them now, ostensibly to regain what had once been Germany territory, but really because of their economic importance (Lorraine is rich in iron) and their value as a barrier against future French aggression. France could never be reconciled to the loss of the two provinces; after 1871 she always hoped to win them back. Their annexation, against the almost unanimous wish of the inhabitants, helped to unsettle the peace of Europe for nearly half a century.

The Treaty of Frankfort had not been made before united Germany came into being. The four South German states yielded to the national sentiment aroused by the war and agreed with Prussia to enter the

North German Confederation, rechristened the German Empire. On January 18, 1871, in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles, William I took the title of German Emperor (*Deutscher Kaiser*).

The new German Empire was a compromise between the national state and the ideas of nationalism, liberalism, and democracy. Its Reichstag was elected by universal manhood suffrage, its new imperial laws were framed by men with a bourgeois liberal point of view, and its very essence was nationalism. The constitution did not give the German people complete control over their own destinies, for the authoritarian principle was skillfully blended in the roles of the kaiser and the chancellor with the more liberal-democratic character of the Reichstag. None the less liberals and democrats no longer had to raise barricades; their ideas had become incorporated in the state as respectable principles.

Austria-Hungary

The democratic and national movements which spread over Europe after the February Revolution of 1848 in France threatened at first the integrity of the Hapsburg realm. But the time for its dissolution had not yet come. Austria weathered the revolutionary storm and under the youthful Francis Joseph returned to the well-worn path of absolutism and reaction. Hungary, as punishment for the rebellion under Kossuth, was cut into five districts, ruled by Germans from Vienna, and German was made the official language. Repressive measures did not extinguish, however, the sense of Magyar nationality. After the disastrous wars of 1859 and 1866, resulting in the expulsion of Austria from Italy and Germany, Francis Joseph found it expedient to adopt a more conciliatory policy toward the Magyars.

In 1867 after Austria was driven out of Germany by the Austro-Prussian War, a constitution, known as the *Ausgleich* (Compromise), was promulgated. It provided for a Dual Monarchy to consist of the empire of Austria and the kingdom of Hungary. Each had its own parliament, ministry, courts, officials, language, and capital (Vienna and Budapest). Both had one flag, one army and navy, and one sovereign, who wore the joint crown of Austrian emperor and Hungarian king. There was also a common tariff, a common coinage, and a common administration of foreign affairs. This political makeshift, renewed every ten years, managed to survive until 1918. It satisfied the Hungarians, the most vigorous national group within the Hapsburg state. The other nationalities were either oppressed, appeased, or kept from revolt by the fact that they hated each other more than they hated the imperial government.

The Russian Empire

The Russian Empire in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was ruled by five czars of the Romanov family. They were all autocrats, to whom obedience was due, so the law declared, "not only from fear of punishment, but as a religious duty." Many educated Russians, who perhaps were not greatly impressed by this appeal to divine right, nevertheless considered autocratic government a practical necessity for Russia. The enormous size and varied population of the country, the dense ignorance of most of its inhabitants, and the absence of a prosperous, progressive middle class which could take part in political life seemed to indicate that the triumph of democratic and liberal ideas would be long postponed.

Alexander I (1801-1825), grandson of Catherine II, began as a monarch of enlightened views. He adopted many principles of the revolutionary period in Europe, and for a time he put them into effect. He freed some of the serfs on the crown lands; drew up an elaborate scheme of primary education, which, however, was wrecked by the lack of teachers and the stupidity of the popular mind; and started to codify the chaos of laws, consisting principally of seventy thousand decrees issued by his predecessors. Alexander's ardor for reform grew cold during the latter part of his reign, especially after he came under the influence of that archfoe of liberalism, Metternich, and he supported his brother monarchs in their efforts to suppress revolutionary movements in Italy and Spain. The last years of his reign found him equally reactionary at home.

Nicholas I (1825-1855), unlike his brother, never felt any sympathy with liberalism. To prevent that "disease" from spreading among his subjects, he relied on a strict censorship of the press, passport regulations which made it difficult for anyone to enter or leave Russia, an army of spies, and the secret police known as the Third Section. The chief of the Third Section had unlimited power to arrest, imprison, or deport political suspects, without warning and without trial. Liberals by tens of thousands languished in jail or went as exiles to Siberia. Nicholas was no less autocratic in his foreign affairs. He put down ruthlessly the Polish insurrection of 1831 and in 1849 he helped Francis Joseph destroy the Hungarian Republic. It is true that he supported the rebellion of the Greeks against their Turkish masters, but his purpose was less to free Greece than to weaken the Ottoman Empire. Nicholas afterward waged the Crimean War, a venture which brought him into conflict with Great Britain, France, and Sardinia as allies of Turkey. He died before the war ended.

The Crimean War had been a severe shock to the prestige of the imperial government; it obviously was impossible to continue the pattern of Czar Nicholas' regime without the hazard of some kind of revolt. In the eighteenth century several czars had been assassinated when they failed to satisfy the demands of the "great ones" in the land, so that regicide had almost become a constitutional fixture in Russia. Czar Alexander II had to embark upon reforms in order to wipe out the memory of the catastrophe of the Crimean War. He pardoned political offenders, relaxed the press censorship, issued a new code of laws based on those of western Europe, and improved the courts of justice, long notorious for their incompetence and corruption. More important still, he entrusted the administration of roads, schools, churches, and other local concerns to provincial and district assemblies freely elected by all classes of the people. His most memorable achievement was the abolition of serfdom. Alexander's decrees between 1858 and 1861 freed nearly fifty million peasants and earned for their author the title of the Czar Liberator. The era of reform lasted scarcely a decade. The czar was not a liberal at heart, and his counselors were men trained in his father's school. They convinced him, as Metternich had convinced the first Alexander, that liberalism was a Western novelty, quite unsuited to Holy Russia, and bound to result in a revolution and the overthrow of autocracy.

The intense disappointment of the educated classes (the *intelligentsia*) at Alexander's relapse into the traditional ways of Russian monarchs gave impetus to the movement known as nihilism. Those who took part in it had lost all faith in the existing order of things; they believed in nothing (Latin, *nihil*). Russia, they urged, must make a complete sweep of autocracy, of the Orthodox Church, and of every other institution that had come down from an unreasoning, superstitious past. When the ground had been thus cleared, it would be possible to reconstruct a new and better society. The nihilists worked among both artisans and peasants, preaching the gospel of freedom to those who, as they said, were "exhausted by hunger, broken down by toil, the eternal slaves of the privileged classes, laboring without pause, without hope of redemption." The government soon got wind of the movement and imprisoned or exiled those who took part in it.

Since the government ruled by terror, it was henceforth to be fought with terror. A secret committee of revolutionists at St. Petersburg condemned to death a number of prominent officials, spies, and members of the hated Third Section, and in some instances succeeded in assassinating them. Coercion having failed to stamp out terrorism, Alexander II adopted conciliation. A plan was drawn up for a consti-

tution and a representative parliament. On the very day when the czar reluctantly consented to it, he was killed by a bomb while driving to his palace in the capital.

Alexander III (1881-1894), undeterred by his father's fate, trod the path of reaction. He was the perfect autocrat. The leading revolutionists were ferreted out so remorselessly that terrorism almost disappeared. A handful of men could not overthrow a governmental system which commanded the support of the official classes, of the Orthodox Church with its tens of thousands of priests, and of the stolid, conservative peasants, who formed the bulk of Russia's millions. As a revolutionist regretfully confessed, terrorism was merely an "exercise in self-sacrifice."

The expansion of European Russia begun by Peter the Great and Catherine the Great was completed in the nineteenth century by the acquisition of Finland and Bessarabia, together with additional Polish territory and the Caucasus region. Many non-Russian peoples were thus incorporated in the empire. The government tried to Russify them. The policy of "one Russia, one creed, and one czar" had been occasionally followed by Nicholas I and Alexander II; Alexander III pursued it consistently and ruthlessly. Nationalism, Orthodoxy, and Autocracy were the slogans of the regime. It was a compromise with nationalism that excluded the liberal democratic ideals completely. Alexander III meant Russification when he used the word nationalism. Finns, Lithuanians, and Poles, who chafed under the imperial despotism and longed for independence, were severely treated. The Jews formed objects of special persecution, and there were terrible massacres of them recalling the anti-Semitic outbreaks of the Middle Ages. The liberal democratic compromise did not come in Russia; men still had to consider fighting in the streets and violence as a method of forcing the czar's government to grant freedom.

PART THREE

The Impact of Industrialism on Modern Society

X

The Rise of Industrialism

AT the opening of the eighteenth century Western European men had the same motive power and the same materials that were well known in Roman times. Wind and water wheels, sails for ships, and the backs and muscles of animals furnished the power with which men did their work and moved their goods. It was puny compared with that which is now available, but it was all that men knew. In the next two hundred years steam engines, internal combustion engines, and the miracle of our age, electricity, expanded, seemingly endlessly, the power facilities that men could use, and with that expansion made possible production and transportation on a scale that no age had even conceived.

At the opening of the eighteenth century western European men used wood for practically everything they made. Their houses, their shops, their ships, and their tools were of wood. Their metals were smelted with wood (charcoal); their leather was tanned with the bark of trees. A few industries making soap, beer, starch, etc., used coal in cities near coal mines but, by and large, wood was the basis upon which material civilization rested. Furthermore in such more advanced economic nations as England and the Netherlands the consumption of wood was proceeding so rapidly that the forests were threatened with extinction. The forges ate them up faster than nature allowed new trees to grow, and a crisis seemed at hand that might force a slowing down of the production of things for man's use. At this critical point, it was discovered that usable iron could be made with coke and limestone. This fact meant that the vegetation of the geologic ages was placed at the disposal of man and he was freed from the necessity of living within the yearly growth of his trees. From iron made with coke, to alloy steel, aluminum, and other nonferrous metals was only a short hundred and fifty years. But in this century and a half men were able to change the very face of the earth with their newly found power and abundant cheap materials.

This transition from an age of wood, wind, and water to an age of steam, iron, steel, and electricity has two important roots. The one is to be found in the development of business and industrial institutions through which industry was organized; the second is to be found in technological and scientific advances that were to alter both the machines of industry and the commodities produced.

The Domestic System

When the commercial revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries made the closed economy of the medieval towns obsolete because the guild organizations and the town economy could no longer supply the goods needed for the market, new types of business institutions came into being. These have long been associated with the new economic man that stepped in to supply the goods and services needed for the new markets. We have called him the entrepreneur. The new men differed from the medieval economic men in that they invested labor and capital with the object of securing profits. They were buyers and sellers of goods rather than craftsmen or guild merchants. They organized adventurous trading enterprises, took risks on a large scale, and manipulated the market to secure profits for themselves.

Some of these entrepreneurs were merchants who traded in goods of all kinds but in no way influenced their manufacture. Others we call merchant-manufacturers; it was this group that created the business forms so important for the rise of industrialism in our times. These merchant-manufacturers came to control the whole process of production and distribution. An example or two will show how they came into existence.

In Ireland in the seventeenth century the peasants made linen cloth in the winter months for sale at the Dublin or Belfast markets. This cloth had to be bleached, and in the early days some men set themselves up as "bleachers" to perform this service. At first the bleaching was done for a money payment or a share of the cloth, but as time went on, the bleachers began to assume the role of middleman: they bought the cloth from the peasant to save him a trip to the distant market. By the eighteenth century, the peasants were in debt to the bleachers, and the latter had risen to the role of merchants with practically absolute control over the work of their debtor-laborers. The merchant knew the market and regulated the price.

In the embryonic cotton industry in England or Alsace in the eighteenth century, merchant-manufacturers bought raw cotton wool on the world market and then let it out to peasants who spun, wove, and

died it for a price. Sometimes the merchant furnished machinery (looms, spindles, etc.) as well as materials. In any case the worker very early became a hired laborer even though he did the labor in his own home. This method of manufacturing is called the domestic system. It requires but little imagination to see how it was transformed into the factory system when machinery and workers could profitably be assembled under a single roof.

The Shop System

The other method of production that developed to supply the increased demand for goods is called the shop system. Even in the Middle Ages some work was done in shops similar to the ones that developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: grain was ground, wood was sawed, wine was pressed in mills, and iron was forged and worked into weapons and tools in shops. As the market grew, the list expanded to include starch, mirrors, tapestry, wine, soap, candles, pins, and a host of other commodities for which there was a steady demand and a comparatively simple process of manufacture. These shops came to be dominated by a merchant-manufacturer, an entrepreneur whose contribution was, first, the organizing of the workers and, secondly, knowledge of the markets both for the raw materials and for the finished product. The shop system, like the domestic system, developed the process through division of labor. Adam Smith's description of a pinmaker's shop is a classic: by having the process broken down into some ten to twenty separate tasks, each performed by a skilled man, the number of pins that would be made per man greatly exceeded the number that a "master pinmaker" could make if he had to perform each task himself. This was the same experience that the merchant-manufacturer had when he employed one peasant to card, another to spin, another to weave, etc. The skill required for each separate operation was less than that required to make the whole piece, and division of labor greatly increased the worker's productivity.

Interchangeable Parts

There was one additional manufacturing technique that had to be learned before the machine driven by power could totally transform industry. That was the manufacture of interchangeable parts. Up to the end of the eighteenth century every complicated item of manufacture was unique. Muskets, cannons, clocks, and machines of every kind had to be made by skilled craftsmen, and each item was finally

"worked" with file, plane, or sandpaper so that they fitted together in a unique piece. This meant, of course, that articles like guns, wagons, carriages, and chairs were expensive to manufacture because the process was slow and the workingmen needed special skills. It was a Yankee, Eli Whitney, who first developed the idea of interchangeable parts for the manufacture of muskets. By the end of the eighteenth century precision working of iron and wood had developed to the point where dies and molds could be made and exactly copied — not to the precision of a modern airplane motor, but close enough for the needs of the day. With Whitney's invention, the process of manufacture became that of "assembly," a task easily learned and quickly accomplished.

Business Institutions

Financial institutions also contributed to the development of industrialism. The early enterprises were almost always family enterprises. The first merchant-manufacturers supplied their own capital, took their own risks, and pocketed the profits or losses. But as the magnitude of the capital needed and the risks to be undergone increased, primitive partnerships and adaptations of the medieval merchant guilds became more common. In the latter sixteenth and in the seventeenth centuries the necessities of trade with the Orient and the current mercantilist conception of politics led to the creation of stock companies. The Dutch East India Company, the Levant Company, the Muscovy Company, and other such trading ventures required more capital than any one individual could supply, and so shares were sold to many merchants and other investors (usually princes of church and state). These were, however, usually for trading enterprises only. The merchant-manufacturer even into the eighteenth century continued to supply his own capital and assume the entire risk.

But the idea of co-operative pooling of capital was developed; it had only to be applied to manufacturing processes. The first factories using power-driven machinery were not infrequently owned by partnerships. Arkwright, for example, owned parts of many factories; in each of them he had one or more partners whose capital was invested only in one plant while he was a partner in all of them.

The growth of co-operative ownership of industrial property was checked by the fact that the liability of each partner was complete. If the enterprise failed, each could be called upon to the total extent of his wealth to make good the bankruptcy. Consequently men hesitated to invest in enterprises over which they had little or no control. By the end of the eighteenth century, however, the legal basis for

limited liability companies began to appear in Europe, and by the third decade of the nineteenth century such companies were legally possible in almost every country in Europe. In the limited liability company a man might lose his original investment but he could not be forced to make good any further losses. When these companies first appeared they got a bad name, for many crafty operators organized companies and sold stock with the sole idea of shearing the investing lambs. One was organized "to manufacture a product that will be announced later"; others with a less obvious "wildcat" intention were equally bad as investments.

By the middle of the nineteenth century, however, the limited liability company had become a respectable fixture in the economic life of the Western world. Its advantages are obvious: the new processes of manufacture and the new enterprises for public service (railroads, gas plants, etc.) required more capital than one man or a small group of men could supply, but by tapping the wealth of hundreds and even thousands of investors, it was possible to organize such large enterprises. It is interesting to note that limited liability companies did not develop until the price of land, the traditional investment, rose beyond the point which would assure a good return. Perhaps this fact forced men with money to invest to risk their capital in a railroad, a gas plant, or a spinning mill.

In the second half of the nineteenth century the process of pyramiding co-operative enterprises into great trusts, combines, supercorporations, and cartels developed as a method of ending cutthroat competition and securing monopoly over production. Gigantic corporations or holding companies that controlled the destinies of many individual enterprises could effectively dominate the market and fix prices. At first these organizations were formed within state boundaries, but before the turn of the century international agreements fixed the production, prices, and markets for commodities ranging from steel rails to galoshes, from electric light bulbs to transportation rates on the North Atlantic. Some of the abuses of these huge corporate enterprises cried aloud for reform. In some countries like the United States antitrust laws were passed to force competition; in others, like Germany, trusts were encouraged but supervised.

For good or for evil the new business institutions that came into existence combined with the new science and technology to give industry larger and larger business units. Great industrial and commercial enterprises like Lever Brothers and Vickers-Armstrong in England, Schneider-Creusot in France, I. G. Farben in Germany, and the Standard Oil Company in the United States have their roots in the union of

technology and business organization that was developed in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

Exchanges, Insurance Companies, Banks

Financial institutions also were developed to support the emerging industrial society. Stock exchanges and bourses go back to the sixteenth century, but it was not until the nineteenth that they emerged in their present form. Stocks, bonds, and commodities (wheat, cotton, corn) had to have central markets before they could be freely exchanged. It was the electric telegraph that linked the isolated exchanges of the world into a single unified market and gave prices the world uniformity that has become characteristic of the modern era. Supporting the exchanges there developed banks and insurance agencies that provided capital and assurance against overwhelming risk to the entrepreneur.

The banks, in many ways, were most important. Before the nineteenth century bankers loaned money to princes of the church and state, but rarely to private individuals. The chief function of bankers, as far as traders were concerned, had been to discount bills and facilitate payment of funds from one place to another. In the nineteenth century, however, bankers, like the Rothschilds for example, branched out into investment banking. They financed railroads, floated bond or stock issues, and made outright loans to corporations. The era of financial capitalism was at hand when the bankers could, with their money, force their way on to the boards of directors of enterprises concerned with the manufacture of shoes, cloth, plows, or guns.

The banks, too, changed their character. Before the nineteenth century most of them were family enterprises controlled by the men whose capital was invested in them. But with the demand for greater and greater accumulations of capital, no family was rich enough to supply all that was needed, and new banks, in which many stockholders participated, began to appear. The laws governing the liability of stockholders in these enterprises were more strict than those that regulated other business corporations, because they usually accepted deposits and some of them even acquired the right to issue notes that passed as legal tender. Many of the early banks were "wildcat enterprises," but as the nineteenth century moved into the twentieth they were superseded by respectable, sound banking firms that did business on a world scale.

Progress of Mechanical Invention

The other side of the picture of modern industrialism is to be found in the development of the techniques and the machines that facilitated the organization of large-scale production. Man's control over his environment began when he learned how to supplement hands and feet and teeth and nails by the use of tools, and then by means of machines to utilize human and animal muscles and the energy of natural forces. Prehistoric mechanical inventions include levers, rollers, and wedges; sails, oars, and paddles; fishing nets, lines, hooks, and harpoons; the plow, the harrow, and the wheeled cart; the needle, bellows, and potter's wheel; the turning lathe for metal-working; the distaff and spindle; and the hand loom. Few important additions were made to this list in antiquity; among them may be mentioned the crane, the water wheel, the pump, the treadmill, and the wine and oil press. European peoples in the Middle Ages improved some of these devices and added others, including mechanical clocks, watches with spiral springs, spectacles, chimney flues, the windmill, the water-driven mill, the wheelbarrow, the rudder, the compass, and the printing press. The telescope, compound microscope, thermometer, barometer, and pendulum clock were invented in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries have produced such a succession of inventions, such an array of practical arts and discoveries as to extend enormously man's control over the blind forces of matter and to put at his disposal the immense new resources of steam, oil, and electricity. As a result, greater changes have taken place in the material conditions of human life during the last two hundred years than in all the period of recorded history previously — and the end is not yet.

The inventions to be considered here are principally those which have stimulated production in industry and agriculture by substituting machine power for man power, those which have accelerated travel and transport, and those which have provided new means of communication. The classification is by no means complete, for it does not include the numberless inventions increasing chiefly the convenience, comfort, and luxury of mankind. Such are the central-heating furnace; the photographic camera; the lead pencil, steel pen, and fountain pen; the elevator; canned and frozen food; the refrigerator; and appliances for air conditioning. To these mechanical devices might be added such inventions as the friction match, as a substitute for the old flint and steel, and illuminating gas and the electric light, which replaced the candle and the lamp burning whale oil or kerosene. But to enumerate all the things unknown two hundred years ago and now in common use would be

about equivalent to enumerating all those things whose possession makes the material difference between civilization and barbarism.

Machinery in Manufacturing

The era of the great inventions began in manufacturing and at first affected chiefly the textile industry of Great Britain. Old-fashioned spinning was a slow, laborious process. The wool, flax, or cotton, having been fastened to a stick called the distaff, was twisted by hand into yarn or thread and wound upon a spindle. The spinning wheel, probably of Oriental origin, was used in Europe as early as the thirteenth century. The spinner now no longer held the spindle in the hand, but set it upon a frame and connected it by a belt to the wheel, which, when revolved, turned the spindle. The addition of a treadle to move the wheel freed both hands of the spinner, so that it was possible to twist two threads instead of one.

Weaving was done on the hand loom, a wooden frame to which vertical threads (the warp) were attached. Horizontal threads (the weft or woof) were then inserted by means of an enlarged needle, or shuttle. John Kay's "flying shuttle" (1733) enabled the operator, by pulling a cord, to jerk the shuttle back and forth and thus to dispense with an assistant to return the shuttle. The device saved labor and doubled the speed of weaving.

After Kay's invention had come into general use, the spinners could not supply enough thread and yarn to keep the weavers employed. Prizes were then offered for a better machine than the spinning wheel. Probably in 1764, James Hargreaves, a weaver of Lancashire in northern England, invented what he named the "spinning jenny," in compliment to Jenny, his daughter. This machine carried a number of spindles, turned by cords or belts from the same wheel and operated by hand. It was a very simple affair, but it spun at first eight threads, then sixteen, and within the inventor's own lifetime eighty, thus doing the work of many spinning wheels.

The thread spun by the jenny was so frail that it could be used only for the weft. Spinners needed a machine to produce a hard, strong thread for the warp. Richard Arkwright met this need by constructing in 1769 the "water frame," so called because it was run by water power. The machine contained two sets of rollers, one rotating at a higher speed than the other. The cotton was drawn out by the rollers to the required fineness and was then twisted into thread by revolving spindles.

Samuel Crompton in 1779 combined the essential features of the Hargreaves and Arkwright machines into what became known as the spin-

ning "mule," because of its hybrid character. When the cotton was drawn out on the wheels one way, the strands were stretched and twisted into threads; when it was run back the other way, the spun threads were wound on spindles. Improvements have been steadily made in Crompton's device, until at the present time it can carry thousands of spindles, all worked by a single spinner.

These three inventions again upset the balance in the textile industry, for once more the spinners were able to produce more thread and yarn than the weavers could convert into cloth. In 1785 Edmund Cartwright, a country clergyman who had never even seen a weaver at work, devised a loom with an automatic shuttle propelled by water power. This rude contrivance was gradually improved by Cartwright and others until it now enables a single operator to make more cloth than two hundred men could weave on the old-fashioned hand loom.

Both spinners and weavers required for the new machinery an abundant supply of raw material. They found this in cotton, previously much less used than either wool or flax. Cotton had been produced chiefly in India and Egypt. Its production in the United States was enormously stimulated by Eli Whitney's invention in 1793 of a machine to remove the seeds from the cotton boll. A revolving disk with saw teeth drew the fiber through openings too small to admit the seeds, and automatic brushes then removed the fiber from the teeth. The principle of this simple engine, or "gin," has never been changed, although electric power now takes the place of the original horse power or water power in its operation. It did the work of three hundred slaves in cleaning cotton by hand and thus made possible a great extension of the cotton plantations throughout the South.

The spinning and weaving machinery of England was quickly introduced into New England and Whitney's gins were cleaning more and more cotton, yet no one had invented a practical machine to sew the cloth into clothes. A French tailor patented a clumsy device of the sort as early as 1830. The modern lock-stitch machine owes most to the pioneer work of Elias Howe, a poor Massachusetts mechanic who died a rich man. It was patented by him in 1846 and afterward greatly improved by Isaac M. Singer and other American inventors. Singer established the largest sewing-machine company in the world.

The Steam Engine

What was to furnish motive power for the new textile machinery? Windmills were too unreliable to be profitably used. Human hands had at first operated Hargreaves's jenny and horses had worked Ark-

wright's original machine. Both inventors, however, soon turned to water power to drive the wheel, and numerous mills were built along the streams of northern England. Then came steam power. The expansive power of steam had been known in antiquity — for instance, to Hero of Alexandria, who described devices for using it — but it was first put to practical service at the close of the seventeenth century, when steam pumps were operated to rid coal mines of water. Newcomen's engine (1705), in general use for this purpose, had many defects, especially its waste of power. After the steam entered the cylinder and pushed the piston upward to work the pump handle, a jet of cold water had to be squirted into the cylinder. The steam then condensed, forming a vacuum, and the pressure of the outer air on the piston forced it down again. This alternate heating and chilling used too much coal and took too much time.

James Watt, a Scotsman of both mechanical and scientific genius, patented an improved engine in 1769, a year remarkable for Arkwright's first patent. The inventor himself was a poor man, but he entered into partnership with Matthew Boulton, a wealthy manufacturer of Birmingham, who took an intelligent interest in the new device and supplied the necessary funds to make it a commercial success. By providing a separate condenser, into which the steam was introduced after it moved the piston, Watt was able to keep the condensing vessel cool and the cylinder hot simultaneously and thus to operate the engine for pumping with a great economy of fuel. Other improvements followed, above all, a device to convert the back-and-forth motion of the piston to the rotary motion necessary for driving a wheel. Watt at length produced an engine essentially like that of today and opened for it a new field of usefulness in manufacturing. In 1785, the year of Cartwright's power loom, the Watt engine began to be set up in factories for the operation of spinning and weaving machines. Steam power only slowly displaced water power, owing to the fact that manufacturers had already invested so much capital in water-driven machinery.

The nineteenth century has been called the age of steam. The steam-boat, the steam locomotive, and the steam printing press are some of the children of Watt's epochal invention. Toward the close of the century electricity began to compete with steam as a motive force, after the development of that mystic marvel of science, the dynamo; and the internal-combustion engine, which operates by the expansion of exploding gases and thus "puts the furnace into the cylinder," has begun in the twentieth century to influence profoundly both transportation and manufacturing.

Iron and Steel, Coal, Oil, and Rubber

The growing use of machinery called for an increased production of iron. Northern and north-central England contained much iron ore, but until the second half of the eighteenth century it had been smelted only with wood charcoal, a process which threatened to exhaust the timber supply of England and extinguish the native iron industry. After the middle of the eighteenth century coal, previously converted into coke, was successfully used in blast furnaces. Some years later Henry Cort introduced the puddling furnace and the rolling mill, improvements which made available a better and cheaper wrought iron for tools and machinery.

Steel had been known and prized for ages, but the high cost of making it from wrought iron long confined its use to such special articles as knives and sword blades. In 1856 Henry Bessemer patented the process by which crude iron (pig iron) could be made into steel by forcing a draft of air through the molten metal and thus consuming the impurities in it. The Bessemer process reduced the cost of a ton of steel to less than a seventh of what it had been. Other improvements in steel-making now enable the poorest iron to be made into excellent steel, thus opening up extensive fields of low-grade ore in France, Germany, and other countries. Used in every form from girders to watch springs, steel is the mainstay of modern industry.

The use of iron and steel and the operation of the new machinery required an abundant, inexpensive fuel. Coal had long been burned in small quantities for domestic purposes; applied to the blast furnace and the steam engine it was to become an almost boundless source of heat and power. Various improvements in mining cheapened its production, one of the most notable being Sir Humphry Davy's use of wire gauze to protect miners' lamps from the explosion of the gas called firedamp. His first safety lamp was invented in 1816. This simple device, besides saving thousands of lives, enabled the most dangerous mines to be worked in comparative safety. Great Britain furnished nearly all the coal for manufacturing until the middle of the nineteenth century; later, much of the world's supply has come from the mines of France, Germany, and the United States.

Mineral oil, or petroleum, first became commercially available in 1859, when E. L. Drake drilled a well in Pennsylvania. "Drake's Folly" was 69½ feet deep; today a well in California goes down 14,600 feet — nearly three miles. There are now several hundred petroleum products, including kerosene for illumination, gasoline (petrol) for gasoline engines, fuel oil for oil-burning engines and furnaces, and cheap lubricants.

The United States is still the chief producer of petroleum, but large quantities are also furnished by Mexico, Venezuela, Russia, Rumania, Iraq, and the Dutch East Indies. Many new sources of supply must be opened up throughout the world if the present enormous consumption is to continue indefinitely.

Caoutchouc, the coagulated and dried gum of the tropical rubber tree, found little use until Charles Goodyear discovered in 1839 the chemical process of vulcanization, which made all the difference between a sticky unmanageable gum and the hard and durable rubber. The gum is now manufactured into tens of thousands of different articles, by far the most important being automobile tires. The demands of the automobile industry have led to the systematic growing of rubber trees, and plantation rubber from Ceylon, southern India, and the Dutch East Indies now supplies the market. Large quantities of synthetic rubber, from alcohol or acetylene, are now being produced in many parts of the world.

Agricultural Machinery

Farmers in Washington's day had no better tools than had the farmers of Julius Caesar's day: iron-shod wooden plows which turned only a narrow furrow or merely scratched the ground; rude harrows; sickles and scythes to cut the grain; and flails to separate it from the straw and chaff. In 1827 two Bohemians, the Veverka brothers, made possible subsoil plowing by curving the face of the plow so that it moved, turned, and returned the soil in one process. Ten years later John Deere, a Vermonter who settled in Illinois, constructed the first steel plow. The introduction of disk harrows; of mechanical seeders, weeders, and cultivators; of horse rakes, portable threshers, and hay presses; and especially the introduction of the reaper or harvester (first patented by Cyrus H. McCormick in 1834) wrought a veritable transformation of agriculture by immensely increasing the output of farms and at the same time diminishing the need for manual labor on them. The transformation continues with the growing use of tractors for all sorts of agricultural operations.

Improvements in Transportation: Roads and Canals

Throughout the Middle Ages the roads in Europe were little more than narrow tracks, either deep with mud or dusty and full of ruts. They were gradually improved, especially from the latter part of the eighteenth century, when the enormous quantity of goods produced by

the new machinery increased the need for cheap and rapid transport. The introduction of the turnpike system in England, which allowed tolls to be charged for the use of roads, encouraged the investment of private capital in road-building, and it was not long before engineers covered the country with well-bottomed, well-drained, and well-surfaced macadamized highways. Those on the Continent were built chiefly during the nineteenth century and before the era of railroads. The widespread use of the automobile has produced another good-roads movement, the results of which are manifest in the many thousands of miles of concrete and asphalt highways now linking city with city, state with state, and nation with nation.

The expense of transportation by road led people in the Middle Ages to send their goods by river routes whenever practicable. Canal-building in western Europe began toward the close of the medieval period, especially after the invention of locks for controlling the flow and level of the water. The great era of the barge canal was between 1775 and 1850, not only in Great Britain and on the Continent, but also in the United States. Barge canals relieved the highways of a large part of the growing traffic, but the usefulness of both declined relatively after the introduction of railroads. With the general adoption of steam navigation on the ocean, many ship canals have also been constructed.

The Steamboat and Ocean Navigation

The earliest successful steamboat seems to have been a tug built in Scotland in 1801-1802 for towing canal boats. The pioneer of practicable steamboats for river transportation was Robert Fulton's "Clermont," a side-wheeler equipped with a Watt engine; it made its memorable first trip from New York to Albany in 1807. The next year John Stevens's "Phoenix" steamed from Hoboken to Philadelphia, thus making the first ocean voyage in the history of steam navigation and giving encouragement to those who dreamed of a transatlantic passage. That came in 1819 when an American vessel, the "Savannah," provided with both sails and a steam engine, crossed the Atlantic from Savannah to Liverpool in twenty-seven days. The first ships to cross entirely by steam power were the Dutch "Curaçao" (renamed the "Calpé") from Rotterdam to the West Indies (1827), and the "Royal William" from Quebec to London (1833). They were followed by the British-built "Sirius" and "Great Western," which left Liverpool and arrived at New York almost together in 1838. The "Great Western" took only fifteen days for the trip. It was the first steamer to be specially designed for transatlantic service. In 1840 Samuel Cunard founded the

first passenger and mail line between Great Britain and the United States; the line still bears his name.

Various improvements after the middle of the nineteenth century added greatly to the efficiency of ocean steamers. Iron, and later steel, replaced wood in their construction, with a resulting gain in strength and buoyancy. Screw propellers were substituted for clumsy paddle wheels, and turbine engines, which apply the energy of a jet of steam to secure the rotation of a shaft, were introduced. The size of steamers has so increased that the "Great Western," a boat of 1440 tons, would appear a pygmy by the side of the leviathans that now cross the Atlantic in five days or less. The development of an internal-combustion engine burning heavy oil, particularly the engine produced by a German, Rudolf Diesel, in 1895, makes the motor ship a rival of the steamship, especially as a cargo-carrier.

As far back as the Revolutionary War an American inventor constructed a tiny submarine and tried, without success, to sink a British warship. Robert Fulton, encouraged by Napoleon, made several submarines. In one of them he descended to a depth of twenty-five feet, remained below for four hours, and managed to blow up a small vessel with a torpedo. Underwater boats propelled by steam power were used by the Confederates in the Civil War. From about this time inventors in several countries worked on the problem of the submarine. One of them was an Irish-American, J. P. Holland, who sold the boat named after him to the United States in 1898. The improvement of the submarine in recent years is a familiar story.

The Steam Locomotive; Railroads

Wooden or iron rails had long been used in mines and quarries to draw heavy loads with ease, and as early as 1803 a horsecar line was opened to general traffic in the suburbs of London. George Stephenson, who profited by the work of other inventors, made in 1814 a successful locomotive for hauling coal from the mine to tidewater. He improved it and eleven years later secured its adoption on the Stockton and Darlington Railway in Yorkshire, the first line over which passengers and freight were carried by steam power. Stephenson then built the Liverpool and Manchester Railway and persuaded the directors, who favored haulage by fixed engines, to give the locomotive a trial. A prize of five hundred pounds was offered for the best one, and Stephenson's "Rocket" won the prize over two competitors. This was in 1829. The greatest speed attained by the "Rocket" in the trial run was twenty-nine miles an hour, but later it made fifty-three miles an hour.

The railway was formally opened in 1830 with eight of Stephenson's locomotives. The same year found two American-built locomotives in operation, taking the place of horses, mules, and even sails which had furnished the power for the earliest railroad experiments in the United States. At first British models were followed, but it was not long before Matthias Baldwin of Philadelphia and other designers began to evolve a distinctively American type of locomotive.

Many technical improvements — the increased size of locomotives and cars, air brakes, automatic couplers, block signals, the use of steel rails in place of iron rails, which supported only light loads and wore out rapidly, and now streamlining — have extended the usefulness of the railroad far beyond the dreams of its earlier promoters. The greatest development of railroad transportation came in the latter part of the nineteenth century, with the construction of great trunk lines and branches (feeders) radiating into the remotest districts. The year 1854 saw the first line over the Alps; 1869, the first transcontinental line in the United States (the Union Pacific and Central Pacific); 1900, the Trans-Siberian line; and 1910, the Trans-Andean line. Modern electric traction dates from the early eighties of the last century, when the overhead trolley began to take the place of horsecars and cable cars in cities. The improvement of the electric locomotive has made possible the substitution of electricity for steam on railroads through tunnels and over heavy grades. Electric traction for suburban lines is another development.

The Automobile, the Airplane, and the Airship

The earliest application of steam power to transportation was neither the locomotive nor the steamboat but the road engine. As far back as 1801 an English inventor constructed a steam carriage for passengers. Repeated efforts were made during the next forty years to popularize the new mode of travel in England, but bad roads and an unsympathetic public discouraged inventors. Parliament even enacted legislation which restricted the speed of every mechanically propelled vehicle to a maximum of four miles an hour and further required that it be preceded by a man on foot with a red flag as a warning signal. In 1835 a Vermont blacksmith built an electric car, which he was able to drive on the road. Nothing came of this pioneer effort because the cost of batteries was excessive. The automobile had to wait for the internal-combustion engine, small, portable, and fueled with light oil, before becoming a commercial success. Such an engine was first brought out in 1883 by a German, Gottlieb Daimler. He used it for motor bicycles and boats;

a French company, which manufactured his engines in France, used it for road vehicles. The rapid improvement of the horseless carriage and its mass production by Henry Ford (beginning in 1903) and other manufacturers soon popularized the new means of transportation. It almost entirely displaced horse-drawn vehicles, made trolley cars obsolete in many localities, and now competes with the railroads for both passengers and freight. The United States far surpasses every other country in the wide use of the automobile.

The gasoline engine also made possible the airplane. The history of the airplane illustrates the truth that great inventions seldom spring fully developed from the brain of one man but usually result from long and patient experimentation by many men. An American scientist, S. P. Langley, who himself owed much to the work of others, produced in 1896 a heavier-than-air machine driven by steam, and experimented with it over the Potomac River at Washington. In 1903 Langley's assistant, C. M. Manly, constructed a gasoline motor for the airplane and made two ascents, both unsuccessful solely because of the clumsy launching apparatus. The same machine after alterations was successfully flown by the designer of the seaplane, Glenn H. Curtiss, thus showing that Langley and Manly had solved the engineering problem of mechanical flight. Their work was stopped at the very moment of success, but this same year, 1903, saw the Wright brothers, Wilbur and Orville, opening the long-besieged lanes of the air with their famous flight in a biplane at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina. The flight lasted only twelve seconds, long enough, however, to prove that a machine carrying a man could rise by its own power, fly at an even speed, and descend without damage. "They done it," cried a fisherman who saw them. "They done it. Danged if they ain't flew!"

Swift was the development of the airplane. Eleven years after that first flight over the Carolina sand dunes, aviators were fighting in the air over France, and soon after the return of peace they were spanning every ocean and circling the globe. The first nonstop transatlantic flight was made in 1919 by two British aviators, John Alcock and A. W. Brown. They covered the distance from Newfoundland to Ireland in sixteen hours, twelve minutes. More spectacular was the achievement of Charles A. Lindbergh, who in 1927 made a solo flight from New York to Paris (3610 miles) in thirty-three hours, thirty minutes. And more spectacular still was the round-the-world flight in 1938 of Howard Hughes and his companions, who rose into the air at New York, traversed the Atlantic, crossed Europe, Asia, and North America, and in four hours short of four days came down again at New York. The development of the airplane has been quickly followed by the establish-

ment on every continent of numerous air lines for carrying mail and passengers, while "clippers" now regularly cross the Pacific, the South Atlantic, and the North Atlantic. The great oceans have become the courses of air ferries.

Two Frenchmen, the Montgolfier brothers, invented the balloon inflated with hot air. The first successful ascent took place at Paris in 1783. Benjamin Franklin, who witnessed it, believed that the balloon might "possibly give a new turn to human affairs," for with the improvement of the invention sovereigns would be unable to protect their dominions from attack and hence would become convinced of the "folly of war." This prophecy may yet be fulfilled, if not through the improvement of the airship then through that of the airplane.

Experiments in balloon navigation continued throughout the nineteenth century, and finally Count Ferdinand von Zeppelin, an officer in the German army, built an airship which consisted, not of one balloon, but of a row of bags enclosed in an enormous shell of aluminum trellis work. It carried two cars, each provided with a gasoline motor. Two successful flights in 1906 showed how nearly the problem of a dirigible balloon had been solved. Airships were soon constructed in France, England, and the United States. The World War stimulated their development, as was the case with airplanes. A British dirigible, the "R. 34," crossed the Atlantic in 1919 and ten years later the "Graf Zeppelin" circled the globe in twenty days, four hours, on a course that covered nearly twenty-two thousand miles.

Improved Communication: Telegraphy and Telephony

Eighteenth-century scientists, familiar with the Leyden jar, often discussed the idea of using electricity to communicate at a distance, but an apparatus for converting the electric current into intelligible signs did not appear until the nineteenth century. An American artist, Samuel F. B. Morse, enlisted the aid of scientists and mechanics and with them eventually produced a practical method of sending words over a wire. The original message, "What hath God wrought!" which he sent in 1844 from Washington to Baltimore, to be instantly flashed back by his collaborator, L. D. Gale, was, in 1932, sent around the world in four minutes and forty-five seconds. Morse should probably have also the credit for devising the telegraphic code which, with modifications, continues in use today. Another collaborator, Alfred Vail, is sometimes credited with the invention of the "Morse alphabet."

Experiments showed that wire cords protected by wrappers of gutta-percha would conduct the electric current under water. A cable be-

tween Dover and Calais was laid in 1851. A group of American promoters, including Cyrus W. Field and Peter Cooper, then took up the project of an Atlantic cable which should "moor the new world alongside the old." Discouraging failures marked the enterprise, for the first lines were broken by the ocean and the line which was finally laid soon became useless, owing to the failure of its electrical insulation. After the Civil War, Field and Cooper renewed their efforts, and in 1866 a cable two thousand miles long was successfully laid and communication perfected. Many submarine telegraph lines now bridge electrically all the oceans.

Experimentation with rude forms of the telephone began in the same decade which produced the telegraph. Little progress took place until 1876, when Alexander Graham Bell, a native of Edinburgh but later a resident of Boston, first successfully transmitted human speech by means of the electric current. The many improvements that have since been made in the telephone enable long-distance messages to be transmitted not only by land but also along special cables under the sea.

Wireless, or radio, telegraphy was made commercially available by the use of the aerial wire, the invention of an Italian, Guglielmo Marconi, who took out his first patent in 1896. Two years later wireless messages were sent between France and England across the Channel. A transatlantic service was soon established, and now the range of Marconi's apparatus is world wide. An American inventor, Lee De Forest, did much to make possible wireless, or radio, telephony (broadcasting).

Printing and Typesetting; the Typewriter

Weekly and daily newspapers had begun to appear in the seventeenth century, but they were luxuries reserved for subscribers of the middle and upper classes. The cheap newspaper for the masses could only develop after mechanical power had been substituted for printing by hand. The London *Times* installed the first steam printing press in 1814, and a paper-making machine which produced wide sheets of unlimited length came into use soon after. Richard M. Hoe, the son of an English immigrant in New York, invented and patented in 1846 the revolving or rotary press, which in an improved form now turns out newspapers complete, folded, and counted at the rate of a hundred thousand copies an hour instead of the four hundred copies possible with the hand press.

Meanwhile, machines have largely displaced typesetting by hand, a slow and expensive process. The linotype, so called because it casts from the molten metal a complete line of type in one piece, enables an

operator to set five or six times as much type as a hand setter. It was the invention of Ottmar Mergenthaler of Baltimore and is now used by all newspapers. The monotype, which casts individual pieces of type and sets them into lines, is employed chiefly in book printing. The type-writer was made a practical device by C. S. Sholes and his associates, who patented their improved machine in 1871 and two years later disposed of it to Remington and Sons, manufacturers of firearms. The "Remington" soon had competitors and, as usual, competition has produced many improvements in mechanical writing.

Some inventions in communication — the motion and sound motion picture, the phonograph, the radio, television — are so recent that the historian may well decline to appraise their contribution to human welfare. Properly directed, they should furnish the common people in civilized countries with an education in art, music, and the drama which in former times could be secured only by persons of wealth and leisure. Their great service promises to be that of popularizing culture, as cheap newspapers and books have popularized knowledge.

The Inventive Process

Necessity has been called the mother of invention, but her maternal role is dependent upon the cultural conditions of the time. A primitive people may require almost as many things as we do for comfort and happiness, but it does not know that it requires them. If the general desire for new inventions is strong and persistent, these are likely to be forthcoming, provided technology is sufficiently advanced. Thus Hargreaves and Cartwright set out deliberately to make machines for increasing the production of textiles, and Whitney made his cotton gin in three days after he had learned of the need for such a device.

Many inventions, however, are undesigned and some are accidental. Bell, while working on an appliance for the deaf, found out the principle which led to the telephone. Goodyear, dropping on a hot stove some indiarubber mixed with sulphur, discovered the process of vulcanization. Edison, who had tried without success nearly every known material for the filament of the electric lamp, by another happy accident discovered the carbon filament (later replaced by one of tungsten).

Inventions requiring more than the simplest mechanics for their origination are always conditioned by the state of scientific knowledge at the time. Joseph Black, Watt's close friend, had shown how large a quantity of heat is released when steam is condensed to water. Watt applied this discovery of so-called latent heat when he took the decisive step of separating the cylinder from the condenser and so produced an

engine that would multiply man's energies a thousandfold. One of the ablest of American scientists, Joseph Henry, demonstrated that the electric current could be transmitted to great distances with sufficient energy to produce a mechanical effect; it remained for Morse and his fellow workers to make a practical application of what Henry had learned. Once the English scientist Michael Faraday had established the principal laws of electromagnetism, electric power could be put to man's service by means of the dynamo and the motor.

In the last seventy-five years the process of invention has undergone an important change. Earlier inventions were the work of the master craftsman or an isolated individual seeking a simpler, more effective way to "do something." These isolated seekers still exist, but they are not responsible for the great inventions of modern times. The union of the scientific laboratory and the industrialists' needs has produced a new kind of inventor. University-trained scientists, equipped with a thorough understanding of theoretical physics or chemistry, biology or geology, have joined their labors in co-operative laboratory efforts. The results have been fabulous. Plastics, modern radio, radar, synthetic materials, and in recent years even an atomic bomb have been born in those laboratories. No longer can one man be assigned the credit for an invention; the finished product today is the result of the united efforts of many individual researchers working in laboratories all over the world.

Modern Industrialism

Mechanical invention, linked with applied science, has hastened and intensified to an extraordinary degree the development of industry, that branch of economic activity which adapts raw materials to man's use and enjoyment. The momentous changes thus produced in our daily life within a period of about two centuries are often said to constitute an Industrial Revolution. This designation was first popularized by an Oxford economist, Arnold Toynbee, who chose it as the title of a course of lectures published posthumously in 1884. Never since prehistoric times, when with the domestication of animals and plants man ceased to be a simple food-gatherer and became a food-producer and with the use of copper and bronze entered the Age of Metals, has there been any such transformation of the human lot as that in the present Machine Age. Man is now nature's conqueror rather than its drudge and slave. All things are under his feet.

Yet the word "revolution" ill describes a transformation that had been long in progress. Various features of the Machine Age appeared

before the first great inventions were made in the eighteenth century. Prior to this time some labor-saving devices came into use: the spinning wheel, a machine for knitting hose and another for weaving ribbons, cloth-finishing machines, water wheels, and windmills. Some factories were to be found in England and on the Continent; for example, the Sèvres porcelain works and the Gobelin tapestry manufactory, both established near Paris under the patronage of Louis XIV. Some industries from the start operated on a large scale because they required a heavy investment of capital and an extensive force of workers; such industries were coal mining, iron smelting, and shipbuilding. It seems to be true that in the economic sphere no sudden and complete breach with the past ever takes place. Man's ways of getting a living change, but they change by gradual steps.

Moreover, the Machine Age dawned slowly. Boulton spent the greater part of his fortune in the effort to convince manufacturers that the steam engine possessed any genuine utility; as late as 1800 not more than three hundred and twenty Watt engines were at work in England. The railroad began to displace the stagecoach only in the second quarter of the nineteenth century and the ocean-going steamship long continued to have a formidable rival in the sailing ship. The improvements in coal mining and iron smelting were spread over more than a hundred years. No great development in the building industry occurred until the use — comparatively recent — of structural steel and concrete. Even in the textile industry all was not rapid change. Twenty years passed before Cartwright's power loom found much acceptance and a still longer time passed before it completely ousted the hand loom. Cotton manufacture offered, indeed, an example of the sudden shift from hand labor at home to machine production in a factory, but cotton was "a lonely hare in an industrial world of tortoises." It is only within the memory of men now living that the pace of mechanical invention has so quickened as to make our age seem one of Aladdin's-lamp marvels. The word "revolution" ill describes a transformation which still continues and shows no prospect of coming to an end.

Progress of Industrialism

Not only did the Machine Age begin earlier in Great Britain than elsewhere, but it developed further there than in any other country. Protected by an insular position from the wars that ravaged the Continent, Great Britain enjoyed prolonged internal peace. Her moist climate proved to be well suited to the production of cotton goods; her swift streams supplied abundant water power for machinery; and

beneath her soil lay vast stores of coal and iron in close proximity and near good harbors.


To the bounty of nature man added a "social atmosphere" which favored industrial development. The British Isles embraced the widest free-trade area in western Europe; no domestic tariffs hampered the exchange of goods from one district to another. The craft guilds had lost most of their former privileges and could offer little effective opposition to free enterprise. In contrast to the situation on the Continent, industry in Great Britain enjoyed comparative freedom from governmental interference, and for the acquisitive middle class there were unusual opportunities to engage in money-making activities. Great Britain had more surplus capital for investment in machines and factories, a better banking system to make that capital available for energetic employers, and a larger merchant marine to distribute her manufactures abroad than any of her Continental rivals. She also possessed a larger body of skilled workmen, especially in the textile industry, many being Protestant refugees who fled from the Netherlands to escape the Spanish terror and from France after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. These considerations go far to account for the primacy in industry which Great Britain began to secure after the middle of the eighteenth century and held until near the close of the nineteenth century, becoming in this time the richest of European countries and the world's workshop.


A scene such as Great Britain presented as industrialization proceeded had never before been witnessed. In sixty years (1760-1821) the population rose from about seven millions to twelve millions. Instead of farms, hamlets, and an occasional small town, appeared great cities crowded with workers who had left their rural homes to seek employment in factories. The movement of population was to a large extent toward the northern and northwestern counties, where there were many streams to furnish water power for machinery and abundant supplies of coal and iron. Manchester, Leeds, Sheffield, and Birmingham sprang up as centers for the manufacture of textiles and hardware, while Liverpool, a small place at the opening of the nineteenth century, became a commercial metropolis. Aside from London, it is northern England and southern Scotland that now form the chief seats of British industry and commerce.

On the Continent the Machine Age began later than in Great Britain partly because of the opposition of the still powerful craft guilds, which feared that the new mechanical devices would deprive workers of employment; partly because Continental governments placed obstacles in the way of invention and technical progress; and partly because of



NAPOLEON'S PLAN TO ATTACK ENGLAND BY AIR (Bettmann Archive)






AN EARLY RAILROAD IN GERMANY · (*Historical Pictures Service*)



Industrial England in the 20th Century



the exhausting wars of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic era (1789-1815). There were other reasons. France lacked a sufficiency of coal and raw materials; Frenchmen, moreover, were wedded to agriculture and manufacturing on a small scale. Germany, though rich in coal and with considerable iron, continued to be economically disunited until the creation in the second quarter of the nineteenth century of a Customs Union (*Zollverein*) that abolished the tariffs previously levied against the goods of member states. The country remained politically disunited until the formation of the empire in 1871; after that time its industrialization proceeded by leaps and bounds. Belgium alone kept pace with Great Britain during the first half of the nineteenth century. France, Germany, and Belgium are more thoroughly industrialized than the rest of the Continent, although there are large and growing manufacturing districts in northern Italy and western Russia.

Machines were introduced and factories for the manufacture of textiles were set up in New England before the end of the eighteenth century, but the real industrialization of the United States did not start until after the Civil War. Mexico and especially Canada are developing industries on the modern pattern. Large manufacturing districts exist in Australia, New Zealand, India, and China, and particularly in Japan. The influence of the Machine Age extends far beyond those countries where it has deeply penetrated. With the development of transportation and communication the whole world begins to share in the benefits, as well as in the drawbacks, of modern industrialism.

Trade Unionism

The new conditions of industry soon made the craft guilds obsolete. They were out of place in a world of whirling machinery, crowded factories, free competition, and the separation of labor and capital. Few of them in Great Britain survived the eighteenth century. In 1791 the French revolutionists abolished their industrial monopoly and thenceforth entry to all trades and professions became free in France. They did not disappear in Germany, Austria, and Italy until after the middle of the nineteenth century.

Trade unions of the modern type began to appear in Great Britain during the eighteenth century. Immediately they ran afoul of the common law, which treated them as conspiracies in restraint of trade, and of parliamentary statutes forbidding what were called "unlawful combinations of workmen." The last of these measures, passed in 1800, provided the penalty of three months' imprisonment at hard labor for

persons who combined with others to raise wages, shorten hours, or in any way control industrial conditions. The various Combination Acts were repealed in 1824, and in 1825 parliament enacted a measure which permitted workmen to meet together for the purpose of agreeing on the rate of wages or the number of hours which they would work, so long as the agreement concerned only those present at the meeting. This qualification was removed a number of years later. Finally, laws passed between 1871 and 1876 declared that nothing done by a trade union should be considered illegal unless it was also illegal "when committed by an individual." The workers thus secured the full rights to combine, strike, and picket, for which they had so long striven.

British trade unions now enroll factory operatives, railway workers, coal miners, craftsmen, and agricultural laborers. Their interests are represented at a Trades-Union Congress, which meets every year to discuss and deal with matters affecting organized labor. They send representatives to parliament and exercise much influence on labor legislation, while their officers frequently serve as factory inspectors. Many trade unions enjoy a considerable income, which goes to support members who are temporarily out of work, sick, disabled, or infirm.

British trade unions began to take an active part in political life with the organization of the Labour Party. The new party was intended to represent the interests of the lower classes, as the two old parties (Liberals and Conservatives) represented the interests of the upper classes, and it was committed to a program of socialistic legislation. The Labourites gradually increased their parliamentary representation until in 1924, and again in 1929, they were able to form a cabinet with J. Ramsay MacDonald as prime minister. The depression and the collapse of world economy after 1929 overtook this second Labour government, and the compromises that Ramsay MacDonald made with the Conservatives crippled Labour's political career in the years before the outbreak of war in 1939. With the end of the war in 1945, however, Labour won an overwhelming victory at the polls and started the task of making England into a socialist commonwealth. The process is slowly bringing public utilities, the coal industry, and a number of other great enterprises under state ownership. It remains yet to be seen how the nationalization of industry and mining will affect the life and organization of the trade unions.

In France the trade union movement never held as strong a place in the economy as it did in England or in Germany. French industry has traditionally been organized to a large extent on a small-unit basis (small

plants employing less than five workers) that has not been conducive to large union organizations. None the less there was enough large-scale industry in France to enroll several million workers in the General Confederation of Labor and the two smaller organizations controlled by the communists and the Catholics. In 1936 the victory of the Popular Front (Léon Blum's government) gave the French labor movement a strong stimulus for rapid development, but the war of 1939 came before it could consolidate its gains. It is still uncertain what the future will bring to the French labor movement, for conditions in postwar France have been such that no prediction can be made. The size of the Socialist and Communist Parties in the last elections seems, however, to indicate that there will be a favorable political climate in France for the growth of the trade unions.

Before 1933 the German trade union movement was the strongest on the European continent. There were several federations—socialist, Catholic, and communist—that accounted for a large percentage of the German working class. The Nazis broke up all these unions, and herded the workers into the Labor Front, a state-controlled union. For twelve years the old trade union movement was dead. The defeat of 1945 has left Germany in such a chaotic condition that it is impossible to guess what the future has in store for the workers. They may be able to recreate their former organization; they may be forced into controlled unions on the Russian model.

In Italy, as in Germany, the Fascist government wiped out the unions and forced the workers into state organizations. The future of post-war Italy is still unpredictable.

Trade unions appeared in the United States early in the nineteenth century, but their great and rapid growth has occurred only within recent years. Many of them are affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, founded in 1886 as an organization of the skilled crafts, such as carpentry, painting, and plumbing. In the 1930's the Congress of Industrial Organizations (C.I.O.) appeared as a rival for the A. F. of L., and the two labor organizations began to compete with each other for the support of American workers. The labor legislation of the New Deal gave the unions greater power than they had ever enjoyed before and acted as a mighty stimulus to their growth. It is not surprising, therefore, that the bulk of American labor came to be organized in unions. The war of 1939–1945, in which American labor won a mighty production victory, swelled the ranks of the unions and stuffed their “war chests” with money so that the unions emerged stronger than ever. The waves of strikes that followed upon the heels of the victory in Europe and Asia and that interfered with the reconversion of industry

to peacetime needs strikingly testified to the power of organized labor in America.

Labor Legislation

The need for government regulation of industry became apparent very early. The crowded factories were unsanitary. Hours of labor were long. Wages were on a low level. Moreover, the use of machinery led to the employment of women and children, for whose labor there had been previously little demand outside the home. These evils were naturally most prominent in Great Britain, where industrialization began. Little effort was made at first to remedy them. Workingmen exercised no political influence; indeed, by the Combination Acts they had been prohibited from forming trade unions for their protection. Statesmen, instead of meeting the situation by remedial legislation, adopted the policy of *laissez faire*, the policy of letting things alone. The government, they declared, should keep its hands off industry. The greatest good to the greatest number could be secured only when "economic laws" of supply and demand were allowed to determine the wages and conditions of employment, just as they determined the prices, quantity, and quality of commodities produced.

Nevertheless, there was a growing realization that the state ought to protect those who could not protect themselves. After much agitation parliament passed the first Factory Act in 1802. It limited the hours of labor of pauper children bound out as apprentices in cotton and woolen mills. The second Factory Act, passed in 1819, gave some protection to children who were not pauper apprentices. Little more was done for fourteen years. During this time philanthropists and social reformers took up the cause of the oppressed workers and on the floor of parliament, on the platform, in the pulpit, and in the newspapers sought to arouse the public to the need for additional legislation. Prominent among the leaders of this movement were Michael Sadler in the House of Commons and Lord Ashley (afterward Earl of Shaftesbury) in the House of Lords. Their efforts led to the passage of the Factory Act of 1833, applying to all textile factories. This prohibited the employment of children under nine years of age; limited the working hours of those between nine and eighteen; and forbade night work. Skilled inspectors were also provided to enforce the law. In 1842 Lord Ashley carried through parliament a measure forbidding the employment in mines of women, of girls, and of boys under ten. Five years later parliament passed the Ten Hours' Act, which restricted the labor of adult women and young persons of both sexes to ten hours a day in textile factories and also provided for half time for children. This

measure became a law only after the fiercest opposition on the part of manufacturers, but it proved so beneficial that henceforth the desirability of labor legislation was generally admitted.

What began as an effort to ameliorate some of the more glaring abuses of the factory system has widened into an extensive program of labor legislation both in England and on the Continent. European governments restrict or prohibit the employment of children, limit the hours of labor of men and women, and require employers to take all the precautions necessary for the preservation of the lives, limbs, and health of their employees. They also set up insurance systems providing against accidents, sickness, incapacity, old age, and unemployment. Many states of the American Union have established similar benefits. With the adoption of the National Labor Relations Act (1935), National Security Act (1935), and Fair Labor Standards Act (1938) the Federal government has also entered actively in the field of labor legislation. An amendment to the Constitution of the United States, giving the Federal government the power to regulate or prohibit child labor throughout the Union, has been pending since 1924. Up to 1939 it had been ratified by twenty-eight states out of the total of thirty-six states whose approval is necessary to put it into effect.

In order to secure concerted action in the interest of the working classes, the Peace Conference of 1919 provided for the establishment at Geneva of a permanent International Labor Office as a department of the League of Nations. The Peace Conference also adopted a set of nine principles for the guidance of industrialized countries belonging to the League. These principles, purely advisory in character, may be summarized as follows: (1) labor not to be regarded as merely a commodity or article of commerce; (2) right of association for all lawful purposes by the employed as well as by the employers; (3) payment of a wage adequate to maintain a reasonable standard of life; (4) adoption of an eight-hour day or a forty-eight hour week; (5) adoption of a weekly day of rest, which should include Sunday wherever practicable; (6) abolition of child labor, and such restrictions on the labor of young persons as shall assure their education and proper physical development; (7) equal remuneration of men and women for work of equal value; (8) equitable economic treatment of all workers in each country; and (9) enforcement of all laws and regulations for the protection of the employed.

Like the League of Nations, the organization of the United Nations that was created at the end of the war of 1939-1945 also provides for an international labor organization. It will, however, be years before any assessment can be made of this new institution. Undoubtedly, like its

predecessor, it will do important work as an agency to co-ordinate labor laws, especially those relating to conditions of employment, but it must not be expected that any international labor organization should become a force to coerce states into more reasonable labor codes.

The Co-operative Movement

The modern co-operative movement started in Great Britain with the founding in 1844 of the Rochdale Equitable Pioneers' Society. Twenty-eight weavers, who invested a pound apiece, set up a grocery store selling goods to the members at regular market prices but at quarterly intervals returning profits to them on the basis of their purchases. Democratic control of the association was secured by the device of allowing but one vote to a member regardless of the amount of his trade. Cash sales, just weights, and pure goods further commended the Rochdale system.

The success of this experiment in consumers' co-operation quickly led to the formation of many societies along similar lines, and both retail and wholesale co-operatives were organized. By 1929 their membership had risen to over ten per cent of the population of Great Britain and Ireland. Consumers' co-operation has also made great headway in several Continental countries, most notably in Sweden. Approximately one-third of the retail trade and more than ten per cent of the wholesale trade is carried on by the Swedish co-operatives without profit. Co-operation in production, with the workers themselves the owners of the factories and machines, has not been markedly successful, because of the difficulty of securing sufficient capital and competent management. Co-operation in credit takes various forms, especially the building and loan associations so common in the United States.

As distinguished from ordinary commercial enterprises, co-operatives are voluntary associations whose members seek to avoid competition with one another and to subordinate or get rid of the profit-making motive in economic life. While retaining many features of industrial capitalism, they would substitute group for individual action in the processes of production and distribution and they would eliminate the middleman, whether storekeeper, employer, or moneylender. The extension of the co-operative movement has led its advocates to see in it a form of organization which might in time supplant private business run for profit. It has scarcely affected, however, the great fuel, light, power, and transport industries, banking, and insurance. Co-operation at present seems to offer no serious challenge to the prevailing capitalistic system.

State Enterprise

The modern state does many things which people did for themselves or left undone during the Middle Ages. The state maintains an army and navy, provides a police system, administers justice, and furnishes public education. It subjects private enterprise to ever increasing regulation for the benefit of the less fortunate members of society. Furthermore, it engages in a variety of business undertakings.

Governments sometimes take over branches of business to raise a revenue. In France and Italy, for example, the sale of tobacco and matches is a public monopoly. Moral considerations may combine with financial considerations, as is illustrated by the public monopoly and sale of alcoholic liquors in Soviet Russia. The post office is always in government hands, not so much for revenue as to secure cheap communication. In Great Britain and on the Continent telegraphs and telephones are managed in connection with the post office, and the government parcel post does all the business which in the United States is partly absorbed by a private express company. Coinage is everywhere a public function, as is banking also in most European countries. Some countries have also public forests, mines, canals, and electric power plants. On the Continent railroads are generally state owned and state managed. Great Britain and the United States took over their railroads for military purposes during the first World War, but after its conclusion returned them to the private companies. Municipal ownership and operation of such utilities as streetcar lines, gas and electric lighting plants, and waterworks may also be included among examples of public enterprise.

The modern state thus assumes many more duties than the three to which Adam Smith proposed to limit it. Defense against external aggression, preservation of internal order, and maintenance of a few public institutions do not exhaust the responsibilities of the state as these are now understood. The second war in the twentieth century seems destined to accelerate this tendency.

The Mechanization of Industry

Few would wish to retrace their steps to a time when there were no great mechanical inventions. Machines, those nonhuman slaves, have to a large extent "taken the backache out of industry" by eliminating much of the hardest and most exhausting labor. They have eliminated many kinds of monotonous labor. Think of sewing before the sewing machine, of sawing before the steam saw, or of clerical work before

the typewriter and mechanical adder. While new forms of repetitive work have come in, together with a great deal of "speeding up" and a consequent increase of nervous tension, these real evils of mechanization tend to be offset by the shortening of the hours of toil. Already the normal working day has been decreased to eight hours from the ten to twelve hours which were usual not so many years ago, and the five-day week seems likely to be adopted in the future by many industrial concerns. In the most industrialized countries machine workers enjoy far more leisure and greater opportunities for recreation than did their predecessors, the handicraftsmen.

The introduction of machines created some temporary unemployment. Not infrequently the workers rose in blind rage against them. Hargreaves met with mob violence and had to move from one place to another in order to set up in safety his jenny. Cartwright's power looms and the mill containing them were burned by incendiaries. Such excesses could not stave off the inevitable; the mechanization of industry proceeded without a halt when it was discovered that the machines called for more labor than they displaced and that the workers who had lost their jobs were usually reabsorbed in industry. Consider how such recent inventions as the automobile and the radio have increased the need for human hands to make them, dispose of them, and maintain them.

Now we face a new situation. Scientific processes and practical inventions may increase so rapidly as to throw the whole organization of labor out of gear from time to time. The result is "technological unemployment" such as we experienced in the 1930's. No considerable elimination of machinery would help matters, since the substitution of man power for machine power would greatly increase the cost of manufactured goods and hence would curtail their production because of the lack of consumer buying. Grants in relief by Federal, state, and local authorities, together with expenditures on public works, are palliatives, not remedies. One remedy is the reduction of the hours of labor (the five-day or forty-hour week) to absorb the unemployed. Another remedy is the development of insurance systems to provide not only for sickness, disability, and old age, but also for temporary or seasonal unemployment. Still another remedy may be found in the opening up of new fields for the profitable investment of labor and capital on an extensive scale; such fields are improved housing and air conditioning.

Fundamentally, however, the problem is one of increasing purchasing power, either by a steady decline in the prices of manufactured goods or by such a steady advance in wages and salaries as will enable consumers to buy all that is produced. Uninterrupted mass consumption

is just as essential to national prosperity as is mass production. We have achieved the miracle of mass production; it may not be beyond our power to achieve the other miracle of mass consumption. As has been said, "We must learn to live in a machine age, and then the machine will serve us well."

XI

Industrial Society before the First World War

The Two Europes

AT the end of the nineteenth century there were two Europes: one industrial, the other agricultural. A circle drawn from Edinburgh through southern Norway and Sweden, then down past Königsberg, Warsaw, Budapest, and around through northern Italy, Barcelona, and then through Dublin and Belfast back to Edinburgh would largely enclose the first Europe. Within that circle were flourishing cities, with beautiful public parks, theaters, opera houses, hospitals, art galleries, schools, and great public monuments of the modern age; beyond the circle was a Europe that was largely agricultural, lacking the installations we associate with modern culture. This does not mean, of course, that on one side of the line all was brightly progressive, and on the other side all darkly backward; it only means that the circle inscribed most of the cultural developments of Europe. In agricultural Europe there were rich men — aristocratic landlords and merchants — whose lives were not dissimilar to those of the wealthy in industrial Europe, but the lives of the masses and the conditions under which they lived were very different in the two Europes.

It was industrialism that accounted for the difference. In industrial Europe steam engines, internal combustion motors, and electric dynamos provided power, millions of horsepower, to drive machines that produced wealth. In agricultural Europe there were a few steam engines, but most of the power utilized the backs of men and animals. Industrial Europe by 1900 sent its agents to the very ends of the earth to gather food, raw materials, and luxury goods, and paid for those commodities with the fruits of its looms and forges. Agricultural Europe, except for a favored few, still had to content itself with the things it could produce, supplemented somewhat by the manufactured

goods made by its more fortunate neighbors. Industrial Europe, by piling up masses of men and capital in the restricted areas of its cities, could easily create the public works that disposed of sewage, brought good water, provided light in the evening and power by day, and all the other public utilities such as good roads, cheap transportation, and ready amusements. Agricultural Europe with its small villages and towns could do very little of this, for it had neither the capital nor the concentrated population nor the necessary techniques to accomplish the miracle.

It was, of course, the tremendous expansion of industrialism in the last forty years of the nineteenth century that was responsible for this development. Industrial Europe had the ingredients for making a new society. First of all it had coal. The coal fields of England, of the Rhine, of the Ruhr, of Belgium, and of Silesia, and the scattered deposits in France and Austria provided the power that revolutionized society. By tapping the resources created by billions of years of the sun's energy stored up in the earth, western European men truly found the formula for the philosopher's stone. Coal drove their machines, coal supplied their industries with raw materials, coal was the black gold that made western Europe rich beyond the dreams of earlier societies. In addition to its coal, Europe had the advantage of strategic location. Europe is a peninsula of Asia, indented with seas and gulfs and watered by great rivers. Practically all of western Europe has easy access to the oceans, and with rivers, canals, and finally railroads to facilitate transportation, it was as a whole in an excellent position to develop a vigorous commercial and industrial life. There were two other necessary ingredients for an industrial society that western Europe possessed. The first was capital; the second, technical knowledge. Capital had been accumulated by the *bourgeoisie* in increasing amounts ever since the commercial revolution, and it continued to increase at a geometric ratio throughout the nineteenth century. Technical knowledge, too, grew apace, first in the skill of craftsmen, secondly in the genius of the graduates of universities and technical schools. They provided the scientific and industrial "know-how" that made Western Europe the workshop of the world.

The other Europe, agricultural Europe, lacked one or more of these necessary factors. In some cases the lack of coal and other minerals seemed to be an almost absolute barrier between the backward area and an industrial civilization; in other cases, Russia for example, the barrier was not absolute and there was more than a promise that the twentieth century would see great changes in the economic pattern.

Critics of industrial society at the opening of the twentieth century

were not slow to point out that within the charmed circle all was not as it seemed. Often the great cities were ugly, soot-blackened, and dirty. The brilliant operas, the magnificent boulevards, the well stocked libraries, and even the modern hospitals were only for the wealthy *bourgeoisie* that could afford to pay for them. Wretched slums in London, Paris, Milan, and other great metropolitan areas emphasized the assumption that the cities might become the graveyards of the nations. And when the business cycle turned men away from the factories without means of gaining their daily bread, the critics had no difficulty in pointing out the advantages of rural security. None the less the cities continued to grow; industrial Europe was creating these metropolitan areas to fill its needs for labor.

The most striking fact about Europe in this epoch was the fantastic increase of its population. Ever since the Middle Ages European population, in spite of famine, war, and pestilence, had made a steady growth, but in the nineteenth century a number of factors reduced the efficacy of the checks upon population, and accelerated the pace of its growth. Better midwifery and obstetrical care reduced both the infant mortality and the deaths of young women of childbearing age. Better sewage disposal, purification of water supplies, and more general attention to public health reduced the incidence of pestilence, while the discovery of vaccines and better medical knowledge made further inroads upon the work of death. The result was that Europe could send hundreds of thousands of her sons and daughters to the Americas and at the same time fill her own cities to overflowing. The villages could not support the increase in their numbers; the more adventurous of their youth went to America or to the neighboring big city. Bismarck complained that the "tangle-tangle" of the city corrupted the peasant youth, but the peasant boys had to go to the city because there were too many of them for the land to support. Thus industrial Europe fed itself with its own inhabitants; the problem was to make the cities better places in which to live.

In spite of the obvious disadvantages that industrial Europe offered to its poor, not many of them preferred to exchange their lot for that of their cousins in agricultural Europe. The victories of the revolutionaries in the preceding period, and the liberal compromises that had been made in politics, opened even to the poor the hope that they could better their destinies, and not alone the hope, for they could actually see that their lot was improving in practically every industrial area. The real wages of labor may not have increased as rapidly as the accumulations of the capitalists, but they did increase and there was promise that they would increase even more.

Thus within the charmed circle of the favored Europe there was hope, there was power, and there was growth. We shall see how this Europe was able to control most of the world.

The System of Bourgeois Society

Industrial Europe in the forty-odd years before the war of 1914-1918 tended toward a common pattern of government. Britain's parliamentary government seemed to be the model that eventually would be copied everywhere. Britain, the Mother of Parliaments, had learned to work a system whereby the government responded to the wishes of a majority of the elected representatives of the people. The Continental politicians were proudly aware that they were conducting their governments in much the same way. Actually, of course, the systems of parliamentary government on the Continent were very different from that practiced in England. In England political life was dominated by two great parties, and the government, secure in its majority and party solidarity, had a firm base upon which to operate. On the Continent the picture was different: instead of two parties contending for the support of the electorate, there were anywhere between seven and twenty separate parties, none of which could gain an absolute majority. This meant that governments on the Continent had to rely upon coalitions, often very unstable, to maintain a majority behind their policy. In spite of much learned writing on the subject and many eloquent speeches, it was France rather than England that provided the most common pattern. Britain's parliamentary life was serene and dignified; its traditions and its political framework made it possible for governments to come into office and work out a program. On the Continent parliamentary life tended to be more turbulent. The coalitions often broke up before any policy could be carried through to a conclusion.

None the less, whether it was on the French or on the British model, it was clear that parliamentary government had won the victory. Men all over the world looked expectantly to the time when in every country the elected representatives of the people would review and direct the acts of their governments. In the other Europe, outside the charmed circle, there were brave words that promised the end of authoritarian government. Even in Turkey, where the sultan was the religious as well as the political ruler, there were attempts to bring the government under parliamentary control. In the Hapsburg Empire, traditionally the home of authoritarianism, there were parliaments at Vienna and Budapest. They did not work just like the ones in London or Paris, but the promise was clear. The day of representative government

was at hand; authoritarian governments would soon be as obsolete as the wind-driven flourmill.

With representative government was associated the whole legal structure of traditional liberalism. Again it was Britain that provided the model, and France that produced the typical example. The guarantees that men asked for were part and parcel of England's century-old traditions; on the Continent they had to be assured by constitutional or statutory law. The guarantees seem simple to an American whose whole life has been lived under the Constitution of the United States, but they were victories for the human spirit in Europe. The basic freedoms and rights that had been proclaimed in 1789 came to be accepted in most of industrial Europe, and demanded in the rest of Europe, as indispensable. Freedom of press, assembly, pulpit, religion, and lecture platform became almost universal. To these were added *habeas corpus*, trial by one's peers, and the legal machinery that guaranteed equal and just treatment before the law. And lastly, the governments withdrew the "oppressive" hands that had formerly shackled individual economic initiative. Some regulatory measures had been necessitated by the abuses of the factory system, but in general the concept of *laissez faire* that left prices, labor contracts, methods of production, and the like, free, prevailed all through industrial Europe.

There were, of course, variations from country to country. In England's Hyde Park a man could say anything about anything that came to his mind. In Germany an editor had to be careful not to insult the emperor, but after 1900 he had freedom to advocate socialism or even anarchism. In France the press was free almost to a grant of license. In Russia, which was beyond the charmed circle of inner Europe, many topics could not be discussed, but even in Russia there was an expectation that the liberal system would eventually win a victory. Indeed progressively minded men everywhere assumed that the liberal system was the pattern for the future, that the residues of authoritarian and absolutist government were mere anachronisms destined to disappear just as the dodo had disappeared in the animal kingdom.

The system of government, like the economic system, worked the greatest advantage for the upper class. The rise of a popular press put publishing in the category of Big Business, and it naturally came under the influence of the upper *bourgeoisie*. The bulk of the press supported the *status quo*, and as the *status quo* became more and more satisfactory to the traditional liberals, the press tended to become conservative. Governments in the first half of the century feared the influence of the journalist; by the last of the century there was an army of tame newspapermen upon whose support governments could rely. The elections,

too, tended to be dominated by men of wealth, first because they could gain importance in the political parties and thereby influence the choice of candidates, and secondly because the men who could afford to run for office and whose abilities obviously fitted them for the position were usually themselves members of the upper class or hoped to become members of that class through politics. By control over the principal organs of public opinion, and influence in the choice of candidates, the upper *bourgeoisie* assured themselves that legislation inimical to their interests would not be passed. The lawyers, doctors, professors, and businessmen who were elected to the parliaments of Europe had a common interest in maintaining the system that politics and economics had created.

Thus just as the economic system created a structure which the upper classes dominated and from which they drew the greatest advantages, so the political system also fell into the hands and under the influence of the upper classes. But just as the rest of the people, peasants and workers, also benefited from the machine civilization, so also did the masses benefit from the parliamentary political machinery. They did have votes and their votes could be cast for or against candidates whose policy either satisfied or dissatisfied them. The politician could not ignore his humble constituents, and their presence kept him from instituting a regime completely in the interests of his class.

The nations outside the charmed circle of industrial Europe toyed gingerly with liberal democracy and parliamentary government, but were not quite able to put it into effect. In the Balkans, in Russia, in Spain and Portugal revolutions or threats of revolutions promised the eventual downfall of absolutism. It was generally assumed that the first step would be some sort of compromise like that found in Austria-Hungary and Germany. Few "progressively minded" liberals of the era were willing to believe that authoritarian regimes anywhere in the world would be able to survive the inroads that the liberal democratic system was making.

Protests against the System of Bourgeois Society

There were men, however, who refused to believe that the politico-economic compromise had created "the best of all possible worlds." Some of them attacked the system because they felt that liberal democracy without social democracy was meaningless. Political equality, these men insisted, was a travesty as long as economic inequality prevailed. Others attacked the system because they refused to accept the basic assumption that all men should have a voice in public affairs. To

men like Nietzsche or Carlyle it was preposterous folly to give the vote to the masses. Both the Social Democrats and the authoritarians had scant respect for the *bourgeoisie* that were running the Europe of their day.

The demand for some radical solution of the economic system was eloquently voiced in the first half of the nineteenth century by a group of social reformers known as Utopian socialists. These men objected vigorously to the exploitation of men by man and the politico-economic theory that justified the system. They might be divided into two groups: the men that would reorganize society on the basis of the local community, and the men that would reorganize the state as an economic unit. Robert Owen in England and Charles Fourier in France represented the former; the Saint-Simonians, the latter. Owen and Fourier each proposed the creation of partially self-sufficient communistic societies in which there would be a balance of agriculture and industry. A number of these communities were set up in France and the United States; the Brook Farm community, which numbered among its members such well-known Americans as Horace Greeley and Nathaniel Hawthorne, was perhaps the most famous. These projects, however, were unable to maintain themselves and in the end collapsed. A second group are really misnamed when they are called Utopian socialists. They stemmed from the school of a French social prophet-philosopher named Saint-Simon. Their central idea was that technological progress made it possible for the exploitation of man to end and the exploitation of the earth by man to begin. They hailed the state as the agency that could bring about this transformation. As we read their work today, these Saint-Simonians appear as the veritable prophets of the totalitarian idealism of our own times. They themselves never were able to translate their ideas into action but many of them individually made important contributions in banking, railroad and canal building, and industry in the third quarter of the century. The idea and the first projects for the Suez and Panama Canals were the work of Saint-Simonians.

These Utopian socialists were unable to build a political party. In the revolutionary epoch of 1848 half a dozen of them appeared momentarily on the scene as would-be political leaders, but their programs lacked unity and their propaganda was poor. The whole movement was absorbed in the more vigorous and clear cut socialistic doctrine of Marx and Engels, the true founders of socialism as a political movement.

It is Karl Marx that has given his name to modern socialism. His collaborator Friedrich Engels never captured the imagination of the

masses as this scholarly revolutionary succeeded in doing. Marx, armed with sound academic training in several German universities and intensely interested in the moral problems that grew out of the Industrial Revolution, appeared as prophet and philosopher in the revolutionary epoch of 1848. The *Communist Manifesto* presented an indictment of bourgeois society, a philosophy of history, and a program of action. In the years following he produced a long scholarly treatise, *Das Kapital*, to prove that the intuitive protest of his first work was economically and philosophically sound. The first volume appeared in 1867; the last, after his death, in 1883.

Marx felt little sympathy with ideal schemes for making over society and described them as "pocket editions of the New Jerusalem." In opposition to Owen, Fourier, Blanc, and other earlier socialists, he sought to build up a system of socialism based on economic principles. Put in its simplest form, Marxism asserts that, while labor is the source of all value, laborers ("proletarians") receive, in fact, only a fraction of what they produce. All the rest goes as rent, interest, and profits to the capitalistic *bourgeoisie*, or middle class, whose members are said to produce nothing. Private capitalism, however, is the inevitable result of modern industrial conditions. Marx predicted its disappearance by a revolution, bloody or bloodless, of the "expropriated" proletarians, who would in turn expropriate the *bourgeoisie*, end private ownership of the agencies of production and distribution, and introduce the socialist regime.

The classic brief statement of Marxian socialism is the *Communist Manifesto*. It demanded, among other things, abolition of property in land and application of all rents of land to public purposes; a heavy, progressive income tax; abolition of the right of inheritance; centralization of credit in the hands of the state by means of a national bank with an exclusive monopoly; state ownership of the means of communication and transport; state ownership of factories and instruments of production; national cultivation of the soil; and compulsory labor for every citizen. Finally, it called for the union of the workers of all lands. "The proletarians have nothing to lose except their chains. They have a world to gain."

Socialist Parties; the International

During the seventies of the last century the co-workers of Marx in Germany founded the Social Democratic Party. It provided the model for similar organizations of Marxian socialists in Great Britain, France, Italy, Spain, Austria, and Russia, as well as in Australia, Japan, and the

United States. In 1914, before the first World War, the socialists in these and other countries polled about eleven million votes and elected over seven hundred representatives to the various parliaments. All the parties were divided into a moderate (right) group and a more radical (left) group.

Marxian socialism has never been narrowly national in character. It opposes wars, as profiting only the capitalists, and it encourages fraternal relations between the workers of every land. All socialists are "comrades," wherever they live. These ideas found early expression in the founding at London (1864) of the International Workingmen's Association, for the purpose of uniting proletarians in the class struggle against the *bourgeoisie*. Marx was in fact, though not in name, the head of this organization.

The International held several congresses, but national feelings and prejudices ran so high that it was impossible to keep together English trade unionists, French and German socialists, Russian nihilists, and even anarchists. The organization was finally dissolved. A second International, which was afterward formed at Paris (1889), held regular congresses representing the different socialist parties. At the turn of the twentieth century the socialist parties met a crisis. Contrary to Marx's doctrine, the poor did not become poorer. Indeed, the trade union movements and the general rise in economic well-being seemed destined to discount his whole prediction. Furthermore socialist politicians, elected to parliaments, wanted to participate in government by joining political coalitions. It was difficult for an ambitious man to remain outside of a coalition because of a revolutionary principle. The result was that a split appeared in the socialist ranks. One group called themselves "revisionists"; socialism, they believed, could be achieved by evolution rather than revolution. The other group, "pure" socialists, refused to compromise. The "revisionists," by 1914, had become a reformist rather than a revolutionary party. The non-revisionists, with leaders like Lenin and Liebknecht, remained "true" to the ideals of the founder.

Socialism, like any doctrine with dogmas and prophets, had a tendency to develop heresies. The Marxists were never able to bring the whole movement under their control. Two heretical groups, the anarchists and the syndicalists, were the most important. Anarchism antedated Marx. The good anarchist believed that government with its laws, its police, and its armies was responsible for the evils of the world. They wished to abolish the state entirely and allow free associations of men to govern human affairs. Unfortunately the anarchists developed a

belief in violence, and their unsocial tendency to assassinate heads of governments soon gave them an unsavory reputation. The syndicalists developed, particularly in Latin Europe, out of the trade union movement. They too wished to abolish the state, and put "syndicates" or unions in its place. Sabotage was their weapon and the general strike their threat. In France, Italy, and Spain the syndicalist movement was very popular with the laboring classes.

In England, socialism early became reformist. Fabians they called themselves, after the Roman general who won his wars by never giving battle. They were convinced that they could win the battle of socialism by propaganda and education. A brilliant group of literary people, including Shaw, Wells, the Webbs, and others began the education of England for the future socialist commonwealth.

While radical social thinkers attacked the existing order of liberal democratic society from the left, another group of men assaulted it from the right. One of the most important of these critics was none other than the pope. Leo XIII, one of the most vigorous and enlightened leaders of his age and one of the great popes of all times, laid the groundwork for a Roman Catholic social doctrine in his encyclical *Rerum Novarum*. Following the condemnation of liberal political forms that his predecessor Pius IX had pronounced (the Syllabus of Errors), Leo XIII urged Roman Catholics to give up the unchristian ethics of bourgeois economic society and return to the more human and just conception of the Christian Middle Ages. He made the relationship between employer and employee a matter of conscience, and insisted that justice was important in economic life. These Catholic teachings have become a fighting doctrine capable of making converts and influencing policy.

Others attacked the system of the liberal democratic compromise because they objected to its premises. Nietzsche, for example, thought it nonsense to give every "blockhead" the right to vote, and hypocrisy to pretend that society granted all men liberty and equality. He called for the creation of a new system of values and the rise of a new aristocracy of men strong in will and intellect. The masses, he felt, should be led; the rulers should be men of will and force. To credit Nietzsche with the travesty of this system as it appeared in Nazi Germany is unjust, but it is true that he urged the rise of an élite, the supermen, who should rule. Nietzsche was only one of a group of philosophers and social critics that objected to the "shams" of the liberal democratic compromise and demanded rule by a superior class. Ruskin, Carlyle, Barrès, and many others reached more or less the same conclusions.

They believed that the system that had "materialized the upper classes, vulgarized the middle classes, and brutalized the lower classes" should give way to a society with more enlightened ideals.

England: the World's Banker and Manufacturer

As we have seen, England's industrial development outstripped that of the Continental states after 1750. As an island fortress England enjoyed both security against foreign armies and immediate access to the oceans of the world. She alone escaped the tramp of French soldiery of the Napoleonic Empire, and her insular position, added to the ingenuity and skill of her inhabitants, gave her the opportunity to build up a commercial fleet that sailed every sea as well as a navy to protect and defend her commerce. Furthermore the island was abundantly stocked with coal, the black gold that industrialism required, and she had considerable deposits of iron ore. It was of lower grade than that found in Sweden, but it could readily be used in the creation of a great metallurgical industry. England's climate, too, was favorable. Warmed by the Gulf Stream, it was suitable for the production of cotton cloth, and in many other ways ideal for the development of industry. Political traditions, too, were important in the growth of Britain's economic power. The revolutionary epoch in the seventeenth century had given parliament a secure place in the government of the realm, and the fortunate political compromises of the eighteenth century had encouraged the growth of the constitution through adjustment to the needs of the rising political powers. England went through the whole stormy period from 1789 to 1870 without a single serious uprising, and when the epoch was over, her constitution was the model that revolutionaries all over Europe had tried to copy. The government nicely kept pace with the political needs of industrialism so that England's economic growth never lacked political support.

The British Constitution

Since England's government was so widely acclaimed as the best suited for modern industrial society, it is important to understand the principal features of the British constitution. The written part of the British constitution consists, first, of such documents as Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights, which represent agreements between king and people; second, of parliamentary statutes; third, of international treaties; and fourth, of the common law as expressed in court decisions. All these documents have never been brought together in one compre-

hensive statement as in the constitutions of the United States, France, and other countries. The unwritten part of the British constitution includes a mass of customs binding on both crown and parliament — for example, those relating to the cabinet. Traditional usages of this sort have developed in the United States, as may be seen from comparing the constitutional provision for the Electoral College with the actual method in vogue for choosing a president. In Great Britain they play a still larger part, owing to the respect for precedent so characteristic of the British people.

As far as appearances go, the sovereign of Great Britain is a divine-right monarch. Coins and proclamations still recite that he rules "by the grace of God" (*Dei gratia*). He is also, as far as appearances go, an absolute monarch. Whatever the government does, from the arrest of a criminal to the declaration of a war, is done in his name. It is all a matter of form, for the British sovereign now acts only by and with the advice of his responsible ministers. This figurehead king occupies, nevertheless, a useful place in the governmental system. As the representative of the nation, he often exercises a restraining, moderating influence upon public affairs, especially through his consultations with politicians of both parties. He himself stands above party. A common loyalty to the crown, as an ancient, dignified, and permanent institution, also helps to bind together the self-governing Dominions of the British Empire.

British legal theory makes parliament consist of the crown, the House of Lords, and the House of Commons. The share of the crown is now limited to expressing assent to a bill after its passage by the Commons and the Lords. Such assent the king always gives. The royal veto has not been expressly taken away, but Queen Anne in 1707 was the last sovereign to exercise this former privilege. Nor may the courts set aside a statute as unconstitutional, for every statute is a part of the constitution. The separation of powers between the legislative, executive, and judicial departments, found in the American constitutional system, does not exist in that of Great Britain. Parliament has unlimited, undivided power. There is no law it cannot make, no law it cannot modify or repeal. The only check upon parliament lies in the political good sense of the British people.

The House of Lords continued to be the dominant chamber until the passage of the First Reform Act. Since then it has been understood that the Lords cannot continue to oppose the Commons on any measure supported by a majority of the electorate. In the first part of the twentieth century, when a Conservative House of Lords persistently opposed the Liberal majority in the House of Commons, this

fact was definitely written into the constitution of the realm by the Parliament Act of 1911. The Lords agreed to it only when confronted, as in 1832, with the prospect of being "swamped" by a large number of newly created Liberal peers. The Parliament Act deprived the upper chamber of all control of money bills—that is, bills levying taxes or making appropriations. It further provided that every other kind of bill passed by the Commons in three successive sessions (extending over two years at least) and rejected by the Lords at each of the three sessions should become law. The House of Lords was thus left with only a "suspensive veto" of legislation.

The House of Commons consists of six hundred and fifteen members, chosen by universal suffrage from equal electoral districts. Members serve for five years, which is the maximum life of a single parliament. This period is shortened whenever the crown, upon the advice of its ministers, dissolves the House of Commons and orders a new general election. Voting does not take place on one day throughout the country; it may extend over as much as two weeks. Nor need a candidate be a resident of the district which he proposes to represent. Defeat in one constituency, therefore, does not necessarily exclude a man from parliament; he may always stand for another constituency. Prominent politicians usually keep their seats year after year. The property qualification for members of the House of Commons has been abolished, and they now receive salaries.

The Cabinet System

Parliament works through a committee, the cabinet. This usually includes about twenty commoners and peers, who belong to the party in power. In times of crises such as the wars of the twentieth century, coalition cabinets have been formed representing all parties. Members of the cabinet are selected by the party leader, the prime minister. The cabinet acts together in all matters, thus presenting a united front to parliament and the country. The terms "cabinet" and "ministry" are often used interchangeably, but the ministry contains administrative officers who do not attend cabinet meetings.

The cabinet, in secret sessions, drafts the more important measures to be laid before the House of Commons. That body may amend bills presented to it, but amendments are usually few and unimportant; as a rule, the House of Commons performs docilely at the command of the prime minister and of the party disciplinarians appropriately known as "whips." Should a cabinet measure fail to pass the Commons, or should the Commons vote a resolution of "no confidence," custom

requires the cabinet to resign or "go to the country." In the former case, the king sends for the leader of the opposition party and invites him to form a cabinet which will have the support of the Commons. In the latter case, the king dissolves parliament and calls a general election. The return of a majority favorable to the cabinet permits it to remain in office; otherwise the prime minister and his associates give way to a cabinet formed by the Opposition.

The cabinet system, meaning the control of the government by a compact group of ministers and their dependence upon a party majority in the House of Commons, was not a deliberate invention. It grew up in the early eighteenth century after the rise of political parties. The Whigs, who had been chiefly responsible for the "Glorious Revolution," then ruled Great Britain and settled all matters of public policy in a secret gathering, or cabinet council, of their own leaders. William III and Queen Anne always attended cabinet meetings and took part in them; George I (1714-1727), the first of the Hanoverians, did not do so because, being a German, he could not understand the deliberations or be understood in them. Since this time the British sovereign has not been a member of the cabinet. His powers and patronage are exercised by the prime minister.

Experience showed the new method of government to be eminently workable. It made possible searching criticism of ministers by parliament and at length established the principle of ministerial responsibility to parliament. All the self-governing commonwealths of the British Empire adopted it, as well as most of the states of Continental Europe. Great Britain is not only the "mother of parliaments," but is also the mother of cabinet systems.

Britain's Economic Position

Britain's position in the world comes, however, more from her economic organization than from her political institutions. English mechanical genius made the island a vast workshop, while her businessmen and bankers made that workshop the workshop of the world. It was possible to ship raw cotton from India to England and then return it to India as cotton cloth and undersell the Indian clothmaker in his own home town. English machines and forges made railroad and dock equipment that was used in every port of the world. English investors developed tea, cotton, rubber, fruit, and other plantations in Asia, Africa, and America to supply the raw materials and the foodstuffs for the island, while English engineers exploited mines from Colorado to Malaya, from South Africa to Canada to provide the minerals, gold, and

jewels that were needed by the new industrial society. The "City" in London, the bankers, provided loans to governments and businessmen in places as far apart as Egypt, Argentina, and Hong Kong; the "City" was the world's banker, and the "City" dominated the money markets everywhere. The British merchant marine practically monopolized world commerce by 1890. Its flag was found in every port from New York to Basra, from Shanghai to Naples and Rio de Janeiro, and the shipbuilders on the Clyde and other British streams continued to pour more tonnage into the arteries of trade.

At the turn of the century, when Queen Victoria celebrated her Diamond Jubilee, the power and the prestige of England were at their height. The parade held in London at that time was brilliant testimony to the fact that in the preceding century England's power and influence had girdled the earth. No one who saw the kings and potentates that came to honor the venerable queen could miss the fact that behind this display stood the ships, the factories, the banks, and the vigorous population of England. The "tight little island" had become the richest place on earth, and the great city of London had become the nerve center for the economy of the entire world.

Yet there were many economic problems awaiting solution. In the first half of the century the deplorable conditions in factories and mines had aroused the conscience of humanitarian-minded Englishmen and eventually a series of acts regulated the most unsatisfactory conditions of labor, especially the labor of children and women. In the last half of the century the rise of the trade union movement and its eventual recognition by law (1871-1876) gave the workers a weapon with which to better their own conditions by collective bargaining. The unions very early developed political interests, and by the turn of the twentieth century the Labour Party appeared in parliament. Forty-odd years later, after a war that shook England's power and prestige, that party dominated the House of Commons. The rise of Labour as a political force made the older parties more interested in catering to the needs of the workers. In the years just before the war of 1914-1918 the British Liberal Party, taking a page out of Bismarck's legislation, pushed a social security law through parliament. This law created insurance against old age, sickness, and unemployment, and became a charter for the development of Labour's right to consideration by the state.

In the first decade of the twentieth century England's position as the leader of the industrial society was challenged by rising powers in America and on the Continent, but England seemed, at least to those who did not penetrate deeply into economic realities, secure and well fortified for the future. Her traditions of political compromise almost

assured her people that any problem that might arise could be settled more or less amicably, and her enormous wealth buttressed the predominant position that she had won in the nineteenth century.

Industrial Germany

The most important rival of England at the opening of the twentieth century was Germany. This would be surprising only to one who remembered the weakness and poverty of Germany before 1871 but forgot that she had the necessary ingredients for an industrial society. Germany was perhaps the most ideally situated country in Europe for the new industrialism. In the Ruhr-Rhine-Saar valleys she had enormous deposits of fine coal. In Silesia there was another immense deposit of coal, less valuable than that in western Germany but still of great importance as a source of power and raw materials. The annexation of Lorraine gave her control over the largest iron deposit on the Continent, and after 1878 when a cheap process for refining the ore was discovered, this Lorraine iron could be used commercially. At the same time the country contained large deposits of potash, salt, and many other less important minerals. Germany's strategic location became apparent after the growth of the railroads. Germany was to Europe what Chicago, St. Louis, and the Twin Cities are to the United States: the heart of the railroad network of the Continent. At the same time her harbors on the Baltic and the North Seas gave her easy access, in time of peace, to the oceans of the world. Hamburg, some ninety miles up the Elbe River, easily became the most important harbor on the Continent. And lastly, Germany had the technological genius necessary for an industrial society. The skill of her craftsmen had been famous since the Middle Ages and her universities were the best in Europe. From their laboratories there poured a stream of soundly trained technicians and scientists who were to make "made in Germany" a trademark known over the entire earth.

Government in Germany, too, was friendly to industrial growth. Prussia set the tone for Germany, and Prussia's government had for centuries been both efficient and paternalistic. The paternalistic bureaucracy had given Germany the *Zollverein*, and continued to anticipate the economic needs of the new empire that arose after 1871. The German never was to have the exuberant feeling of self-satisfaction that comes from a political victory but he had the assurance that his government was looking out for his needs. It is perhaps this dependence that prevented Germany from maturing politically in our times.

The German Empire that emerged from the Franco-Prussian war

was a federation of twenty-five states, besides the imperial territory of Alsace-Lorraine. The constitution allowed each state to manage its local concerns and specified what authority might be exercised by the federal government. The emperor had very great powers. He commanded the army and navy; appointed and received ambassadors; and through the chancellor, whom he selected, influenced both foreign and domestic policies. There was a legislature of two chambers. The Bundesrat, consisting of delegates who represented the hereditary princes, drew up in secret sessions the bills to be considered by the Reichstag and could veto any measures passed by the Reichstag. The latter contained nearly four hundred members elected by manhood suffrage. At times it seemed to be merely a debating society, at others, to give promise of becoming a fully developed parliamentary body. Between 1871 and 1914 the Reichstag was dissolved four times because of a conflict between it and the government. In each case the latter won a victory at the polls and the new Reichstag meekly passed the bill its predecessor had rejected. But twice a chancellor's resignation was accepted by the emperor when he no longer could depend upon a majority in the Reichstag.

None the less the constitution of imperial Germany did not provide for a true parliamentary regime. The chancellor was responsible to the emperor rather than to the legislature, and the chancellor's powers reached into the upper house of the legislature because he was also minister-president of Prussia and could appoint the Prussian representatives to the Bundesrat. Although Prussia did not have a majority voice in that body, her delegation was the largest and had the most influence in public affairs.

The architect of the imperial constitution was the first chancellor, and Bismarck was careful to see to it that the law gave him plenty of room and power. He intimidated the democratic and liberal forces by reminding them of their failure to unite the country in 1848. He told them that not speeches or parliamentary majorities, but "blood and iron" were the deciding factors in great events. And the German people in their hero worship and their gratitude accepted his interpretation perhaps as much from conviction as from the feeling of well-being that accompanied the tremendous economic expansion which followed on the heels of unification. Bismarck's first problems were to unify the nation in fact as well as in theory. To do this the federal power was pushed to the utmost at the expense of the several states. Uniform codes of civil and criminal law were provided for the entire empire. A supreme court at Leipzig was created to hear appeals from state courts. An imperial bank (*Reichsbank*) was set up at Berlin to

become the central institution for financial operations and the issue of bank notes. The railways were placed under the control of an imperial bureau. An imperial coinage, with the mark as its basis, also appeared. The new coins bore on one side the emperor's effigy, and on the other side, the arms of the empire; they carried everywhere the "good news of unity." Bismarck also embarked upon a policy hostile to the Roman Catholic church, the so-called *Kulturkampf*. He wanted religion within Germany to be under German control. But Rome proved to be an antagonist worthy of his steel, and finally he was obliged to reach a compromise that amounted to full retreat.

In his early work Bismarck had the loyal support of the liberals. In 1879 he embarked upon a new policy for which he secured the support of the Junkers (conservatives). Socialism was growing in Germany. With industrialism the Marxian doctrine came to the worker. To Bismarck this international revolutionary doctrine was a red flag; he would not tolerate it at all. About the same time he was converted to protectionism and decided to end the relatively free trade policy of the *Zollverein* in favor of protection for both agriculture and industry. The conservatives supported both these policies.

The legislation against the socialists was intolerant to a high degree. It limited their freedom of press and assembly and outlawed their party. It did not, however, end socialism. The socialists continued to send delegates to the Reichstag, and their speeches, printed and distributed at state expense in the *Stenographische Berichte*, became the only legal socialist propaganda. This legislation was only one side of Bismarck's antisocialist policy. He was no blind conservative. He reasoned that German workers became socialists because they had needs that were unsatisfied; the greatest of these was security against old age, sickness, and unemployment. To cut the ground out from under the socialists' feet, he forced the Reichstag to pass a series of bills guaranteeing the workers against these hazards. In the 1880's this legislation was progressive beyond anything found elsewhere. Similar laws were passed in England just before 1914, in France in the 1920's, in the United States under Roosevelt's "New Deal."

In 1888 Kaiser William I, the first German emperor, died. His successor, Frederick III, who had married a daughter of Queen Victoria, was a man of democratic leanings and an admirer of the British parliamentary system. German liberals looked forward hopefully to his reign, but he mounted the throne only to die within a few months. Frederick's son, William II, became king of Prussia and German Emperor when not quite twenty-nine years of age. The young ruler could not work well with the old chancellor who had so long reigned in all

but name. Friction between them led to Bismarck's enforced resignation in 1890.

After 1890 the German Empire became a world power. The government under William II became a sort of director for the expanding economy. In chemicals, metals, textiles, shipbuilding, and a dozen lesser industries the Germans made tremendous progress. At the turn of the century Germany produced more steel than England, and by 1910 her commerce was crowding into every port of the world. This expansion was the most disturbing factor in the world after 1900. In 1870 the German army before Paris had seized the hegemony of the Continent from the French; by 1900 German industry was ready to challenge England for the hegemony of the world. The rise of Germany upset the whole balance of power and threatened the peace of Europe.

The chief problem of this German Empire revolved around the constitution. The Socialist Party, again legal, became the reform party and made sensational gains at the polls. It demanded a revision of Bismarck's constitution. There was a series of crises in the first decade of the century; one of them even brought the role of the emperor into question. But the system continued. None the less the Socialist Party continued to grow. In 1913 it became the largest in the Reichstag, and a socialist was elected president of that body. The war of 1914-1918 intervened before this challenge to the imperial system could be worked out; whether it could have created a more liberal government or not will always be an unsolved question.

Republican France

While Germany emerged from the Franco-Prussian War with the opportunity to create a great industrial society, France came out of the same war with the bitter taste of defeat and no comparable economic possibilities. The great difficulty that confronted her was lack of coal. At no time in the nineteenth century did the French mines satisfy the demand, and coal from England, Belgium, or Germany was expensive because of the carrying charges. This lack of cheap coal put a crimp in the development of industry that had started with such promise under Louis Napoleon; without cheap coal, great industrial plants were at a disadvantage in the competition for world markets. But coal was not the only factor that limited expansion. French business traditions worked against big enterprises. France was a land of skilled craftsmen, of small industries specializing in luxury commodities. She had no peers in the manufacture of perfumes and fancy textiles, and she con-

centrated upon these items rather than on sulphuric acid or gingham cloth.

This does not mean that there were no steel mills or chemical factories in France, but merely that the heavy industry characteristic of England, Germany, and the United States did not dominate the scene in France. French production for the luxury markets did not make a great war potential to prepare the nation for competition with her neighbors.

France's great problems in the period before 1914 were political. After the defeat of her armies in 1870 a revolution deposed Napoleon III and ended the Second Empire. A provisional government continued the war. Leon Gambetta, the most prominent republican leader, escaped from Paris in a balloon, aroused the fighting spirit of the people by his eloquence, and carried on for several months a brave but futile struggle against the German enemy. Equally futile were the diplomatic missions which the eminent statesman, Adolphe Thiers, made to one European capital after another to enlist foreign aid. Paris could not be saved. After its fall an armistice was arranged, in order that the French people might elect a National Assembly to secure terms of peace from Germany. It met and promptly ratified the humiliating Treaty of Frankfurt.

The National Assembly in 1871 made Thiers president of the republic. Nevertheless, a long time passed before France became republican in much more than name. The provisional government was allowed to continue, largely because the quarreling factions which opposed a republic could not agree whether the ruler should be the son of Napoleon III, the grandson of Louis Philippe, or the grandson of Charles X. All three had supporters in the National Assembly, but all three could not sit upon one throne. The failure of the monarchists to unite upon a candidate played into the hands of Gambetta, who made it his mission to spread republican ideas among conservative Frenchmen. Gambetta's services during the Franco-Prussian War endeared him to the masses, while his oratory and lively personality fascinated even political opponents. More and more people who had hitherto been monarchists now accepted the republic as permanent, and in 1875 France adopted a republican constitution.

The constitution of 1875 was a compromise unsatisfactory both to the republicans and to the monarchists, and all parties assumed that it would not last. It was, however, the public law of France for the next sixty-five years. Unlike previous French constitutions, it was not a formal document with a preamble and elaborate provisions. Indeed, it was merely a series of constitutional laws providing for the executive and

legislative branches of the government, and even these laws left much to be worked out in practice. At the head of the executive branch was a president, elected for seven years by the parliament or National Assembly. The parliament, the legislative branch of the government, was made up of a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies. Senators were elected indirectly by electoral colleges for nine-year terms, one third being retired every three years. Deputies were elected by universal manhood suffrage for four-year terms. From the parliament was selected a cabinet, which controlled the official acts of the president. Such an arrangement reduced the president to a mere figurehead with decidedly limited powers. In theory the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies were equally important but in practice the latter was the more powerful because most of the cabinet positions were filled from it. Whenever a majority in either the Senate or the Chamber lost confidence in a cabinet, it was forced to resign.

The entire political life of the Third French Republic was stormy. In its sixty-five years of existence it averaged more than one new government every year. Many of the reasons for this situation can be traced to the fact that French political parties were not parties in the Anglo-Saxon sense of the word. There were no national party organizations, little party discipline, and accordingly many, many parties, not one of which could ever command a majority. To form a government it was necessary to make a coalition or bloc of several parties. These coalitions were very unstable since the cabinet was forced to resign whenever a difference appeared within the ranks. To an American or an Englishman, accustomed to seeing a government remain in office for four to twelve years or even longer, it seemed that the rapidity of the rise and fall of French cabinets indicated fickleness and instability. A closer examination shows, however, that while the governments changed often, the men that made up the governments did not. Many of the same faces would be in the new cabinet that had been in the old one. There were few of the violent upsets that occur in American and British politics when one party replaces another, but there were small ones that kept the government responsive to public opinion. Stability was further assured by the existence of a powerful permanent civil service. It has been said that France was governed by civil servants: "Ministers come and ministers go, but the functionaries go on forever."

The chief political problem was the relationship between the emerging democracy and the older conception of authority in politics. Only a few men of wealth actually admitted that the people should rule themselves, but the form of the republic allowed the little people — peasants, artisans, workers, and petty *bourgeoisie* — to elect deputies who tried

to carry out a program of democracy. For the first time in French history there was a definite breach between the men who dominated politics and the men who ruled the industrial and high society life of the nation. The latter resented these new men and tried desperately to upset the regime that allowed them to come to power. This was the principal fact behind a series of political crises — the Boulanger crisis, the Panama crisis, and the Dreyfus affair. The church, the army, the captains of industry, and the old aristocrats were lined up against the democracy. The latter emerged victorious in the first decade of the century and brought about changes in the army and the church that deprived both institutions of the power to assault the regime of the democratic republic.

In spite of the fact that France in this period developed a closer approximation to a democracy than any of the other great states in Europe, France fell behind her rivals as a modern progressive society. It was true that the wishes of the electorate, so far as they were expressed, got a better hearing in the parliament than elsewhere, but France was a sick society that even democracy could not make well. One manifestation of her difficulties was to be seen in the decline of her birth rate. Two hundred years before, she was the most populous state in Europe; by 1900 her population was ceasing to grow when that of her neighbors was increasing by leaps and bounds. France not only ceased to grow but was actually faced with the real threat that her population would decline. She was the only great power in western Europe where there was widespread pessimism about the future.

Austria-Hungary and Italy

The Hapsburg monarchy on the Danube emerged from the period of the 1860's somewhat shaken but still a going institution. The compromise of 1867 gave the Hungarians satisfaction for their nationalistic ambitions and thereby solved one of the most difficult problems of the state. But the other subject nationalities — Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, and Rumanians — remained more or less dissatisfied. The policy of the Hapsburgs had always been "divide and rule," and this policy continued to work; but with the rise in the economic well-being of the people and the extension of education to the masses, it became increasingly difficult to keep them in subjection. The problem was aggravated by the fact that Serbia and Rumania wished to unite their ethnic groups in a national state. This unification could be accomplished only at the expense of Austria-Hungary. Naturally the governments in Vienna and Budapest tried to combat the pressure and

propaganda that threatened to destroy them, but it was difficult to stem the separatist tide.

The Hungarian side of the monarchy tried to solve its difficulties with the south Slavic minorities by a vigorous policy of Magyarization. But the Croats, Serbs, Slovenes, and Rumanians resisted the process; they had their own culture and did not wish to become Hungarians. The Austrian side played Poles and Czechs against the Germans; so much so that many of the Germans responded to the Pan-German propaganda from the north. Finally in an effort to check the disintegrating forces, the government in Vienna granted universal manhood suffrage. It did little good, for the deputies to the Austrian parliament grouped themselves in parties based upon nationalist lines and made a travesty of any attempt to develop a true parliamentary government.

Francis Joseph, the aged emperor, could make no further reform, but his heir, Francis Ferdinand, was known to be planning a further division of the Hapsburg state to allow the Slavic elements equal rights with the Germans and the Hungarians. His assassination in 1914 came before any such reform could be tried, and the war that followed imposed a new reorganization upon the troubled lands of the Danube.

The problems of Italy largely grew out of the fact that the country was poor, its people illiterate, and its politics corrupt. Italy was unified in 1860-1870, but that unity was a creation of armies, diplomats, and revolutionaries rather than of the Italian people. The newly united provinces were not economically bound together nor did they have a common political tradition — unless it was that of foreign oppression. The governments from 1870 to 1914 worked hard to build railways, roads, and other public services that would tie the land into a real unit, but often the expense was many times what it should have been because of corruption. The problem of education was equally pressing. The dialects of Italian spoken from province to province were markedly different; only the few educated people and the people of Tuscany spoke the Italian of Dante. Schools to combat the illiteracy of the masses came slowly; in 1914 only slightly more than half the troops could read and write. Such conditions did not lend themselves to the development of a liberal democracy; an illiterate people could not govern itself.

The biggest problem of all was poverty. Italy had no coal worth mentioning. The railroads and the engines in her factories ran with imported coal. This was an almost absolute barrier to great industrial expansion. But the other side of the picture was not heartening. Italy was an agricultural nation that had to rely upon imports of foreign-grown food for her urban population. Olive and citrus culture helped


supply exports to pay for these imports, but the whole economy was crippled because of dependence upon the outside world for both food and raw materials. The population began to grow rapidly in the third quarter of the century, but here again the situation was not entirely satisfactory. In the first place there was a high incidence of disease ranging from malaria to tuberculosis that sapped the nation's strength (one writer insisted that the sunshine and climate of Italy alone kept the nation alive), and secondly the economic opportunities were so slow in developing that the more ambitious had to migrate to North or South America to make a living. Italy tried to play the role of a first-class power, but at best she was a "second and a half" class power in the world of industrial Europe.

Both Italy and Austria-Hungary were on the edge of the charmed circle of industrial Europe. But the one was too poor and the other too torn with internal strife to play a role comparable to that of their more powerful neighbors.

Russia: the Potential Colossus of the East

One of the most significant long-time trends in European affairs since the eighteenth century has been the westward expansion of Russia. By the end of the nineteenth century the Russian Empire, a great land mass covering about one-seventh of the earth's land surface, extended from the Pacific Ocean to beyond the Vistula River. Within its frontiers there were over a hundred and fifty million people, some of the richest agricultural land in the world, and vast quantities of unexploited raw materials of all kinds. Russia was on the outskirts of industrial Europe just as she was on the outskirts of Oriental Asia. Her government and her economic institutions were still those of a land beyond the charmed circle in inner Europe, but potentially she was the giant that could dominate the whole of the Continent.

As we have seen, the "reform" era of Alexander II came to an end under Alexander III (1881-1894) when Russia adopted the slogan, "One Russia, one creed, one czar." For the moment the hopes of those Russians who wanted a liberal regime were smothered by the secret police. But if Russia under Alexander III remained politically "frozen," economically the country made rapid progress. Modern industrialism began to penetrate a land that previously had been almost wholly agricultural. The government started railway building on an extensive scale and induced foreign capitalists to invest in Russian coal mines, oil fields, and other natural resources. Factories sprang up like mushrooms, especially in the western part of the empire, and gave employment to



Russia in Europe during the 19th Century

many former serfs. Old cities grew rapidly and new cities developed. A middle class appeared, and also an industrial proletariat more intelligent and far less conservative than the peasantry. The workingmen organized trade unions, conducted strikes, and lent a receptive ear to socialistic agitation. Here was fertile soil for the seeds of revolution.

The opposition to autocracy, which apparently had been suppressed during the reign of Alexander III, revived during that of Nicholas II (1894-1917). Not only the intelligentsia, but also the middle and lower classes, now took up the liberal cause. Enlightened members of the nobility, as in France before the Revolution, added their voices to the rising volume of criticism. Then came the Russo-Japanese War, which revealed in pitiless fashion the government's incapacity and corruption. On Sunday, January 22, 1905, an event occurred which stirred public feeling to its depths. A radical priest organized a procession of work-

ing people, both men and women, to march through the streets of the capital and lay their grievances before the "Little Father" in person. They had no faith in the promises of any of his officials. The demonstrators reached the Winter Palace to be received, not by the czar, but by Cossacks, who mowed them down with volleys of musketry. This was the massacre of Red Sunday.

The months that followed witnessed an epidemic of strikes throughout Russia. Every strike had a twofold purpose — the improvement of economic conditions and the securing of a constitution. In October, 1905, a general strike began in St. Petersburg and other large cities, with a stoppage of railway transportation all over the country. The strike fever extended to the middle class; teachers dismissed school and judges court; merchants closed their stores and doctors their offices; even ballet dancers refused to dance. With life practically at a standstill, no alternative remained to the government but submission. The czar issued a manifesto promising freedom of speech, meeting, and association; he further promised that a representative assembly (Duma) should be elected on a wide franchise and that henceforth no law should be valid without the Duma's consent. Russia was at last to have the parliamentary institutions which were no longer novelties in western Europe.

The first Russian parliament, known as the Duma of the National Indignation, met in 1906. The members scarcely without exception represented all the elements opposed to autocracy. A struggle with the government occupied the entire session. The Duma wanted the czar's ministers to be responsible to it, as the only means of giving the people control over the officials. The czar would not accept any further limitation of his authority and at length dissolved the Duma. Its failure to co-operate with him was a "cruel disappointment" to this sorely tried autocrat. Three other Dumas met between 1907 and 1914. The czar so modified suffrage qualifications that the membership was confined mainly to large landowners, wealthy manufacturers, and other representatives of the propertied, conservative classes. They accomplished some useful legislation, but did not succeed in reforming fundamentally the processes of government. When the first World War broke out, autocracy seemed to be still firmly seated in Russia.

The Ottoman Empire: the Sick Man of Europe

Southeast of industrial Europe were the Balkans and the empire of the Turks. This land lay well outside the favored area in Europe but it was of great importance to the political life of the Continent because

of its strategic position as the bridge between Europe, Asia, and Africa. The narrow waters of the Suez Canal and of the straits between the Black and the Mediterranean Seas channeled the military and commercial lifelines of both England and Russia. With the coming of the railroad age a railway that started in Central Europe and pushed through Asia Minor toward the Persian Gulf (the Berlin to Bagdad line) threatened to become the shortest route between Europe and the Orient. Thus strategy and commerce combined to give the Levant an importance out of all proportion to the civilization of the people that lived in the area.

The empire of the Ottoman Turks formed a typical Oriental despotism. The sultan was not only lord of the Turkish realm in both Europe and Asia, but was also the caliph, or spiritual head, of all Islam. He lived shut up in his palace at Constantinople and depended upon his vizier (prime minister) and divan (council of ministers) to execute his will. Each province had a governor, nominally subject to the sultan. The professional soldiers known as Janizaries, who at first had been exclusively recruited from Christian children brought up as Moslems, comprised the standing army. Only believers possessed the rights of citizenship. Unbelievers were forbidden to hold any civil office or serve in the army, and they were obliged to pay heavy taxes not imposed upon Moslems. Even including converts to Islam, the Turks in southeastern Europe remained a small minority of the population. Impassable barriers, raised by differences of race, language, religion, and customs, separated them from the "Christian cattle," their subjects.

The Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century showed obvious signs of the blight which inevitably descends upon states built up and kept up by the sword. Few of its despotic rulers had real ability, and the control of affairs passed more and more into the hands of self-seeking ministers and favorites. The Janizaries, a turbulent body, often named and deposed sultans at will. The weakness of the central government was reflected in the provinces, where the pashas secured practical independence and in many instances made their power hereditary.

Dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire

Ever since the fateful year 1683, the Turks had lost ground in Europe. Austria soon recovered Hungary and adjoining territory. Russia under Catherine II took the Crimea and the northern coast of the Black Sea, and under Alexander I took Bessarabia. The Vienna settlement of 1815 made the Ionian Islands a British protectorate. Then, as the nineteenth



Dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire (1815-1914)

century progressed, the Christian peoples of the Balkans began to cast off the Ottoman yoke. By 1829 Greece (central and southern) had won independence and part of Serbia had secured self-government. The dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire began.

The great powers, Russia especially, were much interested in the disposition to be made of the possessions which the "sick man" of Europe, as Nicholas I called the sultan, would leave behind when he died. The czar finally decided to solve the Eastern Question by force of arms, and in 1854 Russia declared war on Turkey. The Turks did not fight alone. Great Britain supported them because of the fear that the downfall of the Ottoman Empire would be followed by Russian occupation of Constantinople and Russian control of the eastern Mediterranean, thus threatening British communications with India. France joined Great Britain principally because Napoleon III, who had recently become emperor, wished to win glory by paying off the grudges against Russia which Napoleon I had accumulated. Sardinia was added to the alliance by Victor Emmanuel II and Count Cavour, in order to further their plans for the unification of Italy.

The fighting was confined to the Crimea, where the allied forces tried to capture Sevastopol, Russia's great port on the Black Sea and the naval base essential for any attack on Constantinople. Sevastopol fell after a long and difficult siege. Russia then withdrew from the unequal contest. The conditions of peace were drawn up by representatives of all the great powers, meeting in Paris. The Treaty of Paris, signed in 1856, guaranteed the integrity of the sultan's dominions and gave a new lease of life to the Ottoman Empire.

Russia's desire to rescue the Christians of the Balkans from oppression and, incidentally, to acquire Constantinople, led to another war with Turkey in 1877. Western Europe remained neutral and watched the duel. The Russian armies advanced almost to Constantinople but never took it, for both Great Britain and Austria-Hungary threatened hostilities were the city occupied. In 1878 another international congress assembled, this time at Berlin and under Bismarck's presidency, to attempt another solution of the Eastern Question. By the Treaty of Berlin Montenegro, Serbia, and Rumania were recognized as independent states. Part of Bulgaria received self-government. Austria-Hungary was allowed to occupy the Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Great Britain, the island of Cyprus. These arrangements having been made, the powers again solemnly guaranteed the "integrity" of what remained of the Ottoman Empire.

The year 1908 saw a revolution in the sultan's dominions. It was the work of the Young Turks, a group of reformers who aimed to revive and modernize the Ottoman Empire. They won over the army and carried through an almost bloodless *coup d'état*. The terrified sultan, Abdul Hamid II, had to issue a decree restoring the constitution granted by him at his accession but afterward annulled. His despotism vanished, and the Ottoman Empire, with an elective parliament, a responsible ministry, and manhood suffrage, began to take a place among democratic states.

The Young Turks, ardent nationalists as well as democrats, started out to weld together all the peoples of the empire. Cruel oppression and massacres of Christians marked their efforts at Ottomanization, particularly in Macedonia. This Turkish province was peopled by Greeks, Serbians, and Bulgarians. Many of the inhabitants fled to their respective countries, carrying their grievances with them, and agitated for war against Turkey.

The war came in 1912. Greece, Montenegro, Serbia, and Bulgaria (now an independent state) formed a Balkan alliance, sent the sultan an ultimatum demanding self-government for Macedonia, and, when this was refused, promptly began hostilities. They were everywhere

successful. Turkey was compelled to give up all her European territory except a small area about Constantinople and to cede Crete to Greece. The Balkan allies then fell to quarreling over the disposition of Macedonia. A second war followed, with Greece, Montenegro, Serbia, Rumania, and Turkey ranged against Bulgaria. That country could not cope with so many foes and sued for peace.

The treaty signed at Bucharest in 1913 completely altered the aspect of the Balkans. Bulgaria surrendered to Rumania districts south of the Danube and allowed Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia to annex most of Macedonia. These three states were now nearly doubled in size. The Turkish province of Albania became an independent principality. Turkey escaped complete dismemberment and even secured an accession of territory. The Treaty of Bucharest not only left the Turk in Europe, but by sowing seeds of enmity between Bulgaria and her sister states helped further to postpone a satisfactory solution of the Eastern Question.

The rise of these Balkan states increased the hazards to the peace of Europe. The two most important of them, Serbia and Rumania, had nationalistic ambitions that could be satisfied only at the expense of Austria-Hungary. When one remembers that the Serbs came to count upon support from Russia, this fact assumes its true importance. It was, indeed, the spark that set off the war of 1914-1918.

XII

European Imperialism in Asia

Greater Europe

FROM the point of view of world history, the expansion of European culture and institutions beyond the frontiers of the Continent is the most significant movement of our age. The idea of "one world," or indeed "global history," is almost meaningless unless it implies the predominance of Western civilization. The cultures of Asia had very little in common with the culture of the West until European armies rudely battered down the walls that separated the Orient and the Occident and forced non-Europeans either to accept Western domination or to graft Western culture onto their own. It was the colonial expansion of Europe that gave the idea of global history a unified meaning. Historically speaking, the colonial expansion of European whites is but a thing of yesterday. Begun by the Portuguese and Spaniards in the sixteenth century and continued in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by the Dutch, French, English, and Russians, it has culminated during the past hundred-odd years. Between 1500 and 1800 the American continents were occupied and settled; since 1800 Asia, Australia, Africa, and the islands of all the seas have provided the chief areas of European penetration. Out of 52,000,000 square miles, which (excluding the polar regions) comprise the land area of the globe, over 46,000,000 square miles are either occupied or controlled by whites of European origin or extraction. Two-thirds of the remainder is represented by China and Japan, with their dependencies.

It was Spain that first founded a world empire. Her explorers, soldiers, and merchants in the sixteenth century planted the Spanish flag all around the earth, the first empire upon which the sun never set. But in the seventeenth century lusty rivals appeared in Holland, France, and England, and the era from 1660 to 1815 was filled with wars in which colonial possessions were very important pawns. The Spanish Empire was weakened by these developments, and Great Britain, when the nineteenth century opened, was the leading world power. The Seven Years' War had put an end to French dreams of domination in India and Can-

ada and had established British mastery of the seas more firmly than ever. During the wars of the revolutionary and Napoleonic eras the naval superiority of Great Britain enabled her to seize most of the remaining French colonies and to acquire Ceylon and Cape Colony from Holland, at this time subject to France. The loss of the Thirteen Colonies, as the result of the War of American Independence, was offset, in part, by the settlement of Australia and later of New Zealand.

The spectacle of the British Empire, so populous, so rich in natural resources, so far-flung, stirred the imagination and aroused the envy of the witnessing nations. They, also, became eager for colonial possessions, which would enhance the national prestige and, it was believed, would conduce to the national welfare. France began to conquer northwestern Africa and Madagascar and to acquire territories in southeastern Asia. Italy and Germany, having attained nationhood, entered into the race for overseas dominions. Portugal and Spain annexed new colonies. Belgium built up a colonial empire in Africa. Russia spread eastward over the whole of Siberia and, having reached the Pacific, moved southward toward the warmer waters of the Indian Ocean. Meanwhile, the United States expanded across North America, secured Alaska, the Hawaiian Islands, and the Philippines, and stood forth at length as a world power.

The word "imperialism" conveniently describes all this activity in reaching out for colonial dependencies. Sometimes imperialism led to the declaration of a protectorate over a desirable region or to the delimitation of an exclusive sphere of influence. Sometimes it went no further than the securing of concessions in an undeveloped country. Frequently, however, it resulted in the complete annexation of a distant territory, with or without the consent of the inhabitants. By 1914 this scramble for territory had produced a world map on which the men of the West had written their conquest of most of the globe.

Backgrounds of Modern Imperialism

The earlier empires of Spain and Portugal, of England, France, and Holland had been trading empires. Only in the Americas was there any considerable settlement, and even there it was largely confined to the coastlands. Islands and strategic harbors, rather than absolute control of the whole territory, had been the aims of the commercial societies before the nineteenth century. But in the nineteenth century Europeans expanded their beachheads and invaded the land behind the coasts. Like most of the phenomena of modern society, industrialism in the Occident undoubtedly is the most significant force behind this expansion,

but any simple explanation of so complex an event as the conquest of the world must inevitably have large areas of falsehood in its texture. To explain imperialism in terms of coal and iron, and to leave out the hopes and aspirations of men, would do great injustice to the facts.

The economic considerations, however, were facts without which the Occident never could or would have accomplished this gigantic enterprise. Before Europe learned to produce goods through the use of power and machinery, the Oriental manufacturer had little trouble holding his own in the markets. Indeed, European craftsmen were hardly the equal of the men of the East. The less civilized areas of the globe held but little commercial interest to Europe except in so far as they could be exploited for their precious metals or through plantations of sugar, rice, coffee, tea, or spices. After the machine began to alter European economy, the Oriental craftsman lost out in many markets, and the new materials needed for the new civilization made the ruder areas of the globe more important as sources of raw stuffs.

Mechanical production allowed Europe to create mountains of textiles, iron and steel products, and other goods that could not be entirely absorbed at home. These goods were usually produced under conditions of decreasing costs; that is, the more units produced, the cheaper each unit in terms of money. This fact encouraged manufacturers to look beyond the frontiers of the Occident for markets. It is a long-standing joke that the textile manufacturer who read in a missionary journal about the uncounted numbers of naked inhabitants of Africa became interested in missionary work. If he could sell one yard of cloth to each of these poor benighted savages, it would help mightily to dispose of the cloth that his looms were turning out. But it was not only among people that heretofore had used no cloth that Europe could find a market. European textiles could undersell Indian and Chinese textiles in the Oriental market. To reach that market, however, it was necessary to have ports, docks, railroads, and warehouses. These items had to be created by Europeans, but they wanted to be sure that their investments were safe. Such security could best be assured by political, i.e., imperial, control over the land in question.

The new machine economy also required raw materials in larger and larger quantities. When the steam-propelled freighter could cheaply transport heavy goods, new items appeared on the world markets. Rare ores like wolframite, copra from coconuts, hemp, mica, flaxseed, and a thousand and one other commodities suddenly could be brought from the ends of the earth to feed the factories of the West. To gather these raw stuffs required transportation; to be assured of a steady supply required control over mines and plantations. This meant that money had

to be invested, and investors wanted a means of security against the native population. Thus, the need of raw materials became a factor in high politics and the expansion of imperial controls.

The fact that the world called for money investments in plantations, mines, warehouses, railroads, and the like was matched by another fact: the West had money to invest. The interest rates in Europe declined throughout the century. As the amount of capital in Europe increased, the income from investments tended to decline. By the fourth quarter of the century good returns could be obtained only by sending capital beyond industrial Europe. In the world beyond the "charmed circle" there were many opportunities for profitable investments. For example, the backward states in North Africa, Morocco, Tunis, and Egypt or in the Near and Middle East — Turkey, Persia, and Greece — were anxious to borrow Western money and willing to pay high rates and good commissions to get the loans. Bankers in England, France, and Germany did not hesitate to loan the money, for there were political ways of making a defaulting debtor pay. One by one these "backward" states fell under control of the "advanced" states through debts that had been incurred at ruinous interest rates. The bankers who made these loans have been called the "jackals of imperialism." They made usurious contracts on the ground that the investment was risky, and then cancelled the risk by calling on battleships and marines.

There were other investments made with a better moral basis. The railroads and harbor installations, plantations and mines also cried for money, and Europe had the money to supply. European entrepreneurs, bankers, or adventurers, would secure concessions or buy up land for plantations, and then return to Europe to sell stocks and bonds in the enterprise. Railroads in Anatolia, tin mines in Malaya, tea plantations in India, and gold mines in Africa were financed by the ever-increasing hoard of capital in industrial Europe. These investments, of course, were made in the form of rails, locomotives, plantations equipment, and manufactured goods of all kinds so that with each loan there was an increasing pressure of goods pouring out of the factories and forges of Europe.

There was another kind of export that aided the development of imperialism: technical and managerial ability. The schools of Europe produced technicians and managers to run the enterprises that were created beyond the seas. Young men eager to make their way in the world, anxious for a quick route to wealth, found an outlet for their energies and opportunities for adventure and worldly goods in pressing Europe's economic controls on the world. These men appeared in every corner of the earth as mining engineers, as directors and managers

of railroads and plantations, and, of course, as public officials who came to rule. The more important of them had the confidence of their governments behind their efforts. A Turkish official complained that the directors of the Berlin to Bagdad Railway talked with the full authority of the German government behind them. The case could be multiplied a hundred times.

Money and manufactured goods, however, do not alone explain the imperialism that developed in the later years of the nineteenth century. Humanitarian and religious interests, too, played a role, and scientific curiosity also had a part. The nineteenth century saw a burst of interest in missionary activity. It almost seemed that western Europe had just discovered the Biblical injunction to preach the Gospel to all nations. The missionaries went everywhere: Africa, Asia, the South Seas. They taught the natives the Word of God and the necessity of wearing clothes; they introduced European goods and values; sometimes they got in trouble with the inhabitants and needed protection. In many places their religious interest was the first contact that Europe had with out-of-the-way areas of the world. The conditions they found stirred European conscience. Europeans have always had a strong reformist streak in their nature and, joyfully, many of them undertook to bring civilization to backward lands. The "White Man's burden" may be a cynical remark today but to the generation before 1914 it was a challenge that many sincere men felt could not be ignored. When explorers and missionaries brought back tales of deplorable conditions in the outer world, many honestly felt that it was the duty of the white man to lead his brown, black, and yellow brothers to a better civilization.

Another source for imperialism is to be found in national patriotism. The interests of merchants and bankers became national interests that found the support of millions of little people who obviously had no direct economic connection with the enterprise. The Bagdad Railway is an excellent example of this development. At first it was the brain child of a few German capitalists. When it became a target for the opposition of Russia and England, it became a German national interest, so that by 1910 little people in Germany called it "our Bagdad Railway." Nationalism had become an article of faith, and imperial interests easily blended with nationalism. Kipling wrote:

God of our fathers, known of old,
Lord of our far-flung battle-line,
Beneath whose awful Hand we hold
Dominion over palm and pine —
Lord God of Hosts, be with us yet,
Lest we forget — lest we forget!


He was appealing to the tribal God of the English Nation, not to the God of "Gentiles . . . or lesser breeds without the Law," and he asked for blessings on the British Empire. Here was a source of imperialism far removed from the counting-house and the factory.

Europe and Asia

Europe's contacts with the East were almost as old as European society itself. Oriental goods had been at a premium on the markets of Europe since Roman days; since the sixteenth century the contact had been direct, by sea, and Oriental goods reached Europe without passing through the hands of Near and Middle Eastern middlemen. India had been the first objective of European merchants, but in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries they also established themselves in the commerce of the fabulously rich East Indian and Chinese areas. Even the markets of Japan, where foreigners were not welcome, were tapped by the Dutch. By the opening of the nineteenth century the coastline of Asia had few secrets that Europeans had not penetrated. India was well known up to the mountains; only the hinterland of China was still something of a mystery. When the time came that Europe could impose her commercial will upon the Orient, most of the information that was needed was available.

The Conquest of India

It should not be surprising that the British conquest of India and the American War for Independence began about the same time. The removal of the French from North America and from India came with the end of the Seven Years' War. In America it produced a situation that allowed the colonists to revolt; in India it gave the British East India Company a free hand to deal with the turbulent Indian political situation. Cornwallis, who lost the battle of Yorktown, recouped his reputation in the native wars in India. The conquest of the land was facilitated by the fact that the native princes were forever at war with each other and under threat of invasion from the Afghans on the northern frontier; the British fished in these muddy political waters for allies and enemies. The allies they made into dependent protectorates; the enemies they made British possessions. Sometimes the Indian princes attacked the British settlements and were repulsed and overcome; sometimes the lawless condition of their states led to intervention; and sometimes, again, the need of finding defensible frontiers resulted in annexations. In 1857 British dominion was seriously threatened by the Indian



Extension of British Rule in India

Mutiny. What began as a revolt of some of the sepoys, or native soldiers in the army, quickly spread to the people generally, among whom there was much vague fear that the British intended to make everybody Christian. The rulers of the principal native states remained faithful, however, and Great Britain poured in reinforcements from every quarter. Bloodily conducted, the mutiny was at length as bloodily suppressed.

Until this time India had been largely controlled by the East India Company, a private corporation organized for profit. The mutiny disclosed the weakness of company rule, and in 1858 Parliament passed an Act for the Better Government of India, transferring all governmental functions to the crown. Nineteen years later Queen Victoria assumed the title of Empress of India.

Two-thirds of the area of India and three-fourths of its population were ruled directly from London through the Secretary of State for

India, a member of the British cabinet. The actual administration rested in the hands of a Viceroy, appointed for a term of five years. He was assisted by an Indian legislature, which contained native as well as British members, and by the officials of the Indian Civil Service, also open to natives. The Viceroy's seat was the old Mogul capital of Delhi. The remainder of India consisted of the princely or feudatory states, numbering about seven hundred. Most of them were states which submitted without opposition to British authority. Great Britain controlled their foreign affairs and preserved order, but did not interfere in their local concerns.

Great Britain enforced peace — the *Pax Britannica* — throughout India; provided an unbiased and unbought system of justice; built roads and railways; stamped out the famines and plagues formerly so destructive of human life; and reduced the death rate by improved sanitation and the spread of medical knowledge. The prevention of infanticide and the abolition of wife suicide (suttee) and other barbarous customs also stand to the credit of Great Britain. Efforts were made to provide for primary education, a task of enormous difficulty in a land where illiteracy is general. India, under British sway, supported a larger and more prosperous population than ever before in its long history.

British rule in India has been facilitated by the fact that the inhabitants of this subcontinent of Asia speak a babel of tongues, profess many different religions, and represent a variety of cultures. In the nineteenth century it was comparatively easy to rule the land because of the divisions between its peoples. Some educated Indians may have dreamed of an Indian nationalism that would expel the British rulers, but the divisions between Hindus and Mohammedans, the rigid caste system, the multiplicity of languages and dialects and cultures were insurmountable barriers to any united action. Furthermore as long as England was powerful on land and sea, these prophets of a "free India" could not expect that their efforts would find success. It was only when England lost some of her power in the war of 1914-1918 and more of it in the truce between 1919 and 1939 that the nationalists could hope for some success. The shattering blow to British prestige in 1942, when the Japanese drove them out of Singapore, may be the fact that will make these dreams of the prophets come true, even though Britain emerged on the side of the victors in the great war, 1939-1945.

India was as important to England as England was to India. England gave India a sense of unity and her first contacts with the civilization of the West. On the other hand, India was an immense source of wealth to Englishmen. Plantations, railroads, docks, and factories scattered all over the land represented an enormous capital investment that paid

handsome dividends to bondholders and stockholders. The markets of India that absorbed all sorts of manufactures — from stockings and cloth to steel rails and cranes — furnished an important outlet for the factories in England. The Indian service, both official and commercial, beckoned to young Englishmen with promises of wealth and adventure awaiting them. The actual government often was not a profitable venture when one considers the expense of defending the country as well as of administering it, but England found in India a treasure that Englishmen could use to make themselves and their homeland rich. It is small wonder that the pleas for independence and for recognition of Indian nationalist aspirations were not readily accepted in English governing circles.


China and Europe

The penetration of China by Western influence presented a more difficult problem than that of India. As we have seen, India was a land of warring rulers in the eighteenth century, a perfect target for a vigorous imperialism. By the opening of the nineteenth century the British had established a secure foothold from which to conquer the land. China's history was somewhat different. The last of the nine imperial lines which ruled China for upwards of three thousand years was the Ch'ing ("Pure") Dynasty, established by the Manchu Tatars in 1644. The early Manchu emperors did not rest satisfied with the Eighteen Provinces for their dominions, but by sweeping conquests acquired both outer and inner Mongolia, Sinkiang (the "New Territory"), and Tibet. On the southwest and south, Nepal, Burma, and Annam became Chinese tributaries. The empire, about the middle of the eighteenth century, was four times as large as that of ancient Rome.

The Manchus made no radical innovations in Chinese society. The civil service examinations were retained, and native officials were left in most administrative positions. Confucius continued to be highly honored, and both Taoism and Buddhism received recognition as state religions. Chinese literature and learning also enjoyed imperial patronage. But the Manchus never allowed the Chinese to forget who were masters. In order to keep the people in subjection, garrisons were established at strategic points throughout the country. The Chinese were also required to adopt the Tatar mode of shaving the front of the head and braiding the hair in a long queue, as a badge of submission to their foreign overlords.

Under the later Manchu emperors trading relations between China and the Western peoples began to assume importance. The chief exports from China were tea, porcelain, fine cotton, and silks; the chief

Asiatic and European Civilization



(After Friedrich Ratzel)

imports were opium and specie. When the nineteenth century opened, the Portuguese were already established at Macao and the Dutch and English at Canton. Americans sent their first ship to Canton in 1784 and during subsequent years did some business in exchanging furs for Chinese goods. There was also some traffic overland between Russia and China.

Foreign trade had little attraction for the Chinese, who considered themselves to be amply supplied with all things needful from their own products. Consequently, foreigners at Canton were compelled to pay high duties on both exports and imports and were subjected to many vexatious restrictions. The Chinese reasoned that if Europeans persisted in thrusting their trade upon China they ought not to object to any regulations laid down by the authorities. Europeans, on the other hand, looked upon China as a profitable field for commercial expansion. Conscious of their armed strength, they were prepared to secure by force what could not be secured by diplomacy.

Opium had long been one of the principal exports from India to China. The Chinese government, aware of the evil effects of the drug and also alarmed by the drain of silver resulting from its sale, demanded that all opium in the possession of British merchants at Canton should be surrendered to the imperial commissioner for destruction. This was done, but his subsequent demands seemed to them so onerous that they retired from Canton and found shelter at Hong Kong. Open war between Great Britain and China soon broke out. The British defended it as necessary to secure proper treatment of their subjects in China; to the Chinese it appeared an attempt to force opium upon them. Since the British were determined to secure commercial privileges in China and the Chinese were equally determined not to grant them, the so-called Opium War (1840-1842) may be included in the category of "inevitable" wars. Actual fighting was limited almost entirely to naval attacks on the coast cities of southern China. The British, with their modern fleet, won an easy victory.

The conditions of peace, as arranged at Nanking in 1842, contained several clauses of much importance in view of the later relations of China with European powers. First, Canton, Shanghai, and three other cities south of the Yangtze River became "treaty ports," open to foreign trade. Second, regular tariff rates were to be imposed, in place of the arbitrary duties levied by Chinese officials. China to some extent thus surrendered to foreigners the control of her customs system. Third, the island of Hong Kong was ceded to Great Britain, an action which furnished a precedent for other cessions of Chinese territory to foreign nations. Fourth, an indemnity was exacted for the loss of the

opium and the expenses of the war, in this way establishing still another precedent for future dealings with China. Fifth, the Treaty of Nanking proclaimed the equality of Great Britain and China. Hitherto, Europeans had been regarded by the Chinese as barbarians ("foreign devils"); henceforth, the Chinese might no longer assume that "there is only one sun in the heavens, and there is only one emperor on earth."

The Great Powers in China

During the forties and fifties of the nineteenth century the treaties made by Great Britain, France, Russia, and the United States with China undermined the high wall behind which that country had tried to isolate itself from the Western world. These new contacts with the West combined with the weakness of the Chinese government to produce a great civil war in the middle of the century. The Taiping rebellion (1848-1865) almost overthrew the Manchu rule, but its leader lacked military genius, and the foreigners and wealthy Chinese threw their support against the rebels. While this conflict was in progress, the pressure of Western merchants and governments fomented another "opium" war. The problem was larger than merely legalizing the opium traffic, although that was one of the results of the war. The Westerners wanted more ports opened to their trade; they wanted larger extraterritorial privileges for their nationals; they wanted freer rights to exploit the coolie trade; and they wanted control over the tariff that China could charge against Western goods entering the country. In 1860, after a confused period of negotiation, an Anglo-French army invaded the city of Peking. The city was looted, the Summer Palace, one of the most beautiful buildings in the Orient, was burned. The Europeans got their "rights" in China; the Chinese got a renewed impression that the "foreign devils" were really barbarians.

In the years following 1860 the Chinese government could not prevent the extension of foreign influence. The concessions had given foreigners control over China's tariff policy, had created an extraterritorial system of courts under foreign control, and had established foreign powers at Shanghai and Hong Kong. On the edges of the Manchu Empire France conquered Indo-China, and Great Britain acquired Burma; both of these lands had formerly been vassal states of the Chinese Empire. But the greatest blows were yet to come. The island kingdom of Japan, rejuvenated and reorganized along Western lines, also entered the race for imperial control and introduced a new period of foreign intervention in China.

As soon as Japan adopted Western military, industrial, and political

patterns, she too began to look about for opportunities to expand. The "hermit kingdom" of Korea was a natural target for her activities. Korea had maintained her closed-door policy in part because she was a vassal of China, and in part because there were other, richer prizes for Western imperialism. It was to be Japan that "opened" Korea to modern civilization. The method adopted was a copy of the European tactics of the era. Japan went to war with China (1894-1895) not, of course, to annex Korea but only to assure for Korea the advantages of Western civilization. When the war was successfully completed, Japan appeared with a series of demands that would have given her control over a large area of North China.

Japan's ambitions, however, conflicted with Russia's. She demanded control over territory that the Russians had marked out for themselves, and hurriedly Russia, supported by Germany and France, intervened to "protect" China from Japan. It was the German ambassador who brutally informed Japan that she had overstepped her place in the Far East, but it was the threat of the Russo-Franco-German Entente that forced Japan to back down and accept a smaller "bite" of Chinese territory. Japan secured the island of Formosa and the Pescadores, the right to "protect" Korea, and a substantial money indemnity.

Within a few years the very powers that had "saved" China from her lusty neighbor brought their own demands for payment. Two German Catholic missionaries had the misfortune to be murdered by irate Chinese (1897). German troops landed on Chinese soil and soon "had the situation well in hand." Unlike the Japanese, who had demanded annexation of a part of China's mainland territory, the Germans asked only for a ninety-nine year lease on the port of Kiaochow with economic concessions in the hinterland of the Shantung peninsula! Germany's action started the avalanche. Russia obtained a lease over Port Arthur and rights in the hinterland of Manchuria. Britain, to watch Germany and Russia, secured comparable rights at Weihaiwei, and France acquired a lease over Kwangchow Bay. A French priest unfortunately was murdered in time to assist the negotiations so that France also demanded 100,000 francs indemnity, a chapel, and a railway concession.

By 1899, just four years after her defeat by Japan, it seemed that China was ready for division among the great powers. It remained only to settle which territories would fall to each of the "heirs" of the Manchus. Spheres of influence, railway concessions, and the behind-the-scenes discussions of diplomats seemed to indicate that the West intended to make China another India. At this point the Spanish-American War introduced the United States into the Far East as a mili-

tary and colonial power. Dewey's victory at Manila planted American influence firmly in the Orient. Only a few years before, the United States had moved into Samoa and Hawaii; the Philippines gave her a new advanced base for operations in the Far East.

The United States was late in the scramble for Chinese concessions. By the turn of the century British investments in China totalled \$260,300,000; Russian, \$246,043,000; German, \$164,282,000; French, \$91,120,000. American investments were only \$24,700,000. The United States government clearly saw that if a partition of China were made, American interests, particularly trading interests, would suffer. Current practices tended toward monopolistic controls. John Hay, the United States Secretary of State, came forth with a new policy, the "open door." This was a buttress to Chinese sovereignty against the greedy pressures of the concessionaires, for it meant that no power would have the right to monopolize any of China's lands to the exclusion of the others. Hay, of course, could not expect to cancel the leaseholds that had been granted, but he did attempt to halt the disintegrating tendencies that were attacking China.

Foreign intervention, as might be expected, finally roused the Chinese. Some of them felt that China must reform; others, hostile to the West and all its works, were ready to strike at the "foreign devils" with violence. Enlightened members of the commercial and literary classes began to realize that China must adopt Western ideas and methods if the country was to escape dismemberment. A reform movement, starting in Canton, spread through the southern and central provinces and finally reached Peking. It won the favor of the young emperor, Kuang Hsu, who, upon reaching his majority, had freed himself from the regency of the empress-dowager, Tzu Hsi. Early in 1898 he issued a series of edicts, which, had they been carried out, would have suddenly transformed Chinese society. The fossilized civil service examinations were to be brought up to date by introducing Western subjects of study. A number of temples were to be closed to religious services and opened for educational purposes. A national bureau was to be created for the translation and dissemination of standard works of European literature and science. Young men of intellectual promise were to be sent abroad to acquire foreign languages and culture. Other imperial measures provided for a reorganization of the army and for various improvements in the antiquated system of government. China was to be made over, much as Japan had been made over thirty years previously.

The reform movement found no support with the majority of Chinese officials, who remained content with the old order, or with the intensely conservative Tzu Hsi ("the only man in China"), who wished

to recover her power. Late in 1898 the dowager-empress, with the aid of the army, which was still controlled by reactionaries, carried out a *coup d'état*. The emperor was shut up in his palace and forced to restore the regency; many prominent reformers were imprisoned, exiled, or executed; and the reform edicts were canceled. Henceforth the word of Tzu Hsi was law, and her word was reaction.

The reactionary tide culminated in the Boxer uprising of 1900. The Boxers, popularly so called by foreigners, were bodies of local militia organized by Tzu Hsi after her seizure of power. They believed that the spirits defending China felt incensed at the introduction of Western novelties and had made them invulnerable to Western weapons. Their banners bore the device, "Exterminate the foreigners and save the dynasty." The Boxers destroyed European churches, business houses, and residences, and murdered missionaries and native Christians. The foreigners in Peking took refuge in the legation quarters, where after a desperate defence they were finally released by an international army composed of European, Japanese, and American troops. The great powers then made peace with China and promised henceforth to respect her territory. They insisted, however, on the payment of a heavy indemnity for the losses suffered by foreigners. Part of the American share of the indemnity was later returned to the Chinese, to be used to provide scholarships for their students in the United States.

The humiliating results of the Boxer uprising convinced even Tzu Hsi and her advisers that China must submit to Westernizing. The abolition of the old-style examinations, the foundation of elementary and higher schools teaching modern subjects in a modern way, the reorganization of the army and navy, and the introduction of railroads, telegraph lines, factories, and machinery were evidence that China had begun to awaken from the sleep of centuries.

The death of Tzu Hsi in 1908 (Kuang Hsu had died the same year) removed the last prominent representative of the Manchu Dynasty. The late emperor's nephew, who succeeded to the throne, was only a child. Conditions therefore favored the more radical reformers, who, not satisfied with the constitutional government promised them by the Manchus, determined to make China a republic. The guiding spirit of the republican movement was Sun Yat Sen, a doctor of medicine and a Christian in religion. While yet a youth, he had tried to incite a rebellion in Canton and had been obliged to take refuge abroad. Years of exile in foreign lands familiarized him with Western ways and brought him the support of liberal-minded Chinese, particularly in the United States and Japan. Many of his disciples now returned home to lay the train which soon set China ablaze with revolutionary fires. The

revolution broke out late in 1911 and in 1912 led to the abdication of the child emperor. China then became a republic.

The Chinese of the northern provinces are unlike those of the southern in physique, speech, and customs. These differences have always kept the two sections apart, and after the revolution they continued to prevent any real unification of the country. Constant struggles between ambitious military governors, together with much brigandage in the interior districts, also helped to produce unsettled conditions throughout the greater part of China. For a time there were two rival governments, at Peking and Canton, but eventually North and South co-operated in the formation of a single government centering at Nanking and controlled by the Kuomintang (People's Party), which developed from the revolutionary groups organized by Sun Yat Sen. He died in 1925. His loyal disciple and associate, Chiang Kai-shek, then emerged from the welter of revolution and civil war to become the leader of the New China.

Japan

The pressure of the West upon Japan produced a very different reaction than it did upon China. Japan was the first non-Occidental state to adopt the external characteristics of Western civilization. In less than a century after Japan was "opened" to Western influences, she had defeated one European power (Russia, 1905) and challenged both the United States and Britain to a war that ended disastrously to herself. The Japanese did not wait for Europeans to exploit their country. They aggressively adopted Europe's methods to their own advantage.

The empire of Japan, formed by a long cluster of islands, many very small and uninhabited, stretches crescentwise off the coast of eastern Asia. Four large islands of the central group (Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu) constitute Japan proper, or Nippon, the "Land of the Rising Sun." Only about one-sixth of the land is under cultivation, because so much of it lies in a cold belt unfitted for typical Japanese farming and a large part of the rest consists of mountains. Rice, the principal food of the people and the basis of *sake*, their national drink, is the leading crop. Barley, rye, tea, and tobacco are the next most important products. There are extensive forests, largely state-owned. The government encourages the planting of mulberry and camphor trees, which give rise to profitable industries. Coal, iron, copper, and petroleum are found, but in limited quantities. The deep inlets of the coast provide commodious harbors and the many rivers, though neither large nor long, supply abundant water power. The seas about the islands teem with fish, which enter largely into the diet of the people.

The Japanese live in a land of noble mountains, green, softly modeled valleys, moonlit lakes, rapid streams, and sparkling waterfalls, a land of trees and fruits and flowers. So attractive an environment could scarcely fail to develop an appreciation of natural beauty among the people. Their sensitiveness finds constant expression in the fine arts and also in poetry, landscape gardening, and the popular festivals — the autumn nights of full moon, the first fall of snow in winter, and in spring the flowering of the fruit trees. Not without reason did a Japanese poet liken the exquisite cherry blooms of April to the "soul of Japan."

The Japanese seem to be descended mainly from Mongols, Koreans, and North Chinese, who emigrated probably several centuries before the Christian era, conquered the aborigines, and drove them northward to the inhospitable island of Hokkaido. There are also strong strains of Malay blood in the population. Out of the mixed swarms of invaders a more or less homogeneous people gradually developed. In disposition the Japanese are described as light-hearted and pleasure-loving, yet stoical enough to repress in public all outward displays of emotion. Great frugality, an extraordinary politeness, resulting in much attention to etiquette and ceremonial, and an altruistic spirit which sets the welfare of the social group above the interests of the individual are national characteristics. Other qualities possessed by the people in a marked degree include obedience, the result of many centuries of autocratic government; a martial spirit; and an intense patriotism. "Thou shalt honor the gods and love thy country" is the first commandment of the popular faith.

The language of Japan exhibits no affinity in grammatical construction to that of China, and in vocabulary it is polysyllabic whereas Chinese is monosyllabic. For writing it the Japanese went to the wilderness of Chinese characters and used these to represent, not entire words, but syllables. There are two syllabaries, both dating from the eighth century of the Christian era. The longer one contains about three hundred signs; the shorter one has only a single character for each of the forty-seven distinct syllables in the language.

The national faith is Shinto (the "Way of the Gods"), essentially a worship of the powers of nature personified as gods and goddesses. It has always been closely associated with the interests of the imperial dynasty, thus becoming almost as much a political as a religious institution. The chief deity is *Amaterasu*, the sun goddess, the divine ancestress of the imperial family. The idea of sin never occurs in Shinto and prayer is absent from it, but magical rites and sacrifices to bring material good things (rain in time of drought, victory to the armies)

bulk large in it. Without a founder and without a creed, Shinto today is the sole example of a primitive religion surviving as that of a great power.

Introduction of Chinese Culture into Japan

Beginning in the seventh century of the Christian era, the Japanese began to absorb many features of Chinese culture, just as in the nineteenth century they were to reach halfway around the globe and take over the best that Europe had to offer in the arts and sciences. Confucianism found ready acceptance in Japan, where it strengthened the reverence for parents and the worship of ancestors. Chinese Buddhism, introduced by way of Korea, brought new ideas of the spiritual life, of personal salvation, and of self-renunciation. All Japanese are nominally Buddhists, as well as adherents of Shinto. Writing, literature, philosophy, the fine arts, the calendar, medicine, education, law, official customs, court ceremonialism, and even the popular superstitions of Japan reflect the abiding influence of China.

The Chinese did not force their civilization upon the Japanese. The islanders visited the mainland to acquire it; they also encouraged Chinese scholars, merchants, and artisans to settle among them as preceptors of the people. From the older country the younger country received a cultural legacy comparable to that which the modern nations of Europe have had from ancient Greece and Rome. Yet while borrowing from China, Japan did not do so slavishly; she took only what seemed suited to her needs, and what she took was wrought into the fabric of the national life. The same process of assimilation has marked the Westernizing of Japan in our own times.

The Government of Old Japan; Feudalism

The Japanese begin their history with the gods. Their most ancient annals tell how Ninigi, a grandson of the sun goddess, received a divine commission to rule Japan and received as evidence of sovereignty the jewels, sword, and mirror that are still the insignia of Japanese emperors. His grandson, Jimmu Tenno, the first mikado (*mi*, "sublime," and *kado*, "gate"), is said to have mounted the throne in 660 B.C., a date which marks the beginning of the Japanese era. From Jimmu Tenno all the mikados are believed to have followed in an unbroken line—the oldest existing dynasty in the world. The empire thus established included only a few hundred square miles (the province of Yamato) on the island of Honshu. Such is the story of the founding of Japan.

Jimmu Tenno and his successors, being offspring of the sun goddess, were themselves regarded as divine. Their association with the sun is expressed by the Japanese national flag, which shows a red sun on a white ground. Japan was the only great power in the world ruled by a sovereign regarded as an actual living deity. Man-gods were found in ancient Peru and Egypt and are still to be found among the dusky potentates of Africa.

The mikado reigned in state from his capital of Kyoto. He reigned, but from the seventh century of the Christian era onward he often did not rule. The government fell more and more into the hands of the leading families. In 1192 a military leader, Yoritomo, made himself master of the empire and took the title of shogun (*sho*, "general," and *gun*, "army"). The mikado became only a puppet ruler, having the shadow of authority but not its substance. No attempt was made to depose him, however, because of his acknowledged sanctity. The situation affords a curious parallel to that among the Franks, when the Merovingian kings were thrust into the background by their all-powerful "mayors of the palace."

The period of the shogunate was also the feudal period in Japan. Two-thirds of the arable land was parceled out among less than three hundred nobles (daimyos), who held their estates from the shogun, in return for military service when called upon. The daimyos lived in fortified castles and enjoyed all the rights of petty sovereigns, levying taxes, coining money, administering a rude justice, keeping armed forces, and indulging in constant warfare with one another. Their knights, or retainers, were called samurai. Far beneath this warrior class came farmers, artisans, and traders, the last standing lowest in the social scale. The commoners, though much more numerous than the samurai, really counted for nothing, except to pay the taxes and labor for the comfort and luxury of their superiors. It was all quite like the contemporary feudalism in western Europe.

A samurai, the "man that handled the bow and arrow," as he styled himself, was exclusively a fighter. He despised money, regarded all bread-winning pursuits with contempt, and lived only to serve his lord. Fealty to the daimyo required him, if necessary, to sacrifice wife, children, liberty, and even life itself. Suicide by disembowelment (*hara-kiri*) was frequently resorted to by a samurai as an expression of sorrow for the death of his lord or sometimes as a means of turning the latter from an unwise or unworthy course. Extreme sensitiveness on points of honor also marked a samurai; his sword must instantly leap from its scabbard to avenge a personal affront or one to his lord. This moral code, with its insistence upon courage, loyalty, and personal honor,

was *bushido* (the "Way of the Warrior"). It did not disappear with the passing of feudalism. Transformed into loyalty to the nation, as personified in the mikado, it became the source of that ardent patriotism so characteristic of the modern Japanese.

Japan Secluded

Portuguese, Spaniards, and Dutch first came to Japan in the sixteenth century. The government welcomed these strangers, who brought, among other interesting things, firearms and gunpowder. They also brought Christianity, which was propagated by Jesuit missionaries. The rapid progress of the new religion alarmed the authorities, for it seemed likely to disintegrate the fabric of Japanese society and might even bring Japan into political dependence upon foreign countries. A severe persecution of the native converts extinguished Christianity, and both Portuguese and Spaniards were expelled from the country during the first half of the seventeenth century. The Dutch, who had shown themselves less eager to spread their Protestant faith than their rivals to spread Catholicism, were allowed to maintain a single trading post. All other Europeans were forbidden to approach the shores of Japan under pain of death. A decree issued in 1636 made it a capital offense for Japanese to go abroad and further prohibited them from building ships large enough to make an ocean voyage. Previously the Japanese had been adventurous seamen, sailing to Korea, China, and Siam; henceforth they had to remain in their island home, cut off from intercourse with the rest of the world.

Meanwhile, important changes were taking place in Japanese society, especially in the old feudal system. The daimyos gradually lost much of their power after the shogun required them to reside for half the year at his court and during the other half to keep hostages there for their good behavior. The daimyos were also virtually disarmed, being forbidden to alter or enlarge their castles, to equip more than a handful of horsemen, or to use firearms. The petty warfare that had so long desolated Japan now ceased entirely, and the land enjoyed the "Great Peace."

The decline of feudalism, in Japan as in western Europe, fostered the national spirit. The Japanese felt more and more conscious of their unity and took renewed interest in their native history and institutions. The effect of this movement was to create a popular feeling in favor of the mikado, as the head of the Shinto religion and representative of the nation, and thus to weaken the authority of the shogun. During this period some knowledge of the outside world began to penetrate

Japan from the Dutch traders, while foreign news also trickled in from Korea and China. The prohibition hitherto resting on the importation of books was removed, and the Japanese began to study translations of European geographies, histories, and scientific works. When the foreigners came to Japan, determined to establish intercourse with it, the people were not total strangers to the West.

Foreign Intercourse with Japan

Competition between the Occidental powers for Oriental trade had led to the forcible opening up of China. Japan naturally came next. It was not, however, Great Britain or Russia, but the United States, which put the first pressure on Japan to end a hermitlike existence. By the middle of the nineteenth century California had been acquired from Mexico and American ships were sailing from San Francisco to the new treaty ports of China. Japan lay in the direct path of the ships, so that it became a vital matter that her harbors should be accessible to them for restocking and refitting. The government of the United States decided, therefore, to induce the Japanese to enter into commercial relations, by persuasion if possible, by force of arms if necessary. President Fillmore now sent a squadron of steam warships, under Commodore Matthew Perry, to Japan. He arrived there in 1853, with a presidential letter to the mikado dwelling on the advantages to be derived from the establishment of commercial intercourse between the two countries. Perry also carried with him, as presents to sugar the American pill, the electric telegraph and a model railway. He then steamed away, but returned in 1854 with a larger and more formidable fleet. Duly impressed by the sight, the Japanese signed a treaty which permitted American vessels to be fueled and provisioned in Japanese ports. Four years later another treaty allowed Americans to trade in Japan. The diplomatic ice being thus broken, various European countries received similar commercial privileges. No longer secluded, Japan had entered on the path which was so soon to lead her to world power.

The Japanese Revolution

Thoughtful Japanese, however great their dislike of foreigners, could not fail to recognize the superiority of Western peoples in the arts of war and peace. They advocated a resumption of intercourse with the outside world, in order that Japan might prepare herself as quickly as possible to resist future acts of aggression. These reformers became increasingly influential in the decade following Perry's visits, and their

arguments for opening Japan were reinforced by the guns of the hated strangers. In 1863 a British fleet bombarded a Japanese city as punishment for the murder of an Englishman in Japan, and two years later the allied fleets of Great Britain, France, Holland, and the United States demolished the forts guarding the Strait of Shimonoseki (between Honshu and Kyushu), which the government was determined to keep closed to foreign shipping. The military helplessness of Japan stood clearly revealed. At the same time, the country was vexed by internal disorders, for a rebellion had been started against the shogun by some of his powerful feudatories. It was under such circumstances that in 1867 the shogun yielded to the growing national sentiment for the restoration of the imperial regime and resigned his office. The mikado Mutsuhito, who now became the actual as well as titular sovereign, reigned for forty-four years (1867-1912), an era of "Enlightened Government."

Mutsuhito moved his residence from Kyoto to Tokyo, a coastal city favorably situated for commerce. Instead of shutting himself up in the recesses of the imperial palace, as previous mikados had done, he appeared in public and even allowed foreign ambassadors to gaze upon his sacred person. An imperial edict in 1871 abolished feudalism, ~~together with the social distinctions between the samurai and the commoner.~~ At the same time the Japanese began to send their sons to Europe and America to study and spy out the secrets of the West. For two generations the universities, particularly of Europe, swarmed with Japanese students. They were interested in everything, and they carried home with them the science as well as the political patterns of the West to adapt them to their own society.

In 1889 Japan received a written constitution, providing for a parliament (Diet) of two chambers and a cabinet appointed by and responsible to the mikado. A ruler by divine right, the vicegerent on earth of the gods in heaven, the mikado remained the final source of all authority. The constitutional system resembled that of imperial Germany before the first World War rather than that of republican France or monarchical England. It should be added that this constitution allowed control of affairs to be largely taken over by the militarist elements, who, after 1931, reduced the imperial throne to a mere symbol behind which to work their will.

(The revolutionary movement affected almost every aspect of Japanese society. All were equally subjects of the emperor. It now became possible to establish compulsory military service. The army was modeled upon that of Prussia and the navy upon that of Great Britain. Codes of civil and criminal law were drawn up to accord with those of western Europe. Common schools were established everywhere, and

attendance was made compulsory. Many high schools and technical institutions and several imperial universities were founded to provide for secondary and higher education. The Gregorian solar calendar was adopted, replacing the Chinese lunar calendar. The decimal system was introduced. A government postal and telegraph system went into operation. European costume came into use, especially among the official and upper classes. Buildings in the cities began to follow Western architectural styles. Banks, railroads, and steamship lines were multiplied. The abundant water power and cheap labor available made possible modern methods of manufacturing. Factories sprang up on every side and machine-made goods were added to the artistic productions of hand workers. Japan became an industrial nation and a competitor of Europe and America for the trade of the world. All this was accomplished within less than a half century. History records no other instance of so rapid a transformation in the political, social, and economic life of a great people.

Expansion of Japan

Once in possession of Western arts, sciences, and industries, Japan began her advance into eastern Asia. Behind this movement was the persistent pressure of numbers. The population of Japan, for at least two centuries before the opening of the country, had been almost stationary, but it has been increasing rapidly in recent decades with industrialization and the growth of cities. The increase is also partly due to successful efforts on the part of the government to stamp out infanticide and abortion. About a million persons are added annually to a population now half as large as that of the United States, but occupying four islands whose total area is somewhat less than that of California. Curtailment by birth control being out of the question and emigration to Australia, the United States, and other "white" territories being prohibited, the Japanese turned their faces westward, determined to find in the Asiatic continent more land for cultivation, raw materials for their industries, new markets, and opportunities for the profitable investment of capital. To the economic causes of territorial aggrandizement, must be added the desire of Japanese imperialists to set up a barrier against the eastward advance of the Russian colossus. And dreams of national greatness, with Japan as the lord of Asia, gave driving force to the movement for expansion.


As the result of the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), Japan detached Korea from the Chinese Empire and later annexed that kingdom; she also acquired the island of Formosa. In 1904-1905 came the Russo-

Japanese War, with Manchuria as the bone of contention. Russia wanted to convert that rich but sparsely settled territory into a subject province, closed to all non-Russian trade; Japan wanted to keep it open for her own commercial and industrial exploitation. After much heavy fighting by land and sea, both sides accepted the suggestion of President Theodore Roosevelt to arrange terms of peace. The treaty, as signed at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, recognized the claims of Japan in Korea, transferred to Japan the special privileges in the Liaotung peninsula which Russia had previously secured from China, and provided for the evacuation of Manchuria by both contestants. Russia also ceded to Japan the southern half of the island of Sakhalin.

In 1902 Great Britain concluded with Japan a defensive alliance, providing that if either ally went to war to defend its Far Eastern interests, the other would remain neutral, and that if either was attacked by two or more belligerents, the other would come to its assistance. After the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War the scope of the alliance was widened, and each contracting party pledged itself to help the other in case the possessions of either in eastern Asia and India were attacked by a single state. The alliance was renewed in 1911 for a period of ten years. Meanwhile, both France and Russia entered into an understanding with Japan for the preservation of peace in the Far East. As the twentieth century dawned, European and Asiatic affairs were inextricably mingled; the great game of power politics had begun to be played in Asia as in Europe.

Russia in the Far East

The only European power that had a land connection with the Far East was Russia. Russian fur traders, trappers, missionaries, and adventurers early began to spread over the gentle slopes of the Urals and between these mountains and the Caspian Sea, where the great plain of Russia merges into the still greater plain of Siberia. Before the end of the sixteenth century they had secured Sibir, a Mongol capital from which the whole region takes its name, and by the end of the seventeenth century they had occupied Kamchatka and faced the Pacific. Their expansion over this enormous but thinly peopled wilderness was facilitated by its magnificent rivers, which served as highways. Northern Siberia is a waste of swamps and tundra, where the terrible climate blocks the mouths of the streams with ice and even in summer keeps the ground frozen beneath the surface. Farther south comes a great belt of forest, the finest timbered area still intact on the face of the earth, and still farther south extend treeless steppes, adapted in part to farming

[illegible]

and in part to herding. Siberia also contains much mineral wealth. In order to secure an outlet for Siberian products, Russia in 1860 compelled China to cede the lower Amur valley, with the adjoining sea-coast, and here founded Vladivostok as a naval base.

In 1900 the imperial government completed the Trans-Siberian Railway between St. Petersburg and Vladivostok, a distance of six thousand miles. It was intended primarily to facilitate the movement of troops and munitions, but it also fostered the economic development of Siberia as a home for Russian emigrants and a market for Russian manufacturers. This railroad also represented Russia's political thrust into East Asia. Vladivostok is not an ice-free, year-round port and therefore not a satisfactory terminus for the railroad. Russia needed an ice-free harbor. This led to an interest in Manchuria, Korea, and Port Arthur where a suitable outlet for the great transcontinental railroad could be found. The Manchurian railroads that were built in connection with the trans-Siberian line were a bid for eventual control of the whole area between the Amur Valley and Mongolia; but here Russian imperialism met the aggressive imperialism of Japan. In 1905 the Russo-Japanese war temporarily decided the issue in favor of the island kingdom, but the weight of Russian land mass behind North China and Manchuria could not be counterbalanced by mere control of Port Arthur. By 1909, when the imperial government began to recover some of the prestige lost in the war, Russia again appeared as a vigorous contender for power in the Far East, but this time she was willing to make a treaty with Japan to regulate the spheres of influence of the two powers. A generation later that power, under Soviet auspices, had grown to the point where Russia could join in the overthrow of her Oriental rival and re-establish her claim for control over northeast Asia.

The Middle East

In Middle Asia, between China and India on one side and Russia and Turkey on the other, there is a land potentially rich in raw materials and very important strategically to the rulers both of Russia and of India. Afghanistan and Persia and a host of minor principalities that in one way or another were tied to these two ancient states, were buffers between Russia and Great Britain. These were sleepy, medieval kingdoms with cultural and political traditions distilled from Islamic and earlier cultures; they were quite inadequately prepared to meet the pressure of Western civilization.

In the seventies and eighties of the nineteenth century Russian military forces pressed in from the north and British from the south. From

the Caspian Sea to Sinkiang the Russians carved out an empire where cotton, cherries, wool, wines, and a host of other raw stuffs and foods could be raised. With the slogan "Peace and Plenty" they brought order and law to the nomadic as well as to the settled population in the area. At the same time the British rounded off the conquest of India from the south and began the penetration of Afghanistan and Persia.

Persia was more important than Afghanistan. To Russia, Persia might offer a warm water outlet to the south. It was just this fact that made Persia strategically important to the English, for no British government could admit the possibility of a foreign power's establishing bases on the Persian Gulf. In 1899 Lord Curzon's naval demonstration in those waters and a debate in the House of Commons practically declared a British "Monroe Doctrine" over the whole Persian Gulf area. The English were resolved to stop Russia from coming to the Gulf through Persia, and Germany from reaching the Gulf via the Bagdad Railway. The discovery of oil in both Persia and Iraq under British auspices reinforced Great Britain's intentions to make the Middle East their own reservation.

After 1905, when Russia was weakened by the Russo-Japanese war, and both Russia and England were concerned over the growing power of Germany, the two Middle Eastern powers reached an agreement. In 1907 they divided the area into spheres of influence, and mutually agreed to exclude any third power (Germany). This agreement stabilized the Middle East until the World War of 1914-1918 but it could not be a permanent solution, for both Russia and Great Britain needed control over the area to round out their imperial ambitions.

Southeastern Asia

Europeans first established themselves in southeastern Asia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Portuguese trading station at Timor, the Dutch possessions in Java and the neighboring islands, and the British posts at Singapore and Penang antedated the late nineteenth century thrust for colonial possessions. From these lands Europeans had imported spices, drugs, and other Oriental goods ever since they came in contact with the East. In the nineteenth century, however, the area grew in importance until it became as rich a possession as Europeans had anywhere. Rubber, tin, oil, hemp, rice, coffee, and a host of other commodities important for the expanding industrial society of the West were to be found in abundance in southeastern Asia.

The Dutch and the English were the first to establish extensive colonies, and were able to hold and expand the area under their control. The

Dutch Empire in the Indies may be considered a junior partner of the British Empire, but in many ways it was a more profitable venture than that of the British. France under Napoleon III and the Third Republic got a hold in the area by beginning the conquest of Indo-China, and the United States by the annexation of the Philippines also took over a valuable possession. The Germans, late in the game of island-grabbing, had to content themselves with the Solomon Islands and the atolls of the Bismarck archipelago.

The natives of these lands ranged in culture from the Spanish-trained Filipinos and the Chinese-influenced Indo-Chinese and Malaysians to the rudest savage headhunters of New Guinea. Chinese merchants, whose forebears had once controlled the trade of the whole area, were found everywhere throughout southeast Asia. As for the government that Europeans imposed upon the natives, it can be said in general that the natives were exploited by their rulers. The white men loaded much of the wealth of southeastern Asia into their ships and carried it away, leaving to the brown and yellow men only a minor share. The natives engaged in retail trade and some of them acted as agents for the white man's corporations, but they rarely had an opportunity to become masters of their own lands. It may not be surprising that after the second World War, southeastern Asia, like India, was seething with antagonism to White rule.

The Philippines

The conquest of the Philippines by Spain, after their discovery by Magellan in 1521, was essentially a peaceful missionary enterprise. Spanish friars accomplished a remarkable work in converting the natives, the only large mass of Asiatics who have adopted Christianity in modern times. During the latter part of the nineteenth century many educated Filipinos took advantage of the increased facilities for travel to visit Europe. They came back to their country full of enthusiasm for Westernizing it, only to meet the opposition of both the friars and the Spanish officials. The result was much discontent, which found expression in conspiracies and revolts against the government.

Such was the situation in 1898, upon the outbreak of the war between the United States and Spain. Commodore George Dewey, who commanded the American fleet in Far Eastern waters, set out at once for the Philippines and in the battle of Manila Bay disabled or destroyed the Spanish ships. After his victory insurrections started in nearly every province. The Filipinos, under Aguinaldo, at first co-operated with the Americans in campaigning against the Spaniards, but after the cession of the islands to the United States hostilities broke out between

the former companions in arms. Over two years of continuous fighting were required to overcome the native resistance and to capture Aguinaldo.

Under the direction of William Howard Taft, the first governor general, an amnesty was extended to all Filipinos who would take the oath of allegiance to the United States. A constabulary, made up of native soldiers and officered by Americans, was organized to preserve order. The agricultural lands belonging to the friars were purchased for the benefit of the people. Hundreds of American schoolteachers were introduced to train Filipino teachers in English and modern methods of instruction. Large appropriations were made for roads, harbors, and other improvements. The United States also set up a Filipino legislature, elected entirely by natives.

By the time the war of 1939-1945 broke out, the American government in the islands had become a model that demonstrated the benefits of white man's rule in the Orient. The inhabitants still wanted independence, but few of them would not admit that American rule had worked wonders for the Philippines. When the United States demonstrated the sincerity of her pledge to grant independence to the Philippines, the prestige of the American republic reached a new high in southeastern Asia.

Australia and New Zealand

Captain Cook, on the first of his voyages, raised in 1770 the British flag over Australia. Colonization began in 1788, with the foundation of Port Jackson (now Sydney), on the coast of New South Wales. This part of Australia served for many years as a penal station, to which the British transported convicts. After the introduction of sheep-raising and the discovery of gold (1850-1851), more substantial colonists followed. They settled chiefly on the eastern and southern coasts, where the climate is cool and where there is plenty of water and good land for sheep-raising. Australia is essentially a pastoral country, and its wool, meats, and dairy products are major elements of its wealth. Southeastern Australia has also developed into one of the great wheat-producing areas of the world. The output of gold has decreased in recent years, while that of coal has increased, and coal is now the leading mineral produced. Farming and mining provide raw materials and power for the rapidly growing industries of the country. The natural resources of this island continent are capable of supporting many times its present population.

New South Wales, the original colony, had two daughter colonies, Victoria and Queensland. Two other colonies — South Australia and Western Australia — were founded directly by emigrants from Great Britain. All these states, together with Tasmania, formed in 1901 the federal union known as the Commonwealth of Australia. It follows American models in its written constitution, senate and house of representatives, and high (or supreme) court. The cabinet system, however, is based on the British model. A governor general, sent from Great Britain, represents the British crown. In order to make the Commonwealth independent of any state influence, its capital was placed at Canberra, almost equally distant from Sydney and from Melbourne, and in a district of about nine hundred square miles, which was set apart for the purpose of forming the Federal Territory. Each member of the federation retains its own government, and all powers not expressly granted by the constitution to the government of the Commonwealth are reserved to the separate states.

Twelve hundred miles southeast of Australia lie the two large islands that form New Zealand. Their temperate climate, abundant rainfall, and luxurious vegetation soon attracted British settlers, but they were not annexed by Great Britain until 1840. In 1907 New Zealand was raised from the status of a colony to that of a dominion, thus taking a place beside Australia among the self-governing communities of the British Empire. With Australia it promises to become a rich, populous, and prosperous country as the Pacific Ocean is opened to the civilizing influences which have so long centered in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic.

XIII

European Imperialism in Africa

The "Dark Continent"

HERE are two Africas. The one on the southern edge of the Mediterranean Sea was well known to Europeans ever since they had put to sea in ships; the other, below the Sahara and the upper reaches of the Nile, was largely unknown until the middle of the nineteenth century. In general this latter Africa consists of a plateau, which for the most part rises abruptly from the surf-beaten shore. Good harbors are therefore few, while rapids and cataracts obstruct the larger rivers as they descend from the great tablelands to the sea. Where the land slopes more gently and the rivers flow more quietly, pestilential swamps and sandbanks bar approach from the ocean. The Atlas Mountains and the Sahara Desert, the latter nearly as large as Europe, oppose a formidable obstacle to penetration of the interior from the Mediterranean Sea. Slight wonder that inner Africa so long remained practically unknown to Europeans. Before the nineteenth century, except for a few stations developed by the Portuguese and the Dutch, colonizing nations turned from its fever-ridden coasts, vast deserts, and tropical jungles to more favored regions in America and Australasia.

Mediterranean Africa

Since classical times the Mediterranean Sea has linked North Africa with Europe. Egypt, one of the cradles of civilization, Carthage, and the area that we today call Algeria were among the most prosperous and highly civilized provinces of the Roman Empire. In the centuries intervening between classical and modern times, however, the Arab conquest gave it a cultural development different from that of Europe so that when the nineteenth century opened, the whole coast was far behind Europe in its civilization. From Morocco to Egypt a series of Moslem rulers oppressed the poverty-stricken people that inhabited the territory. Piracy seemed to have given them their most important con-

tact with the rest of the world, while ignorance, squalor, dirt, and oppression characterized the society. Areas that had once been the granary of the Roman Empire could hardly support the population that occupied them, and the once vigorous cities that had formerly been renowned for their learning as well as their trade were in a state of decay. It was just the sort of backward civilization that would attract a conqueror. This was especially true when one remembers that there was great potential wealth to be taken from mines and plantations all along the coast as well as inflated profits to be earned by loaning money to semiresponsible rulers.

French North Africa

Algeria was the first of these states to fall under foreign influence. In 1830 Charles X of France, in hope of distracting his subjects' attention from the pressing problems at home, sent an expeditionary force to conquer that Berber state. Charles and his government disappeared in the July Revolution, but France spent the next fifty years subjecting Algeria. Just as the British had to conquer all India to get defensible frontiers, so the French had to march into the Sahara to defend their holdings on the coast. Algeria, however, was flanked on the one side by Tunis, on the other by Morocco, and as long as these two states remained independent, their position was not secure.

Tunis fell to France in the early 1880's. At the Berlin Conference all the great powers were prepared to "take something," and both Germany and England agreed upon Tunis as France's part in the general scramble. It was easy to find an excuse for invading Tunis. A border incident — and there were hundreds of them — indicated that the situation was intolerable. French troops landed and the situation was soon "well in hand." Tunis did not receive the same treatment as Algeria. The older colony had been made a part of France with a right to direct representation in the Chamber of Deputies. Just before invading Tunis, the French had assured the Italian government (which wanted Tunis for Italy) that France would not annex the territory. France did not annex it; she declared a protectorate over it, and governed through the Bey. To all intents and purposes, Tunis became a French territory, exploited like Algeria by French capital and controlled by French agents.

Morocco presented an even more difficult problem. In 1880, by the Treaty of Madrid, France and the other great powers guaranteed the independence of Morocco, and the territory was exploited by Europeans of several different nations. It was not until 1904 when France

gave England the right to take over Egypt in return for the right to move into Morocco that the conquest of the territory became feasible. Hurriedly, France made agreements with Italy and Spain whereby, in return for French control over Morocco, Italy could take Tripoli and Cyrenaica, and Spain could have a small segment of Morocco. Germany was left out of these agreements, and so when France tried to make Morocco her protectorate, Germany intervened (1905). It took two further crises (1909 and 1911) before France and Germany came to a bargain whereby Germany gave up her interests in Morocco in return for a strip of Congo jungle (1911).

British Rule in Egypt

At the other end of the Mediterranean Sea is Egypt. Unlike Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco, Egypt's connection with the Ottoman Empire was more than a legal fiction when the nineteenth century opened. This fact made any impairment of Egyptian sovereignty an aggressive act against the Turkish Empire. Mehemet Ali and his successor, Ismail, in the first half of the century made the role of khedive (ruler) almost independent, but they and their successors continued to recognize the sultan at Constantinople as their overlord.

In the third quarter of the century the khedives fell into debt. European bankers gladly floated bond issues to provide them with everything from irrigation projects and schools to race horses and women. But, as usually happened when a ruler of a "backward" state borrowed money, the terms were usurious and in due time the debt was in default. To secure the bondholders' interests the French and British governments in the 1870's imposed "dual control" over Egyptian finances. The interest on the debt was collected but the people revolted under the oppressive load that was placed upon them. There was nothing to do but intervene with armed force. France refused to co-operate, and so England occupied the country alone.

British occupation, however, proved a vexing problem for both sides. England's interest in Egypt, like her interest in Cyprus (occupied in 1879), was in part dictated by the Suez Canal. The British had been unable to prevent the canal from being built under French auspices, but they had succeeded in buying up a large share of the stock. The canal was of great importance to Britain, for it literally was her link with India. By occupying Egypt she was in a good position to dominate the Mediterranean approaches of the canal. There was another side to the story, however. England could not annex Egypt without starting a race for the partition of Turkey, a consequence that British

statesmen wished to avoid. This meant that the British occupying force had to pose as a friend of the khedive and govern the country under the same limitations that the Egyptian government had had to face. Egypt, like the rest of Turkey's empire, was subject to capitulatory treaties with the European powers that gave the consuls of the great powers control over Egyptian policy at every point where it might touch European nationals or goods. Thus British policy in Egypt came to be dependent upon the good will of a majority of the great powers and Egypt was therefore a lever by which the Continental states could, and did, force Great Britain to recognize their "rights" to imperial conquests elsewhere.

Once established in Egypt, British rule did much to improve the country by building railroads, extending the irrigation system, purifying the courts, and maintaining order in the land. The cynical point out that "progress" merely aided the exploitation of the land, but it must not be forgotten that Egyptians also benefited from these improvements. The people, however, did not accept Britain's rule without protest. Nationalism grew apace; antforeign riots and demonstrations were surface indications of unrest.

Egypt was the base from which English troops occupied the upper Nile valley. The Sudan was important as a source of cotton and other African products as well as the link between Egypt and Britain's empire in Black Africa. It also was the main highway for the slave trade between the Congo area and Arabia, Persia, and Afghanistan which the British tried to suppress. In the 1880's a revolt in the Sudan forced the British to withdraw, but by the opening of the twentieth century, after preventing an ill-advised French attempt to occupy the territory, the Sudan was reoccupied by an Anglo-Egyptian army. Great Britain and the British-controlled Egyptian government shared the administration of this enormous, but sparsely populated region.

Italian North Africa

Between Egypt and the French protectorates of Tunis lay the most unpromising of the North African derelict lands: Tripoli and Cyrenaica. The native Beys retained a shadowy connection with the Ottoman Empire down to the twentieth century, but to all intents and purposes they were independent rulers over an independent but poverty-stricken stretches of sand and arid coastline. This territory — with the humility of the least of the great powers — Italy marked out for herself. The treaty she made with France assured her that there would be no objection to the conquest when France succeeded in taking over Morocco.

Thus in 1912, after Morocco was firmly in French possession, the Italian government moved fast to cash the check that assured Italy this territory. It required a "war" with Turkey, a war in which Italy took the initiative and marched her armies into the deserts of Cyrenaica and Tripoli. When the Italian navy captured the Dodecanese Islands and the sultan discovered the plot of his Balkan neighbors to attack him in Europe, he made a peace that gave Italy the territory she coveted.

Italian imperialism did build roads and create a few imposing monuments in Tripoli and elsewhere to testify to Italian initiative. But no amount of work could make it a rich or prosperous colony. Italy, the ruler over the deserts of Eritrea and Somaliland, had acquired more wasteland.

The Other Africa

The vast Sahara Desert, the Sudan, and the mountains of Ethiopia separate the Africa that Europe had always known from the Africa to the south. Fossil human remains of very primitive type, together with many Paleolithic and Neolithic implements, have been found in various parts of Africa; they testify to its occupancy by man at a remote period. Successive waves of migrants, coming, apparently, from Asia by way of Arabia and Egypt, spread gradually throughout the continent. Negro Africa begins south of the great barrier of the Sahara. The pure Negro physical type is best represented by the natives of the Sudan. The widespread Bantus, who live chiefly below the equator, have mixed more or less with surrounding peoples. They speak the single stock language known as Bantu. To these elements of the black population must be added the scattered Pygmies of the equatorial districts and the rude Bushmen and Hottentots of the extreme south. The white population includes the Hamitic-speaking peoples of northeastern and northwestern Africa; the Semitic-speaking peoples (Arabs), who established themselves in Egypt and on the north African coast during the seventh and eighth centuries of our era and have since spread widely into the interior; and the intrusive Europeans at both extremities of the continent.

The Sudan Negroes and the Bantus occupy, in the main, the least desirable parts of Africa, where the hot climate, dense vegetation, tropical diseases, insect pests, and wild animals in abundance combine to form an environment very unfavorable to human activities. Nature seems to have doomed much of the continent to be a savage or a barbarian land. Nor must the fact be forgotten that for many centuries the inhabitants were cut off by the impassable waste of the Sahara from all the civilizing influences which radiated from the Near East

and the Mediterranean region. Lack of fertilizing cultural contacts doubtless goes far to account for their lowly estate.

The most important agencies working for the uplift of the Negro are Islam and Christianity. Of the two, Islam counts by far the greater number of converts. Its simple creed, without theological perplexities; its practical emphasis on prayer, almsgiving, and pilgrimage; and its tolerant spirit all commend it to the black man's mentality; furthermore, the prevalence of Islam north of the Sahara from Morocco to Egypt has naturally aided its transmission by Arab merchants and travelers southward to the Sudan. It is supreme today from the Mediterranean to ten degrees north of the equator. Below this line Christian missions, both Catholic and Protestant, have been planted throughout the broad belt of heathenism which extends almost to the Cape of Good Hope. In addition to their religious and educational work, missionaries have made many contributions to the study of African languages and customs.

The Penetration of Africa

The vast extent of Africa was first revealed to Europeans by the Portuguese discoveries in the second half of the fifteenth century. The Portuguese imitated the Arabs in founding stations upon both the eastern and western coasts, where they did a profitable business in ivory, gold, gum, and spices, and especially in black men, who were exported by thousands annually to be sold as slaves. The merchants of Spain, Holland, France, and England also shared in this traffic. Europeans did not settle in Africa, except at the Cape of Good Hope, where the Dutch East India Company established a colony in 1652. But so far as relations with Europe were concerned, African history for the next one hundred and fifty years was almost a blank. The scanty knowledge of inner Africa acquired by the ancients and the Arabs was perverted or forgotten, and geographers, to conceal their ignorance, decorated their maps with pictures of savage men and savage beasts.

The penetration of Africa was mainly accomplished by following the course of its great rivers—the Niger, the Nile, the Zambesi, and the Congo. All four were first completely explored by persons of British nationality. In the last decade of the eighteenth century the African Association, then recently founded, sent Mungo Park to explore the Niger. His first journey opened up three hundred miles of that river. A second journey ended in disaster, for after descending the Niger for about one thousand miles toward the coast and only just failing to solve the problem of its outlet, he and his party perished,

except for one Negro slave, who survived to tell the tale. Twenty-five years later Richard and John Lander did what Park had failed to do and traced the Niger from Bussa to its mouth in the Gulf of Guinea.

The determination of the sources of the Nile — a problem which had interested the ancients — met with success shortly after the middle of the nineteenth century. The explorations of Captains Speke and Grant, who started from Zanzibar, resulted in the discovery of the great lake (*nyanza*), which serves as the head reservoir of the White Nile. It was named Lake Victoria, in honor of the Queen of England. Sir Samuel Baker shortly afterward found the smaller lake (called by him Lake Albert, in honor of the Prince Consort), into which and out of which the White Nile flows.

Meanwhile, David Livingstone, an intrepid missionary and explorer, had traced the course of the Zambesi. Starting from the Cape of Good Hope, he pushed northward, found the Victoria Falls, twice as high as Niagara, crossed to the west coast at Loanda, and returning followed the Zambesi to its mouth on the east coast. A second journey led to the discovery of Lake Nyasa. On a third journey, when no word came from Livingstone for several years, the *New York Herald* sent Henry M. Stanley, an adventurous newspaper correspondent, to find him. In 1871 Stanley "found" Livingstone at Ujiji, much to the latter's surprise, for he had not realized that he was lost. After his death, two years later, Stanley continued the work of African exploration. Having discovered that Lake Tanganyika drained into the Congo, he proceeded down that mighty stream to its mouth. The feat was performed in the face of tremendous difficulties; the three white men who accompanied Stanley died before the journey ended and he himself became prematurely aged. A subsequent expedition opened up the central African forest with its pygmy tribes, discovered Lake Edward, and revealed the lofty, snow-clad Ruwenzori Range, called by Greek geographers the Mountains of the Moon, whose flanks fed the rivers forming the White Nile. Stanley's fascinating narratives of his travels did much to attract the eyes of Europeans to Africa as a field for colonial expansion.

The Partition of Africa

Until the last quarter of the nineteenth century European settlements in Africa were patches on the coast, but once the main work of exploration had been accomplished there ensued a general rush for African territory. No other part of the world had such extensive unclaimed areas capable of producing the tropical raw materials required by the

countries of the temperate zone for their industries; no other part of the world had so many childlike peoples amenable to the white man's control. Six European powers now divided the continent between them. Two-thirds of it was shared about equally by France and Great Britain; the other third fell to Belgium, Italy, Spain, and Portugal.

The possessions of Belgium grew directly out of Stanley's discoveries. He realized the enormous potential value of the rubber, ivory, and palm oil of the Congo basin and persuaded Leopold II, king of the Belgians, to supply the funds for the organization of a private commercial company to develop the resources of that part of Africa. The company's lands were later erected into the Congo Free State, with the king as its personal sovereign. The forced labor demanded of the natives and the cruel punishments inflicted upon them for failure to perform their allotted tasks aroused world-wide indignation. King Leopold, who had made a vast fortune out of this exploitation of human misery, finally transferred his African holdings to the Belgian government, which now administers them with wisdom and humanity. The area of the Belgian Congo is almost eighty times that of Belgium.

Until the creation of the Congo Free State, the British government at Cape Town, the two decadent Portuguese stations at Mozambique and Loanda, and the scattered holdings of France, England, and Spain along the Gold Coast and up the west side of the hump of Africa constituted the only penetration of Africa by European governments. The British apparently felt that the territory largely belonged to them, but did not bother to stake out claims. The founding of the Congo Association, however, was the gun that started the race for African possessions. To the surprise of many contemporaries who did not understand the meaning of her industrial development, it was Germany that led off in the race. Bismarck had many times protested his lack of interest in colonies, but in the early 1880's Germany acquired in rapid succession Southwest Africa, Togo, the Cameroons, and East Africa (Tanganyika). The method was simple: German agents made treaties with the chiefs, and the German flag appeared over their villages.

The scramble was on. In rapid succession British, French, Italian, and Portuguese agents and explorers secured "claims" to jungles, plateaus, deserts, and plains; many of them very naturally overlapped and formed the basis for disputes. By 1884 there were enough conflicting interests to make a general European war. Bismarck and Ferry, the French premier, called a conference to meet in Berlin to discuss the problem. This Berlin Congress, 1884-1885, smoothed over the disputes, laid down rules for future annexation, and pointed the way to amicable

settlement of conflicting claims. To the conference should go the credit for the peaceable partition of Africa.

Conflicts in Africa

Naturally the partition of Africa was not accomplished without some violence. The natives often did not like the white man's ways, but their revolts were crushed by the white man's bullets. In only one case were the natives able to stem the advance of their presumptive masters. The Italians had modestly contented themselves with a small corner of northeastern Africa. Eritrea and Somaliland were easily acquired, but when they attempted to link these two areas by the conquest of Ethiopia, their armies were defeated. The Abyssinians had the advantage of the railroad from French Somaliland to Addis Ababa, and when the natives met the Italian army at Adowa (1896) they, too, were equipped with Western guns. Mussolini, while he still was a Fascist dictator, erased the "shame" of that defeat, but his conquest has disappeared in the cataclysm that struck his regime.

The Union of South Africa

The most serious conflict in Africa was not a clash between Europeans and natives, but between England and the European settlers in South Africa. The Cape Colony was permanently acquired by Great Britain from Holland by the Vienna settlement of 1814-1815. Though small in extent, it had great importance as a port of call on the route to both India and Australia. The Dutch farmers, or Boers, did not take kindly to British rule, and many of them, with their families and flocks, moved from Cape Colony into the unknown country to the north. This "Great Trek" resulted in the formation of the Boer republics of Natal, Orange Free State, and the Transvaal. Natal was soon annexed by Great Britain, but the other two republics remained independent.

The discovery of the world's richest diamond fields in the Orange Free State and the world's richest gold mines in the Transvaal led to a large influx of Englishmen, who, since they paid taxes, demanded a share in the government. Their leader was the prime minister of Cape Colony, Cecil Rhodes, who had gone to South Africa to seek health and fortune and had found both there. The Dutch, under the leadership of President Paul Kruger of the Transvaal, were just as determined to keep the control of affairs in their own hands. A little more forbearance on the part of Rhodes and Kruger, a little more of the

spirit of compromise on both sides, might perhaps have prevented the outbreak of the terrible South African War (1899-1902), which turned a large part of the country into a desert. The Boers were finally overcome by sheer weight of numbers.

The war had not been popular in Great Britain, for to many people it seemed an act of naked aggression in the interests of African capitalists and British imperialists. When in 1906 a Liberal government came to power, steps were taken to right the wrong that had been done and self-government was granted to the two Dutch states. In 1910 Cape Colony, Natal, Orange Free State, and the Transvaal established the Union of South Africa. There is a governor general appointed by the British crown, a common parliament, and a responsible ministry. Pretoria is the capital of the Union and Cape Town is the seat of the legislative body. Both English and Afrikaans (South African Dutch) are official languages. Unlike the constitution of Australia, that of South Africa provides for a strongly centralized state rather than for a federation of states.

The Union may ultimately include other British possessions in South Africa. Great Britain asserts a protectorate over Bechuanaland and Nyasaland. She also controls the imperial domain acquired by Cecil Rhodes and called after him Rhodesia. This territory, now divided into Northern and Southern Rhodesia, is three and one-half times as large as the British Isles.

The loyalty of the majority of the Boers to Great Britain was shown during the first World War, when, in addition to conquering the German possessions in southwestern Africa, they co-operated with the British in conquering those in eastern Africa. British East Africa now includes Tanganyika Territory, Kenya Colony, and the Uganda Protectorate.

The African Generation

The men that subjected Africa to European control were a vigorous race whose dreams of empire knew no bounds. They saw before them a vast land with riches waiting to be tapped, with markets waiting to be opened, and with political possibilities waiting to be exploited. They lived in an age when the railroad was the principal symbol of man's conquest of the earth. It is not surprising, therefore, to find them thinking in terms of railroad empires. One of the first of these dreamers was Cecil Rhodes. His was the idea of British control from Cape Town to Cairo. Such a line, nearly six thousand miles in length, would give England a firm grip on the whole continent. The British Cape-to-Cairo project was matched by a French imperial dream that envisaged

a French east-west African empire from Senegal to Somaliland. Obviously both these empires could not be realized. In 1898, at Fashoda, representatives of the military power of France and England met, and for a moment threatened the peace of Europe. Camped on the banks of the upper Nile the tiny French army and a slightly larger Anglo-Egyptian force watched each other while in London and Paris the diplomats struggled to find a formula to end the crisis. The Senegal-Somaliland dream collapsed when the French were forced to back down.

The Germans, too, had their dream of African empire: German Middle Africa. They hoped to buy or otherwise acquire Belgian and Portuguese colonies in Central Africa so that the German flag would float throughout the center of the continent. In two separate treaties with Britain they approached the problem of acquiring the colonies of the weaker European states in union with the British, and in 1911 they secured from France, in exchange for Morocco, a strip of jungle that would link the Cameroons with the Congo basin. In 1914 German imperialist dreams were as extravagant as any in the world; by 1918 they had other more pressing problems at home and no empire abroad.

Africa for the Africans

Africa is an undeveloped continent and, considering its great natural resources, an underpopulated continent. Room exists in it for many emigrants from overcrowded Europe. While neither the tropical forest nor the desert will support extensive settlement by Europeans, there are enormous areas in South Africa and East Africa which, by reason of a generally healthy climate and fertile soil, offer a field for colonization. Even in such relatively favored regions germ diseases and insect pests oppose serious obstacles to economic development — for instance, sleeping sickness spread by the tsetse fly and deadly to both men and cattle, and rinderpest, which further limits the grazing industry. With the progress of scientific medicine these environmental problems will doubtless be solved. As an outlet for European population Africa so far has been a disappointment. Europeans who go there do not expect to do their own work, as would settlers in Australia or Canada, but to exploit the cheap native labor on the plantations and in the mines.

The Negroes (including the Bantu-speaking peoples) comprise four-fifths of the population of Africa. With the cessation of the tribal wars, slave raids, and cruel customs which formerly kept their numbers down, they are increasing more rapidly than ever. How long will they accept the white man's supremacy? Their conversion to Christianity, their education, their growing employment in agriculture and mining,

and the lessons taught them by the World Wars have already awakened a sense of racial unity previously unknown. As time goes on, large parts of Africa seem likely to be stirred by the same democratic and national movements which affect so much of Asia. The old issue between imperialism on the one side and national self-government and self-determination on the other might thus be raised in still another part of the world.

XIV

The Americas and Europe

Expansion of the United States

BY far the most significant fact in the history of the western hemisphere in the nineteenth century was the rise of the United States to the status of a great power. Like the rise of imperial Germany in Europe, the growth of the United States as an industrial and military force of the first magnitude upset the balance of power in the Americas and forced the development of a political structure that revolved around the interests of this new power.

There are many reasons for the growth and development of the English-speaking republic in North America. The most important, from a world historical point of view, is the fact that between 1815 and about 1900 the balances of power in Europe and the interests of the European states were such that the United States obtained almost a whole century in which she could solve her own problems without danger of effective interference from Europe. In the eighteenth century and again in the twentieth, the political disturbances of the Old World struck with great force upon the evolution of the New; conversely, the long peace of the nineteenth century gave the American republic almost complete freedom to work out its destiny unmolested by the military powers of Europe.

In that century the republic succeeded in fixing a firm grip on the continent between the parallels 28 and 48 degrees North. The expansion of the United States beyond the limits fixed by the Treaty of Paris in 1783 began with the purchase of the Louisiana Territory between the Mississippi and the Rocky Mountains. This immense region, originally claimed by France by virtue of La Salle's discoveries, had passed to Spain at the close of the Seven Years' War and had been reacquired by Napoleon. The French emperor, about to renew his conflict with Great Britain, realized that he could not defend Louisiana against the mistress of the seas. Rather than make a forced present of it to her, he sold it in 1803 to the United States for about fifteen million dollars.

The possession of Louisiana provided the United States with an outlet on the Gulf of Mexico. This was greatly extended by the purchase of Florida from Spain in 1819 and by the annexation of Texas in 1845. The settlement in 1846 of the dispute with Great Britain as to the Oregon country and the Mexican Cession in 1848 brought the United States to the Pacific. The continental area of the United States was completed by the Gadsden Purchase in 1853. Alaska, which had been a Russian province since Bering's voyages in the eighteenth century, was sold in 1867 to the United States for about seven million dollars.

In the last decade of the nineteenth century the United States began to secure overseas possessions. The Hawaiian Islands were annexed in 1898. The same year saw the acquisition of the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico, as the result of the war with Spain. The Samoan island of Tutuila and the Danish West Indies have also come into American hands.

Between 1793 and 1815 the European powers were too busy with the struggles on the Continent to move effectively against the rising power of the young republic. After 1815 the political structure of Europe provided so even a balance of power and so many purely Continental problems that none of the European states could move to prevent the development of the political colossus of North America.

This, of course, was not all. The lands of the United States were rich in coal, iron, and other minerals; her fertile fields provided cotton, corn, wheat, and other crops; and her people were able to exploit these advantages effectively. Industrialism came to the United States almost contemporaneously with its development in Europe, and with the abundance of raw materials, with the benevolent government, and the skillful and ambitious inhabitants of the nation, American industrialism in many ways surpassed that of Europe.

Latin America

The same international political climate that allowed the growth of the North American republic affected the political and economic life of both continents in the western hemisphere. Eighteen independent states in the New World developed from Spanish colonies, Brazil sprang from Portuguese settlement, and Haiti had a mixed Spanish and French origin. They constitute the Latin America of today. Omitting Haiti, as being partly French, they may be called still more definitely the Hispanic-American states, from Hispania, the Roman name of the Iberian peninsula.

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The motives which prompted the colonization of the New World by Spaniards and Portuguese are summed up in the three words "gospel, glory, gold." As for the first motive, it was natural that the occupation of America should assume in their eyes the character of a crusade. The holy war against the Moorish infidel had just ended, but here in America Providence had bestowed upon them a vast region teeming with heathen peoples to be converted and given the blessings of the Christian religion. Priests regularly accompanied the *conquistadores* (conquerors), and the propagation of the true faith formed an essential object of almost every expedition. As to the second motive, it was equally natural that to the knights of Spain and Portugal, who no longer had any warlike occupation at home, the New World offered entrancing prospects for adventure and valorous feats of arms.

Religious and martial enthusiasm was never allowed to interfere with the purely business aspect of colonization. The conquerors intended to appropriate the wealth of the Indians in precious metals and then to locate mines and make the Indians work them. The development of Mexico and Peru may be traced directly to the silver mines of these countries, whereas Brazil, which showed no promise of mineral resources, for a time was on the verge of official abandonment. When, subsequently, the more fertile parts of tropical and subtropical America were appropriated by Spaniards and Portuguese, they introduced the plantation system, allotting to each settler his share of the lands. The great temperate regions of North America and South America appeared uninteresting and indeed repellent to the colonists; such regions, yielding neither gold nor tropical products, they called "worthless territories."

Spain faced a tremendous task in trying to rule well a realm so vast and so distant as Spanish America. The absence of any means of quick transportation and communication, such as modern colonial nations enjoy, proved a great obstacle to efficient management. Justice was slow and uncertain, and many officials enriched themselves in illegal ways; in general, the administrative system was cumbersome when not actually oppressive. Furthermore, it failed to develop either local or national institutions through which the colonists might have learned how to manage their own affairs. There were no deliberative and law-making assemblies corresponding to the legislatures of the English colonies in North America. Since free political institutions did not exist in Spain at this period, they did not arise in her possessions overseas. The Brazilian colonists, on the other hand, enjoyed a good deal of liberty in local matters. Discontent with the rule of the mother country never became so pronounced in Brazil as in Spanish America.

The Spanish colonial system had not been designed or operated in the interests of the colonists. Spain crippled their trade by requiring them to buy only Spanish goods and to sell only to Spaniards. She placed restrictions upon the manufactures of the colonies, with the idea of preserving their markets for her own industries. She filled all the high offices, both civil and ecclesiastical, with Spaniards born in the mother country, to the exclusion of those born in the colonies (Creoles). She tried to confine the colonists in an intellectual strait jacket by means of the Inquisition, by a censorship of books and the press, and by limiting educational opportunities. This colonial system became more burdensome as time went on. By the end of the eighteenth century most Spanish Americans wanted self-government and some of them wanted independence.

The Winning of Independence

The successful issue of the War of American Independence and the formation of the United States encouraged the revolutionary spirit in the colonies. French translations of the Declaration of Independence and Spanish translations of the Constitution soon found their way southward, to be studied by ardent patriots. France, as well as the United States, gave them lessons in liberty. Even before that *annus mirabilis*, 1789, some Spanish Americans of the intellectual class had become familiar with the writings of the French reforming "philosophers." A Spanish version of Rousseau's *Social Contract* enjoyed a wide circulation, thus making known the new gospel of popular sovereignty and the rights of man. The colonists not only read French books, but also watched with growing interest the progress of the Revolution in France. After their own struggle for independence began, they made "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity" their watchwords, took the liberty cap for their emblem, and out of their Masonic lodges formed secret revolutionary societies after French models.

Latin-American independence was closely bound up with events in Europe. Napoleon Bonaparte, at war with Great Britain, had devised the so-called Continental System for the commercial strangulation of that "nation of shopkeepers" (a Napoleonic phrase). Every European country under French influence was to exclude from its ports British ships and British goods. Napoleon's desire to extend the Continental System to Spain led him to overthrow the Bourbon monarchy there and to seat his own brother Joseph on the Spanish throne. The colonists refused to recognize this "intruder king," as they called Joseph, and set up what were practically independent governments throughout Spanish America. Ferdinand VII, who returned to Spain

Exclusion of Spain and Portugal from S. America



after Napoleon's downfall, tried by force of arms to subdue the revolting colonists, but they had now tasted the sweets of liberty and would not accept again the yoke of Spain.

The wars for independence continued in one part or another of Spanish America for more than a decade. The United States followed the struggle with sympathetic eyes and sent commissioners to establish commercial relations with the revolutionists. Great Britain took a more practical interest in them, contributing money, ships, and munitions, and allowing her own subjects to enlist in the patriot armies. The Spanish government finally withdrew its troops in 1826, but many years passed before it consented to recognize the independence of the colonies. This long and desperate struggle produced military heroes, above all, José de San Martín, who liberated Chile from Spanish rule and began the liberation of Peru, and Simón Bolívar, who, besides winning freedom for his native Venezuela, assured it for what are now Colombia and Ecuador and contributed powerfully to the freedom of Bolivia and Peru. Five South American nations hold him in grateful remembrance.

Brazil also took part in the revolutionary movement. Brazilian patriots set up an independent empire in 1822, with Pedro, the oldest son of the Portuguese king, as its first ruler. He abdicated nine years later in favor of his infant son. The second Pedro (1831-1889) was the last monarch to occupy an American throne.

Political Conditions in South America

At the close of the wars for independence South America contained six Spanish-speaking states: namely, "Great Colombia," Peru, Bolivia, Chile, Argentina, and Paraguay. They were soon increased to nine by the secession of Uruguay from Argentina and Brazil and by the break-up of "Great Colombia" into Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. All of them promptly became republics, with liberal constitutions that had much to say, in the language of the first ten amendments to the American Constitution and of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, about liberty, justice, and the indefeasible privileges of citizenship. Brazil also became a constitutional republic, as recently as 1889.

The republics are either unitary or federal in type. In the first group come Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay; in the second come (to use the official designations) the United States of Venezuela, the Argentine Republic, and the United States of Brazil. In the unitary republics the political divisions are administrative departments, as in France, and the chief executive of each is usually appointed

by the national president. In the federal republics the political divisions are commonwealths, comparable to those of the United States. Each elects its own governor and other officials, has its own judiciary, and makes its own laws in all matters not reserved by the constitution to the federal government.

Fifteen years or more of almost constant warfare had developed among the people military habits, a contempt for the arts of peace, and a willingness to draw the sword for the settlement of troublesome questions. Where such an attitude prevailed, the machinery of popular government could not operate. Of what avail were constitutions which no one respected and laws which no one obeyed? These things being so, the inevitable happened: one republic after another relapsed into a condition of chronic disorder. The insurrections against the government received the dignified name of "revolutions," as if some great political principle had been at stake; actually, they were squabbles between outsiders and insiders for office and the rewards of office. Nor were the "civil wars" protracted sanguinary struggles involving the entire population of a country. Only small armies followed a rebel leader, and a very little bloodletting generally sufficed to decide whether he would become the new president or face a firing squad.

The military chieftain (*caudillo*) who reached the presidential chair posed as the "regenerator," "restorer," or "liberator" of his afflicted country. In truth, he was a dictator, the real successor of the Spanish viceroy, but without the latter's sense of responsibility and legality. He ruled by force. If he ruled badly or made himself otherwise unpopular, by force he was overcome. The dictator usually preserved constitutional forms. The citizens went through the farce of electing a president, but his soldiers controlled the elections. Legislators continued in session, but they passed only such laws as pleased him. Judges still sat on the bench, but they did his bidding. Not all these presidential despots were men intent only on enjoying ill-gotten gains. Some of them accomplished a great deal for the material welfare of the countries over which they ruled. It may be plausibly argued that, until the people were ready for democracy, a firm and efficient dictatorship formed the only practicable method of government.

Revolutions, civil wars, and dictatorships characterized the history of nearly all the republics for a full half century after the achievement of independence. This situation has continued until the present time in tropical Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia, and in subtropical Paraguay. None of them is a genuine democracy. Their population consists largely of Indians, half-breeds, and Negroes, quite unfitted for the responsibilities of citizenship. European immigrants

and European capital alike avoid these countries, where the climate (except as modified by altitude and coastal currents) is enervating and political conditions are so unsettled. Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil have made by far the greatest advance politically. But even in these states the practices of government and the norms of politics are not very closely akin to the conception of democracy in the United States. In all of South America there is a high incidence of illiteracy and traditions of democracy are weak. Strong-arm methods are not shocking to a people that have never really understood the practices of self-government.

The Spanish-speaking inhabitants of South America, under the rule of Spain, had one language, one king, one church, and a common culture. They were essentially a single people. Having secured independence and definite frontiers, they began to differentiate as separate nations, each with its own ambitions, aspirations, and ideals. The same process of nation-making also went on in Brazil. To this result geographical isolation largely contributed. Chile, for instance, is separated from Peru by a desert and from Argentina by a lofty mountain range, while Paraguay dwells secluded in almost inaccessible forests. Differentiation has likewise been brought about as the result of foreign wars, which, whatever their other consequences, certainly fostered patriotic sentiments and thus strengthened the feeling of nationality. Lastly, increased political stability, together with growing numbers, wealth, and power, has done much to develop a strong national consciousness. History affords no other example of the creation of so many new nations over so enormous a region and in so short a time.

Economic and Social Conditions in South America

South America produces a greater variety of plants useful to man than any other part of the globe. Tropical fruits grow abundantly in the equatorial regions, as do cotton, sugar cane, coffee, cacao, and tobacco. Cereals of every description flourish in the subtropical and temperate areas, and cattle, sheep, and horses thrive on the boundless pampas of Argentina. Rubber, medicinal products, dyewoods, and timber of extraordinary hardness and durability come from the forests of Brazil and adjacent countries. Many valuable minerals are found in the Andes, besides asphalt and oil in Venezuela and extensive deposits of nitrate of soda in Chile.

The development of this wealth in mines, forests, and soil must for a long time absorb the energies of South American peoples. Their industrial progress has been slow because of the scarcity of labor, espe-

cially of skilled labor for employment in factories, and also because of the lack of capital, since wealth takes chiefly the form of large plantations and cattle ranches. Furthermore, few deposits of coal and iron, those essentials of modern industry, are available. South America must continue to produce mainly raw materials and to import mainly manufactured goods. It offers an ever-expanding market for textiles, iron and steel wares, machinery, and general merchandise, and needs also the services of an army of engineers and business experts.

South America has no color problem. Neither law nor custom interposes any barriers to the free intermingling of the races. Such distinction as exists between them is one of rank and class. The admixture of Indian, African, and European blood seems destined to produce in this part of the world almost a new division of mankind. It will be Ibero-American in most of Spanish South America and Ibero-American-African in most of Brazil. Argentina and Uruguay, with inconsiderable Indian and African elements, and southern Brazil, where these disappear before the tide of European immigration, are and must remain the only really white countries in South America.

Spain and Portugal excluded aliens from their overseas possessions. The three centuries of the colonial era saw no movement of Old World peoples across the Atlantic to South America, other than the very limited migration of Spaniards and Portuguese. Conditions did not at once change with the advent of independence, for foreign immigrants neglected this part of the New World as being climatically and racially less attractive than the United States. European immigration has increased within recent years, chiefly to Argentina, Uruguay, and southern Brazil. The newcomers from Portugal, Spain, Italy, and France blend readily with peoples, like themselves, of Latin origin. The Germans, a numerous group, tend to preserve their own language and customs. Englishmen and Americans are comparatively few in number. Japanese and Chinese have established themselves in Brazil and other states, but nowhere are they sufficiently numerous to affect the character of the population.

South America is a continent of economic and social unrest. A few thousand white families, mostly descended from the *grandees* of colonial days, own the bulk of the land fit for agriculture and herding. These landed aristocrats, with their enormous holdings, rule like the old-time feudal lords over the peasants and manual laborers who compose the mass of the population. The bitter class struggle between rich and poor, between the *haves* and the *have-nots*, will continue, doubtless, until the common people are firmly in control of the governments in all the republics.

Central America and Mexico

The Spanish dependencies in Central America declared their independence in 1821, and two years later formed a federal union with a constitution modeled upon that of the United States. The federation soon broke up into the republics of Guatemala, Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. They continue to maintain a separate existence, sometimes vexed by factional strife and revolutions. The secession of Panama from Colombia in 1903 has added a sixth republic to their number. The population of Central America is small, far smaller apparently than before the arrival of the Spaniards. The vast majority of the inhabitants are either Indians or half-breeds.

Mexico also secured independence in 1821, only to enter upon a long period of disorder. Counting regencies, emperors, presidents, triumvirates, and dictators, the "republic" had as many rulers during the first half century of its existence as the colony had viceroys in the whole period of Spanish government. Then came the long autocracy of Díaz, to be succeeded by another period of revolutionary upheaval and dictatorship, lasting until quite recent times. Mexico, in common with the rest of Latin America, suffers from the political inexperience of its people and the absence of any large middle class which might serve as a buffer between discordant factions.

The dominant personality in Mexican politics for several decades after independence was that of General Santa Anna. Elected president in 1833 as the candidate of the Federalists, who proposed to keep Mexico a federal republic, he promptly went over to the Centralists, representing the great landowners, army officers, higher ecclesiastics, and other persons with monarchical tendencies. Santa Anna put through a series of laws which suppressed the state legislatures and converted the states themselves into mere departments of the national government.

Santa Anna's overthrow of the constitution was followed by the revolt of Texas. The white population of this Mexican state consisted largely of emigrants from the cotton-growing and slave-holding area of the United States. They introduced Negro slavery, even though it had been prohibited by Mexican law. Fearing the loss of their political privileges and the abolition of slavery, the Texans proclaimed their independence and won it by hard fighting. They then organized a republic and set up a claim to territory as far southward and westward as the Rio Grande. When a member of the Mexican confederation, Texas had never reached farther south than the river Nueces. After the admission of Texas to the American Union in 1845, President Polk

determined to support this extreme boundary claim and ordered United States troops to the Rio Grande. They were attacked by the Mexicans, whereupon Polk sent a message to Congress stating that Mexico had "shed American blood upon the American soil." Congress accepted the issue thus raised and the Mexican War (1846-1848) followed.

The details of this aggression by a strong nation on a weak one need not be rehearsed. Its result was the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo by which Mexico ceded Upper California and New Mexico (the latter including not only the present American state of that name, but also part of Colorado and Wyoming, all of Utah and Nevada, and most of Arizona), the whole amounting to about two-thirds of her territory. The United States paid Mexico fifteen million dollars and also assumed liability for claims of American citizens against the Mexican government. The Senate of the United States ratified this treaty with regret — regret that Mexico had not been compelled to make a still greater sacrifice.

In 1861 Benito Juárez — a full-blooded Indian — became president. His government, strongly anticlerical in character, confiscated all the property of the Catholic Church, suppressed the religious orders, and granted freedom of worship. The disturbed conditions prevailing for many years had embarrassed the finances of the government, so that it could neither pay interest on the debt owed foreign countries nor satisfy the claims against it for outrages committed on the persons and property of Europeans. These circumstances gave Napoleon III a pretext for interfering in Mexican affairs. A French army entered Mexico City in 1863 and set up a government representing clericals and conservatives. Mexico was declared a hereditary monarchy, under a Catholic emperor. Archduke Maximilian of Austria accepted the imperial crown. For a time he held sway over about two-thirds of the country, while the Juarists, as the Mexican patriots were called, maintained themselves by guerrilla fighting in the remoter provinces. After the close of the Civil War the United States protested vigorously to Napoleon III against the presence of his soldiers in Mexico and backed up the protest by sending troops to the Rio Grande. The American ultimatum wrung from him a promise to withdraw his soldiers, and in 1867 the promise was carried out. Maximilian remained, only to be captured by the Juarists and shot as a rebel against the lawful government.

Ten years later Porfirio Díaz, an able lieutenant of Juárez, made himself supreme. Díaz repressed disorder, fostered industry and railroad building, encouraged immigration, placed the national credit on a sound basis, and improved the educational system. He gave the coun-

try peace and opened its resources to the rest of the world, but failed to lighten the burden resting on the peasants, or "peons," and on the proletariat of the towns. In 1911 he was overthrown and exiled to Spain. The revolution was, in large measure, an uprising of the poverty-stricken masses. Nor did it lack political aspects. Educated, patriotic Mexicans resented more and more what they sometimes called *diazpotism*; they wanted a free press, liberty of suffrage, honest elections, and, in general, a return to constitutional government.

The expulsion of Díaz was followed by many years of civil warfare between rival leaders and their followers. This has now ended—at least for a time—and there is a fairly stable and efficient government. The problems before it are indeed difficult. The peons must be enabled to acquire farms of their own; the industrial workers, who show a strong drift toward radical socialism, must be satisfied; and the clerical elements, opposed to the creation of an entirely secular state, must be overcome. Much need exists, also, of attracting the foreign capital so necessary for the development of Mexico's rich resources, without allowing foreign capitalists to acquire a strangle hold upon its economic life. The government has launched an extensive program to provide for schools, libraries, and public health work and to eliminate the evils of intemperance and gambling so prevalent among the masses. All this work aims at remaking the Indian, the basis of the Mexican state, into a self-respecting and self-helping member of a modern society.

The West Indies

The Spaniards, having conquered the West Indies, forced the natives to labor in the mines and on the plantations. After the Indians perished, as the result of overwork and ill treatment, their place as slaves was taken by African Negroes, whose descendants still comprise a large majority of the inhabitants. The abolition of the slave trade and slavery in the nineteenth century led to the introduction of Chinese and East Indian laborers. Spaniards, French, and English early settled in the islands, but very few Americans have gone to them.

The West Indies filled a not inconspicuous place in the history of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Their position between two continents made them the scene of innumerable sea fights and land fights, a "natural cockpit" of the European nations then disputing the supremacy of the New World. The islands were equally prominent in the intervals of peace, for they supplied Europe with cane sugar. A long period of depression followed the abolition of the slave trade and slavery, which cut down the supply of cheap labor, while at the

same time beet sugar began to be extensively produced in Europe. However, the Panama Canal places the West Indies on a great oceanic trade route and promises to restore some measure of their former prosperity.

Most of the smaller islands are still held by Great Britain, France, and Holland. Haiti, once a French possession, declared for independence at the time of the French Revolution and successfully resisted Napoleon's efforts at reconquest. The Negro republic of Haiti and the Dominican Republic (Santo Domingo), whose inhabitants are of mixed African and European blood, divide the island between them. Cuba, thanks to American intervention during the war with Spain, also forms a republic. The United States took Puerto Rico from Spain in 1898 and in 1917 purchased three small islands forming the Danish West Indies (renamed the Virgin Islands). Their acquisition reflects the increased importance of the Caribbean to the American people.

Latin-American Culture

Culturally, the twenty republics between the Rio Grande and the Strait of Magellan are much nearer to Spain, Portugal, Italy, France — the so-called Latin countries — than they are to "Anglo-America." Their white population comes chiefly from these countries, speaks Romance languages, accepts Roman Catholicism, and finds in the literature, art, music, and intellectual life of Latin Europe both models and inspiration. Even the customs, the social usages, the general ideas, the psychology, are essentially South European.

The divergence between Latin America and Anglo-America began with the occupation of the New World, became accentuated during the colonial period, and has not disappeared during the era of independence. It may be expected to continue in the future, however closely increasing trade, travel, and diplomatic intercourse draw together the two Americas.

Formation of the Dominion of Canada

The British colony of Canada, too, was affected by the great events of the nineteenth century; it was the political wisdom of England's statesmen, perhaps acquired from the success of the thirteen American colonies in staging a revolt against British rule, that determined the political evolution of the area. The people of Canada in 1763 were almost entirely French in origin. During and after the American Revolution Canada received a large influx of Tories, or British partisans, from

the Thirteen Colonies, and also numerous emigrants from Great Britain. In 1791 parliament by the Canada Act separated Upper Canada (Ontario), with its predominantly English-speaking population, from Lower Canada (Quebec). Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland were also separate provinces.

The relations between the French Canadians and the new settlers long remained unfriendly, and in 1837 a rebellion against Great Britain broke out in Lower Canada. It was easily crushed, but it called attention to the political discontent and prompted the British government to send over a prominent Liberal statesman, Lord Durham, as a peacemaker. In his *Report*, issued in 1839, he recommended that Upper Canada and Lower Canada be joined in a legislative union, in order to provide a common government for the two provinces. This action was promptly taken, thus preparing the way for the future Dominion of Canada.

Lord Durham also urged that the fullest liberty be accorded the legislature of the united provinces, so that in future they should be uncontrolled by the mother country, except in foreign affairs and other matters of strictly imperial interest. If the Canadians received freedom to manage their domestic affairs, they would be more, and not less, loyal, for they would have fewer causes of complaint against Great Britain. "At any rate," he urged, "our first duty is to secure the well-being of our colonial countrymen; and if, in the hidden decrees of that wisdom by which this world is governed it is written that these countries are not forever to remain portions of the Empire, we owe it to our honor to take good care that, when they separate from us, they should not be the only countries on the American continent in which the Anglo-Saxon race shall be found unfit to govern itself." The *Durham Report* produced a lasting effect on British colonial policy. Not only did Great Britain grant parliamentary institutions and self-government to the Canadian provinces, but in course of time she bestowed the same privileges upon her other white dominions in Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa.

The Dominion of Canada was formed in 1867 by the confederation of Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick. It has a governor general, as much a figurehead as the British sovereign whom he represents, a senate whose members hold office for life, an elective house of commons, and a responsible ministry. Each province also has a parliament for local legislation. The distinguishing feature of the Canadian constitution is that all powers not definitely assigned by it to the provinces belong to the Dominion; consequently, the question of "states' rights" cannot arise in Canada.

The new Dominion expanded rapidly. It purchased from the Hudson's Bay Company (chartered in the seventeenth century for fur trading with the Indians) the extensive territories out of which the provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta have been created. British Columbia and Prince Edward Island soon came into the confederation, but Newfoundland and the coast-strip of Labrador (administered by Newfoundland) remain outside it. With this exception, one government now holds sway over the whole region from the Great Lakes to the Arctic Ocean. The Dominion of Canada, the second largest country in the world, exceeded in size only by Russia, is more than "a few acres of snow."

The Monroe Doctrine

Over a hundred years of tradition have established the precedent that the Monroe Doctrine is the basic charter of the foreign relations of the Americas. That Doctrine was born in the atmosphere of the post-1815 world and it developed in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries under the twin stars of the European balance of power and the rise of the United States to great-power status.

The overthrow of Napoleon Bonaparte had been followed by the restoration of the "legitimate" dynasties of Europe and by the revival of the old principles of absolutism, privilege, and divine right. The sovereigns of Austria, Prussia, Russia, and France, now in close alliance, agreed to aid one another in suppressing democratic or nationalist movements that might threaten the security of their thrones. The alliance bore fruit in 1823, when French troops, acting under a commission from the three eastern powers, crossed the Pyrenees, put down a liberal revolution in Spain, and restored Ferdinand VII once more to his throne. He eagerly besought his fellow monarchs to complete their work by subduing the rebellious American colonies of Spain.

Great Britain and the United States felt much alarm at the prospect of European intervention in the affairs of the New World. Both countries sympathized with the Spanish-Americans in their struggle for freedom. The United States had already recognized the independence of four of the republics and Great Britain was about to take the same step. Moreover, both countries had built up a valuable trade with the revolting colonies, which had thrown off the commercial restrictions of Spain. The new markets would be lost were Spain allowed to recover its possessions and revive its former monopolistic policies. Still another cause for anxiety existed in the situation on the northwestern coast of North America, where Russia, long established in Alaska, had

recently set up a claim to a part of the Oregon country. The claim was incompatible with the pretensions of Great Britain and the United States to the same territory and was stoutly opposed by both powers.

Such were the circumstances which led George Canning, the British foreign minister, to communicate with the government of the United States, proposing a joint declaration against the measures which the reactionary sovereigns seemed likely to pursue. President James Monroe decided, however, upon an independent course of action. His message to Congress (1823) contained a pronouncement, referring particularly to Russia, to the effect that the American continents were henceforth closed to colonization from Europe, and a statement expressing the attitude of the United States in regard to foreign intervention. "In the wars of the European powers, in matters relating to themselves, we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy to do so. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective governments. . . . We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety." These words were written by Monroe's Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, but the President assumed responsibility for them and the Monroe Doctrine is rightly coupled with his name.

Being an executive policy, not a law of Congress, the Monroe Doctrine is capable of modification and enlargement. It has been modified and enlarged to meet new situations. As early as 1825 President Adams notified the French government that the United States could not consent to the occupation of Cuba and Puerto Rico "by any other European power than Spain under any contingency whatever." President Grant, in a message to Congress (1870), declared that "henceforth no territory on the continent shall be regarded as subject of transfer to a European power." Twenty-five years later President Cleveland intervened in a dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela, in order to prevent an alleged encroachment by the former country upon the Venezuelan boundary of British Guiana. Cleveland insisted that Great Britain arbitrate her differences with Venezuela, even threatening war

in case of refusal. The British government finally yielded and accepted a settlement by arbitration.

At the opening of the twentieth century, when the industrial power of the United States had begun to mature, it is not surprising to see that the Monroe Doctrine, and the web of interpretations that came to surround it, meant American imperialism to many people in both North and South America. The Spanish-American War and the subsequent acquisitions of the United States in the Caribbean area, the investment of American capital in plantations, oil fields, harbors, and railroads, and the building of the Panama Canal secured a strong foothold for "Yankee Imperialism" in parts of South and Central America. The fact that the fleet and United States marines backed up United States policy troubled the relations between the United States and her neighbors to the south. It was not until the creation of the "Good Neighbor Policy" that the mistrust began to subside.

The Panama Canal

The building of the canal through the isthmus of Panama was at once a great benefit to all the peoples living in the Americas and a shock to the sensibilities of Latin America. The idea of an artificial waterway at Panama or some other isthmian point had been broached almost as soon as the Spanish conquest of Central America and had been repeatedly discussed for more than three centuries. Nothing was done until 1881, when a French company, headed by De Lesseps, undertook excavations at Panama. Extravagance and corruption marked the management of the company from the start; finally, it went into bankruptcy. A second French company then took up the task, but made slow progress. The United States bought its property and rights for \$40,000,000. At this point a revolt broke out in Panama, obviously engineered by the United States, and the isthmus freed itself from Colombia. In South and Central America this act of violence recalled the Mexican War of the earlier generation and opened vistas of future Yankee aggression. The new Panama government promptly granted the United States the right to occupy and control a zone, ten miles wide, for the purposes of the canal. Before work could begin, yellow fever had to be banished and a tropical pest hole converted into a healthful dwelling place. The canal was opened to traffic in 1914, but was not entirely completed until six years later. To United States army engineers, under the direction of Colonel George W. Goethals, belongs the credit for this engineering feat. A torrential river turned into a navigable waterway; a great arti-

ficial lake created; a mountain ridge, the rock-spine of the continent, cut through for nearly eight miles; six sets of thousand-foot locks constructed to raise ships eighty-five feet above the Atlantic sea level and lower them again to the level of the Pacific — all this was done to make a flowing road between the two seas! The canal is open to all nations on equal terms, but the United States has the right to erect fortifications commanding it and the adjacent waters and, in time of war, to close it to foreign shipping.

Pan-Americanism

The enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine and the need of safeguarding the approaches to the Panama Canal and to any other oceanic waterway which may be constructed in the isthmian region seemed to make it necessary for the United States to intervene from time to time in the affairs of the Latin-American states about the Caribbean. The warships and marines of the United States were repeatedly sent to Mexico, Central America, and the West Indies for the alleged purpose of protecting the lives and property of Americans and Europeans from rioters or revolutionists.

These actions produced much criticism of the supposed imperialistic policies of the "Colossus of the North." Confidence of the southern peoples in the just purposes of the United States has never quite recovered from the shock given by the annexation of Texas and the war with Mexico, resulting in the loss of vast Mexican territories. Even the war with Spain, it is asserted, was forced on Spain by the United States, which proceeded to annex Puerto Rico and to convert Cuba into a dependent ward. The measures by which the United States acquired the Canal Zone and the protectorates subsequently set up over Panama, Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic also aroused much apprehension of the "Yankee Peril." The recent withdrawal of the United States marines from the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua, the abolition of the protectorate over Cuba, analogous action with regard to Panama, and the growing strength of the Pan-American movement have done much in late years to improve relations between the two great peoples of the New World.

Pan-Americanism rests on the fact that the northern republic and her southern neighbors, however unlike in many respects, are one in their independence of Europe and relative detachment from European concerns, one in their governmental system, and one in their political ideals. They form a distinct family of nations and might well co-operate for the promotion of their common interests.

The Pan-American ideal may be said to date back to 1826, the year of Latin-American independence, when Bolívar invited the United States to participate in an international conference at Panama. Congress made the necessary appropriations to send delegates, but they did not arrive until the meeting had adjourned. The United States took no part in any other gathering with the Latin-American republics until 1889. In that year James G. Blaine, Secretary of State under President Harrison and long an advocate of Pan-Americanism, presided at Washington over the first International Conference of American States, popularly called the Pan-American Congress.

Pan-American Congresses met irregularly and without many really important results up to the inauguration of the "Good Neighbor Policy," but from 1933 onward Pan-Americanism became a stronger movement with possibilities of extensive development. The Congress at Lima in 1938 proclaimed the "solidarity of the Americas" just before the war broke out in Europe. In 1939 the Congress at Panama proclaimed a western hemisphere neutrality zone; and in 1941, when the United States became involved in the war, most of the Latin-American states either joined with her or broke off relations with the Axis powers. During the war years of 1941-1945 the ties between the United States and her neighbors were further strengthened by economic, political, and cultural relations so that the western hemisphere has emerged from the conflict more united than it ever was before. Obviously the Americas are joined together in a loose association that has, for all purposes, created a bloc of nations ready to stand together in defense of their common interests.

One result of the First Pan-American Congress was the foundation of the Pan American Union, an international organization maintained in Washington by all the American republics. It is supported by quotas which each republic contributes upon the basis of population, and is controlled by a governing board made up of the Secretary of State of the United States and the diplomatic representatives of Latin America in Washington. The Pan American Union has for its expressed aim the "development of commerce, friendly intercourse, good understanding, and the preservation of peace" among all American countries.

XV

International Relations in the New Industrial World

New Framework for High Politics

—THERE were two important factors that permeated international relations in the forty-odd years of peace between the Franco-Prussian War and the first World War of the twentieth century. The first was the industrialization of Germany; the second, the fact that British control of the seas was challenged in Europe, in Asia, and in the western hemisphere by the rise of new naval powers. If one does not keep these two facts and their implications in the forefront of any consideration of high politics, the story becomes a tangle of moves and countermoves as meaningless to the reader as chess moves are to the uninitiated.

The industrialization of Germany made obsolete previous considerations of European politics. The solutions of the eighteenth century, the Congress of Vienna, and, indeed, Bismarck's policies of the 1870's and 1880's, were all based upon the assumptions that had grown up in an agricultural European society. A great power was now one with a population of twenty-five to forty million; its strength was manifest in its standing army and its trained reserve. Economically, great-power status required workshops to fabricate munitions of war; but no one conceived the necessity of having enormous production plants to supply an army in the field. There were five states in Europe that could rate as great powers: Russia, England, Austria, France, and Prussia. The diplomatic structure that organized European government maintained a balance among these five states so that they were believed to be approximately equal. The rise of German industrial power made this thinking meaningless.

As we have seen, in one generation Germany outstripped the whole Continent in the production of steel, chemicals, machinery, and many other goods. As a corollary, her population shot up to around seventy

millions. This might not have been so disturbing if it had not been joined to the fact that the military traditions of Brandenburg-Prussia-Germany provided this new industrial colossus with the finest army in Europe, an army which could be quickly shifted from one frontier to the other by means of an elaborate system of railways. The true meaning of the rise of German power did not become apparent until 1914-1918 when, aided by two decrepit empires, Germany successfully stood off the industrial and military power of the rest of Europe for four years, and succumbed only when the military and industrial strength of the United States was thrown into the balance. From about 1880 onward the potential military power of Germany so outstripped that of her neighbors that she became a menace to their freedom of action. To balance the power of Germany, her neighbors had to combine against her; their combinations made Germany fearful of encirclement and more truculent than ever.

The second factor, namely, the crisis of British sea power, is obviously tied to the problem created by this aggressive, truculent Germany. From the battle of Trafalgar, when the last of the eighteenth-century French naval strength was wrecked, until the 1880's, Great Britain had practically absolute control of the seas. With bases scattered all over the globe at strategic locations, with control over practically every narrow channel in the world's water highways, and with a navy that could exert preponderant force in Europe, Asia, and the Americas at the same time, England literally ruled the waves. It was this control over the sea that allowed her to develop the British Empire and at the same time to be absolutely secure from the military pressures on the continent of Europe. This sea power was, of course, an outward manifestation of her economic power; behind it were British industry, British capital, British trade. After 1880 this sea power was challenged from several points of the compass.

There are a number of events that explain the challenges Britain was forced to meet. In the first place, of course, is the rise of Continental industry, particularly German, and then the rise of American and Japanese industry. As other areas of the globe developed heavy industry, they too reached out for sea power. Technology also entered the picture. Just before the American Civil War, naval architecture began to undergo a revolution that completely changed shipbuilding. In the period after 1860 the introduction of steel hulls, armor plating, and heavy rifles mounted on revolving turrets in the center of the ship, made the old British navy obsolete. In the race that started in the 1880's Britain's advantage over her rivals was slim. When France, Russia, the United States, and Japan ordered new battleships, Britain was forced

into a large-scale program to match this construction. Even so, however, she was unable to keep the lead she once had had. The Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars clearly showed that the Japanese navy was ready and able to dominate the waters of northeast Asia. The Spanish-American War and the building of the Panama Canal indicated that an American navy was in process of gaining control over the western hemisphere, at least north of the equator. British naval stations both in eastern Asia and in the Caribbean no longer had the importance that once was so obvious.

Until 1900, it was France and Russia that seemed to challenge British authority over the seas around Europe. Their threat was easily met, but after 1900 a new one arose from the German fleet that was not so easy to counter. Germany came into the race late; but when she did embark upon a program of naval building, her great industrial strength gave her enormous advantages. Once again technique altered the picture. The British, as usual in the era before 1914, pioneered by constructing a super-battleship, the *Dreadnought*, that in the words of Admiral Fisher "could sink the whole German fleet." But Germany, too, could and did build super-battleships. Challenged in her own home waters as well as in Asia and America, Britain was in a highly dangerous position. She could not exist as a great power without control over the sea lanes. It was imperative that she keep it or she would be reduced to the status of a nation like Holland, dependent upon the benevolence of her neighbors.

There were, of course, many other problems that influenced the direction of high politics in the world between 1871 and 1914. Imperialism, nationalism, armaments, and secret diplomacy have been given credit for bringing on the war. Arrogance, jealousy, insecurity, ambition, revenge, and greed might also receive credit for the catastrophe. But all these elements operated in a world in which the rise of German power in Europe and of rival sea powers in the world—that is, industrialism—disturbed the balances that previous generations had created.

Militarism and Armaments

Objectively the new high politics was expressed in the military organization of Europe. Between 1871 and 1914 there were wars in the Balkans, in Asia, in Africa, and in America, but the nations of western Europe did not draw the sword against one another. Yet at no other period had there been such enormous expenditures for armaments, huge standing armies, and colossal navies. Western Europe enjoyed peace—an "armed peace" based on fear.

The improvements in weapons after 1871 made warfare a branch of applied science requiring expert technical knowledge in the munitions factory and on the battlefield. The new or perfected means of destruction included the breech-loading rifle, the machine gun, and smokeless powder, together with the continuous enlargement of cannon and the use of long-range, high-explosive projectiles. In death-dealing efficiency these threw all previous inventions into the shade.

The wars of early modern times were waged by comparatively small armies. Hired soldiers who enlisted for a long service composed the rank and file, while the commissioned officers came from the nobility. The French revolutionists introduced recruiting by conscription, and Napoleon retained this method of filling the depleted ranks of his troops. Prussia, defeated by Napoleon and obliged to limit her army to small proportions, evaded the obligation by adopting the short-service system. All able-bodied men received a brief training and then passed into the reserve, whence they could be called to the colors upon the outbreak of hostilities. This system, having proved its worth in the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian wars, was adopted by all the Continental nations. Europe thus became an "armed camp," with five million men constantly under military training and with many more millions of trained men ready for the call to arms. By paying Germany the compliment of imitation, the nations of the Continent were attempting to achieve outward manifestations of power comparable to Germany's. Indeed in 1914 the standing army of Russia was much larger than that of Germany; even France had a slightly larger number of men under arms. But these figures could not conceal the underlying differences in the strength of the three nations. The naval race that developed between Germany and England after 1905 further emphasized the importance of the new relationships in the world.

Great Britain did not compete in the race for land armaments and adhered to the principle of voluntary, long-time enlistment for her armies overseas. At home she found sufficient protection in the fleet, which she maintained at a strength at least equal to that of any two other powers. Her far-flung empire depends upon control of the seas and, being no longer self-supporting, she would face starvation in time of war were she blockaded by an enemy. Germany would not acquiesce in British maritime supremacy and under the inspiration of the kaiser, who declared that the "trident must be in our hands," started to build a powerful navy. Helgoland, off the mouth of the Elbe, was converted into a naval base, a second Gibraltar. The Kiel Canal, originally completed in 1896, was widened in 1914 to allow the passage of the largest warships between the Baltic and the North Sea.

Great Britain watched these preparations with unconcealed dismay. Her answer was the complete reorganization of the British fleet, the scrapping of nearly two hundred vessels as obsolete, and the laying-down of dreadnoughts and superdreadnoughts. The naval rivalry became so enormously expensive that British statesmen twice proposed an agreement to keep down the rate of increase, but Germany refused to enter into an arrangement which would have left Great Britain still mistress of the seas.

The Hague Peace Conferences

The growing burden of the "armed peace" led to an agitation in various countries for the reduction of excessive armaments. It took practical shape in 1898, as the result of a proposal by Nicholas II for an international conference to deal with the problem. Russia's reasons for calling a conference were not based altogether upon idealism. Her Central European neighbors had introduced a new weapon in their artillery that Russia did not have, and the czar's generals wanted time to repair the gap between their forces and those of their prospective foes. None the less the czar's circular note to the powers described with clarity and insight the exact state of affairs then existing in Europe. "The preservation of peace has been put forward as the object of international policy. In its name great states have formed powerful alliances. For the better guaranty of peace they have developed their military forces to proportions hitherto unknown and still continue to increase them without hesitating at any sacrifice. All these efforts, nevertheless, have not yet led to the beneficent results of the desired pacification. . . . Moreover, in proportion as the armaments of each power increase, so do they less and less attain the object aimed at by the governments. Economic crises, due in great part to the system of amassing armaments to the point of exhaustion, and the continual danger which lies in this accumulation of war material, are transforming the armed peace of our days into a crushing burden which the peoples have more and more difficulty in bearing. It appears evident, then, that if this state of affairs be prolonged, it will inevitably lead to the very cataclysm which it is desired to avert, and the impending horrors of which are fearful to every human thought."

As the result of the czar's action, delegates from twenty-six states met in 1899 at The Hague, in the first International Peace Conference. A second conference, representing forty-four states, or practically all the civilized world, assembled in 1907. Attempts were made at these gatherings to lessen the horrors of future wars by prohibiting, for in-

stance, the use of asphyxiating gases and the dropping of projectiles from balloons. But no agreement could be reached to limit armaments or military expenditures, much less to provide for general disarmament. A third conference was projected for 1915. It never took place.

Bismarck's System

In 1871 on the morrow of the defeat of France and the proclamation of the German Empire, neither the problems to be created by German industrialism nor the crisis to come for British sea power were apparent to the world. The defeat of France was explained by the weaknesses of Napoleon III's government, by the political situation created by Russia's interest in regaining control over the Black Sea and her hostility to Austria, and finally by the military genius of the Prussian army. Bismarck well understood that if he were to follow an adventurous policy, his newly created empire would have to meet a European coalition that probably would destroy it. It was not an accident that he announced that his policy henceforth would be to maintain peace in Europe. Any other policy would have ended in disaster.

To secure peace, Bismarck first turned to England. An Anglo-German alliance, then a popular idea in both countries, would tie Britain's preponderant sea power to the preponderant land power of Germany and guarantee peace. Control of the sea, however, allowed Britain serenely to pursue her own course. Isolation, "splendid isolation," was her policy, and Bismarck's blandishments could not change it. She was willing to maintain close and friendly relations with Germany, but not to become her ally. An agreement between France and Germany was impossible; no French government could admit that Alsace and Lorraine were permanently lost. Gambetta's famous advice, "Think of it always and never speak of it," was only half carried out — Frenchmen both thought and talked! Thus with France and England impossible candidates for an alliance, Bismarck was practically forced to consider Austria and Russia as his only alternatives.


In effect, the alliances that were made between Austria, Russia, and Germany constituted a return to the Metternich system and the Holy Alliance. But Bismarck's problems were greater than those of Metternich. Austria and Russia were both rivals in the Balkans and "bad friends" because of Austria's "treachery" at the time of the Crimean War. Bismarck brought them together in the name of conservative, monarchical solidarity against the "red" menace. The treaties that made up the Three Emperors' League were signed in 1872 and 1873. These treaties pledged the signatories to defend the *status quo* and pre-

vent aggression in Europe; but the *status quo* is a fragile plant and very soon a situation in the Balkans made its maintenance impossible.

By 1875 the Bulgarian question and the problems of Serbian relationship to the Ottoman Empire made all Europe look anxiously toward the Balkans. The questions involved "atrocities" committed by the "terrible Turks" and nationalistic aspirations of the subject Slavic populations. The great powers tried to settle the difficulties by a conference of ambassadors at Constantinople, but their efforts were forestalled by the proclamation of a Turkish Constitution (1876) that seemed to grant much more than the powers demanded. Nevertheless the disorders in Bulgaria and Serbia continued, and finally Russia, after a preliminary agreement with Austria-Hungary, declared war upon Turkey (1877). After initial reverses, the Russian army swept deep into the country and appeared about to take Constantinople itself. At this juncture, Turkey found a protector. The British government decided that, bad as she was, she was a better guardian of the Straits than Russia. A British fleet steamed into the sea of Marmora.

The Russians made peace immediately. This Peace of San Stefano, however, neglected to consider the agreement that Russia and Austria-Hungary had made before the war, and by creating a big Bulgaria, obviously a Russian protectorate, irritated the English government. The general European situation became tense when both England and Austria-Hungary indicated that it was unacceptable. To Bismarck this development presented a problem of great magnitude. If his two allies went to war with each other, Germany could hardly keep out of the resultant imbroglio, and the German Empire, not yet solidified, might fall to pieces. Bismarck therefore turned peacemaker; "honest broker," he called it. His suggestion was that all the interested powers might get some compensation, and, after exploring the ground well, he called a congress to meet at Berlin to decide the issue. The Russians had to accept, but to many of them it meant that Germany had turned against them, that the road to Constantinople was *through* Berlin.


The Berlin Conference of 1879 successfully staved off a war in no small part because of skillful work by the Russian ambassador at London and the Foreign Secretaries of Great Britain and Austria. The Treaty of San Stefano was whittled down, Austria received a mandate to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Russia received territory in Asia Minor and a money indemnity. On the edges of the congress, Britain got the right to occupy Cyprus, and France was assured of the opportunity to take Tunis. Bismarck, who said the whole Near Eastern question was "not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier," took nothing for Germany; it was enough that peace was assured. The



Bismarck's Alliance System before 1887

peace came, however, at a cost. Russia withdrew from the Three Emperors' League, and the Pan-Slav "lunatic fringe" talked glibly about a Russo-German war in the future. To meet this danger, in 1879 Bismarck concluded an alliance with Austria-Hungary that specifically agreed that the two states would aid each other in the event of Russian aggression.

The early 1880's saw an extension of Bismarck's defensive alliances. When France took Tunis, the Italians begged Bismarck to make an alliance with them. Bismarck had a low opinion of Italy and the Italian army. "It doesn't matter what kind of uniform they wear, they will run," was one of his sarcastic remarks. None the less he told the Italians that if they would make an alliance with Austria-Hungary, they could have a German alliance too. Austria had been Italy's "eternal enemy" for a generation; to make an alliance with her meant a reversal of policy. The Italians were prepared to do this, and Austria was also willing because it secured her southern frontier. This is the origin of the famed Triple Alliance. The Austro-German treaty of 1879 and the Italo-Austrian and Italo-German treaties of 1882 provided that the signatories would come to each other's assistance in the event of an attack from an outside power. The next year Rumania was added to the alliance.



Bismarck's Alliance System, 1887-1890

While these negotiations were under way, the Russian government, disturbed by nihilist revolutionary attacks, returned to the fold, and the Three Emperors' League was renewed for another period, 1881-1887. This was greatly to Bismarck's taste. He felt that Russia, potentially, was Germany's most dangerous neighbor and therefore he was anxious to keep her tied to Germany.

In the middle 1880's, however, the Three Emperors' League again ran into difficulties because of Austro-Russian rivalry in the Balkans, and Russia refused to renew the treaty. In 1887 Britain and Russia were quarreling over Middle Asia, in France a movement headed by the popular General Boulanger threatened a war of revenge with Germany, and Austria and Russia were tense over the Balkans. A spark of any kind might well have produced a general war. Bismarck's diplomacy rose to the situation. On the one side he sponsored an agreement between Spain, Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Britain to maintain the *status quo* in the Mediterranean. On the other he made a secret treaty with Russia that pledged Russia and Germany to benevolent neutrality

in case either was *attacked* by a third party. Bismarck called this the Reinsurance Treaty; it kept Russia tied to his policy. Since he also had a treaty with Austria assuring her German assistance in case she were *attacked* by Russia, Bismarck was in a position to dictate the policy of the Foreign Offices in both Vienna and St. Petersburg.

This was the high point in German security politics. Three years later Bismarck left the Foreign Office, and new men came to guide German policy. Bismarck's Germany kept the hegemony of Europe because Bismarck wanted security. His neighbors might have realized that German power had been growing rapidly since 1880, but they never had the fact flaunted in their faces by aggressive policies. Even the acquisition of the colonial areas had been made in co-operation with France, Russia, Austria, and Italy, rather than in spite of their interests. By calling a conference on Africa to meet at Berlin, Bismarck further underlined Germany's peaceful intentions. It is true that he knew how and when to rattle the German sword, but he did not use that sword for aggressive political adventures.

The New Course of German Policy

The men that followed Bismarck in control of German policy after 1890 had neither his forbearance and restraint nor his skill and daring. The young emperor, William II, was a true representative of the new German power. His blustering, boastful, tactless approach to world affairs was a reflection of the "newly rich" psychology that Germany began to demonstrate to the world. While Bismarck had been content to have Germany maintain hegemony on the Continent, the new men wanted Germany to be a world power. The German merchant flag was beginning to crowd into every port in the world; they wanted German influence and policy to support and expand that pressure. At the end of the decade, Chancellor Bülow explained that all Germany wanted was her "place in the sun." Place in the sun was something more than hegemony in Europe; to demand that place meant, of course, that Germany was elbowing her way into world power. These new men were not so skillful as the old master. Bismarck had been able to gain advantages with a minimum of hostility to his actions. His successors earned the reputation of being sharp bargainers. Their bargains may have been fair but they left bad feelings and, what was worse, the impression that Germany was becoming a power whose rise endangered the interests of her neighbors. From the Germans' point of view they were merely claiming the place that their industry, commerce, and prestige rightfully gave them; their neighbors, whose industrial plants were not expanding so rapidly, saw their action as plain aggressive behavior.

To add to their sins of bad manners and offensiveness, these new men were also blunderers. Within five years after Bismarck left the government, they had pushed Russia into an alliance with France and had grossly insulted Britain.

In 1890 the new German government refused to renew the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia, at the same time that Germany and England reached an agreement over East Africa, and Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy noisily renewed the Triple Alliance. Russia, isolated in Europe, naturally looked about for an ally. There were many obstacles to an alliance with France. France was "red" and republican; Russia holy, autocratic, and conservative. Russia persecuted the Jews, and French Jewish bankers did not want to loan her money. But when Pope Leo XIII recognized the French Republic, there was reason to believe that the czar might be able to get along with it. Russia wanted a market in which to sell her bonds; to secure this she made concessions. So did France for the French were anxious to come out of isolation. After a four-year flirtation the two powers signed the Dual Alliance by which they agreed to come to each other's aid in case of an attack from one or more of the great powers. This was one of the first fruits of the new German policy. From the moment the Franco-Russian treaty was signed, Germany had to consider the possibility of a two-front war, and the Bismarck system of security was badly damaged.

Almost at the same time the new German government went out of its way to offend Britain. The troubles between Britain and the republics of South Africa came to a head when the Boers captured Dr. Jameson and his raiders before they could upset the little Boer government. With grand disregard of the consequences, the kaiser sent President Kruger a congratulatory telegram. Germany appeared to the British public to be intervening in a quarrel in which she had no business at all. It was a blunder perhaps not as irreparable as the dropping of Russia, but a blunder anyway. The Germans may have felt sympathetic with the Boers, but their tactless intervention did the Boers no good and did Anglo-German relations considerable harm.

The Crisis in British Policy

The formation of the Franco-Russian alliance was as disturbing to Britain as it was to Germany. In Asia British policy was at odds with Russia from Tibet to Turkey, where their rival imperialisms clashed. It was at odds with France in Africa and Asia, where their colonial spheres met. Indeed, to many it seemed as if the new alliance were directed against Great Britain rather than Germany. At the same time the Kruger telegram, conflicts between German and English concession-

aries in Turkey, and the co-operation of Germany, France, and Russia in the Far East emphasized more fully the isolation of Britain. Into this situation the Boer War at the end of the century burst like a bombshell. England was isolated, but not splendidly. The stubbornness of the Boer resistance struck a severe blow to British military prestige, while loose talk about possible intervention from Europe made the English position embarrassing. When the fact was added that her naval position had deteriorated for twenty years through the rise of new naval powers in America and Asia and the growth of the French and Russian navies, it became clear that Britain must come out of her isolation.

The first move was made toward Germany. About 1900 belief in Teutonic superiority was widespread in both countries, and the idea of an alliance between the two great Teutonic powers, one a sea power, the other a land power, was attractive to those people who firmly believed in the myth of Nordic or Teutonic superiority. The alliance Bismarck had failed to get was freely offered to his successors, but the German government turned it aside. True, the idea was not popular in Germany, where Britain was regarded as the oppressor of the Boers, but the German refusal to accept the possibility of an alliance finally drove Britain into the arms of Germany's potential enemies. England after 1900 had to have allies or at least friends in the world, and she trimmed her policy to fit that need.

In 1902 she made an alliance with Japan. For Japan this alliance was protection against intervention by third parties in the war that she planned to wage against Russia in the Far East. For Britain it meant that she had an ally to share the responsibility for protecting British interests in Asia, and protection against Japanese pressures in that area. Japan, a new naval power, allowed Britain to withdraw some of her sea power into the Mediterranean and Atlantic waters without danger to her interests in the Orient. About the same time Britain began a more assiduous cultivation of the United States. Twisting the lion's tail was a favorite sport of many irresponsible American politicians, but during the Spanish-American War the State Department in Washington had learned to value the advantages to be derived from British friendship and to appreciate British courtesy in international affairs. John Hay and the first Roosevelt found British friendship advantageous in the first steps made by the United States as a world power after the defeat of Spain clearly indicated her new position in the world.


Britain, however, needed a friend on the continent of Europe. It must not be forgotten that in the first decade of the twentieth century Europe was still the most important continent, and on it could be made decisions that would affect the destiny of the whole world.

The Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian Ententes

German diplomats in 1900 were profoundly convinced that Great Britain and France could not get together. In 1898 the Fashoda incident dramatized the fact that English imperialism and French imperialism were at odds in Africa, and the humiliation that France had to accept increased the recriminations against England that filled the French press. None the less in 1904 Britain and France did sign an important agreement that laid the basis for Anglo-French co-operation in Africa, Asia, and Europe. There can be little doubt that the rise of German power and the subsequent disruption of the European balances were responsible for this development. In 1898 France did not go to war over the Sudan; the unpreparedness of her navy and army was one factor, latent and persistent hostility toward Germany was the other. And when talk of an agreement with Germany in 1899 broke down on the rocks of Alsace-Lorraine, it became clear that France must always oppose German power. From the time of the Kruger telegram onwards there was growing hostility to Germany in England. The phenomenal expansion of German trade, the beginnings of the German navy, and the anti-British tone of the German press during the Boer War, called the German problem forcibly to British attention. A number of influential journals in England began to take a definite anti-German orientation for their editorial policy.

It was not easy to bring France and Great Britain together, but patience and clear-headed negotiations finally did accomplish an understanding. The agreement was made by Britain's recognizing France's "rights" in Morocco, and France recognizing British "rights" in Egypt. But when France tried to secure a protectorate over Morocco without first paying off Germany, the kaiser made a visit at Tangiers and publicly opposed French pretensions. This action strengthened the Anglo-French understanding. The British government agreed to hold Anglo-French military conversations to plan for joint defense against German aggression, and thereby enlarged an entente (understanding) into potential military co-operation. As we have seen, the Moroccan question was not settled until 1911, and each time that Germany challenged France's interests there, the Anglo-French entente became firmer.

This Anglo-French entente weathered another storm as serious as the Morocco crisis. When Japan, Britain's ally, attacked Russia, France's ally, there was danger that a general conflict might follow. But again European interests proved strong enough to bridge the difficulty. German truculence over Morocco and the propaganda campaign of the



Alliances and Ententes, 1902-1914

German Navy League emphasized the significance of Germany's policy of world empire to both France and Great Britain.

At the end of the Russo-Japanese war, the Russian government decided that it should make an agreement with the English over Middle Asia, an agreement with Germany over the Bagdad Railway, Turkey, and Persia, and an agreement with Austria over the Balkans. Of these three, only the first was fully effected. Great Britain, on her part, was also anxious to make some arrangement with Russia that would reduce her Asiatic commitments and secure for her another friend in Europe. English publicists were not afraid to connect this agreement with the fact that Germany's growth in power, industrial, commercial, and naval, was a menace to Britain and that Russia could help redress the balance of power.

It was rather difficult for Russia and Great Britain to come together because for almost a century they had been rivals. In 1907, however,

they did reach an agreement that divided Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet into spheres of interest, and provided for co-operation rather than hostile rivalry. Several years later military conversations gave this agreement even greater meaning. With the Anglo-French Entente and the Franco-Russian Alliance, it completed the Triple Entente. When Japan and Russia reached an accord over Manchuria, the four powers presented a front to the Triple Alliance.

Interpenetration of the Entente and Alliance Systems

The other two Russian policies, namely, proposals for agreements with Germany and with Austria-Hungary, did not work out so well. The former welcomed the opportunity to deal with Russia over the Bagdad Railway question, and a treaty between the two powers reached the stage of a second draft. But it had to be postponed because Russia accepted the English formula that the Bagdad Railway question should be settled by a conference of Great Britain, Russia, France, and Germany. Such a formula was unacceptable to the Germans. Their bankers had the concession and had already built a large part of the line; they were willing to deal with each of their opponents separately, but not *à trois*. The negotiations were not resumed for several years.

The approach to Austria ended in disaster. Negotiations over the Straits question and Bosnia-Herzegovina were well under way, when the "Young Turk" Revolution (1908) forced Austria's hand. The Austrian government brutally announced the annexation of the two Turkish provinces that it had administered since the Berlin Conference, and Russia could not obtain any comparable compensation. The crisis that followed was heightened because Serbia, a Russian protégé in the Balkans, refused to admit Austria's right to incorporate more South Slavs in the empire. When the crisis was at its height, the German government declared that it would back Austria-Hungary with German power. That ended it. Russia and Serbia had to back down, for German power in 1908 was clearly more than a match for anything that could be opposed to it on the Continent. The fruits of German industrialism and German military traditions were now apparent to all.

Germany's position, however, in spite of her power, was none too good. After the Anglo-French Entente was signed, Italy too made an entente with France regarding Morocco and Tripoli, and in the years immediately following it became apparent that Italy was cooling toward the Triple Alliance. By 1909 she had made written or verbal agreements with France, Russia, and Britain that for all practical pur-

poses placed at least one of her feet in the Triple Entente even though the other was still, by treaty, in the Triple Alliance.

This situation and the general fear that the entente system was encircling Germany led to a policy under Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg that attempted to break into or destroy the Triple Entente. The Germans reopened negotiations with Russia over the Bagdad Railway, and by 1911 they reached an agreement, the Potsdam treaty. Russia gave up her opposition to German railroad building in Turkey, and Germany renounced her political penetration of Persia (railroads, banks, telegraph lines, etc.). But the agreement was a *détente*, not an *entente*: it provided for mutual abstinence rather than co-operation. The same year, after the Agadir crisis over Morocco, Germany and France came to an agreement: in exchange for Morocco, France ceded Germany a few million square miles of tropical jungle. This removed another cause of friction between Germany and her neighbors. In 1912-1914 Germany and Britain began discussions of their points of difference; a treaty was drawn up in 1914 but not ratified because war overtook it.

The failure of the Anglo-German negotiations to prevent the war of 1914-1918 is an interesting illustration of the basic problems of high politics in the twentieth century. The points for discussion were the navy, the colonies, and the economic penetration of Turkey. German and British bankers and statesmen after months of negotiation were able to find a formula whereby irrigation projects, oil wells, river shipping companies, and railroad enterprises in Turkey could be divided between them by percentage exchanges of stocks. No one reading the treaties that were finally drawn up can doubt the possibility that friction in Turkey would have been ended by them. The Germans and the British could also agree in principle about colonial claims and the future possible disposition of colonial areas. But they could not agree over the problem of naval power. The German navy, after 1906, had grown by leaps and bounds. While Britain had little trouble keeping relative superiority, she obviously was losing the race, for she could not keep superiority over the German navy and at the same time maintain superiority elsewhere in the world. Furthermore the rivalry meant enormous expense to Britain, for she tried to build two ships for every German ship. To the British, the navy was a necessity; without superiority, their homeland was untenable. They quite naturally regarded a navy as a luxury to Germany or as a weapon directed against themselves. The German government refused to consider a percentage limitation because they insisted that their ever-expanding commerce and merchant marine needed protection. It was an impasse. The Brit-

ish were anxious for an agreement but could not accept any terms the Germans would offer them because those terms would have isolated Britain from France and Russia.

The Approach to War

The war of 1914 found its immediate origins in the problems of the two decaying empires in central and southeastern Europe: Turkey and Austria-Hungary. For over two hundred years Turkey had been slowly slipping from the heights she had reached in the sixteenth century. In the nineteenth century the pace of her disintegration was accelerated by the nationalistic ambitions of the subject peoples and the encroachments of her powerful neighbors. The decay of the Austrian Empire was less spectacular but in every way as real. Austria lost her Italian provinces in 1859-1866, she was excluded from Germany in 1866-1870, and during the whole of the century restless stirrings of her minorities threatened the breakup that came in 1918. It is not surprising that statesmen both in Vienna and in Constantinople worked to counteract these evils, nor is it surprising that the heirs presumptive to these two empires did all they could to accelerate the process of disintegration.

Curiously enough it was the Morocco crisis of 1911 that released the avalanche of events. When France occupied Morocco, Italy hastened to cash the check that assured her the right to occupy Tripoli. This meant war with Turkey. Thereupon the small states in the Balkans — Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro — with Russian advice formed an offensive alliance against Turkey. The Turks were quickly defeated, but when the great powers intervened to keep Serbia from annexing territory on the Adriatic coast (Albania) a second Balkan war broke out with Bulgaria, rather than Turkey, as the victim. The most important results of these wars (1912-1913) were that (1) Turkey was practically excluded from Europe, (2) Bulgaria desired revenge, and (3) Serbia expanded southward about as far as possible. This last fact now concentrated Serbian attention upon the problem of redeeming the South Slavs living in the Austrian Empire.

The assassination of Francis Ferdinand, heir to the Hapsburg throne, by a Serbian nationalist backed by a plot hatched in Serbia, was the direct result of Serbia's new orientation even though the act itself was quite fortuitous. To the Austrians it was sufficient evidence that they had to move quickly against this South Slavic thrust or face rapid disintegration in the empire. On the other hand, the Serbians and their backers in Russia could not accept the idea that South Slavic nationalism

should or could be nipped in the bud. Serbia hoped to play the role that Piedmont had played in the unification of Italy; to the Serbs and their friends, Austria was an anachronism anyway and must not be allowed to stifle a vital movement like South Slavic nationalism. Unfortunately for Europe the crisis could not be isolated; if it could have been, unpromising as the prospects were, some solution might have been found.

The German Empire entered into the picture even before the crisis developed. There was a growing fear of encirclement in Germany that made her statesmen ever conscious of the problems of her only secure ally. If the Hapsburg state were broken up, they felt that they would have to face a hostile Europe alone. Furthermore the kaiser had been a personal friend of Francis Ferdinand, and the assassination deeply moved him. As a result, the German government acted in a way that made general war inevitable when Russia insisted upon backing up Serbia. The Austrians asked the Germans for support in a strong action against Serbia, and the Germans gave them a "blank check" that could be drawn on the German army. They assured Austria of their support and urged her to act quickly. This gave the more irresponsible of the central powers freedom to pursue her disastrous course.

This "blank check" might not have been fatal if Russia had been willing to back down again as she did in 1908. But she could not do so and retain her prestige in the Balkans. Furthermore the Russians also received what amounted to a "blank check" from France. The French president and foreign minister were in St. Petersburg when the crisis was gathering, and they assured the czar's government that France would honor her signature to the Dual Alliance. This second assurance of support gave the most irresponsible of the anti-German powers a free hand to act.

Who was to blame? It is a question upon which students are not in accord. If one considers the crisis from the viewpoint of any one of the nations, there were ample and good reasons for their action, and yet the resultant catastrophe makes all the reasons seem puny and meaningless. Serbia could not accept Austrian dictation; Austria feared disintegration; Germany, encirclement; Russia, loss of prestige; France had to stand by Russia or risk seeing the Dual Alliance broken; and finally Britain could not allow Germany to defeat her two friends on the Continent without gravest danger to herself. But these reasons produced a cataclysm in 1914 and laid the foundations for another one in 1939.

The crisis of July, 1914, moved swiftly after Austria, on July 23, sent a note to Serbia demanding that Serbia suppress anti-Austrian

publications and societies, dismiss from the army or the civil service all those having anything to do with the anti-Austrian propaganda, get rid of anti-Austrian teachers and textbooks from the public schools, and allow representatives of the Austro-Hungarian government to take part in the Serbian investigation of the criminal assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand. Forty-eight hours were granted for the unconditional acceptance or rejection of these terms.

Serbia replied within the time limit and agreed to all the Austrian demands which "would not impair the country's independence and sovereignty." She also expressed willingness to submit the dispute to the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which had been set up by the great powers at The Hague, or to their friendly mediation. Simultaneously, she mobilized her army. Austria-Hungary, having rejected the reply as insincere and only "a play for time," also mobilized; on July 28 she declared war on Serbia, in order, as the Austrian foreign minister declared, "to cut the ground from any attempt at intervention"; and on July 29 she bombarded Belgrade and fired the first shots of the first World War. By issuing an ultimatum which made demands incompatible with the rights of a sovereign state and by invading Serbian territory in order to chastise a people not her subjects, Austria-Hungary violated international law, but her action was not out of line with the usual policy followed by great powers toward small states in the nineteenth century. Austria was actually emphasizing the fact that the nations lived together in a state of international anarchy.

The European sky had darkened suddenly and ominously. Should Russia attack Austria-Hungary in order to aid Serbia, then Germany, allied with Austria-Hungary, would surely attack Russia; and France, allied with Russia, would attack Germany. The "defensive" alliances of the great powers, instead of preserving peace, threatened to involve most of the Continent in strife. Efforts to prevent it began as soon as the Austrian note was sent to Serbia. The Triple Entente first asked Austria-Hungary to extend the time limit for the answer from Serbia. Austria-Hungary refused to do so. Great Britain and France then urged Serbia to make her reply to the Austrian demands as conciliatory as possible. That it was sufficiently conciliatory to allow a diplomatic solution of the controversy the kaiser himself admitted: he declared that Austria-Hungary had no further reason for war. After the reply had been delivered, Great Britain, through Sir Edward Grey, minister for foreign affairs, suggested that the four great powers not directly involved should hold a conference in London to adjust Austro-Serbian relations. France and Italy accepted the suggestion, but Germany, on

the ground that the whole dispute concerned only Austria-Hungary and Serbia, declined to "drag her ally before the bar of Europe." It was now Germany's turn to make a suggestion. She first tried to establish direct negotiations between Russia and Austria. This proved to be something like persuading two spitting cats to come together amicably. After Austria had declared war, Germany proposed that Austria should be allowed to take Belgrade and must then submit the quarrel to a European conference. This solution seemed satisfactory to England, but even German threats of withdrawing from the alliance did not bring Austria's consent. Russian mobilization intervened and made the whole scheme impossible.

We know, of course, that the proposals for peace were ineffective because they had to function within a web of fears, ambitions, and plans that could not be put aside. Austria-Hungary, relying on the support of Germany, had already decided to take aggressive action against Serbia. The reason for doing so was the threatening situation in the Balkans. The two Balkan wars of 1912-1913 had greatly strengthened Serbia and Montenegro, whose peoples now looked forward with increasing assurance to the liberation of their kinsfolk in the South Slavic provinces of the Dual Monarchy. This situation seemed to imperil its existence and threw the Viennese diplomats into such a state of panic that before the assassination of the archduke they actually drafted and presented a memorandum to Berlin on the necessity of crushing Serbia. The Sarajevo tragedy offered only a convenient pretext for the punitive measures which had already been decided upon; it provided only the long-desired opportunity to settle accounts with the troublesome Balkan state. The German government sanctioned such action in advance, without, apparently, being aware of its exact nature.

Russia had yielded to the Central Powers in the Balkan crises of 1908 and 1912-1913. In 1914 she did not yield, for she could now count unreservedly upon French support, which had been previously lacking. Raymond Poincaré, the president of France, and his colleagues in the government, made it clear to the czar's advisers that, in case hostilities broke out, France would "fulfill her obligations under the alliance." The assurance might be regarded as another blank check, drawn this time by the French government in favor of Russia. When news came of the bombardment of Belgrade, Russia started a partial mobilization of her armies along the Austrian frontier. It was soon extended into a general mobilization upon the entire western border of the Russian Empire. Russia thus served notice on the Central Powers that she would fight rather than look on passively while they deprived Serbia

of independence and destroyed Russian influence in southeastern Europe. War, if it broke out, was not to be localized in the Balkans, as the Central Powers expected and desired.

Russian general mobilization compelled Germany herself to mobilize — and at once. She could not afford to wait until her slower-moving antagonist had brought enormous forces into the field. The kaiser's government, accordingly, sent an ultimatum to Russia ordering that country to start demobilization within twelve hours or accept the consequences (July 31). Russia did not reply. The kaiser then signed the document declaring that a state of hostilities existed between Germany and Russia (August 1). War with Russia also meant war with France. Asked by Germany what was to be her attitude in the coming struggle, France replied that she would "act in accordance with her interests" and began to mobilize. Germany then declared war on France (August 3).

The German plan of campaign involved a swift, crushing blow upon the French before Russian mobilization could be completed. No rapid movement against France was possible from the east, first, because the high bluffs and narrow river valleys in this part of the country made defense easy; and, second, because the eastern frontier had been protected, since the Franco-Prussian War, by fortresses all the way from Verdun to Belfort. An attack from the northeast presented fewer difficulties, for a comparatively level plain, well provided with roads and railways, stretches from Germany through Belgium and France to the environs of Paris. Furthermore, France had not so strongly fortified her frontier on the side of Belgium, having trusted to the neutrality of that country (and of Luxemburg) for protection.

The neutrality of Belgium had been guaranteed by the European powers, including both France and Prussia, in 1839; furthermore, the second International Peace Conference in 1907, with Germany consenting, expressly declared the territory of neutral states to be inviolable. Nevertheless, on August 2 Germany addressed a note to Belgium demanding permission to move troops across the country into France and threatening, in case of a refusal, to leave the fate of Belgium to the "decision of arms." The Belgian government, under King Albert, declined to "sacrifice the honor of the nation and betray its duty toward Europe." On August 4 the German army invaded the country. The chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, admitted before the Reichstag, the same day, that the invasion was "a breach of international law." "Necessity knows no law," said the chancellor.

It is a cardinal principle of British foreign policy that the Belgian coast shall not be occupied by a strong military power, thus threaten-

ing the control of the Channel by Great Britain. Over this issue she fought with Philip II of Spain in the sixteenth century and later with Louis XIV and Napoleon. Great Britain, moreover, had explicit obligations to Belgium as one of the signatories of the treaties guaranteeing the neutrality of that country. But even if Belgium had not been involved, Britain could not have stood by and placidly watched the German armies roll up France and Russia. Germany's upsurge of power from about 1880 onward had already endangered her position in the world; if Germany were now to free herself from checks and balances on the Continent, Britain's position would deteriorate rapidly. Thoughtful Englishmen have always known that their island and their empire is safe only so long as there is a balance of power on the Continent. The German invasion of Belgium provided an excellent moral pretext for intervention; it allowed Britain to fight for her interests, her survival, and the sanctity of treaties. When, therefore, news came that German troops were entering Belgium, the British government sent an ultimatum to Germany, requiring assurances by midnight, August 4, that Belgian neutrality would be respected. Germany did not give them, and Bethmann-Hollweg, in his final interview with the British ambassador at Berlin, complained that Great Britain was about to fight a kindred nation just for "a scrap of paper." About midnight Great Britain declared war on Germany. As Sir Edward Grey said, the lamps were going out all over Europe.

Armageddon

The Book of Revelation (xvi, 16) tells of a final conflict to be waged "on the great day of God" between the forces of good and evil assembled at Armageddon. The great day seemed to have arrived in 1914, but who could distinguish between the forces of good and evil then aligned in battle? No government really desired a general European war; no government willed it. Moreover, the people of every belligerent country were convinced of the justice of their cause. For Austro-Hungarians the war was to prevent the dissolution of the Dual Monarchy; for Russians, to aid their Slavic-speaking "brothers"; for Germans, to defend the Fatherland against a hostile coalition; for Frenchmen, to win back the "Lost Provinces"; and for Englishmen, to defend a little neighboring state against aggression. In the absence of any form of international organization, and without any accepted procedure for the pacific settlement of international disputes, there was no means of preserving the peace which everyone desired. Therein lay the tragedy of the situation.

The outbreak of hostilities quickly converted the Triple Entente into a Triple Alliance. Great Britain, France, and Russia engaged not to make peace separately and to accept a general peace only on terms satisfactory to all of them. Great Britain, with her fleet, her money, and eventually her army, formed the keystone of the coalition. The Central Powers, though less populous and wealthy than the Allies, possessed in the German army the finest war machine in the world. They had unity of command, for the German general staff largely directed military operations. They enjoyed, also, the advantage of their central position, enabling them to fight on "inner lines" and, by means of their strategic railroads, to move and concentrate troops on the eastern and western frontiers with greater speed than either Russia or France. Military theorists, assuming a rapid "war of movement" made possible by the progress in offensive arms, predicted an early close of the struggle. Economists held the same view, on the ground that even the richest countries could not long support the enormous expenditure necessitated by great armies and the stoppage of civilian pursuits. Should it be a short war, the Central Powers seemed likely to win an overwhelming victory.

It proved to be a long war, a "war of attrition." Beginning on July 28, 1914, with the Austrian declaration against Serbia, it lasted until November 11, 1918, when Germany signed with the Allies an armistice that amounted to unconditional surrender. During these years the number of contestants steadily increased. Turkey and Bulgaria threw in their lot with the Central Powers. Italy, Rumania, Greece, and Portugal joined the Allies. Japan almost immediately took the Allied side and the United States did so in 1917, after submarine atrocities by the Germans and their intrigues and conspiracies in this country had aroused the warlike temper of the American people. The Allies won because eventually they had an overwhelming superiority in men and resources, and because the control of the sea enabled them to establish a blockade which prevented the Central Powers from renewing their armaments and feeding their peoples. Yet for all this the Allies required the aid of a non-European power; the entry of the United States into the war, when all the other combatants were well-nigh exhausted, was the decisive factor in the final victory.

To tell the story of the bitter struggle on land and sea and in the air; the gigantic battles, beginning with that of the Marne; the victories and defeats; the mutual slaughter; the suffering, heroism, and patient endurance on each side—to tell the story of a man-made cataract of destruction such as never before had descended on our planet would be out of place in a book which recounts the history of civilization.

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None the less, since war plays so great a part in this twentieth century, it is necessary to see how war affected the industrial-economic system and the liberal-democratic political system. The former was enormously aggrandized; the latter received a serious setback.

The brilliant German plan for a "lightning war" that would crush France and then knock out Russia, failed in 1914, and with it, any hopes for early peace. Then and only then did the character of modern warfare reveal itself. Like no other war in previous history that of 1914-1918 was one of production. Modern science had multiplied and complicated the tools of war; democratic mass-armies had expanded the amounts of materials that could be used; and modern transportation made it feasible to pour the entire production of a great nation on the battlefield. This meant that by 1915 the man in the coal mine, the woman filling shells or weaving blankets, the worker manufacturing guns, trucks, or chemicals, and the peasant on the farm were every bit as important in the actual process of war as the soldier in the field. It meant, too, that the interests of businessmen in their own plants were transcended by national interests; indeed the whole economic system had to respond to the total needs of war. The war behind the front was vital for the war at the front, and that fact made the whole nation part of the army. Realization of this fact came slowly, but before the war was over, this fact had imposed the controls of the state upon practically every phase of the economic life of the belligerent nations. Laissez-faire economics had to give way before the imperative needs of the total society. No citizen in the twentieth century could say with Voltaire in the eighteenth, "My king makes war; I am not interested."

To keep the peoples of Europe fully behind the war effort of their governments, other liberties were also curtailed. Strict censorship over the press prevented "information valuable to the enemy" as well as ideas disturbing to morale from appearing, while propaganda machines in every country poured forth streams of arguments that ranged from philosophical and historical discussions to prove the essential rightness of the nation's case, to emotional stories of atrocities that may or may not have occurred. The whole moral force of the nations was mobilized. Preachers, teachers, publicists, novelists, poets, and artists were encouraged and even organized to whip up the patriotic feelings of the people. The law and the police were also entrusted with new duties. It was inconceivable to allow individuals liberty of action at a time when the national existence was at stake; so the whole system of liberal jurisprudence was imperiled. Martial law, arbitrary arrest, concentration camps, and the whole paraphernalia of state controls so familiar to the twentieth century appeared to back up the war efforts.

It was the first lesson in totalitarian control over feeling and conscience — a lesson not lost in the epoch that followed.

In this new kind of warfare each side had certain advantages. The Germans, after overrunning eastern France, had a metallurgical and chemical industry more than a match for that of their enemies. But by controlling the seas the British could prevent the Germans from receiving many raw materials and foodstuffs that were necessary for the successful operation of that industry. Furthermore, control of the seas allowed the English and their allies to tap the industrial power of the United States as a counterbalance to German production. This fact alone probably meant that Germany could win only if she could force a decision in the field *before* her industrial plant was crippled by shortages of vital raw materials. This was the overpowering fact that dictated offensive tactics to the German army. Strategists may have preached the offensive, but the facts of Germany's strategic situation compelled it. During almost the entire war the Germans were on the offensive. They struck towering blows at their enemies, but before they could knock all of them out, their own lifeblood was thinned and their industry slowed up so that in the end they came to defeat.

The course of the war provides an interesting lesson in the movement of politics. Hardly was the first shot fired before Japan joined her ally, Britain, with the obvious intention of installing herself in Germany's Far Eastern colonies. The German concessions in China and the German islands of the Pacific — now very familiar to many Americans — passed over to Japan. At the same time Japan prepared to usurp control over China while Europe was too busy to object. Japan was left with preponderant power in Asia; the United States alone tried to bolster the tottering sovereignty of China. In Europe the fortunes of the war dictated the behavior of the smaller states. Each of them wished to "rush to the assistance of the victor," and the entry of each of the European states can be timed by events on the battlefield. Some of them, like Bulgaria, misjudged entirely; some, like Rumania, temporarily lost everything by bad timing but in the end came out very well.

It was, however, the entry of the United States that decided the issue. Crude thinking in 1918 made many Americans say, "We won the war." This is untrue. The United States tipped the balance at a point when both sides were exhausted, and that settled the victory. The entry of the United States into this first war of the twentieth century has been much discussed. Some say it was the submarine warfare, some say Allied loans and propaganda that plunged the United States into war. It should be clear now, however, that the United States had to enter the war or face the problem of adjusting to a world structure

unfavorable to herself. Russia was almost out by the end of 1916; France and England were weakened and tottering on their feet. If Germany could have exerted the last extra pressure necessary to push through, the subsequent political picture would have presented a very different aspect from the one familiar to Americans. It is absurd to deny that American sympathies and interests were tied up with the Allies, and equally absurd to deny that a German victory would have had serious repercussions upon America's position as a world power. German blunders on the sea and in diplomacy may have provided the spark that threw the industrial and military power of the United States against the Central Powers, but the basic truth is that the United States could not have remained neutral and kept her position in the world.

The war came to an end in 1918. The last offensive of the German army failed; the offensive of the Allied army on all fronts drove the Germans back in France and broke the will of their allies. By the fall of 1918 Germany's military position was hopeless; there was nothing to do but sue for peace. It may be true that her army was still intact and in the field, but no amount of sophistry can deny that it was completely at the mercy of the victors—that is, it was totally defeated. Clausewitz wrote that the objective of war is to deprive the enemy of the power to resist. The armistice placed Germany completely within the grasp of the victors—the German army had no power to resist. We emphasize this fact because two myths arose in the postwar era: the German myth that her army was undefeated but “stabbed in the back by the ‘reds’”; the Allied myth that the failure to bring the war into Germany lost the victory. Obviously the German myth is false. The Allied myth confuses the war with the diplomacy that ended the war. The soldiers won a complete victory in 1918; if it was lost later, it was not the soldiers' fault.

The Background of the Treaties of Peace

The peace treaties that followed the war were written in Paris. That choice was probably a mistake. Paris in 1918–1920 was flooded with the uniformed men of twenty-odd nations; it had been their war capital and their most important furlough city, and those soldiers gave the city a character and a spirit unwholesome for peacemaking. Furthermore the press of Paris, as a result of the French press law, was the least restrained and also the most venial in Europe; its strident tones were no help to men who should have carefully weighed the problem before them. But France had suffered more than any of the other victorious Allies, and the prestige of the conference was her due.

Even more unfortunate than the choice of the capital was the fact that the conference which settled the affairs of Europe and the entire world really represented only the Western Allies and Japan. The new German republic was invited only to sign the treaty; Russia, whose interests spread from the Pacific to the center of Europe, was totally absent from the scene. These two facts meant that some 86,000,000 Englishmen and Frenchmen were later confronted with the necessity of defending the treaty against the opposition of some 80,000,000 Germans and 160,000,000 Russians. This, for some reason or other, did not appear important in 1919, but within ten years its importance became obvious. That revolutionary Russia could not be, or at least was not, invited to participate in the work of peacemaking, is one of the most significant facts of the day. The spirit of Lenin hovered over Paris in 1919, but Lenin himself was far away and by no means committed to the agreements made there.

When the powers assembled to discuss the basis for the new world, it soon became apparent that there were two more or less conflicting philosophies of peace. One, represented by President Wilson, was idealistic and hopeful; the other, represented by the French premier, Clemenceau, was realistic and pessimistic. The tangled mass of negotiations that produced the treaties was always snarled by the conflict of these two points of view.

Clemenceau had been a young man in 1870. He had seen the siege of Paris, the humiliation of France, and the long years between those dreary days and the victory of 1918. He held a rather low opinion of mankind in general and of Germans in particular. He felt reasonably sure that force was the only language they could understand. He had taken the measure of the victory. He understood that France had won because most of the world had come to her assistance, that France by herself was no match for Germany, and that the future discrepancy between French and German population and industrial power would probably be even more unfavorable to his country. "There are," he exclaimed, "20,000,000 Germans too many!" Furthermore Clemenceau had no illusions about the future peace of the world. He had seen France wait forty-odd years for revenge. He knew the history of the world as a history of conflict, and he fully believed that the Germans would some day reopen the armed debate of the Rhine. With this background, he wanted to partition Germany, to disarm her, to load her with debt, and to forge a tight alliance to keep her in subjugation forever. He did not care whether she was a republic or an empire; it was his firm conviction that as long as she was Germany, she was dangerous to France.

This French statesman had a plan to accomplish his ends. He knew what he wanted, and he worked to get it. He wanted France to have the hegemony of Europe. To achieve this he wanted, of course, the return of Alsace-Lorraine with its enormous iron deposits. But Alsace-Lorraine without the coal of the Rhine-Ruhr area would not assure the industrial supremacy necessary to back up hegemony. Therefore, like the French government after the second World War, he strove to incorporate the coal deposits of Germany into France or at least within a French orbit. For every point that came up for discussion where the interests of France were at stake, he had his plans well laid. He did not always achieve success, but a large share of the treaty was from his pen.

Clemenceau's other interest concerned Russia. Czarist Russia, France's faithful ally, was gone; Bolshevik Russia was in her place. Clemenceau had a deathly fear of revolutionary communism. In the demoralization of defeat in 1916, mutiny in the French army had shown him the dangers that revolution might have for France. "We will not only not make peace with communism," he said, "but also we will be the allies of all those people who fight it." To implement this idea he strove to build a tier of states in central and eastern Europe that could act as a barricade to the westward expansion of Lenin's ideas. The task proved eventually to be too great.

The other philosophy of peace was Wilson's. He was an idealist and something of a doctrinaire. When on August 1, 1917, Pope Benedict XV urged the warring countries to end the "fratricidal conflict" and make a "just and durable peace," President Wilson answered, for both the United States and the Allies, that no enduring peace could be arranged with the autocratic German government. In an address to Congress on January 8, 1918, the President set forth his famous Fourteen Points as a program for a just and permanent peace. They included: abolition of secret diplomacy; freedom of the seas alike in peace and war; removal of economic barriers between the nations; reduction of armaments to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety; impartial adjustment of colonial claims; evacuation by Germany of all conquered territory and the restoration of Belgium and Alsace-Lorraine; rearrangement of Italian frontiers along the lines of nationality; self-government for the different peoples of Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire; an independent Poland; and, finally, the formation of a general association of nations. In subsequent speeches he further explained and expanded these Fourteen Points. Justice, he insisted, must be fundamental to the peace; and not only justice to the ones to whom we want to be just, but also to the ones to whom we might not want to be just. Next to justice, the wishes of the people themselves stood high on Wilson's

list. "Peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about like pawns in a game"; in each case the interests and desires of the ones most concerned must be considered. This vigorous insistence upon popular sovereignty and the right of self-determination gives him a high place in the ranks of the prophets of nationalism. But most important to Wilson was his conviction that in a League of Nations civilized man could find salvation from future catastrophes. To the generation that saw the war of 1939-1945, the slogan "A war to end all wars" may seem a bit hackneyed, but Wilson believed that the League of Nations, a sort of Parliament of Man, could and would prevent future conflicts. Justice, rights of minorities, self-determination, and an international league to guarantee the peace: these were brave words, eagerly listened to by a world wrecked by war.

Unfortunately Wilson had not taken the measure of his colleagues nor of the situation of 1919. He came to the conference armed with these idealistic conceptions and backed up by an army of experts, but he did not have a concrete plan of peace. It is not so easy to translate "justice" into boundary lines and protocols; interests very often play a larger role. Not only did he not have definite plans for the wording of the treaty, but he was quite unprepared to meet the violent characters that the heat of war had thrown in his path. He was a politician of sorts and a statesman with vision, but he was not a negotiator who could meet Clemenceau and Lloyd George on their own terms. Perhaps it is unfortunate for the world that he was not a little harder as a man, a little more subtle as a diplomat. Surely he had all the advantages on his side, had he been able to use them. The American armies, fresh and well equipped, were at their height, and Europe not only owed the United States more money than it ever could repay but also must have further assistance in order to survive. These are the realities of power that can be used to dictate terms in the political arena. But Wilson did not use them to achieve his peace.

The other important figure at the conference, Lloyd George, did not have as clear-cut a philosophy as either Wilson or Clemenceau. Wherever the interests of Britain were not at stake, Lloyd George reacted like a statesman, but one cannot but get the impression that he went to the conference to salvage from the wreck of the war as much of the power and the prestige of Britain and her empire as could be saved.

Besides the philosophies of peace there were a number of hard facts that perhaps had more to do with the treaties than the conceptions of the statesmen. In the first place, before the United States entered the war, the Allies had signed a series of treaties by which they had

divided the spoils that were to be won by victory. Germany's colonial empire was divided among Britain, the British Dominions, France, and Japan. The Turkish Empire was split up among Britain, France, Russia, and Italy. Each of the smaller powers that had joined the war had been promised a share of the booty. The United States may not have been party to these treaties, but the signatories each felt comfortably secure of the spoils that were to be divided. These treaties had "bartered provinces and peoples like pawns in a game"; they were based upon national self-interest rather than justice. The Japanese delegation after raising the "red herring" of recognition of the equality of races — an idea that neither Britain nor, for that matter, the United States, would accept — could sit back quietly and collect her pound of flesh — the German colonies north of the equator — because it had been promised to her. Japan's action was no more cold-blooded than Australia's, or Britain's, or France's; the secret treaties were hard political facts that could not be ignored.

Another hard political fact was Europe itself. The breakup of the Turkish, Russian, and Austro-Hungarian empires created a political vacuum that extended from the Baltic to the Aegean. Finns, Letts, Poles, Czechs, Rumanians, Greeks, Serbs, and all the other peoples living in that region had heard Wilson's stirring words about self-determination and had listened to the voices of their native prophets of nationalism. Each one of these groups tried to use the chaos of the collapse to create new national states. Naturally there were conflicting ideas about "just" boundary lines, and one cannot read the history of that area in 1919-1920 without getting the impression that those boundaries were being surveyed with machine guns rather than transits. The men at Paris have been severely criticized for the "balkanization" of central and eastern Europe. This is unjust; they recorded the accomplished fact rather than created the situation. The onrush of nationalism from Finland to Greece was an avalanche that the conference had to accept as a reality; it did not create it.

Perhaps the most important single fact that stood in the way of the peacemakers was the universal hatreds that the war had created. Peace should reconcile victor and vanquished, unless the victor is prepared to enslave the vanquished. But after four years of warfare the peoples of Europe were not prepared for reconciliation. The harvest of the propaganda mills was not suitable for sowing in fields of peace. Each country had suffered terribly, and each country firmly believed that the enemy was entirely to blame for the suffering. Was it strange for Englishmen to support candidates for election who promised to hang the kaiser, to make Germany pay the cost of the war, and to provide Brit-

ish soldiers with pensions? Not at all; it was symptomatic of the climate of European opinion. After the defeat of his nation in 1940 one distinguished French scholar remarked that France had an international "law of suspects" for all Germans. No matter what Germany did or wanted, Frenchmen, or many of them, refused to accept it in good faith. This lack of faith was universal. The war had drawn all Europe in black and white. This was a fact that towered above philosophic hopes for good will and a new world of peace. The men at Paris were totally unprepared to wipe the slate clean for a new start.

The Writing of the Peace

On January 18, 1919, forty-eight years to the day from the proclamation of the German Empire at Versailles, the Peace Conference assembled in Paris to decide the fate of Germany and the future of the world. There were seventy official delegates representing the countries that either were at war with or at least had severed relations with Germany. Representatives of neutral states were admitted to the conference only when their particular interests came up for discussion. On the fringe of the official delegations there were a host of people, pleaders for special interests, that descended upon Paris to influence the course of the negotiations. The representatives of the defeated powers were excluded; there were fears that the Germans might send a Talleyrand to regain their place in the world. Over a thousand experts on geography, history, racial conditions, international law, commerce, and other technical matters co-operated with the delegates. Premier Clemenceau of France was unanimously chosen chairman.

The direction of affairs naturally fell to the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan. The two ranking delegates from each of these five great powers constituted a Supreme Council to formulate and discuss the business of the conference. The difficulty of reconciling the many divergent interests and of reaching a settlement satisfactory to all made it necessary to reduce the original council of ten members to a council of five. Eventually, the representatives of Italy and Japan dropped from the inner circle and Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Wilson decided among themselves the most important matters. This was a far cry from the "open covenants, openly arrived at" that Wilson had demanded, but very early it became evident that no peace could be written if every power, large and small, had its say in open meeting. The "Council of the Three," therefore was an expedient to get the work done.

The conference did not move forward without conflicts. Both Lloyd George and Wilson blocked French Rhineland ambitions, but in return they had to give France a military alliance and control over the Saarland for a limited period of years. Wilson's greatest conflict came over the question of the League. He wanted to make a League of Nations first, and then discuss colonial claims. At one point Wilson threatened to go home; at another Clemenceau accused him of being pro-German. In spite of these conflicts, however, by early May a draft of the proposed treaty with Germany was delivered to the delegates of that country. They declared that its terms violated some of the Fourteen Points and tried hard to secure a radical modification of the Allied demands. The Supreme Council made a number of concessions, none of them vitally important. The treaty, as thus amended, was again delivered to the German delegates, who were allowed five days to declare their purpose of signing it. In default of such declaration, the Allies would consider the armistice ended and would "take such steps as they thought needful to enforce their terms." This ultimatum and the refusal of any further extension of time meant that Germany had the choice between immediate acceptance of the treaty without reservations or renewal of the war. Germany chose to accept the treaty. The historic ceremony of signing took place on June 28 (the anniversary of the Sarajevo crime) in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles.

The Terms of the Treaties

The Versailles Treaty required Germany to return Alsace-Lorraine to France, thus restoring the Rhine, for a considerable distance, as the frontier between the two countries. Minor modifications of German boundaries were made in favor of Belgium and Denmark. To the new state of Poland Germany gave up most of Posen, a part of West Prussia, and a part of southern, or upper, Silesia. She renounced the possession of the Baltic port of Danzig (almost entirely German in population), which became a Free City under the administration of the League of Nations. Danzig was united with Poland by a customs union. A strip of territory—the so-called Polish Corridor—afforded Poland uninterrupted access to the Baltic by the valley of the Vistula River. East Prussia was thus separated from the rest of Germany, left "floating without an anchor," as it were. This was the geographical situation before the eighteenth-century partitions of Poland. Germany also ceded to the Allies (for future cession to Lithuania) the port of Memel in the extreme northeastern tip of East Prussia. In addition to territorial losses in Europe, Germany lost her African colonies, which went as

mandates to Great Britain, France, and the Union of South Africa, and her Pacific islands, for which Japan, Australia, and New Zealand received mandates.

The military, naval, and air clauses of the treaty provided for the almost complete disarmament of Germany. Her army was limited to one hundred thousand men, voluntary soldiers enlisted for long terms of service; conscription was abolished. German territory on the left bank of the Rhine and on the right bank for a distance of thirty miles eastward was made a demilitarized zone, in which no armed forces or fortifications might be maintained. The naval fortress of Helgoland was to be dismantled. All importation, exportation, and nearly all production of war material were prohibited. The German fleet was reduced to a few surface ships limited in size and armament. No submarines, airplanes, seaplanes, or dirigible balloons were to be built for purposes of war. Germany also surrendered her oceanic cables.

The treaty included stringent requirements for a war indemnity, or "reparations," to be paid by Germany. She was to devote her economic resources to the physical restoration of the invaded areas; to replace, ton by ton, the merchant vessels lost or damaged by her cruisers and submarines; and to meet the cost of pensions for Allied soldiers. She had to bear, furthermore, the expense of maintaining the Allied army which was to occupy the German Rhineland for a period not to exceed fifteen years. The total figure of the indemnity was not fixed. When each of the nations with claims had produced figures to add to the reparations bill, the sum was astronomical — more than the capital wealth of all Europe in 1914. Thinking men had a suspicion that it might have exceeded real losses and, even more important, that such sums could not be paid. The treaty did provide for the confiscation of German assets abroad, a new precedent in European wars, for heretofore private property was held to be inviolable, and the Germans were given lists of goods — locomotives, rails, farm machinery, livestock, etc. — that they must deliver. The total bill for the reparations account was not presented until several years later. Before signing the armistice, Germany accepted the responsibility for all damage she had done to the civilian population of the Allies and to their property "by land, by sea, and from the air." In the treaty that she signed, Germany accepted the responsibility for the war itself — the famous "War Guilt" clause. The treaty tried to make her pay, down to the last penny that she was able to pay, for the cost of the war.

Treaties, similar in spirit, were imposed upon the other Central Powers: Austria, at St. Germain (1919); Hungary, at the Trianon, Versailles (1920); Bulgaria, at Neuilly (1919); and Turkey, at Sèvres (1920). In

Territorial Changes in Europe 1918-1923



addition to territorial cessions by the several states, they were required to reduce their military establishments and pay reparations. These treaties delineated the political framework of central Europe. Jugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Poland, and Greece either newly appeared on the map or aggrandized themselves at the expense of the defunct Hapsburg monarchy, Bulgaria, Greece, and Russia. Hungary and Austria appeared on the new map as two new states practically surrounded by enemies. Their future as political and economic units was problematical to a high degree. Only Turkey escaped the worst results of the treaty; a nationalist revolution in Anatolia and the emergence of a new Turkish army forced a revision of the treaty of Sèvres several years after it was imposed upon the defeated state.

The Peace of Paris

These treaties with Germany and her associates were negotiated at Paris and signed at various places in the vicinity of the French capital. Together with the diplomatic arrangements entered into by the Allies themselves, they constitute the Peace of Paris, the fourth great European settlement in modern times. Viewed as a whole, it failed to make for reconciliation between the former enemies. General Jan C. Smuts, one of the representatives of South Africa at Paris, uttered prophetic words when at the signing of the Versailles Treaty he said: "The promise of the new life, the victory of the great human ideals for which the peoples have shed their blood and their treasure, the fulfillment of their aspirations toward a new international order and a fairer, better world are not written in this treaty."

In the twenty years of truce between the signing of the treaties and the German attack on Poland in 1939, the Peace of Paris was attacked from all sides. It would be useless to take up these arguments in detail, for most of them were aimed to prove political points rather than to make an historical judgment of the treaty. It may fairly be said, however, that abstract justice, reconciliation with the vanquished, and brotherly love were not emphasized in the document. The victors felt justified in stripping their fallen foe of a great share of their material possessions and imposing upon him economic sanctions that would cripple competition with the victors and assure them great economic advantages for the period of peace. Much talk during the war in both camps concerned moral issues, but when the peace was written it was obvious that economic realities tended to transcend moral abstractions in the minds of the peacemakers. Wilson was alone in Paris as the representative of a power not seeking material advantages; perhaps that is why he

could advocate justice while his colleagues pressed for self-interest. The spirit of nationalism and the pressures of industrialism manifest in imperial ambitions and the desire for economic advantages were the guiding stars of many of the "peacemakers" in 1918-1920.

The men who witnessed the spectacle in the Hall of Mirrors when Germany signed the treaty thought that an epoch was over. Germany's spectacular rise to power dominated the period from 1871 to 1914; Germany was the principal military power on the Continent, and Germany had challenged England's position on the seas. In 1918 that same Germany was defeated and disarmed — but not deprived of the realities of her power. The men at Versailles dimly understood that the new world picture would be different from the old; they did not understand that it would contain all the ingredients that had brought about the crisis for the British control of the seas in the decade of 1895-1905, nor did they understand that the cataclysm of 1914-1918 had released new revolutionary forces in the world comparable in intensity to the ones released in 1789.

PART FOUR

In Search of a New Synthesis
for World Society

XVI

The Organization of a New World Order

The Aftermath of the War

ON the morrow of 1918, when men took stock of the effects of the catastrophe that had overtaken them, there was much food for sober reflection. This first World War of the twentieth century deserved its name. It cast a dark shadow over almost the entire globe. Twenty-eight countries, with their colonial dependencies, took up arms, while five Latin-American countries severed diplomatic relations with Germany. Only sixteen countries (Spain, Switzerland, Holland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Abyssinia, Persia, Afghanistan, Mexico, Salvador, Venezuela, Colombia, Chile, Paraguay, and Argentina), with less than one-sixteenth of the world's population, remained neutral.

The Allies mobilized about forty million men and the Central Powers about twenty million men, making a grand total of sixty million combatants from beginning to end of the struggle. It is impossible to give an accurate statement of the casualties. Probably eight million soldiers lost their lives in battle or as the result of battle. Probably twenty million soldiers were wounded, perhaps a quarter of them being permanently disabled or enfeebled in body and mind. The death loss among noncombatants, largely women and children, as the result of pestilence, famine, and massacre, was appalling. The world had never before witnessed such an organized destruction of human life.

The soldiers who fell in the war were mostly picked men. They had passed tests for physical and mental fitness; they were in the prime of life and health and strength; they should have been the virile fathers of the next generation. The war, sending the fittest to the slaughter and allowing the weaklings to remain at home, injured the race fiber of the nations. Its evil effects in this direction made themselves felt over a long stretch of years.

A conservative estimate of the direct money cost of the war to the belligerent nations is \$186,000,000,000. This sum, colossal as it is, does not take into account the indirect cost, including the destruction of property on land and sea, the depreciation of capital, the interruption of trade, the loss of production due to the employment of the world's workers in military activities, the payments for war relief, and the extra expenditures of neutral nations. However, any estimate of money cost must make allowance for the depreciation of the currencies of all European countries during the war period. Measured in dollars the total expenditure was one thing; measured in terms of labor and commodities it was another thing. The figure given for the direct cost should be at least halved if it is to be adjusted to the purchasing power of currencies before the war began. But even \$93,000,000,000 is a sum so great as almost to defy the imagination of men in 1919. The devastation that had occurred gave them more concrete evidence of the extent of the disaster. In a broad belt of eastern France and Belgium villages had totally disappeared, towns were wrecked, and the very land itself was scarred as if turned over by a gigantic bulldozer. In eastern and central Europe the destruction was not so concentrated or so complete but it was much more widespread. An area the size of the Midwest in the United States had been seared by war and revolution. The hulks of sunken ships on the bottoms of the seven seas further testified to the fury of the destruction. The long century of peace had seen great accumulations of capital goods; it almost seemed that, in a drunken spree, Western civilized man had attempted to destroy all his savings.

The war was financed to some extent by increased taxation, especially in Great Britain and the United States, but chiefly by borrowing. The nations, in the first place, issued vast quantities of paper money. Such forced loans are easily made on the Continent, where the governments control the central banks and possess a monopoly of note issue. In the second place, the nations sold their bonds. The amounts raised by this means were far greater than had been supposed possible. The people bought the bonds out of their savings, for the war taught lessons of thrift to almost everyone and made it a patriotic duty for the citizen to save so that his country might have more to spend.

The end of the war found the whole financial world in chaos. All the belligerents had to impose heavy additional taxation, in order to meet the interest on their huge debts and repair the destruction caused by the struggle. Many of them with difficulty avoided bankruptcy. Great Britain and the United States were the only belligerents which from the start balanced their budgets and did not show a large gap

between income and expenditure. Some of the countries, particularly Germany and Russia, resorted to paper-money inflation on an enormous scale, with the result that both the mark and the ruble became practically worthless. Neither France nor Italy indulged in the same inflationary orgy, but the French franc sank to about a fifth and the Italian lira to about a fourth of their prewar value. A rapid depreciation of the currency, as measured by the rise of prices, affects most injuriously those who have fixed incomes from securities, annuities, pensions, savings-bank deposits, or salaries—in short, the middle class. That class was almost wiped out in many Continental countries after the war.

The political structure of the world also reflected the destruction of the war. In 1914 the countries within the charmed inner circle of industrial Europe controlled a preponderance of the power in the world. Decisions in London, Berlin, or Paris were final for the destinies of men in all corners of the earth. In 1920 it became painfully obvious that this was no longer true. It was precisely that inner circle that had been badly burned by the conflict, and much of the power, both military and economic, that had given it such great prestige, was gone. The war saw the rise of the United States of America to political and economic maturity. In 1914 she had been a debtor nation; many of her mines, factories, and public utilities, and even some of her land were owned by European bondholders. In 1920 Europe owed her more than it could ever repay, and most of the financial claims on installations had passed into native hands. In the Far East Japan had undergone a similar, if not quite so striking, change of position. And both the United States and Japan emerged with naval power far beyond that of 1914. Furthermore the ties that bound the so-called colonial and backward peoples of the earth to Europe were greatly relaxed. Imperialism was ready to “kick back” at Europe. These were facts with which the new world had to contend, and they were as stubborn as the loss of life, the destruction of property, and the dislocation of financial and commercial systems. It was a world which must soon find new adjustments of power or face further conflict.

At the same time the economic picture revealed problems as pressing as any to be found in the political structure. Four years of war had broken the spell that the nations within the circle of industrial Europe had worked on the world. There were new industrial forces, new market problems, and new sources of economic difficulties. As if to add salt to the wound that the war had inflicted, there was the question of reparations and war debts that threatened to disrupt any solutions that might be found.

Economic Dislocations

The four years of war accelerated tendencies which had started before the turn of the century. The acute observer in 1900 would have seen that industrialism was not to be confined to Europe indefinitely. In the United States and Japan as well as in a number of other places, industrial societies were growing which some day would challenge Europe's control of the world markets. The war forced these non-European areas to mature rapidly and when it was over, European merchants and manufacturers found that American and Japanese competitors were crowding them in all parts of the market. Not only that, but areas like China, India, South Africa, and South America had also adopted machine-production techniques for the manufacture of many commodities that formerly they had purchased in Europe. The peoples of the world could not do without consumers' goods just because Europe was unable to supply them.

Furthermore just as the war had increased the industrial plants of non-European nations so had it expanded Europe's forges and factories. Under the spur of war European plants had greatly increased in size, and the lack of skilled manpower had intensified their mechanization. Fewer men could mine more coal, fewer men produce more cloth, steel, chemicals, and machines; and the plants for that production had greatly expanded. It is small wonder that optimistic social thinkers gleefully announced that the era of scarcity was ended, that an era of abundance was at hand. But the increased plant capacity and the extension of industrial techniques did not necessarily mean that all the goods that could be produced could be sold and distributed. The solution of the problem of production did not bring with it a comparable solution for the problem of distribution. Under the withering blasts of competition industrialists in all countries ran to their governments for protection. The United States tariff was only one of many tariff walls erected to check the flow of goods so that local manufacturers could enjoy the home market.

In some cases these tariff policies actually increased the total plant capacity of the world. The new states wanted to become self-sufficient or at least to control the manufacturing process of important industries. The tariff line between Czechoslovakia and Austria, for example, cut the pre-1914 arrangement whereby thread spun on one side of the line had been woven into cloth on the other. After the tariff barriers appeared, spinning and weaving industries had to be created to meet the needs of economic nationalism. The new frontier between France and Germany cut Ruhr coal off from Lorraine iron. Germany got iron

from Sweden and Spain; France got coal from the Saar, Belgium, and England. The tariff frontier had broken a normal economic system. These examples could be multiplied many times to show that the world's new capacity for production did not necessarily mean more goods for everyone.

The agricultural picture was equally difficult. In the prewar world Russia provided the biggest single portion of the wheat eaten in Europe. In the years when war, revolution, and civil strife kept Russian wheat off the European market and when the war reduced the wheat production of Europe itself, new wheat lands came into existence. The high plains of the United States from Montana and the Dakotas south to Texas, and the grasslands of Argentina and the prairie provinces of Canada were plowed up for wheat. Australia harvested more of it. When Russia and Europe again began to produce it, there was more than the world had ever seen before. Ironically enough the development of the gasoline-propelled vehicle released more lands for wheat by reducing the number of horses. This flow of wheat progressively pauperized agriculture all over the world. There was more than could be used. Cotton soon joined wheat when the new fields planted in Egypt, Brazil, and Russia as well as those of the southern United States met on a textile market in which rayon had become an important competitor. Corn, meat, wool, coffee, and sugar were soon to join the list of commodities for which there was too much production for the ability of the world to consume. These commodities did not create unemployment; they impoverished their growers.

Here were problems that a well world would have found difficult to solve. They were not presented to a well world, but to a world weakened and sick after four years of war. They constituted the cloud that overshadowed the whole of the period of the truce, 1919-1939, and we shall see later how they contributed to the breaking of the peace in 1939.

Reparations: The Great Problem of Reconstruction

The treaty makers could not decide upon the amount of reparations that should be or could be extracted from Germany. There was, however, one thing they were agreed upon, namely, that Germany had to pay as much as possible. The memory of the comparative ease with which France had paid her indemnity after the Franco-Prussian War encouraged uncritical people to believe that Germany, a much richer nation, could surely pay an enormous sum. What was overlooked was the fact that the war of 1870 had been short. France had not had time

to dip into her savings before she was defeated, and the indemnity had been paid by converting French investments abroad, made before 1870, into funds available to Germany. There had been little actual transfer of current funds at that time. Germany, of course, had used her savings to fight the war, and her investments abroad were seized under the terms of the treaty so that there was no reserve of prewar foreign credits. To pay in gold would, of course, be impossible, first, because there was not that much gold in Germany and, secondly, because a reserve of gold was necessary to support the German currency. This narrowed the problem down to its stark reality. Germany could pay only by selling goods abroad in excess of her imports. The difference between the two figures was her potential ability to pay. This fact was slow in gaining recognition, but it was the basic fact in the problem of the day. The victors did not want to despoil German private citizens of their factories and property in Germany; they had no way to use such material. They wanted Germany to pay in credits so that their own financial problems — payment of war debts between the allies, reconstruction of war losses, etc. — could be met.

When the German negotiators met with the Reparations Commission there was a considerable gap between the conceptions of the two groups regarding Germany's ability to pay. After several conferences in which altercation and economic statistics created great disharmony, the Commission set the bill at \$33,000,000,000 and ordered the Germans to agree, with the threat of occupation of Germany as the penalty for refusal. The Germans signed and made the first payment. The results upon the currency were catastrophic. The mark began to soar in terms of the dollar because there was neither gold nor confidence behind it. It continued to soar until it became completely valueless. In the meantime the hard lesson of the economic facts of life was beginning to dictate policy. Unfortunately for the Allies, there were two policies: one for Britain, another for France. When the Germans informed the Commission that they must have a moratorium or declare themselves bankrupt, these two policies came into conflict with each other.

The British, themselves troubled by the fact that their markets were not what they had been before the war, suddenly realized that if Germany were really to pay the reparations account, she would have to flood every market in the world with goods. The account would then become a monster that would destroy British commerce and build up Germany as a competitor. In other words, if Germany paid, English commerce and manufacture would be blighted. It is small wonder that English statesmen began to regard sympathetically the German inability to pay. France, on the other hand, faced a different problem.

The reconstruction of the devastated areas was frightfully expensive. In all, France was to spend over seven billion dollars rebuilding her destroyed villages, cities, and farms. The war had added a fantastic debt to the national obligations of 1914. This debt had already depressed the value of the franc on the world exchange, and the nation was in no mood to accept further losses. If Germany did not pay, however, France herself would have to pay for the reconstruction, and the consequences to the French economy of that eventuality were alarming. The government had budgeted its reconstruction account as "accounts recoverable"; a German default would expose that fiction cruelly. It is not surprising that the French resented "Britain's willingness to excuse Germany from paying her debt to France."

The bankruptcy of Germany was, however, a stubborn fact. Not only did she not have any money with which to pay but she was going deeper into debt every day. The loss of her merchant ships deprived her of income; empty bins required importations of large quantities of raw stuffs before her factories could begin to produce; her food crisis, accentuated by the loss of agricultural lands to Poland, required large imports. All this added up to the fact that she had to import more than she could export; there was no surplus to pay for reparations. The French government that faced the difficulty by granting a temporary moratorium was driven from office, and a new one, composed of men of sterner stuff, took its place. If Germany could not pay, then Germany had to pay. The nationalists had long since been convinced that Clemenceau had fallen into a trap set by Lloyd George and Wilson, and this situation gave them a reasonable excuse to rectify the wrong that had been done at Paris. The bankruptcy of Germany reopened the question of the treaty settlement on the Rhine.

The return of Lorraine with her great iron deposits had not solved France's need for coal. Indeed, if anything, it had aggravated the problem. Lorraine iron was most profitably exploited in conjunction with Ruhr coal, and the French government resolved to collect its just dues in terms of Ruhr coal. It was a political adventure that might pay dividends even beyond the reparations account. The Germans had terrible problems assembling the masses of goods "in kind" that were required for the reparations in addition to the cash. Inflation made contracts difficult to fulfill, for money was steadily losing value and businessmen hesitated to sell the government goods of any kind on a contract basis. The French representative on the Commission announced that Germany was behind in the delivery of telegraph poles, one of the items in the reparations account; there was nothing for the Commission to do but declared Germany to be in default.

The Ruhr Crisis

The French government announced that, to protect its interests, France would occupy the Ruhr. On January 11, 1923, French and Belgian military forces marched in and occupied the whole territory as far east as Dortmund. France assured Europe that she had "no intention of annexing any portion of German territory," but that she would hold it "until we are paid our due." The United States, in protest, withdrew its army from the Rhineland occupation forces. England also objected to the action, but France was within her legal rights under the treaties of peace; so the crisis had to develop as it would. The Germans suspended all further payments, withdrew their little army before the invading French, and called upon the people of the Ruhr to resist by refusing to co-operate with the occupying forces. To finance this resistance the printing presses spilled out more worthless marks and completed the wreck of Germany's currency. The fight was a bitter one, but France had the trump cards. The Ruhr is the industrial heart of Germany, and when it was occupied factories all over the country had to close down for lack of materials. Unemployment increased and with it demands for more marks to pay relief. The mark stood 8000 to the dollar in December, 1922; by August, 1923, it reached 5,000,000 to the dollar, and there was no end to the inflation in sight. The government had to capitulate, and ask for terms.

The struggle, however, had been hard on France too. It had proved to be impossible to mine coal with bayonets; the civilian resistance to French control had made the expedition expensive both in money and in prestige. The franc had lost two-thirds of its value in terms of the dollar during the crisis, and it was predicted that it might follow the mark into oblivion. This fact made France also ready to negotiate. A commission of experts, headed by an American banker, Charles G. Dawes, was given the task of discovering a way out of the tangle of reparations and claims.

The Dawes Plan

The Dawes Plan, in many ways, was symptomatic of the misunderstanding and political blindness of the period following the war. Germany was obviously bankrupt; she could pay her obligations only if markets were opened for her industries, and even then it was obvious that paying the \$33,000,000,000 debt was an impossible assignment. The Dawes experts discovered that Germany needed only to be able to borrow money. She needed it to re-establish her currency; she needed

it to pay her reparation schedules. Since she did not have it, the solution obvious to the men of 1924 was to let her borrow it. Piously the experts declared Germany to be a good financial risk, and then they opened the money markets of the world to her. At the same time a regular schedule of payments was set up, starting at \$250,000,000 a year and rising to \$625,000,000 within four years. By allowing Germany to borrow money to re-establish her currency on a sound basis, and securing further credits for her to use when she needed them, the Dawes Plan "worked" for four years. In those four years Germany "paid" something like \$1,350,000,000 on her reparations account, but a closer examination of her financial condition will reveal that she borrowed more than that and actually paid nothing at all out of her trade balances, for she had no overbalance with which to pay. At the end of four years, a new plan was set up, the Young Plan, but we shall save that story for later discussion.

Like the questions settled by the Washington Conference, the reparations question was not taken to the League of Nations for a solution. One important reason for this was that the United States was not a member of the League but was vitally interested in the economic solutions of the day. The Allies in Europe owed the United States enormous sums which they wanted to see tied, somehow, to the question of reparations.

Inter-Allied War Debts

The people of the United States emerged from the excitement of the war cynically disillusioned. The peace was different from their expectations, and the problems of the new era were distasteful. There was the national debt: in 1910 it had been \$1,191,264,000; in 1921 it was \$23,976,000,000. The Allies owed the United States almost exactly this sum, and the American people reasoned that if they could collect it, they would not have to pay the debt themselves. Somehow they failed to appreciate that a debt of such magnitude could be liquidated only by the importation of English, French, and other goods to meet the payments. The Allies could no more pay the United States than Germany could pay the Allies unless markets were made available. The Republican government in Washington raised the tariffs and asked the Allies to settle up! It is not surprising that the European debtors wanted to associate the United States with their problems.

President Coolidge was deaf to all suggestions of cancellation. "They hired the money," he said; the implication was that they should pay. It was this attitude that earned for the United States the title "Uncle Shylock" in all the Allied countries. The Allies had regarded the

American loans more or less as subsidies in a common enterprise; they were shocked at the idea that they might be expected to repay them. None the less this is just what was expected, and one by one the debtor countries came to Washington to get terms. It must be said that the United States did not hold them to the full debt; but when the accounts were all settled, the late Allies still owed the United States over ten billion dollars which they were to pay on term installments. "After so many payments, the war would be theirs!" To meet these payments and allow for reconstruction of their lands and industries, the Allied countries also were given access to the money market in the United States. They, like Germany, borrowed to pay their debts.

Indeed, after 1924 everyone borrowed to pay. The loans were not particularly good risks, perhaps; but if Germany were solvent, where was there a bad risk? From 1924 to 1929 the world enjoyed prosperity on borrowed money. This was the wonderful era of postwar good feeling. The lion and the lamb lay down together, and French and German statesmen, arm in arm, went to lunch. The general prosperity lasted as long as it was possible to borrow cheaply.

The United States and the Peace

At Paris in 1919 the peace makers laid the foundations for a new world order. President Wilson's League of Nations was written into each of the treaties of peace with the assumption that the League would provide for world government. On the side, as an extra measure of security, Clemenceau proposed an alliance between England, France, and the United States to guarantee the treaty and buttress the *status quo* that it created. These arrangements were the solution offered at Paris for governing the new world. They very soon received a shock that practically made them meaningless. The United States of America refused to ratify the settlement.

The United States had taken part in the war not as an Allied but as an Associated Power. She alone of the Western states emerged from the war stronger than she had entered it; her moral and military force entitled her to the foremost place in the councils of the nations. Her delegates negotiated and signed the Versailles Treaty, but the Senate refused to give the two-thirds vote necessary for ratification. Senatorial criticism was especially directed against certain features of the Covenant of the League of Nations, as inserted in the treaty. The chief stumblingblock was Article X of the Covenant, which reads as follows: "The members of the league undertake to respect and preserve as

against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the league. In case of any such aggression, or in case of any threat of danger of such aggression, the council shall advise upon the means by which this Article shall be fulfilled." Many senators argued that this article would put the military and naval forces of the United States at the disposal of the League and thus impair the constitutional right of Congress to declare war. Attempts were made to amend the treaty by writing into it various reservations indicative of the precise obligations which the United States was willing to accept under it. On both occasions (1919, 1920) when the amended treaty came to a vote in the Senate, it failed to pass by the necessary two-thirds majority.

The rejection of the Versailles Treaty made the entry or non-entry of the United States into the League of Nations the chief issue in the presidential campaign of 1920. The Democrats advocated such action and the Republicans opposed it. The Republican victory, resulting in the election of Senator Harding, was followed in 1921 by the passage of a congressional resolution which declared the war of the United States with Germany at an end. This resolution was promptly signed by the President. Treaties of peace negotiated by the administration, not only with Germany, but also with Austria and Hungary, were later ratified by the Senate.

The action of the United States created a new situation. The League of Nations lost much of its meaning when it failed to include the United States as well as Russia and Germany. The states that had listened with some respect to Wilson's words about co-operation and world government, now understood that in the post-Versailles world, as in the old, each must look out for himself and his own interests.

The Naval Race

The German navy surrendered in 1918; its own sailors scuttled that proud challenge to British power under the very guns of the Allied fleet at Scapa Flow. But this did not solve the naval question. During the war both the United States and Japan, under duress of military necessity, had greatly expanded their fleets. The mere fact that the British navy was strong enough to keep the German navy bottled up in the southeastern end of the North Sea did not interfere with the building of new dreadnaughts in America and Japan. When peace came, the United States navy was approximately as large as the British, and Japan's was only a little way behind. The war had done what Germany in peace could not do: it had created navies capable of rivaling the

British fleet. But this was not all. On the ways in shipyards all over the world there were battleships under construction, and in the planning divisions of half a dozen navies other ships were on drafting boards. In France, for example, there was deep resentment of the fact that during the war her navy had not grown because all her energy was taken up with the land war on her own territory, and she thereby had sunk to a third-class naval power. New building alone could rectify the situation. But Italy, too, planned to build; and if France and Italy built new ships, England's Mediterranean fleet must grow. If England's fleet must grow, then so must the fleets of the United States and Japan or they would lose their newly won position. It was a vicious circle that could make a naval race infinitely more expensive than the Anglo-German rivalry of the prewar era, and no one could safely predict where it would end.

The problem was distinctly embarrassing to the new Republican administration in Washington. It had been elected to bring the country "back to normalcy." If it were necessary to embark upon a naval race, it would be difficult to reduce taxation and satisfy the demands for a peace economy. At the same time the American people sternly rejected any suggestions that the war loans be cancelled. The Allies had borrowed the money to fight the war and to stabilize their economy immediately after the war; most Americans felt that they should be willing to repay. A naval race would absorb money that should be used for such repayments and would force the United States to spend money to keep its own navy up. With such reasoning, it is not surprising that the government in Washington cast about to find some solution for the problem.

The New Far East

In the Far East there was a new situation by 1920 that was disturbing to Washington and to Europe. The war had released the pressure of Europe on the Far East. While the great powers of the West were engaged in a struggle for existence, they could not extend their hold upon China; and when the war was over, the problems of reconstruction largely stood in the way of any active policy. Germany was eliminated; Russia seemed to be also pushed aside by civil war and foreign intervention. England and France were too weak to act. This gave Japan a stronger grip upon the whole of northeastern Asia. While the war was in progress, Japan had presented China with the famous Twenty-one Demands that would have made the latter a protectorate of the island empire. The Chinese had been able to escape some of the most onerous of these demands through the diplomatic assistance

of the United States, but they had granted enough to assure Japan of a dominant position in Chinese affairs.

The diplomatic intervention of the United States created considerable tension between Japan and the North American republic. This was unfortunate because by 1917 both governments were engaged in the war with Germany. After considerable discussion there was an exchange of notes in November, 1917, between Secretary Lansing and Viscount Ishii in which both countries recognized the "territorial sovereignty" of China, but the United States also recognized "that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous." When the Japanese enthusiastically co-operated in the military intervention in Russian Siberia and firmly established themselves in the former German concessions in Shantung, the question of the extent and final meaning of Japan's "special interests" became vitally important. The war-weary Western world was in no position to block her push into China without exertions that would be extremely inconvenient. Moreover, since Japan was the military ally of Britain, it might even be embarrassing to attempt to bring pressure to prevent her encroachments.

This alliance, first signed in 1902 and renewed periodically, was an essential factor in the Far Eastern situation. The alliance was up for renewal, and the English could hardly refuse to continue it in the light of Japan's loyal co-operation during the war. None the less there was considerable opposition to it within the British Empire. Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, fearful of Japanese intentions and of the possibility of a war between Japan and the United States, demanded its termination. A Canadian statesman argued that "good Anglo-American relations were the touchstone of British policy and the hope of the world"; therefore Britain must avoid any commitments that might injure those relations. The Oriental exclusion laws in the United States, the glib discussions of a Japanese-American war in the United States press, and the growing American opposition to Japanese expansion in Asia, pointed to a possible conflict in which the British Dominions could not support Japan. In Washington this Anglo-Japanese alliance caused considerable concern. As long as it continued Japan had support for her aggressive policy in Asia, and the American navy had to consider the possibility of a two-ocean war. When it is remembered that a naval race was under way, this fact assumes its true meaning for American policy.

The Washington Conference

On August 11, 1921, the United States invited Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan to a conference in Washington to consider naval disarmament and the problems of the Pacific. On October 4, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Portugal were also asked to join. The Chinese presented a problem: there were two governments. The one in Peking was living on borrowed money and borrowed time; the revolutionary Sun Yat-sen government in Canton was still unrecognized. The Peking government finally came to the conference, but the Canton group refused to be bound by their action.

It was, of course, impossible for any country to refuse an invitation from the richest nation on earth, but outside of England, China, and the United States, the response was something less than enthusiastic. It was politely assumed that, just as at Czar Nicholas' disarmament conferences, a face-saving formula would be found but nothing done about battleships. The United States naval law of 1919 provided for an American navy stronger than any on the seas. That same year Japan had laid out plans for fourteen powerful ships. The first of the British "Hoods" was almost finished, and more were planned. How could a conference stop this avalanche of naval building?

When the conference actually met, Mr. Hughes, the American Secretary of State, electrified the gathering by calling upon the United States, Great Britain, and Japan to scrap sixty-six battleships, built and building, a total of 1,876,000 tons. Naturally his proposals were not accepted *in toto*, but his formula was accepted. He proposed to end the construction of heavy battleships (above 10,000 tons) for a period of fifteen years and to stabilize the existing navies on the ratio 5:5:3:1.67:1.67. This allowed England and the United States to keep fifteen heavy battleships each and Japan nine; France and Italy were placed on a parity as third-rate naval powers. The Japanese were willing to accept the second-rate position only because the treaty was accompanied by a pact in which it was understood that outside of Pearl Harbor and Singapore, the great powers agreed to maintain the *status quo* of the fortifications in the Pacific. Japan, of course, was allowed to increase the fortifications on her home islands. For practical purposes this prevented any alteration of the military installations in Manila, Guam, and Hong Kong.

At the same time a Four-Power Pact among France, Japan, England, and the United States superseded the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The four undertook to "respect their rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean." Thus an innocuous agreement took the place of the alliance disliked by the United

States. The conference also signed a Nine-Power Open Door Treaty that, in effect, blocked further Japanese aggression in China. This treaty prohibited any power from acquiring a sphere of influence in China in the future. When one considers the fact that there was no Chinese government in 1921 with the right to speak for the whole country, this Nine-Power Pact is an amazing document. It could only be aimed at Japan, for Japan alone was able and willing to extend her influence on the Chinese mainland. The great powers, in effect, gave China an opportunity to develop her own government without outside interference. It remained to be seen what she would do with the opportunity.

The Washington Conference has been severely criticized because it limited America's right to build battleships, but no critical opinion can overlook the fact that it stopped the construction of all heavy battleships at a time when the United States was in no mood to spend money on war equipment. It also secured from Japan the recognition that she should accept an inferior naval status merely by the surrender of the right to fortify islands in the Far East that probably would not have been fortified anyway. And lastly, it ended the Anglo-Japanese alliance and at the same time placed a treaty barrier against further Japanese expansion at the expense of China. In short, the Washington Conference treaties assured the United States against the *visible* dangers that beset her path in the world after 1919. She was strong enough in her continental position to avoid any further entanglements as soon as she secured her position in the Pacific Ocean and stopped the naval race. With these guarantees, she could, and did, settle down to a "western hemisphere isolation" that allowed her to manage the destinies of the Central American states by a liberal use of Marines and loans, and to ignore responsibilities in Europe. The Washington Conference was the first step in the atomization of world authority after 1920. The League of Nations could no longer give organic, collective security.

The League of Nations

By settling such important questions outside the framework of the League of Nations, the Washington Conference underlined the problems of world government in the epoch between the two wars. Woodrow Wilson and the friends of the League had assumed that questions of politics and armaments would be disposed of by the new international organization; the failure of the United States to join it made that assumption meaningless. None the less the League of Nations still remained the hope of many sincere men who wished to see the world

return to peaceful ways of living. The League at least provided an international institution that might develop into a real governing organization for world affairs.

The constitution, or Covenant, of the League provided for an assembly, in which each member had one vote and not more than three representatives; a council on which the great powers had permanent seats and the lesser powers ten temporary seats (the latter being designated from time to time by the assembly); and a permanent secretariat at Geneva. The assembly met once a year at Geneva for the discussion of matters of international concern. The council held three meetings a year and decided on action to be taken in the name of the League. All important decisions of either assembly or council required a unanimous vote.

The League supervised the government of mandated territories, comprising the former colonies of Germany and the countries in the Near East taken from Turkey. The mandatory system represented a departure from the usual method of disposing of enemy territories conquered in war. Instead of being annexed, they were governed, or were supposed to be governed, by the conquerors as trustees for the League. The nations in charge of mandates submitted annual reports to the League, which had final authority to pass judgment on the manner in which their trusteeship had been discharged. By this means it was hoped to get rid of some of the evils of imperialism.

The League served as a convenient agency for dealing with the prevention and control of infectious diseases, the regulation of the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs, the betterment of industrial conditions in the various countries, and the solution of international financial problems. The International Labour Office, under the League, recommended to the different governments needed labor legislation and sponsored annual labor conferences. The League also maintained the International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation, composed of distinguished European scholars and with headquarters in Paris.

One of the provisions of the Covenant required that any treaty or international agreement concluded by League members should be registered with the secretariat and published. This regulation was intended to do away with the old secret diplomacy.

The Covenant provided that when two or more member states could not settle any dispute likely to result in war between them they must submit the matter at issue either to arbitration or to judicial decision by the World Court (or some other tribunal agreed on by the parties), or to inquiry and report by the council. A member state that took up arms in disregard of these obligations was to be considered as having

committed an act of aggression toward all other members. They must then sever trade and financial relations with it, thus imposing economic "sanctions." The council could further recommend (but not require) that the members contribute military, naval, or air forces against the aggressor state. As it worked, of course, the League machinery was regulated by the policies of the great powers which would be responsible for any military or political sanctions that might be adopted. This meant that the League was what the great powers would allow it to be — nothing more.

The World Court

In accordance with the Covenant a Permanent Court of International Justice was set up at The Hague in 1921. It consisted of fifteen judges, chosen by the council and assembly of the League for a term of nine years and representing different races, languages, nationalities, and legal codes. This World Court, unlike the Hague Tribunal, was a body of judges holding regular sessions in a definite place and at definite times. It could hear, consider, and pass judgment on any justiciable question (one relating to the interpretation of a treaty or to a matter of international law) that was submitted to it by the parties concerned. The court also acted as a legal adviser to the League of Nations, being empowered to give an advisory opinion upon any subject referred to it by the council or the assembly. Member nations of the court were not required to accept in advance its jurisdiction, but many of them signed the so-called "optional clause," whereby they agreed to do so in questions about the interpretation of a treaty or about a matter of international law. In other words, the nations that signed this clause were bound to refer many controversies to the court for decision; they could not deal with them henceforth by private negotiations or in any other manner. When Italy's interests in East Africa led her to an aggressive war, it became clear that even this "optional clause" could not curb the will of a great power. The Court had to rely upon moral force for its power, and moral force was not enough to compel Italy to give up her aggressive action. The establishment of the World Court did not displace the Hague Tribunal, since the nations were left a choice between accepting the judicial jurisdiction of the one or the arbitral jurisdiction of the other.

Problems of the League


The League's eventual failure to prevent another war has given rise to considerable criticism of the institution. Much of it is unjust. The League was crippled from the very start by the failure of the United

States to join and by the fact that both Russia and Germany were excluded. These three were potentially the most powerful states in the world; their absence from the League almost foredoomed it. It is true that Germany did join in 1925 and that after Germany withdrew, Russia entered in 1935. The problem the League always had to face grew out of the fact that from its beginning the powers that had won the war and benefited most from the treaties of peace conceived it as a machine to maintain the *status quo* rather than to govern the world. France, for example, was interested in having the League protect the system in Europe that assured her hegemony, and she was unwilling to see it realistically tackle the problems that might upset her position. From its inception both England and France used it when it could support their own policy but often ignored it when other problems came to the fore.

The League, quite naturally, could not rise above the policy of its members. It was not a superstate with real power at its disposal, and so long as it had to depend upon the authority of its member states, its policy had to be linked with that of the great powers that sat on the council. If they were willing to act, the League could act. If they were not, the League could not. When a problem involved small states, or nations without the military strength to resist pressure (Italy in the 1920's), the League could and did act vigorously; but when the question involved a great power, the others had to consider whether or not they were willing to risk war. This fact prevented the men in Geneva from governing the world, for the final decision had to rest with the chancelleries that would provide the force. As we shall see, there was a short period from 1925 to 1929 in which the League played a stellar role in world affairs, but even in that period the realities behind the action were to be found in the foreign offices of the great powers.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

When the United States refused to approve the treaties signed at Paris, Great Britain also showed reluctance to make serious commitments on the Continent. She did go along with the League, but she refused to ratify the agreements drawn up at Geneva to implement action against aggression. She was willing to sign a treaty that would guarantee the "soil of France" against invasion, but she refused to make the larger commitment that would tie British and French policy together. Like the United States, her "splendid isolation" in the nineteenth century had been a solution most satisfying to her people; when her principal enemies of the last hundred years, Germany and Russia, were

[illegible]

broken, there seemed no need to be too deeply involved in the turbulent affairs of Europe.

Moreover, in her empire Britain could find or hope to find security for her political and economic needs. The British Empire that emerged from the war is one of the most interesting political experiments the world has ever seen. Like the British constitution itself, the constitution of that empire was largely unwritten or at best was a patchwork of separate, often seemingly unrelated, documents; but taken together, it was a remarkable expression of political ingenuity. Somehow united under one suzerainty there were selfgoverning nations that themselves possessed colonies, semi-selfgoverning areas, and colonies governed directly and completely from London. One of the nations called itself a republic and elected its own president (Ireland); another was called an empire (India) and exhibited a complexity of administration that defies description in a short account. Taken as a whole, from the smallest Crown Colony to the largest Dominion, this empire was a unique creation in political history. Furthermore it was rich and powerful, or at least it seemed to be so. It spread all over the world and controlled most of the narrow water-passages on the ocean highways. It encompassed vast and rich resources, both agricultural and mineral, and a population of well over four hundred million. There were disturbing problems in many corners of this empire but, as a whole, it presented a brave front to the world in 1920.

In some ways the American Revolution might be said to be the first "document" in the history of the modern British Empire. That revolution taught Britain that it was unwise to try to force her subjects of European origin into a "colonial" mold. In the course of the nineteenth century first Canada and then the other colonies in which the white population constituted a large element, received the right to govern their own affairs. The process was slow. The British-North America Act of 1867, which laid the foundation for the federal constitution of Canada, was the first of a series of Acts that created selfgoverning nations out of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Newfoundland,¹ and, after the war, the Irish Free State. The only visible link between these new nations and Great Britain is a governor general, appointed by the king, whose powers are decorative and whose tenure is dependent upon good behavior. This was the solution that many of the revolutionists in the Thirteen Colonies thought they were fighting to achieve even after they had declared their independence.

¹ Economic distress in the 1930's forced Newfoundland to surrender her Dominion status.

From 1907 onward it became customary to hold imperial conferences periodically to settle problems that arose within the framework of the empire, but there was no constitutional Act to sanction or compel such meetings. When the war broke out in 1914, the Dominions loyally supported Britain with money, men, and materials and took part in the direction of the war effort. The Peace of Paris saw them at the conference, often somewhat at odds with the mother country, behaving as independent nations. They signed the treaty of peace and joined the League of Nations. In the post-Versailles era they made unilateral treaties with third powers and in every way acted as sovereign states. None the less they also kept their relationship to the mother country.

In 1926 the report of the Inter-Imperial Relations Committee attempted to define the relationships that had developed. The Dominions, it stated, "are autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations." This political formula was embodied in the Statute of Westminster of 1931, which might be called the constitution for the British Commonwealth of Nations.

Not all of the empire, of course, enjoyed the status of the Dominions. India in particular created a special problem. The Indian Government also signed the Treaties of Paris and joined the League of Nations, but India was still, in no small part, governed from Britain. During the war the nationalist movement grew apace. It was not truly loyal to the British, but it did accept the formula that, after the war, something would be done for India. In the period after the war Gandhi, the leader of the Nationalist Party, tried to force the British into action by a policy of nonresistance. As long as Britain was strong, she was easily master of the situation but when clouds began to appear on the horizon after 1930, it became precarious. In the immediate postwar era, however, India was governed by the India Act of 1919, which provided for restricted representation of the Indian population in the government (fewer than one million out of about four hundred million had the vote). India was too important as a reservoir of wealth to allow it to fall into the hands of Gandhi and his followers.


There were troubles in other parts of Britain's empire. Egypt and Palestine both gave headaches to men in London. But even though concessions had to be made here and there, the empire had the possibility of giving Britain political and economic security. British policy accepted as few commitments as possible outside of that empire. Great Britain had become a conservative force in the world, anxious only to

maintain the world *status quo*. This was her contribution to the failure of the peace. Like the United States she wanted to concentrate primarily upon her own affairs.

Wanted: Security for France

The collapse of the Anglo-French-United States treaty of alliance left the problem of security up in the air. The British government was willing to negotiate a treaty with France which would guarantee her against a German attack on "French soil," but she would not guarantee "France" for that might mean all Europe. The French, for whom German aggression was a real threat, turned to the League of Nations to see if from that institution a machine for security could be made. Two general agreements defining aggressors and providing for action against them, the one by military mutual assistance, the second by compulsory arbitration, were drawn up in the League Assembly. But these treaties, the Geneva Protocol and the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, were not ratified. The British government was anxious to avoid commitments and evidently distrusted compulsory arbitration as a method of preserving peace. English and French policies were at odds in these first postwar years at many points on the globe, and France obviously was not to have her security guaranteed by Britain even though the realities of the time indicated co-operation between the two as the only means of maintaining the treaties of 1919-1920.

With the failure of the general mutual-assistance treaty, the French returned to their prewar policy of alliances to encircle their prospective enemy. Actually that policy was dictated to them by the facts of the era in which they lived. In 1921 the Polish government ill-advisedly attacked Bolshevik Russia with the object of acquiring a slice of the Ukraine. The Poles thought that the Bolsheviks were weakened by the civil wars to a degree that would allow them an easy conquest. It turned out differently. Instead of besieging Kiev, the Poles had to fight hard to defend Warsaw. What was most disturbing was that the Germans and the Russians apparently understood each other. France could not stand by and see Poland conquered by Russia. The French hurriedly made a mutual-assistance treaty with Poland, and sent arms and generals to stem the Bolshevik flood. The relief was timely, for the Russians had overextended themselves by invading Poland, and with French aid they were quickly driven out of the country. The peace treaty that followed stabilized the Russo-Polish frontier until 1939.



States in Europe Defending the Status Quo of Versailles, 1929.

The Little Entente

The Franco-Polish alliance was soon supplemented by French alliances with the Little Entente powers. The Little Entente was one of the most interesting of the attempts to restabilize the balance of power. For centuries the Hapsburg monarchy on the Danube had played a vital role in the government and the protection of Europe. The old Hapsburg state had stemmed the Turkish conquest in the sixteenth century; in the seventeenth, it had helped check the ambitions of France; in the eighteenth, it had opposed Frederick II of Prussia in a struggle for control of Germany; in the nineteenth, it had blocked Russia's drive into south central Europe and the Balkans. This last adventure had been too much for the old empire, and in the chaos following the war it had fallen apart. But Europe was so accustomed to Austria that somehow, some way, somebody had to play her role on the European stage. The great Central Plain of the Danube and the Bohemian salient were a natural fortress that could, if properly handled, contribute significantly to the balance of power. The Little Entente, backed by France, came forward to do so.

The Little Entente was made up of Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and

Jugoslavia. Together these three tried to act like one great power. But there were several difficulties in their inner organization that made them weak and, in the end, unable to fulfill the traditional role of the Hapsburg state.

Each of these states was a synthetic manufacture of the era of 1919-1920. The Czechs had been an unstable element in the old Hapsburg monarchy for a generation or more, and in the war proved to be disloyal. When, however, they succeeded in creating a new state of their own, they were confronted with the same disloyalty that they had shown to the government of Austria. The new state, Czechoslovakia, contained over three million Germans and almost a million Hungarians, who had occupied their homes for hundreds of years. Neither race had any loyalty to the new government at Prague. And the nationalistic difficulties of the new republic did not end there. While Poland was at war with Russia in 1921, the Czechoslovaks appropriated Teschen, a territory predominantly Polish, to add about a hundred thousand more dissatisfied citizens. The extreme eastern end of the republic was inhabited by Ruthenians, a Carpatho-Ukrainian people who also quickly developed nationalistic complaints against Czechoslovakia. And finally a large party of Slovaks, cousins in race and language to the Czechs, also resisted the new government at Prague. Czechoslovakia was, perhaps, the most enlightened of the new states in central Europe, but it also had grave, practically insoluble problems. The Czechs alone were completely satisfied, but they made up slightly less than one-half of the total population.

Jugoslavia's problems included the same difficulties with minority races that were to be found in Czechoslovakia. In Jugoslavia the chief friction came between the Croats and Slovenes on one side and the Serbs on the other; the few Germans, Bulgars, and Hungarians in the country added only a little to the basic conflict. The Croats and Slovenes were not so politically experienced as the Serbs but they had achieved a higher general cultural level. Serbian politicians used the revenues of the state to build the old Serbia at the expense of Croatia. In the conflicts that followed, King Alexander threw his favor to the Serbs and finally established a dictatorship over the country. Almost from its inception as a state, therefore, there was trouble that weakened Jugoslavia's potential influence. The country, moreover, was continually harassed with economic troubles. Its mines and its farms were never to enjoy real prosperity throughout the period, 1919-1939.

Rumania was the third member of the Little Entente. She was the one country that emerged from the war with everything that both sides had offered her as an incentive for the services of her armies.

Races in Central Europe, 1914



From the Austrian empire she acquired Transylvania; from the Russian empire, Bessarabia. This fact made her the target of both Hungary and the Soviet Union; neither of them officially recognized the loss of its provinces. The acquisitions, moreover, gave her large minorities of Hungarians, Germans, Bulgarians, and Ukrainians who were none too pleased to be under her government. Her greatest problems, however, were political. On the one side they involved the crown. King Carol, the playboy of the Balkan monarchs, was on and off the throne, depending upon the political constellations of the day. The other side concerned a very real agrarian problem. The land was largely controlled by great landlords, and there was a peasant party that demanded reforms that would break up these feudal estates. To add to the problem, Rumania had oil; and oil meant that the powers of Europe were interested in Rumanian politics.

The difficulties confronting the Little Entente did not end with the internal problems of the member states. Really they could not agree upon a common aim for their policy. Germany was Czechoslovakia's principal enemy; her German minorities were a constant menace to the state's existence. Italy was Yugoslavia's principal enemy. The Italians were trying to denationalize South Slavs living in their northeastern provinces, and they had seized the harbor of Fiume which Yugoslav politicians considered rightfully their own. Russia was Rumania's principal enemy. Bessarabia had been taken from Russia, and the Soviet government refused to recognize the annexation. There were half a dozen "war scares" over the problem between 1921 and 1939. The only state that all three of the Little Entente powers could regard as a common "principal enemy" was Hungary. Their combined force was overwhelmingly more than enough to keep Hungarian irredentism from breaking up the Paris treaties, but it was not enough if Hungary should be aided by one or more of the great powers.

In the middle 1920's France made defensive alliances with each of the three states of the Little Entente. French military instructors helped them organize their armies; French money helped them supply these forces with modern equipment. The great Skoda works at Pilsen, the armory of the old Hapsburg state, received an infusion of French money and influence and again assumed its traditional role as the arsenal of the Danube. In the 1920's the Little Entente seemed to be a strong force in Europe, a suitable ally for France. It should be remembered, however, that it was strong only because its three great neighbors were weak. Germany, Italy, and Russia in the 1920's were without power; they presented three military vacuums on three sides of the

Little Entente. When those vacuums were filled in the 1930's, the Little Entente showed its true weakness.

Security in the West

The Treaty of Versailles disarmed Germany, provided for Allied occupation of the Rhineland, and deprived her of the right to install military equipment in a broad belt along her western frontier. French statesmen knew, however, that these were restrictions for the present but that time could change all of them. It is not surprising, therefore, that they tried desperately to prepare themselves against the day when a German army would again appear upon the Rhine. The resurgence of German power was the nightmare that haunted any statesmen in control of French policy.

The Peace of Paris had altered the status of Belgium. After almost a hundred years of neutrality guaranteed by Europe, the little kingdom gained its full sovereignty and with it the right to make military alliances and political agreements for its own defense. It is not surprising that she should rely upon France; the four years of test by fire had cemented the strong ties which had existed since 1830. Together, France and Belgium blocked Germany from the Channel as long as they could restrain her armies. The problem of holding a German army taxed the military ingenuity of both countries.

The fact that the war of 1914-1918 had been won by holding back the Germans until the effects of the blockade finally smothered their military potential, partly blinded the soldiers of the postwar era to other solutions of the problem. Trench warfare, that is, positional warfare, had won the victory. Naturally, therefore, the best military intelligence in France and Belgium looked seriously into the possibilities of creating a supertrench that would permanently shut out the Germans. It must be said that the authors of the plans did not naïvely rely upon it alone. They argued that massive fortifications in eastern France and Belgium would assure the Western allies time to mobilize their armies and prepare to meet any attack, for the fortifications would rule out the possibility of a *Blitzkrieg*. This was the original idea of the famed Maginot Line and its extension into Belgium. The Franco-Belgian alliance allowed military men to plan for joint action in defense of the Line.

With the Franco-Polish alliance, the alliances with the Little Entente powers, and the Franco-Belgian alliance, France constructed a system of defense that surrounded Germany on all sides. As long as Germany

was weak and without allies, it gave France a measure of security. The treaties, unlike the Washington Conference treaties, paid lip service to the League of Nations but no observer was fooled. Just as the Washington Conference provided the security that the United States demanded in the Pacific, the French system in Europe was aimed at security for France. It was part of the atomized system of the post-Versailles era. The failure of the United States to participate in an organic program for the defense of peace, made each area look out for itself. To France fell the unequal task of providing military safeguards on the continent of Europe. She could hope for success only as long as Germany, Russia, and Italy remained weak.

The Pact of Locarno: Regional Security

It was clear to far-sighted statesmen in the early postwar era that Germany, even though she had been defeated and disarmed, still could not be indefinitely ignored. There were over sixty million Germans in the Reich, and another ten to fifteen million living in compact masses in states bordering it. These people had a high standard of culture and literacy, and economic and military traditions quite out of keeping with the political role allotted to them by the treaties of 1919-1920. They still had the finest coal fields in Europe at their disposal, and their economic plant was the largest in Europe. Germany defeated was still Germany.

The treatment of Germany at Versailles and after, made the nation feel that there was little hope that she would again be admitted into the company of the Western powers. Slowly and painfully it dawned upon the people how greatly they were hated by their late enemies. This fact had made the government seriously consider associating itself with the other outcast state, Bolshevik Russia, as the only way that Germany could hope to make a political recovery. In 1922 when the powers held a conference at Genoa to discuss with the Russians the questions of recognition, trade, and Russian debts, the Western powers could reach no agreement with the soviets. But the German and Russian representatives did reach an understanding, signed at Rappallo, that facilitated trade and provided a basis on which the two could co-operate. The treaties are still buried in archives, but there seems little doubt that either at Rappallo or shortly thereafter the Russians and the Germans also reached an agreement about the exchange of military as well as commercial information. The spectacle of the two outcasts coming together was far from reassuring to the Western states. Furthermore there were many people in Germany to whom Communism was a fright-

ening specter and Russians, savages. They did not like the idea of Germany's turning her back upon the West to join with the East.

In 1924 it became possible to consider some rapprochement between Germany and the Western powers. The elections in France returned a left majority, and Briand, a sincere friend of peace and reconciliation, became foreign minister. The Dawes Plan temporarily shelved the reparations question, and the stream of money that was to float the short-lived prosperity of 1924-1929 had begun to loosen the economic and political tensions of the world. In Germany, Dr. Stresemann, who became foreign secretary, was anxious to give the country a Western orientation to lessen her dependence upon the Soviet Union. In England, too, the political picture changed enough for the government to consider some commitments on the Continent; the short-lived Labour-Liberal government would probably have gone far in that direction but even its Conservative successor was willing to proceed in terms of collective action.

The result of this new structure in France, Britain, and Germany was the Locarno Pact. The agreement itself was a regional understanding. It was primarily concerned with the frontier of Germany in the West. France, Germany, and Belgium agreed to recognize and maintain the *status quo* on their common frontiers. England and Italy joined the treaty as policemen; they were guarantors of the settlement in that they agreed to come to the assistance of the aggrieved party if any of the three Rhineland powers should commit an act of aggression. The Locarno Pact was the first act of real pacification, freely entered into, after the war. By it Germany recognized the loss of Alsace-Lorraine (to France) and of Eupen-et-Malmédy (to Belgium) as a political fact. When one remembers that France could never recognize her loss between 1871 and 1919, it becomes clear that the German government was defying a strong feeling within the Reich; German nationalists were as anxious for revenge as French nationalists had been. In return for her concession, Germany was admitted as a full member into the League of Nations and given a permanent seat on the council. This was not accomplished without difficulty, for several of the smaller states tried to use the opportunity to secure a better position in the League for themselves. But by 1925 Germany appeared at Geneva as one of the principals.

The Locarno Pact raised the prestige of the League of Nations. It gave the League an important role in any disputes that might arise over the western frontier of Germany in that it provided for consideration by the League of all complaints. But most important was the coming of Germany to the council. Up to that time the League had

been a sort of club of the victors of 1918, and to many observers it looked like a captive of England and France. The great powers, before 1924, did not send their most important statesmen to attend its sessions, and much of its business seemed to be made work or, like the Geneva Protocol, repudiated by the great powers. After 1925 it became a club of the foreign secretaries of Europe, and Germany's presence assured the possibility that opposition could and would be expressed. Furthermore the "spirit of Locarno," that is, the spirit of reconciliation, seemed to prevail in its halls so that sincere men everywhere found hope that Woodrow Wilson's dream of a world government by free discussion might come true. Cynics may have noted that the prosperity of the late 1920's had much to do with the good feeling at Geneva, but in that rosy period men had not yet seen what could happen after 1929.

The Pact of Paris Outlawing War

In spite of the spirit of Locarno, it was impossible to miss the fact that the pact solved only one question, namely, Germany's western frontier. The really important problem was still unsolved: the fact that there was no general provision for peace in the world, that peace was atomized into component parts. The French, upon whom the greatest load of military security fell because of their geographical position, were anxious to tie those atoms of security together. The Locarno Pact specifically excused the parts of the British Empire beyond the British Isles from obligations resulting from its existence; the United States had no share in it at all. In 1927, in an effort to bring the United States into some kind of agreement with France, Aristide Briand, the French minister for foreign affairs, proposed to Frank B. Kellogg, the American Secretary of State, the conclusion of a pact between France and the United States renouncing war as "an instrument of policy." To this proposal Secretary Kellogg replied that such an agreement ought to be open to the civilized world. Diplomatic correspondence on the subject of a multilateral treaty resulted in the formulation by the government of the United States of a General Pact for the Renunciation of War. It was signed at Paris in 1928 by duly accredited representatives of fifteen nations (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Great Britain, India, the Irish Free State, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Poland, South Africa, and the United States). After ratification by the signatory nations, the Pact of Paris was proclaimed in operation by President Hoover in 1929. Shortly thereafter some sixty-three nations had voluntarily adhered to this pact,

which declared that its signatories "condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy."

The only discouraging fact about the agreement was that none of the important signatories felt justified in reducing their armament budgets because of it, and most of them submitted documents of "reservation" that explained their position and needs. It may have deprived the powers of the right to make war to secure their political ends, but no statesman could be sure that it had ended anarchy in international relations. That anarchy was part and parcel of the political society in which sovereign states did business with each other. The treaty did not establish any authority that could actually force states to honor their signature to its clauses.

Defeated and Disarmed Germany

Germany's contributions to world government between 1919 and 1929 were necessarily restricted. The Rhineland was occupied by foreign troops, the economy functioned under the weight of reparations, and the government's prestige was at a low ebb. As we have seen, she did make tentative moves toward Russia (Rappalo) and toward the West (Locarno and the League), but she simply did not count as a weight in world affairs because she had no available power to put in the balance.

This does not mean, however, that she did not affect the government of the world. From 1919 onwards Germany became a huge propaganda factory, and that propaganda did influence world affairs. In the first place the publication of the German Foreign Office's archives produced a mass of historical evidence which made the "war guilt clause" of the Treaty of Versailles open to serious question. If the Germans did not cause the war, the justice of the treaty was open to question, and that was a threat to the *status quo*. The moral pressure of historians (many of whom were not Germans) and of publicists who were attacking the fairness of the treaties was a threat to the settlement of 1919 even though there was no German army to back up revisionist demands. It gave Englishmen, Americans, and even some Frenchmen a bad conscience and made them sympathetic to German requests. Indeed, by 1928 the headlines in American and British newspapers were often the best spokesmen for German policy and Germany's demands for revision.

At the same time the plight of German-speaking peoples living under non-German governments and in Austria became the theme of a mighty

propaganda blast. A dozen or more "Institutes" were established in Germany to study the problems of Germans outside the Reich. Each of them produced a mountain of literature for world consumption. *Auslanddeutschtum* was to Germany after 1919 what *Italia Irredenta* had been to Italy before 1919, only the Germans were more articulate. It is true that demands from Germany did not *have* to be listened to outside of Germany, but they were. Sympathy secured by German professors and publicists for German interests was a real threat to the peace of a world in which there was no general agreement on world government. The German problem could not be solved nor could it be shelved.

Disgruntled Italy

The Italians, whether justified or not, felt that they alone among the victors of 1918 had not reaped their full share of the spoils. When Italy joined the Allied cause in 1915, she had been promised much for her services. Those services had not been so very valuable, but when the war was over the Italians were anxious to collect anyway. At Paris their representative, Orlando, fell afoul of Wilson, and, although Italy did recover her "unredeemed provinces" plus about a quarter of a million German-Austrians, she did not get all she had wanted. Internal disorders and the Fascist revolution in the early 1920's made her position as a power problematical, and she was further subjected to humiliation by being censured by the League of Nations for "defending her national honor" against the Greeks. After 1925, however, she began to recover and to wish to play a role in Europe.

There were two problems that particularly annoyed her: the one, French treatment of Italian immigrants in Tunis; the other, her relations with Austria and Jugoslavia. It was hard to do much about France, but the vigorous young dictator, Mussolini, rattled the sword in public speeches and demanded redress. The French were trying to force the European population in Tunis to become French citizens. They finally agreed to apply the rule only to third-generation inhabitants of the protectorate. Even this was galling to the Italian government. Most of the European population of Tunis was Italian, and it hoped someday to acquire the area as an Italian colony. In the case of Austria and Jugoslavia, the shoe was on the other foot. The Italians were trying to Italianize the Germans in the south Tyrol and the Slavic peoples on the northeast frontier. There was constant friction between these states. Italy reacted by championing Hungarian claims, by marrying an Italian princess to the czar of Bulgaria, and by becoming a close "friend" of Albania. The latter country became practically an Italian protector-

ate. In this way Yugoslavia was surrounded by potential Italian allies. Italy could not do much, but what she could do to assure her place in the world she did to the accompaniment of Mussolini's militant speeches.

The Russian Enigma

As we shall see in the next chapter, the Soviet Union was born out of revolution, civil war, and foreign intervention, but once the birth was accomplished the country was in a sorry state. In a world in which the great powers were too weary to undertake any extensive military adventures, the communist revolution was allowed to work itself out, but the rulers in Moscow were continually haunted by dreams of military intervention from capitalist Europe. From its experience with foreign intervention and civil war, this regime developed a persecution complex that was to color all its relations with the world. No Russian leader allowed himself or his followers to forget that the capitalist world had once sent troops and materials of war to suppress the communist regime.

The question of the czarist debts gave the new government a tangible reason for fearing the other powers. When they assumed control, Lenin and his friends refused to recognize the financial obligations of the preceding monarchy. This action was contrary to a well-established principle in international law, but the communist leaders insisted that the money had all been used for war rather than for Russia and therefore was no moral obligation upon the new government. When the powers presented their claims, they were given counterclaims for the destruction wrought in Russia by the armies that intervened in the civil wars and by the materials of war sent to the White (the anti-Bolshevik) armies. Naturally the Western powers resisted any such claims. This debt structure provided the most important subject of conversation between the new Russian state and the older nations of Europe, for with it was tied the question of trade and commerce between Russia and the world as well as the question of *de jure* recognition of the existence of the Soviet regime. It was not until the election of Mr. Roosevelt that the United States would admit recognition of a nation that defaulted upon its debts; the other powers were somewhat more flexible. Most of them recognized Russia after 1924.

Perhaps even more objectionable than its failure to pay the czarist debts was the fact that the Soviet Union called upon the peoples of the world to revolt against their governments. The Third or Communist International was born of the Russian Revolution and it soon established communist parties in every country. These parties were ruthlessly

controlled from Moscow to such a degree that an order from Russia could and did exclude anybody who differed with the Russian teaching. This made the communists suspected everywhere. The government maintained the fiction that the Third International and the Soviet regime were two different things, but the personnel of the two institutions and their policies were too closely allied for such "dust" to penetrate the eye. Moreover the Third International, with the aid of the Soviet Union, did actively attempt to foment rebellion. Revolt in Java, a stillborn communist *Putsch* in Germany, disturbances in France, active participation in the Chinese Revolution, and even aid to the British workers at the time of the general strike — all pointed to the new Russian regime as a danger to the peace. The Western powers were as much afraid of Russia as the Russians were of the West.

Under such conditions normal relations between Russia, one-seventh of the land surface of the earth, and the rest of the world were difficult. A "sanitary zone" of powers from the Baltic to the Black Sea was maintained to keep Russian ideas and influence out of Europe. The West wanted desperately to isolate the virus of communism in hope that it would die of suffocation. None the less Russia did find some friends. As we have seen, Germany was willing to reach a trade agreement with her by the Rappalo treaty, and perhaps a military understanding was secretly signed. But Germany was the only power in the West that was willing to go so far; none of the others were in her desperate condition. In Asia, however, it was possible for Russian influence to expand. The new revolutionary government in Turkey was happy to come to an agreement with Turkey's century-old foe when this new Russia appeared as the enemy of imperialism. Persia and Afghanistan, too, were glad to have as a neighbor a Russia that avowedly opposed the extension of capitalistic imperialism, and the Canton government in China eagerly accepted Russian agents and "revolutionary technicians" to help conquer the north. The agreements that Russia made were self-denying treaties that assured her neighbors of her peaceful intentions, but at the same time these agreements assured Russia that her Asiatic neighbors would not become bases from which Russia would be attacked.

After 1925 when the prospects for world revolution had failed miserably, the Russian regime adopted the policy of building communism in its own territory first. This may have violated Lenin's idea that Russia alone could not achieve communism but it was dictated by the exigencies of the political picture, and the communist leaders were hardheaded realists. What they needed for the achievement of communism was peace. The Soviet Union, therefore, appeared as the

apostle of peace in the world. At disarmament conferences she advocated total disarmament; to her neighbors and any power that would sign, she offered nonaggression treaties. By 1933 she had a whole sheaf of treaties with nations in Asia and Europe by which the contracting parties agreed not to attack each other. Anticommunists everywhere were sure that she was planning a crusade because she talked so much about nonaggression. Such talk was nonsense for the immediate future, for Russia, more than any of the states of Europe, needed peace to develop her industries and her politico-economic system. It is clear, however, that Russia was more or less isolated and that she was dissatisfied with the political structure created at Paris in 1919-1920.

The Far East after the Washington Conference

The Washington conference was a rebuke to Japan. She had been politely treated as a potential aggressor in China and constrained to sign a treaty that tied her hands in the future as well as deprived her of the support of her ally, England. The naval agreement forced upon her a secondary position but at the same time gave her a measure of security by preventing England and the United States from building fortifications in her backyard. The nationalists ground their teeth in dismay; the liberals decided to play along with the West to see what would come of the new order. Fortunately the demand for silk, cheap cotton cloth, and other commodities produced by the Japanese was good, so that a brisk trade with the United States and with her Asiatic neighbors kept her economically prosperous. Furthermore, conditions in China were so much in a state of flux that it was possible to wait to see which way they would go before any active policy would be necessary to protect Japanese "vital interests."

The Manchu regime in China had given way to a republic; the republic to an empire; and the empire to near-anarchy. War lords ruling over a town or a province divided the country among themselves. The lip service they paid to any government was a polite fiction; they knew and Japan knew that the realities of power were in their hands. Under such conditions, the Japanese could rest assured of their influence in northern China and in Manchuria. War lords were venial creatures; they could be bought. As long as Chang Tso-lin ruled Manchuria, Japan's special interests were about as safe as if the Japanese ruled there themselves. In 1927 Baron Shidehara declared in the Diet Japan's intention to respect "China's sovereignty and territorial integrity," to promote "solidarity and economic rapprochement" between Japan and China, and "to use all reasonable means of protecting Japan's legitimate

rights and interests" in China. Forbearance but not neglect of "vital interests" was, therefore, the Japanese policy.

Events in China, however, were not reassuring to foreigners. In the South the Cantonese movement of the Nationalist Party (Sun Yat-sen's Kuomintang) was reorganized under Russian auspices. The Russians sent military and propaganda technicians to China and prepared to support the Three People's Principles that Sun Yat-sen had proclaimed: nationality, popular sovereignty, and the people's livelihood (socialism?). Sun Yat-sen died in 1925, but the Kuomintang armies gained military control over the South, and under a young general, Chiang Kai-shek, prepared to conquer the rest of the country. Chiang had studied both in Japan and in Moscow, and with the aid of Borodin, his Russian adviser, he got control of the military organization of the nationalist movement. The march northward was a succession of victories. Propaganda and treachery of the Northern war lords paved the way; Chiang's army did the rest. By 1928 the nationalist forces were in contact with the holdings of the Manchurian war lord, Chang Tso-lin. The latter had long resented his tutelage to Japan; he was killed before he could make a deal with Chiang Kai-shek.

It was not Japan but Britain and the United States that first ran afoul of the Chinese Revolution. The nationalists wanted to abolish the foreign concessions and to abrogate the unequal treaties that gave the West extraterritorial privileges as well as control over much of China's fiscal policy. Obviously China's house was not in order, and the Western powers had no intention of abolishing their consular jurisdictions. This allowed the politicians to give their movement a popular antiforeign, anti-Christian bias. Boycotts against the British at Shanghai, Canton, and Hong Kong convinced them that China could fight back. In 1927 a mob invaded the British concessions in Hankow and Kiukiang so that foreigners had to withdraw. The British did not retaliate with the gunboat policy they had followed since 1840; instead, the concessions were returned to China by a treaty in March, 1927. It was now clear to the Chinese that the "foreign devils" were not what they used to be. The nationalist armies captured Nanking a month later and turned the victory into an attack on all foreigners. Foreign buildings, including consulates, were pillaged and burned. A few days later British and American warships moved up the river and shelled the city to prevent further attacks on the surviving foreigners. The Kuomintang tried to lay the outrages at the door of the defeated Northern armies and the general conditions created by the "unequal treaties."

Contact with the Manchurian war lord and the Western powers produced a reorganization in the Kuomintang. Chiang Kai-shek made a

turn to the right. In 1927 the communist technicians were sent home and the communists "purged" from the ranks of the party. The purge was a bloody one that brought into existence the Chinese Communist Party with which Chiang Kai-shek had to fight for control over the country. After this turn to the right, however, the Western powers showed themselves more agreeable to alterations in the unequal treaties, and Chang Tso-lin's successor openly defied the Japanese by associating himself with the nationalist movement.

This meant that by 1929 the Far Eastern situation had taken a turn to the disadvantage of Japan in that a government which could pretend to rule all China had come into existence and the "captive" war lord in Manchuria was now able to resist Japanese blandishments. Like the situation in Europe, the political structure of the Far East was unstable; a crisis might easily upset the balances set up by the Washington Conference. The depression very soon produced that crisis.

XVII

Problems of the Victors and Woes of the Vanquished

The Test of the Liberal-Democratic Compromise

AT the close of the war the nations that participated had to take stock of their situation. There was no country in the world that had not undergone considerable changes as a direct result of the conflict. In eastern Europe, where there had been four empires — the Germans, the Austro-Hungarian, the Russian, and the Ottoman — the whole slate had been wiped clean and revolutionary governments had taken the place of imperial regimes. In western Europe the victorious powers still presented a brave front, but both England and France were severely wounded and Italy was about to succumb to a revolutionary movement that would reorganize her whole political structure. Even in the United States, the one nation that emerged apparently unscathed, there were dislocations which threatened the system.

In general the crisis could best be explained by going back to the compromise made in the nineteenth century. The liberal-democratic system which had been the political model for the world had assumed two things: first, that the state would erect constitutional or statutory laws to protect its citizens from the state itself: bills of rights, guarantees of freedom of religion, speech, press, assembly, economic activity (contracts, buying and selling, etc.), and the whole paraphernalia of political liberalism; and second, that government would, or should, be directed by a majority of the elected representatives of the people, that is, it should obey the "general will" in so far as it could be expressed in a free society by votes and opinion. This compromise, as we have seen, was supposed by all "progressively minded men" to be the pattern for government in the future. It was made, however, in an era of comparative economic well-being. It had been impossible before 1850; but after 1850, while the world grew wealthy and comfortable, the tradi-

tional liberals and radical-democrats were able to agree. The compromise now had to face a new era in which men were not so wealthy nor nearly so comfortable. Only about four or five years (1925-1929) of the truce between the first and the second World Wars were prosperous ones for most of the world.

The war, moreover, had taught men something about the power and the possibilities of the state. No one in 1914 would have believed that the tremendous economic efforts the war demanded could have been accomplished. For war, the economies of the world had produced masses of materials beyond all expectations, an unbelievable total. This was achieved, however, at the expense of the "liberties" of the businessmen; the governments assumed more and more control over private enterprise so that *laissez faire* became a dead letter. Moreover, the total effort was directed by a process that curbed any criticism. Liberty of press, assembly, speech, and even person went by the board to guarantee that no dissenting voices would mar the national unity. In other words, the war created regimes in which the total productivity of the nation was directed from the top, and that direction achieved the miracles which the war had demanded. When peace came and with it poverty and economic distress, many people asked themselves why it was that such a quantity of economic goods could be produced for destruction and so little could be produced for peacetime distribution. In this question was the germ of revolution, for it was clear that the *laissez faire* economic system and free discussion of economic policies, in short, the very essence of the liberal-democratic compromise, could not achieve the unity of purpose necessary to repeat the effort of war production in a peacetime economic program. Those people to whom liberty meant less than security, were easily seduced into the belief that it would be wise to surrender liberties in return for united action. The program "one folk, one Reich, one Leader" which the Nazis were to proclaim was the most successful but not the only program aimed at destroying the liberal-democratic compromise by using votes to undermine liberty.

The real crisis of liberal democracy grew out of its failure to solve the basic question of economic life. The compromise born in the era of expanding economic opportunities came under fire when those opportunities began to contract.

Great Britain's Economic Troubles

The government of Britain emerged from the war with victory to buttress its position, but victory was not enough to guarantee it against

the evils of the postwar world. Britain's problems stemmed from the fact that the United States had invaded her markets in the western hemisphere while Japan crowded her in the markets of the Orient. The shipbuilding boom that might have been expected after the merchant-shipping losses of the war was checked at once by the transfer of the German merchant marine to English hands. And her coal industry was depressed because on the one side Germany supplied her French and Italian customers with coal as part of the reparations schedules and, on the other, the switch to oil as the basic fuel for naval vessels and many merchant ships wiped out another big customer for coal. Her industrial capacity had greatly increased with the war, but her markets in the postwar era were not even equal to those of the prewar epoch. One further factor depressed her economy. In the prewar era she lived like a rich man by clipping bonds. Englishmen owned stocks, bonds, plantations, and other economic installations all over the world and annually reaped huge sums in profits and interest. When the war was over, she still had considerable holdings but nothing like her prewar hoard and, a thing never considered in the prewar era, she *owed* annual payments on public and private debts to the United States government and to citizens of the United States who had bought British bonds.

Britain's predicament was a sorry one compared with her pre-1914 situation, but even at that she was the most fortunate country in Europe. Her governmental system, with its centuries of traditions, was intact and her people were willing to give the politicians a chance to solve the problems before them in the spirit of the liberal-democratic era. The three parties that were in existence before the war saw no serious rival arise in the postwar period to challenge their right to speak for the nation. There was, however, a shift in their relative weight. The Liberal Party, with almost a hundred years of history behind it, slipped into the position formerly held by the Labour Party; that is, it became the smallest of the three, while the Conservative Party and the Labour Party vied for control of parliament. The rise of the Labour Party was spectacular. In 1900 it had registered only sixty thousand votes and sent two members to parliament. In 1910 it polled a half million votes with forty members in parliament. By 1929 it polled over eight million votes and sent 289 members to parliament. These gains were made at the expense of the Liberal Party, but the two stood together to challenge the Conservatives' right to rule.

During most of the period between the two wars the Conservatives were in office. The Liberal Party went under in the postwar disillusionment, and the Labour Party, after a victory in 1923, was driven out in 1924, partly because it was impossible for the Labour-Liberal coali-

tion to find a policy which they could agree upon and partly because the Conservatives exploited a "red scare" of questionable validity. The traditionally minded middle class were easily influenced by fear of Bolshevism. When the Labour Party did get its chance again in 1929, the world depression proved to be a force too great for it to cope with successfully, and after two years its leader, Ramsay MacDonald, formed a coalition government with Conservatives and Liberals in the hope of finding a national solution of the depression.

The great problem which parliament, whether controlled by Conservatives or by Labour, had to consider was the revival of the industrial machine. Sluggish markets meant unemployment for millions of Englishmen. This, in turn, meant difficulties for the budget, since the social insurance laws provided for a "dole" for the unemployed. The "dole" was enough to keep the poor alive, but hardly enough to let them live satisfactorily. Whole areas were blighted by the poverty and social distress that resulted. At the same time, of course, the owners of factories and mines, the holders of securities, and the professional and commercial classes also felt the pressure and all of them looked to government for relief.

The Conservatives' solutions for the crisis were not too imaginative. Their stabilization of the pound by returning it to the pre-1914 gold value was undoubtedly one of the important reasons for Britain's difficulties in international trade. The prestige of the country seemed to be at stake, and to the Conservatives it was impossible to admit that the English currency was not sound. But by making the pound again worth one-fourth of an ounce of gold, the government actually overvalued it in terms of other currencies. The price levels in Britain did not warrant such a value, and so when English prices were translated into other currencies, English goods were expensive — more expensive than comparable goods from other countries. American manufacturers, for example, had no difficulty in underselling their English competitors in the United States as well as in many other markets, and American tourists, who might have spent money in England, found British prices high in terms of their American dollars.

Another solution offered by the Conservatives was the desertion of free trade. At first, tariff barriers were not raised directly, but by means of obstacles of many kinds foreign goods were kept off the British market and a campaign was started to urge the people to "buy British." The return to protection and economic nationalism may have been justified in view of the fact that the rest of the world was using similar methods, but in Britain's case the policy was not crowned with much success. There were only a few years during the whole

period from 1919 to 1939 that the island empire enjoyed even moderate prosperity.

The greatest crisis of the early postwar era came with the coal strike of 1926. In 1925 about one-fourth of the miners were unemployed, and the operators attempted to lengthen the working day and reduce wages. The miners' union resisted the cut when the railway unions promised not to transport coal in the event of a lockout. The Conservative government tried to stabilize the situation by offering a subsidy to the owners while a parliamentary commission investigated. The report, however, satisfied neither workers nor operators and in May, 1926, the miners laid down their tools and the workers in the Trades-Union Congress called a general strike in sympathy with them. The strike actually involved less than half of the trade union membership in Britain, but it thoroughly frightened the middle classes to see this weapon raised by British workingmen. The general strike lasted only nine days but the coal strike continued for six months, after which the cold, hungry, discouraged miners reluctantly returned to work with longer hours and smaller pay envelopes. The strike weakened both the Labour and the Liberal Parties, but the Conservatives were unable to capitalize their gain by the re-establishment of the power of the House of Lords.

The depression that came in 1929 only aggravated the already difficult situation of Britain's economy. She shared with the rest of the world the distress that came from the world-wide economic crisis, but she came to that crisis with her government intact and her major parties ready and willing to support a liberal-democratic system of government.

Victorious France

In 1910 it was widely assumed that the Third French Republic could not hope to survive a war. Republican government, men felt, was too unstable to meet a great national crisis. In 1920 with the victory an accomplished fact, the republican leaders believed that the regime could weather any crisis that might appear. There were problems that came with the victory to test this belief. Like Britain, France had economic distress that might threaten her national existence. She also had the problem of absorbing the lost provinces of Alsace-Lorraine after their long connection with Germany. These were the two most important political questions in the first decade following 1918.

The most pressing manifestation of France's economic malady appeared in connection with the value of the franc. During the war the government had been forced to abandon the gold standard, and by 1918 the franc, which had stood five to the dollar, fluctuated between eight

and ten to the dollar. In the next five years realization of the predicament of French economy and the crisis of the Ruhr drove it down to thirty and forty and finally fifty to the dollar and threatened to force it along the path of the German and Russian currencies. The problem was a difficult one with which to cope. In 1914 the national debt had been embarrassingly large; by 1920 it was overwhelmingly so, and the end was not in sight, for the work of reconstruction demanded huge outlays. It was obvious that the debt could not be paid if the franc retained its prewar value; furthermore the war inflation had boosted internal price levels so that French goods could not be sold abroad if the franc were restored to the prewar figure of 100 francs equaling one ounce of gold. French goods would have been exorbitantly high in terms of other currencies. But what was the value of the franc? The inflation and the decline in its value weighed heavily upon holders of bonds, mortgages, insurance policies, and such paper assets. The actual losses, as a result of the inflation, ran to about 80 per cent; it was a terrible blow to people who depended upon their investments for their living. These people, the *bourgeoisie*, had taken heavy losses already when the Bolshevik government refused to honor the czarist bonds that Frenchmen had bought in the prewar era; they did not want to take any further losses that could be avoided. It is ironical to read the programs of the bourgeois political parties; practically all of them agree to resist further declines in the franc but none of them were willing or able to do so.

By 1926 the situation became so serious that something had to be done and done quickly. One cabinet after another rose and fell. Government bonds were a drug on the market, and they matured faster than new issues could be sold. The parliament rallied to support a coalition cabinet under Poincaré, a statesman who had been president of the Republic and many times its prime minister. Poincaré "saved" the franc and balanced the budget. New taxes put Frenchmen even ahead of Englishmen as taxpayers; some 20 to 22 per cent of the entire national income went to the government. A solution was found for paying the huge floating debt, and government expenses were whittled down as far as possible. The franc rose from two cents to about four cents, and then it was stabilized by establishing it again on the gold standard. French experience was different from the British. The franc was actually undervalued in terms of other currencies so that French goods and services, when translated into dollars, for example, were cheap. On the other hand, Frenchmen found imported goods to be expensive for, translated into francs, the dollar was overvalued in world trade. This fact gave French exporters a ready market for their goods, but those goods

were often paid for in gold rather than in goods. The result was that by 1929 France had the largest gold supply of any country in Europe.

The period of reconstruction was generally a fairly prosperous one, in spite of the fluctuations of the franc. The physical task of rebuilding the towns and villages of eastern France with their economic installations necessitated the expenditure of over seven billion dollars. The work provided employment of all kinds, and thereby kept the economic system from stagnating as England's threatened to do. It was this reconstruction work rather than any real improvement in her position in the economic world to which her prosperity should be attributed. France after 1919, as before, was still handicapped by her lack of coal. The temporary union with the Saar Valley helped some, but the fact that the Lorraine iron fields were now within the French system aggravated her total needs for coal. The problem simply could not be solved. In spite of the fact that she was now one of the world's leading producers of iron ore and aluminum clay, she could not build an iron or an aluminum industry comparable to that of the United States or of Germany. The prosperity, therefore, was based fundamentally on the expenditure for reconstruction; French economy at the end of the period was poorly prepared to enter competition in the world markets.

French commercial policy, in part, was responsible for France's difficulties. Ever since the opening of the modern era French governments have dreamed of economic self-sufficiency, and now they attempted to give France a balanced economy. To achieve this, tariff barriers were erected on all manner of goods to assure producers control over French markets. The resulting economic structure had many of the undesirable aspects of a hothouse. Behind the tariff, inefficient and uneconomical enterprises flourished; they would have died immediately were the barriers removed. This allowed French capital and labor to be employed less effectively in order that the nation might achieve economic independence. With meager coal supplies at hand, only certain luxury items could successfully compete in world markets; heavy industry was largely confined to French consumption. The theory of economic self-sufficiency was an alluring one, but unfortunately also impossible of realization. France was less dependent upon foreigners than any other great nation, but even France had to import many items which could not be produced at home. The other side of the picture is the fact that the diversity of production and the concentration upon luxury goods left the country inadequately equipped with the heavy industries that are the blood and bone of national power in the modern world.

The problem of absorbing Alsace-Lorraine into the Republic provided a series of the most difficult political questions of the day. The

two provinces had been in the German Reich for almost fifty years. They had shared Germany's political evolution and knew little of the ways of France. Under German rule they had become accustomed to a large amount of local autonomy. Imperial Germany was a federal state; republican France was a unitary state with Paris as the center of administration. The Alsace-Lorraine population may have been emotionally happy to rejoin France, especially when they knew the penalties imposed upon Germany, but they found much to criticize about the French way of doing business. They did not appreciate seeing Frenchmen in important administrative posts in their territory nor did they welcome home those citizens who had refused to stay when Germany annexed the provinces in 1871.

An even greater cause for friction arose out of questions of church and state. The provinces were almost solidly Roman Catholic and they had not experienced the church-state conflict that excited France from 1880 to 1910. Their church was still under a concordat with Rome, and their fight to retain this special position stirred up the embers of old political battles of the prewar period. Clericalism had long been an issue in France. During the war it had apparently died out. Now it became a live issue again. Actually the issue could not regain the importance it had in the days of the Dreyfus case, but in 1924 it did stir up considerable political trouble.

The language question, too, was a problem. Men fifty years old had lived with the German language all their lives, and, although many of them could speak a French patois, German was the language of the majority. Naturally the French resented this fact, and tried desperately to introduce French as the official language. The brutal story of "the last lesson" was re-enacted; this time French replaced German in the schools.

The provinces also had economic complaints. Their commercial and industrial life had developed with ties in Germany, where there were both markets and materials for production. It was difficult for the Germanized economy to find a place in French economic life. French merchants and manufacturers did not welcome their competition, and they in turn did not like the pettiness of the French system. The problems of economic readjustment and cultural assimilation very often tried the patience of both sides.

The French political system survived the war, but not without the growth of undemocratic elements. After 1920 there appeared on the right and on the left of French politics parties that wanted to end the liberal-democratic compromise. The Moscow-directed Communist Party and a half dozen or so little "totalitarian" Fascist parties com-

peted with the older political organizations for the support of the electorate. As long as reconstruction and foreign loans kept France fairly prosperous, these radicals were not a serious menace; but when economic disasters gripped the nation, they were at hand to threaten the end of the Third Republic. The older parties, however, ruled the nation in the decade of reconstruction. In France not two, but many, political parties represent the political interests of the people in the Legislative Chambers. In general it can be said of the postwar era that the liberal and leftist groups were able to win a majority of the votes when elections were held, but they were unable to agree on a program, and so before the new elections were due, the rightist parties usually had a considerable share in the running of the government. The reason for this is not hard to find. The parties of the left included the Socialist Party on one side and the Radical Socialists on the other. The socialists were a Marxist party; the Radical Socialists were neither radical nor socialist but represented the petty *bourgeoisie* and the peasants. It was practically impossible to find a fiscal policy that would satisfy both groups, and so the Radical Socialists had to co-operate with the center and rightist parties to form a government.

Just as in the prewar period, French parliamentary government moved from crisis to crisis. The coalition system was always unstable because it was hard to keep so many diverse elements satisfied. Cabinets rose and fell regularly. They averaged more than one a year in the decade after 1920, but the personnel of the governments remained fairly stable. The same politicians were to be found in the new cabinet that had been in the old one, and probably most of them would be in the next government that would be formed. These crises and the failure of any government to establish a strong regime lent fuel to the propaganda of the antidemocratic parties on the right and on the left. When the depression threatened the economic existence of the nation, it is not surprising to find these totalitarians urging the destruction of the liberal-democratic republic that had proved to be so inefficient.

The Fascist Revolution in Italy

In England and France the liberal-democratic compromise survived; in Italy it succumbed to a new revolutionary credo. In many ways Italy was the hardest hit of the Western allies by the war. Her armies suffered a major catastrophe in 1916 that only reinforcements from her allies prevented from becoming a complete disaster. By 1918 the whole country was infected with defeatism and near despair; it was psychologically prepared for defeat when the victory finally came.

Exultations over victory were short-lived, for early in 1919 Italy came face to face with the realities of her political and economic status. Politically she lost the peace at Paris. The Italians had grandiose ambitions for expansion which neither Wilson nor Clemenceau would consider. Economically she faced disaster, for once the aid which came to her for her war effort ended and she was confronted with the cut-throat competition of the postwar era, her weak economic system threatened to disintegrate entirely. She was on the side of the victorious powers, but a visitor in her principal cities in 1919-1920 would have had difficulty understanding that he was not in a land of the vanquished.

The liberal-democratic compromise in Italy had been realized only in part. In a nation which has a high percentage of illiterates, it is difficult to establish a rule "by the people, of the people, and for the people" that really means what the slogan says. Governments before 1914 were weak and corrupt; in 1919 this weakness and corruption had become intensified. The government, a coalition of many parties, could not solve the problems, and it had retired into a political "bomb shelter" to wait for the crisis to blow over. Labor difficulties, strikes, and lockouts paralyzed industry. Here and there the workers took over factories, and flying the red flag, tried to run them, but there was no organization, no leadership, no chance of success. When an enthusiastic radical told Lenin that Italy was about to join the Red Revolution, the Bolshevik leader is said to have replied, "Don't you know that Italy has no coal?" Whether it was lack of coal or lack of organizing genius, the scattered *coups* from the left failed and Italy became the scene of riots and wild marching demonstrations without much point. Critics of Fascism have tried to prove that all this disorder was mere surface agitation and that, fundamentally, Italy, given time, would have recovered. Such a theory ignores the basic fact which the disorder of war had created. The war had upset the internal balances and thrown down the challenge to the whole structure of liberal democracy. To miss this fact is to be blind to the realities of 1918-1921.

The revolution in Italy was the handiwork of the Fascist Party led by Mussolini. Mussolini got his early training in politics as an exile in Switzerland, where he was avoiding his call to the Italian army. There he was grounded in socialism in the same informal school of socialist revolution in which Lenin acted as a professor. Upon his return to Italy, he became editor of the principal socialist newspaper in north Italy, and achieved fame as a pacifist and front-rank agitator for the socialist cause. When the war broke out, he at first opposed Italian entrance but very soon he was persuaded by French gold that Italy's

salvation could only be found in fighting against her late allies. This earned him expulsion from the Socialist Party. After a short tour of military duty in which he rose to the rank of corporal, he was dismissed from the army to resume his newspaper work; his assignment was to combat the defeatism so rampant in Italy. He was a clever journalist, well above the average in intelligence, and he soon attracted a substantial following both in Italy and among the Italian immigrants in the New World. When peace came, he championed the "black shirt" attack on Fiume led by the poet-hero d'Annunzio, and collected money in Italy and abroad to support the expedition.¹ Once that adventure had succeeded, he and his friends turned their attention to the Italian political picture and organized the Fascist Party.

The early efforts of this party seemed destined to heighten the confusion: it appealed to returning soldiers who were disgruntled at the workers who had not been in the army; it appealed to frightened landlords and capitalists to whom the red flag was a constant fear; and it appealed to the *bourgeoisie* — small shopkeepers, little professional people, upper-bracket white-collar workers, and the like — whose existence and status were threatened by the economic chaos. Tough bands of black-shirt militia entered the political fray with revolvers, clubs, and castor oil as their principal arguments against socialism; where they could not convert, they tried to intimidate. At first the movement proclaimed itself to be republican, but somehow the higher army officers got word to Mussolini that they would stand aside and let him assume power if the throne were not upset. The House of Savoy and its supporters among the aristocrats were willing to abandon the liberal-democratic compromise if it were possible to keep the throne in a place — any place — in the regime. This intelligence made the Fascists withdraw the republican emblems from their flag and strengthened their hand against the weak government that ruled in the name of the parliament. The crisis came in 1922 when an alliance of labor organized a general strike. The Fascist militia broke up the strike by violence and then prepared to overthrow the government in Rome.

In October, 1922, the Black Shirts "marched" on Rome. The army stood aside and the armed party-militia held the city in its grip. At Mussolini's demand, he was made prime minister, and the parliament meekly voted his government "full powers" for a year. The most important law that he secured, from a constitutional point of view, gave

¹ The treaties of Paris did not give Fiume to Italy. D'Annunzio, in the tradition of Garibaldi, organized a "black-shirt militia," captured the harbor, and defied the Allied attempts to make him give it up. Eventually Italy annexed Fiume in spite of antagonism from France and Yugoslavia.

the political party gaining a plurality of votes in an election, an absolute majority of the seats in the parliament. This law became the cornerstone of Fascist legal control. The party could not, even with the aid of its tough boys, secure a majority of the votes, but it could and did get a larger number of votes than any other single party. The others were so demoralized and divided that they could not unite against the aggressive revolutionaries. Mussolini still had to contend with an opposition, but murder and intimidation of its leaders soon relieved him of the most serious consequences. None the less it was not until 1927 or 1928 that the Fascist government achieved control over Italy as complete as that which Hitler imposed on Germany in the first year and a half of his regime.

The Fascist government was energetic, and it did make great improvements in Italy. An extensive public works program rebuilt the railroads, constructed strategic superhighways as well as lesser roads, drained great swamplands — a project of governments ever since Roman times — enormously improved housing conditions in the cities, and raised new public buildings. This program put men back to work and started the economic system into action. Mussolini also used the government power to improve agricultural methods and to encourage the production of citrus fruits so that Italy could come closer than before to feeding herself and at the same time have an exportable commodity for which there was a ready market. The government also greatly encouraged the tourist industry by making the trains run on time, cleaning up the petty corruption and graft which had irritated visitors, and enforcing standard prices. American and British tourists who had known former conditions became convinced that Mussolini was a great man because their vacations were more comfortable after he assumed power.

The new regime did many things for the common people. Children's clinics were set up in connection with the local party cell so that the children of the poor could secure medical attention. The "After Labor" organization brought benefits of cheap wine, paid vacations, and opportunities for low-priced entertainment to the workers. The party and its youth organizations gave Italians the opportunity to meet gregariously, and to feel important by the use of uniforms, parades, and outings. These were the "bread and circuses" which this modern Caesar had to supply to keep the nation behind him. In addition, Fascism gave Italy its first "strong" government since Roman days. Law and order appeared in southern Italy, for example, to crush the bandits who had for centuries taken tribute from the people. Antifascists probably are right when they insist that new "official bandits"

replaced the old *banditti*, but this was probably inevitable considering the traditions of Italy. The secret Black Hand societies which had extorted ransom money for hundreds of years were also broken up in the process. Caesar had to show that he brought real benefits in return for the power he had usurped.

Usurpation of power had its other side. A secret police and a zealous party acted as a whip to keep the people in line. Disgruntled or counterrevolutionary agitators disappeared from their homes and were incarcerated on a malaria-infested island from which few returned. Occasional acts of violence like the murder of prominent socialist politicians and the administration of large doses of castor oil and brutal beatings were outward signs of the inner tensions created by the revolution, as well as brutal reminders that Caesar must not be questioned about his policies. The press was muzzled and the printing houses prostituted for the ends of the regime. Intellectuals with doubts about Caesar's wisdom either migrated or kept quiet. The army was well paid for its neutrality in 1922. Its officers were given medals for their chests and money with which to develop their military machine. Apparently the government did not check too carefully the wisdom with which this money was spent. Mussolini, the pacifist of 1910-1912, readily assumed the role of Mussolini, the sword rattler of 1925, and the youth of Italy were turned over to the royalist officers to be made into cannon fodder.

The revolution was a thorough-going one in many other respects. Mussolini's socialism had always had a little syndicalist heresy in its mixture, and when he became *Duce*, he introduced syndicalism into Fascism. The new Italian state was a corporate state; that is, it was organized on the basis of economic interests rather than political democracy. Each profession, art, craft, and industry was organized in a corporation to which all its members, whether employers or employees, belonged; and each corporation controlled the economic life of its own members. *Laissez faire* was gone; in its place was rigid control. The control, moreover, was exercised from above, for all the corporations were under a governmental agency, and membership in their deliberative bodies was strictly dominated by the Fascist party organization. It is small wonder that opposition to Mussolini eventually came from the very people who had put him in power, the *bourgeoisie*, for he deprived them of control over their own economic destiny.

Thus Italy was the first of the Western states to desert the liberal-democratic compromise and install a regime which ignored or repudiated the worth of any individual man. In place of the guarantees of the rights of man which the French Revolution had so bravely proclaimed,


NEW YORK CITY
AT NIGHT (*Acme*)

PLATE IX





HONG KONG HARBOR (*Erwing Galloway*)



there stood the needs of the omnipotent state to organize and manage society. The people, apparently, were willing to give up their liberty in face of the confusion created by the war, in order to secure some measure of economic stability. The price was high, and the Italians had not yet paid it all when Mussolini had firmly established himself as Caesar.

The German Revolution: Weimar Phase

When the German army decided that the war was lost, the Bismarckian solution for Germany's political structure was doomed. Bismarck had created the imperial constitution, and for almost half a century he and his successors pointedly explained to the people that government in Germany had to be carried on by experts who understood the problem rather than by blundering bourgeois politicians who would be responsible to the democracy. The government of the experts had been liberal in that it guaranteed personal rights; it had been democratic in that it submitted its program to a democratically elected Reichstag. But Bismarck had not created a liberal democracy. In the last analysis his government of experts had been responsible to the emperor, not to the people. Germany was well governed: things moved efficiently, there were no scandals, and the nation had prospered economically. But the people remained politically immature; they had accepted the gifts of government without having much to do with its functioning. Finally the experts blundered. First, they let Germany in for a war on two fronts by following a disastrous foreign policy; then they lost the war by political and military blunders that could not be undone. When the war was completely lost, they announced that the democracy of Germany should "take over" and save what could be saved! The Reichstag, which had practically nothing to do with running the war, found the whole problem tossed into its lap by defeated generals and bankrupt bureaucrats.

To make matters worse Wilhelm II, an erratic genius but also a vain and obstinate man, missed his cue to abdicate and allow the constitution to move into new channels. By the time he was ready to give up his Imperial title, the situation was out of his control. He lost his throne and plunged Germany into a violent revolution which severed the country's traditions too close to their roots for a healthy regrowth. The revolution, quite naturally, was led by extremists. Sailors from the fleet who had raised the red flag and radical workers cried aloud for the establishment of German soldiers', sailors', and workers' councils on the model of the Russian soviets. Thus at a time when the provisional government which took over power in 1918 was trying to arrange

an armistice, it was also confronted with the threat of a repetition of the Bolshevik revolution. To the allied generals who dictated the armistice and the statesmen who imposed the treaty, these problems had little or no meaning. A German was a German no matter whether he represented the kaiser's government, the social and liberal-democratic traditions, or the really red forces of social revolution. Thus the German Revolution and the subsequent Weimar Republic, came into being under the most difficult possible situation.

The extremists did not win in 1918-1919 because Germany was still too steeped in the ideas of liberal democracy to accept a proletariat dictatorship. The largest single political organization was the Social Democratic Party. It was tied to the trade union movement and since the turn of the century its emphasis had been upon democracy rather than on social revolution. Its leaders wanted nothing to do with the extremists who had broken from their ranks. The other two large political groups were the Catholics and the *bourgeoisie*. The Catholic Center Party was not republican but it was liberal-democratic in its orientation. There had been too many conflicts between the Catholics and Bismarck and his successors for the Catholics to have any desire to retain the old system of the Reich; on the other hand the antireligious, atheistic tone of the communists was anathema to them, and their solid mass in the Rhineland and south Germany stood squarely in the way of a communist regime. The middle classes naturally could not approve of communism. They were opportunistic. They understood that Germany would have a better chance if she adopted the slogans of her conquerors, and therefore they were anxious to see a liberal democracy emerge from the revolution. It was these three groups: Social Democrats, Catholics, and *bourgeoisie*, that made the constitution of the Weimar Republic but it was the socialists alone who led Germany through the trying days between the revolutionary outbreak of November, 1918, and the meeting of the National Assembly at Weimar in the winter of 1919.

The socialist leaders sternly set their faces against a revolution in the Russian style. They sent their members into the "soviets" and captured them so that the extremists — called Spartacists — could not use these councils as a weapon with which to seize power. They also cooperated with the returning army, which came back under Hindenburg's slogan "There must be order," as well as with the so-called Free Corps (private armies) to suppress the violence of the extremists. The two most important leaders of the Spartacists, Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, were taken into custody and shot "while attempting to escape." At the same time the Social Democratic leaders saw to it

that the elections to the Constitutional Assembly were fairly and democratically conducted. The socialists had the fate of Germany in their hands from November, 1918, through January, 1919; they were unwilling to create a socialist Germany that was not democratic at its base.

When the National Assembly met at Weimar, the socialist, Catholic, and bourgeois leaders formed a coalition which included the vast majority of the delegates. It was this "Weimar coalition" that wrote the constitution and dominated the politics of the republic up to 1931. Germany had very weak republican traditions. Some of the 1848ers had wanted a republic, but most of the "advanced" political thinkers in Germany had favored a parliamentary monarchy similar to those in the Scandinavian states. The stupidity of Wilhelm II in the crucial days of November, 1918, ruled out the establishment of his grandson, with a regency, on a parliamentary throne. There was nothing to do but establish a republic. The constitution itself was the work of academically trained political scientists who knew all the "latest devices" for the creation of a democracy. It was a "streamlined, latest model" constitution providing for proportional representation, referendum and recall, parliamentary control, and all the paraphernalia of liberal-democratic government. Perhaps at another time or in another place it might have evolved into a document as revered by the people who lived under it as the Constitution of the United States is revered by Americans.

The Weimar Constitution, however, was given to a people whose political lives were torn by the dislocations of war and defeat as well as by the impositions of the victors. Furthermore the men who came to govern Germany in 1919 made a series of political mistakes which prejudiced the republic in its growth and development. The first was made when civilians signed the armistice. That was properly the task of the soldiers who had failed to win the war. It left the loophole, later exploited by the army and the Nazis, that the army had been "stabbed in the back" by radicals rather than defeated in the field by its opponents. A second blunder came when the new regime assured judges and bureaucratic officers that their tenure of office would not be disturbed. Practically the whole of the judiciary and a large percentage of the civil servants were monarchists at heart and hated the republic. Furthermore, since they occupied the governmental positions, there was little patronage to give to deserving politicians whose devotion to the Weimar regime would be unquestionable. The extremist revolts forced a third blunder. The new government had to rely upon the army for protection against the communists and it rewarded

the army by leaving the old officer class in command of the restricted army allowed by the treaty of peace. These old officers were monarchists and authoritarians. They were never loyal to the republic except during the years when Hindenburg was president, and then it was a personal loyalty to the old field marshal, not to the regime. The Versailles treaty, to be sure, made the creation of a republican army difficult, but the mistakes of 1919 made it practically impossible in the light of the problems that Germany had to solve after 1920.

The Treaty of Versailles added to the opprobrium of the republic. By signing it the Weimar regime had to be responsible for the evils and humiliations that came in its wake. It was too harsh to make reconciliation probable; it was too lenient to prevent German recovery. The "war guilt clause," the problems related to the trial of "war criminals" and the extradition of the kaiser, the criticism leveled at Germany's colonial policies, and the general implication that Germany really did not belong to the family of civilized nations, were humiliating to a proud people who believed they had fought a war of self-defense against encirclement and Slavic barbarism. But these humiliations were unimportant compared with the economic and political evils besetting the German people and inevitably credited to the republic. The postwar inflation ruined millions by wiping out their savings; it was the middle class that suffered most from the financial collapse, and that group was articulate enough to voice its discontent. The reparations, too, fell most heavily upon these people. Their tax load may not have been more than that of the victors in France and England, but they regarded the payments as tribute and well understood that they would not enrich the German economy. In England and France the internal debt payments were made to individuals *inside* the nation; in Germany the inflation wiped out internal debts so that the total payments, if and when they were made, would not benefit Germany in any way. Illogically, these economic difficulties as well as the political instability that accompanied them, were blamed on the republican regime. Time might have erased the memory and made the Germans loyal to the republic, but time was denied it.

Republican Germany

The first four years of the republic were stormy and uncertain. The nation was torn by a series of uprisings and revolts. From Bavaria to the Ruhr there were extremist revolts, the creation of "soviet" regimes, and violent liquidation of enemies. The government, headed by Social Democrats, joined hands with the army and the Free Corps to suppress

these rebellions. In Munich the "soviet" ended in a sea of blood; in Dresden, Frankfurt, and a half dozen other cities, the Free Corpsmen brutally suppressed the revolts; in the Ruhr there was a pitched battle which lasted for days before the government forces finally forced capitulation. The Free Corpsmen, however, were dangerous allies, for they were essentially reactionary and nationalistic. In 1920, under Dr. Wolfgang von Kapp, a group of them tried to overthrow the regime by seizing Berlin. The Reichswehr did not hesitate to fire on workingmen waving the red flag, but its officers found excuses for not proceeding against Kapp. The *Putsch* failed because the workers of Berlin called a general strike and Kapp's position became untenable, but its near-success showed how weak the republic really was.

From 1921 to 1923 the disorders continued. The French invasion of the Ruhr, the inflation, and the difficulties inherent in the problem of reabsorbing millions of men into a civilian economy wrecked by war, all contributed to the confusion. The French tried to start a separatist movement in the Rhineland to split up the unity of the Reich. This "revolver republic" collapsed, but the passions it inspired did not. In Munich the rise of Hitler's National Socialist German Workers' Party soon muddied the political waters of all South Germany, for the ruffians who joined his "storm trooper" battalions very early showed tendencies toward violence. In November, 1923, Hitler, in alliance with Ludendorff and a group of reactionary nationalists, tried a *Putsch* in Munich. It collapsed under a hail of bullets; Hitler and Ludendorff were both taken into custody. But no society that has to resort to organized shooting in the streets can make a claim to stability. It was not until the Dawes plan "solved" Germany's economic bankruptcy by allowing her to borrow freely that a modicum of order was restored. The political assassination rate dropped, after 1924, to something less than one a day.

In 1925 the first president of the republic, Friedrich Ebert, died; his leadership in the Social Democratic Party and his real affection toward a democratic solution of German problems had given such steadiness as it had to this first troubled era. Cabinet crises had been frequent, but with Ebert in the presidency the Reichstag (parliament) was able to continue its control over affairs. His successor was none other than the aged field marshal Paul von Hindenburg, the veritable symbol of Germany's war effort. A quiver of excitement ran through Europe. It seemed that a militant Germany must now again appear on the Continent. The old man, however, came closer to keeping things in equilibrium than had his socialist predecessor. Hindenburg was essentially a simple-minded person; he gave his oath to defend the republic and,

within his lights, he did so. By 1929 Europe accepted him as a guarantee for German democracy, and in 1932, when he defeated Hitler for the presidency, men in Paris cried "*Vive Hindenburg!*" It was a curious inversion of French sentiment. He came to office at a time when economic problems gave way before the "prosperity" that came with the Dawes Plan. His social and military prestige lent dignity to the republic; the temporary solution of the economic problems gave him a chance to "save Germany from the right" just as Ebert had "saved Germany from the left."

By 1929 professors, publicists, and statesmen were talking about the recovery of Germany and her re-entry into the family of nations as though they were accomplished facts. Stabilization of the currency and ability to borrow money worked wonders for German economy. It was "rationalized" or "Americanized." New factories were built, new methods of production introduced, new business tactics adopted, and the trade mark "made in Germany" again was found in all markets of the world. It was an era of great plans and programs. Workingmen's houses, public swimming pools, new streets and highways, mushroomed in all parts of the country. The political situation became so calm that Hitler, when he came up for trial, was only imprisoned and Lundendorff went scot free. In international affairs, too, the German Republic became "respectable and accepted." Stresemann, the perpetual foreign minister, ate lunch with Briand and spoke in "reasonable" tones in the Assembly of the League. Germany was again a Western power, accepted by her sister liberal democracies. The fact that there were men on the right and on the left of the Reichstag who demanded the overthrow of the republic did not cause too much worry, for in 1926-1929 both the communists and the nazis were small minorities in the Reichstag, dominated by the Weimar coalition of Social Democrats, Catholic centerists, and the liberal *bourgeoisie*. After 1929 these minorities became dangerous.

Red Revolution in Russia

Of all the belligerents of the war of 1914-1918, Russia suffered most. The war started with a military catastrophe of the first order when the Russians were completely routed in East Prussia, and each successive year brought new disasters to their armies. It was not that their soldiers lacked bravery, but rather that their leadership was faulty and their material inadequate. The army was given neither the tools of war nor the staff necessary to meet the German armies. This was due in part to the agrarian character of Russian economy and in part to the

government ruling in St. Petersburg. Russia was outside the charmed circle of industrial Europe, and when the Germans closed both the Baltic and the Straits, she could not get enough equipment to arm her men. There were great factories in Russia, but not enough to feed the new kind of war that industrial society had brought into being. On the other hand the government was venial. Commands were often given to men for other than military talents, and corruption plagued the already scanty lines of supply. The soldiers who had to face the Germans were not prepared for their ordeal.

As in other parts of the world, the war upset the inner balances in Russian economy. The transportation system was never fully developed, and under the strain of conflict it progressively disintegrated so that goods and men could not move with any degree of rapidity. All the industrial facilities of the country had to be turned to the needs of war so that civilian goods—cloth, leather, and iron—disappeared from the country markets. The peasant, paid in paper money which he could not safely bury because he saw its value going down, lost interest in supplying the agricultural commodities needed to feed the army and the cities. Furthermore his horses and sons had been taken to the front, and it was impossible for old men, women, and cows to do all the work. Agricultural production dropped off sharply so that by 1916 Russia was hungry as well as ill equipped. The factories expanded as best they could, but their very expansion was the undoing of the regime. Country boys and girls were subjected to the industrial discipline of absentee owners or impersonal management, and were inadequately provided with food, clothing, shelter, and fuel. Their productive capacity was low, and they became ready listeners to the socialistic propaganda of the radicals. Thus defeat at the front was accompanied by demoralization behind the lines.

The great danger inherent in this situation stems from the fact that there were grave unsolved social and political questions in the Russia of 1914, and the war accentuated each of them in turn. The peasants, the most numerous class, had real grievances. When the serfs were freed in the 1860's, the peasants received only a small share of the land; and since the peasant population increased by leaps and bounds (it doubled in a century), by 1914 there was not enough land to go around. The broad acres belonging to the nobility sharply contrasted with the land available to the peasants, and radical intellectuals for a generation or more had been quietly telling the peasants that they were cheated in the 1860's. This meant that the great mass of the Russian people had a grievance that could be satisfied only by drastic reforms. In the cities, too, there were men with grievances. The Rus-

sian *bourgeoisie* was small and weak in 1914; it had not developed like its counterpart farther west. But the *bourgeoisie* and the professional classes felt no love for the regime. Like the liberal nobles, they wanted to see some sort of parliamentary government replace the czar's despotism. They understood how the liberal-democratic compromise had given power to their class in the West, and they were anxious to play a similar role in Russia. Last, but not least, were the discontents of the growing proletariat. Russian capitalism was ruthlessly exploitative since much of the capital had come from foreign lands and the sole interest was therefore in profits. The proletariat was, perhaps, the most oppressed in Europe. They had low wages, long hours, bad living conditions. They were an excellent seed bed for revolution. In 1905 they had spearheaded the revolt; the government recovered its power, but only after teaching the people that revolt might really overthrow the government. Defeat and internal economic breakdown gave each of these classes a greater interest in making an attempt to solve problems by force.

The actual outbreak of the revolution was probably due directly to an accident, although it was undoubtedly the inevitable consequence of defeat and internal dislocations. The winter 1916-1917 was terribly bitter, and the general suffering both at the front and in the cities was necessarily greater because of the cold. By the last of February, St. Petersburg was tense from lack of bread and fuel. The members of the Duma, an Assembly that the czar had created after the 1905 revolution but had never allowed to become a real parliament, understood that trouble might develop, but the government depended upon the army and the police to keep order. A demonstration of laborers who demanded bread led to riots; the army joined the workers, and by the twelfth of March the situation was out of the hands of the authorities. There were no leaders for this uprising. It was truly a spontaneous people's revolt. As soon as the soldiers decided that they too were people, there was no hope for the czar's government. Nicholas II ordered his ministers to restore order at once; he might as well have ordered the Volga to reverse its course. There were no substantial political or military forces in the country that would rally to the support of the throne.

The revolution developed rapidly, but it was not so easy for the revolutionists to set up a new government. The Duma appointed a temporary committee which immediately claimed executive authority and proposed a provisional government. On the next day, March 15, the czar abdicated. The Duma carried out its proposals and announced that the provisional government would rule until a national assembly

could be called to write a constitution. Its members regarded themselves as heirs to the liberal-democratic revolutionary tradition and hoped to create a liberal democracy for their country. The new regime was at once formally recognized by Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States. Meanwhile the workers, whose strike had touched off the explosion, had established a council ("soviet") of workers', soldiers', and sailors' deputies and had set up its own temporary committee which also claimed executive powers. A majority in the soviet was socialistic, but of the "revisionist," rather than simon-pure Marxist, party. They wanted a socialist state, but a social democracy rather than a socialist dictatorship. Nevertheless they were willing to work with the Constitutional Democrats (cadets) who dominated the Duma's revolutionary government. No one, apparently, had thought through the problem of co-operation between the two, but the difficulties soon presented themselves.

One man, Kerensky, joined both the provisional government and the soviet. He was a liberal socialist lawyer, whose oratory smoothed over difficulties and made him the darling of the people. But the difficulties remained. The soviet's first order was to the armed forces: soldiers and sailors were instructed to elect soviets in their units to assume control over the political aspects of the armed forces and to send delegates to St. Petersburg. At the same time the officers were stripped of their disciplinary controls and reduced to mere technicians at the beck and call of the soviet.

It was a democratic measure, but it broke whatever fighting power was left in the armies. On the other side, the provisional government, upon finding that the secret treaties promised Russia great territorial gains from the war, announced that Russia would continue to fight on the side of the Allies. Woodrow Wilson's stirring words about democracy gave them propaganda fuel, for Russia too had become a democracy. In the country, the revolts at St. Petersburg caused an upsurge of peasant cupidity. To them the end of the czar's regime meant the possibility of a radical solution of the land question, that is, of course, the confiscation of the nobles' broad acres. The provisional government sternly set its face against such ideas. The land question, it insisted, must be reserved for the National Assembly; there could be no thought of liberal democrats taking action without "due process of law." But this was a concept quite foreign to the peasant.

The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia

The basic confusion inherent in the March revolution became apparent when Lenin, Trotsky, and their friends found their way back to Russia from exile. These men would not compromise with their beliefs. They were convinced that the proletarians could not work with the *bourgeoisie* without losing the fundamentals of their doctrine. The confusion only heightened their conviction that to play along with the provisional government was to invite failure. With the precision of a machine, Lenin and Trotsky both cut through the mass of evidence and isolated the important facts of the situation. The army was defeated, demoralized, and now disorganized. It wanted above all, peace. So did the rest of Russia. The peasants were impatient with the legalisms of the lawyers; they wanted the land. And the workers, just as their placards had stated in February, wanted bread. Bread could be had only through peace and agriculture. Thus the little man who had come through the German lines (Lenin) and the fiery agitator who had traveled from New York (Trotsky) joined hands and voices to shout, "Peace, Bread, Land," as a primary slogan. Since the provisional government stood in the way of all three, they added, "Down with the provisional government; all power to the soviets," as a secondary slogan. And finally to be sure that the program would be carried out, they shouted, "Long live the dictatorship of the proletariat." These new slogans were war cries, a challenge to the flimsy thinking that had characterized the revolution in the spring of 1917.

Events soon justified their validity. The provisional government ordered resumption of hostilities. Kerensky toured the front as "exhorter-in-chief" of the army, and socialists and liberals from the Western allies joined in urging Russia to fight. The offensive was timed for the last of June, but like its predecessors under the imperial regime, it was stopped short by the Germans. Inevitably there was a response both at the front and behind the lines. The first reaction was an ill-timed *coup* at St. Petersburg. Sailors from Kronstadt naval base, workers from the iron foundries and machine shops, and part of the St. Petersburg garrison had been converted to Bolshevism. They stormed into the city, and for a matter of a day or so held power over both governments. If Lenin had been ready, he could have seized control in this July (1917) uprising; but he himself was not ready, and he felt that Russia also was not yet ready for his proletarian solution.

The failure of the military offensive, however, speeded up his program. In the country, village soviets or just village mobs took com-

mand. They confiscated the lands and stock of their noble neighbors; sometimes they burned chateaus and murdered anyone who tried to stop them. The rural police system disintegrated; the peasants took the law into their own hands. Unwittingly they carried out part of the Bolshevik program, and they came to realize that the Bolsheviks alone approved wholeheartedly. At the same time the army literally melted away. The process that had begun with the creation of soldiers' soviets was accelerated by the failure of the offensive. The soldiers heard that the land was being divided at home, and they went home by the hundreds of thousands, taking with them rifles, pistols, machine guns, grenades, and even small cannon. By August, 1917, it was clear that, unless something were done, the army would demobilize itself without more ado. Kerensky had become head of the provisional government, but he was powerless to check the breakdown that was everywhere in evidence. "Peace, Land, Bread": these were the realities of the day. "War for Democracy," "National Assembly and Liberal Democratic Constitution": these were meaningless slogans in face of the flood that engulfed Russia.

In the early fall, the army tried to check the disorder. The new commander-in-chief, Kornilov, attempted to overthrow the regime by military action. Depending upon Cossack regiments and non-Russian troops, he moved against St. Petersburg. The aggressive Bolshevik leadership in the soviets stopped him before he got started; he had to depend upon the railroad workers, the telegraph operators, and others who took orders from the Soviet, and agitators corrupted his troops so that they could not be relied upon. Thus by September, 1917, the provisional government was indebted to the soviets for its survival; its days were already narrowly limited.

The denouement came rapidly. Russia was going over to the Bolshevik camp. In September and early October the Bolsheviks won majorities in the soviets in the principal cities from the Black Sea to the Baltic, and Leon Trotsky was elected president of the St. Petersburg soviet. It was only necessary to push over the façade of the provisional government and declare the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. There was a little fighting here and there. In St. Petersburg the victory came quickly; in Moscow the battle raged in the streets for two weeks. Before the first of December, 1917, the whole of Russia was under Bolshevik control. This second revolution was organized under aggressive leadership. The befuddled thinking of the men who had destroyed the czar's regime had given way to a hard-headed realism which measured the problems and took account of the basic forces at work in the society.

The Trials of the Bolshevik Dictatorship

None of the men who seized power in the fall of 1917 were trained in the art of government. They had been journalists, teachers, salesmen, strong-armed revolutionaries; Trotsky had even been an extra in the American movie "Ben Hur." They had never run banks, factories, or government bureaus; their whole psychology had been attuned to opposition. They now had to learn to administer all kinds of institutions. The bourgeois bankers, factory owners, and government officials struck against these radical usurpers by refusing to cooperate. Lenin answered back by nationalizing banks, industries, and the like. All he had to do then was to find someone to run them.

Lenin's first acts were gestures. He ratified the land seizures with an order to the effect that the land belonged to the men who tilled it. He issued a series of decrees "solving" the housing shortage by forcing the rich to open their homes to the poor, simplifying the marriage and divorce laws, providing food for the cities, changing the Russian alphabet, and the like. It did not matter that his government could not enforce all these rules; the very making of them indicated that it was active. There were two acts of importance in these early months. The first was the forcible dissolution of the National Assembly that had been elected in the last days of the provisional government. Although the Bolshevik Party had secured less than 50 per cent of the seats, the Assembly, when it met, was sent home as unnecessary. The second act was the making of peace with Germany at Brest-Litovsk. This treaty was a harsh one, but Lenin insisted on signing it for he knew that it could not be final and that the nation needed peace above all else.

But peace was just the thing the new rulers were not to have. Hardly was the German treaty signed when a new war broke out. The first conflict came between the Soviet forces and some Czech prisoners of war whom Lenin had allowed to be evacuated through Siberia. They broke their compact about carrying arms; the attempt to force them to live up to it developed into a battle. Soon they were supported by anti-Bolshevik Russians and the Allied powers so that a full-fledged civil war was being fought in Siberia. At this juncture the French and British landed troops on the Black Sea coast with a vague idea of taking part of Russia as spoils of war, and the soviets had to fight on a new front. Fortunately for the government, neither the French nor the British troops had any stomach for the adventure and had to be withdrawn. In their place, however, appeared another "white" army similar to the one in Siberia. Another Allied expedition landed in Arch-

angel in the north, and still another was prepared in Lithuania. The new government had to fight at all points of the compass for its life.

The white armies, however, were handicapped as much as they were helped by the fact that British, French, American, and Japanese aid was at their disposal. In the first place, the presence of foreigners made the Bolsheviks into champions of independence and rallied many of the best of the old czarist officer corps to their side. The whites were also handicapped by their "landlord character." The peasants understood that a white victory would bring the landlord back to claim his estates. When every village was full of former soldiers armed with the weapons they had brought from the front, the whites found that each advance they made only complicated their problem of security and supplies; the peasants unhesitatingly attacked the white armies from the rear. Lastly, they had no common purpose of action; indeed, they had a half dozen contradictory programs which canceled each other.

The Bolsheviks were able to create a new army, the "Red" army, out of the ruins of the imperial war machine. Their propaganda was realistic and their controls were effective. Leon Trotsky was the organizer of this new force and the fiery whip that drove it to victory. The Red armies had the advantage of interior lines and effectively utilized the technical skill of many of the old officers who presented themselves for service when the question of national existence was clearly presented. Unlike the whites, whose rank and file were fighting for money or other personal aims, the core of the Red armies was inspired by an ideal greater than the selfish interests of the men themselves. Both armies were plagued by dissensions, but the Red armies kept their men together better than did the whites. Furthermore, as long as landlord interests were associated with the whites, the Red armies could make alliances with the "green" peasant bands whose aim was to hold the land against the return of the old regime. Once the whites were gone, these peasant bands often conflicted with the Soviet forces but as long as the whites were a menace, they remained loyal allies.

From 1918 to 1921 the civil wars ravaged Russia. At times it looked serious indeed for the newly established government in Moscow, but in the end both the white armies and the troops of the Allied powers were overcome. The costs were tremendous in terms of human suffering. Neither side gave much quarter. Enemies were executed out of hand whenever captured; the arbitrary courts established by the revolutionaries gave summary "justice" to anyone suspected of opposition. A commentary upon the political nature of the struggle can be found in the fact that *both* the reds and the whites made war upon anyone who wanted a liberal or a Social Democratic solution for Russian problems.

The men who had created the provisional government and the men who had had majorities behind them in the soviets of the spring and summer of 1917 could find no refuge in either camp. The whites wanted to re-establish "authority"; the Bolsheviks wanted to establish a "proletarian dictatorship." Social and liberal democrats were caught between the two jaws of the political pincers. Russia also was caught. Her roads, railway systems, bridges, ports, cities, and villages were wrecked; the country was looted of any valuables that were not hidden. The population of livestock and the accumulations of farm machinery sank to such levels that it would require years to replace them. Moral and material devastation on so great a scale had not occurred in the history of western Europe since the barbarian invasions. It has left a mark on Russia's outlook upon the world that will not be erased in generations.

War Communism and the New Economic Policy

While the fighting continued, the government was able to impose its communistic ideas upon the nation. The value of the ruble had sunk almost out of sight so that a money economy was impracticable. Work cards were the basis upon which goods were distributed. Whatever there was, went to the workers. Their cards gave them bread, street-car rides, and the right to wait in line for any commodities that might become available. Private trade was illegal. All workers were drafted just as if they were soldiers. Inevitably the system encouraged the growth of red tape and bureaucratic incompetence; the leaders may have known what they wanted, but there were not enough of them to do the work. As long as there were white and foreign armies on Russian soil, the people put up with the suffering: the revolution's police and arbitrary courts coerced some, enthusiasm for the revolution inspired others, and inertia carried the rest. The country lived on half rations, lived with lice and typhus, lived without new clothes.

When the white armies were defeated, however, the problem changed. War communism was a cumbersome machine that simply could not provide for the needs of the nation and reconstruct the damage of revolution at the same time. Even Bolshevik party members became discouraged; many of them tore up their cards in disgust. This attitude assumed a threatening character when the Kronstadt garrison, the very heart of the Bolshevik thrust for power in 1917, revolted in 1921. The uprising was put down, but the party leaders realistically understood that it was a danger signal not to be ignored.

At this point Lenin abruptly changed the party line and the Soviet

policy. He explained that chance had allowed a Marxist victory but the nation was not economically ready for Marxist solutions. The socialist revolution had come *before* the bourgeois "French Revolution" and therefore capitalism had not been able to prepare the country for communism as Marx said it should before the social revolution could be an accomplished fact. The reasoning was ingenious, and the suggested policy politically expedient. Russian communists, said Lenin, would encourage a "captive bourgeois revolution" by allowing the re-introduction of private trade and manufacture. The "capitalists" would be allowed to build up an economy of "free enterprise" until the communist state was ready to take over and really effect the social revolution. He was willing to give capitalism freedom in Russia, just as the cat gives a mouse freedom while she plays with it. This was called the New Economic Policy, or the NEP; Russia operated under it until the introduction of the first Five-Year Plan just before the depression.

The NEP worked wonders. Private trade brought goods out of hiding, and food from the villages; a race of businessmen, the *nepmen*, appeared to start stores and factories; and even some foreign capital ventured into the never-never land of communism. In the country all the land was divided up, and industrious peasants soon showed that Russian farmers could recover from a catastrophe. In the Volga region a drought caused a great famine, but by 1924 even there the damage was being speedily repaired. In many ways the progress made was astonishing; by 1927, when the rest of the world was reaching toward "new peaks of prosperity," some degree of comfort was reappearing in Russia. The country had almost recovered its position in 1913.

With economic problems safely in the hands of a "captive free enterprise" Lenin and his associates found time to turn their attention to political problems. The creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics gave the world a unique and daring experiment in federalism. Each nationality and each cultural group was encouraged to organize its own government and to develop its own cultural traditions within the framework of the soviet system. These small soviet republics were organized into larger federations, and the whole of Russia was finally organized into the Soviet Union. This system assured the new regime that it would not be troubled by nationalism. Each cultural group, no matter how small, could develop its language, literature, and customs; loyalty to race could not, therefore, cause conflict. The first loyalty was to be given to class, the proletariat class, not to creed or race or province. Individuals who did not belong to the working class (the *bourgeoisie* and the nobility of the old regime) were political outcasts and their social and economic status was insecure.

The political machinery of the Soviet Union developed out of the soviets or councils that had been developed during the revolution. The village and town soviets elected delegates to the regional soviets, and so on to the All-Union Congress of Soviets which stood at the top of the pyramid. The city soviets, in which "true proletarians" were more likely to be found than in the villages, had the right to bypass the intermediate stages and elect directly to each of the soviets above them. This gave the city population proportionally more political power than their numbers would warrant. The key to the system, however, was not to be found in its legal structure, but in the Communist Party. In each of the soviets, from the bottom to the top, there was a Communist Party "cell." Since no other party could exist, anyone who wanted to go into politics actively belonged to one of these cells. They were the steering committees which kept the soviets within the "party line," the disciplinary organizations which controlled decisions and made the whole system work as a single unit. By the late 1920's the authoritarian machine of the party controlled everything from the top. It was not avowedly organized on the "leadership principle" as the Fascist Party was, but it functioned in almost the same way as any Fascist organization would.

The great crisis for the Russian Communist Party came with Lenin's death. He was a real leader of men. He understood how to make diverse and conflicting personalities work together as a team. He was regarded almost as a saint by millions of people who knew him only as a name. When he died in 1924, his successor closed the ranks for a while, but soon fell to quarreling over their inheritance. There were several who might reasonably have expected to take his place. Trotsky was the foremost; many ignorant people did not know that Lenin and Trotsky were two people, so often had their names been linked together. Zinoviev, Bukharin, Stalin, and several others also had reason to feel that they were suitable successors. The conflict finally narrowed down to Stalin *vs.* Trotsky, and Stalin *vs.* Bukharin and a coterie of rightwingers in the party. Stalin's rise to power was firmly grounded in political realities. He was secretary general of the party and from that post he built up a personal machine by methods that would be understood by any American party boss. None of his rivals were able to do anything comparable, and therefore when the showdown finally came, he won the field against all comers. Trotsky was brilliant, but no organizer. Zinoviev and Bukharin were pedantic and overcautious; they could not attract the rank and file. Stalin was a hard working, clear headed organizer, and his hard work paid dividends in the end.

The crisis came over the issue: could Russia build up a communistic

system at home, or must the world revolution come first. It was obvious in 1925 that the world revolution would be delayed, and Stalin was able to oust Trotsky from his post because, with the support of his machine, he insisted upon the obvious fact that Russian communism had to prove itself in Russia before it could win victories abroad. Thus Trotsky and his friends were excluded from control by an issue based on foreign affairs. The right wing faction was eliminated on the issue of internal affairs. They wanted a political alliance between city workers and the richer farmers (the kulaks) that the NEP was creating. Stalin defeated them by insisting upon the fundamental premises of the Marxist-Leninist tradition of no political compromise with the exploiting classes. The NEP was an expedient for him, not a policy. Both the Trotskyites and the rightwingers went into opposition. Soon they were exiled to Siberia or housed in prisons, much as they had been in czarist times. In the 1930's they were to be liquidated in a bloody purge that shocked the world.

The First Five Year Plan

Once Stalin had overcome his rivals, he was ready to turn his attention to economic problems. The NEP had worked so well that it was beginning to threaten the socialist solution which the revolutionaries of 1917 had hoped to achieve. In the country the land had been divided up equally, but some of the peasants had made more of their opportunities than others. Land could not be sold, but the more efficient farmers could and did *rent* land and then hired the owners as farm hands to help work it. The kulak, humorously defined as a man with one cow, was arising in the villages to excite the envy of less ambitious and less able neighbors and threatening to convert Russian agriculture into an individualistic enterprise. In the cities, too, profits from trade and industry were creating a type of *bourgeoisie*, the nepmen, whose wealth and power grew greater each year. Bukharin was probably right when he insisted that a serious problem was before the regime. He was wrong when he added that the government must make a compromise with these budding individualists.

A compromise was just the thing Stalin had no intention of making. A commission had been appointed several years before to study the problem of industrialization and, when he had won his victory over his rivals, he announced that Russia was to be industrialized by the state. A plan was presented for building up heavy industry: steel mills, machine factories, hydroelectric plants, coal mines, chemical plants, and the like. The state would supply capital and management, and control

the whole process. The NEP, and with it the nepmen, was liquidated, and the Five-Year Plan for industrialization announced. From Germany and the United States, Russia ordered machinery and hired technicians. At the same time intense propaganda was launched at home to make the Plan acceptable to the people.

When it was first announced there was prosperity in the capitalistic world, and Russian wheat, furs, timber, flaxseed oil, and other commodities found a ready market. The Plan assumed that the machinery and technicians necessary to create an industrial Russia could be paid for by these exports plus the gold that was being dug from the soil. The Plan was hardly a year old when the depression of 1929 struck the world, blighted markets, reduced prices, and gave capitalism a series of catastrophic headaches. Communist Russia, too, was to feel its impact, for her products could be sold only at reduced prices while the machinery that she had ordered still cost heavily.

Japan: The Great Power of the Far East

Japan, like the United States, did not suffer physically from the war and therefore her problems in the era of reconstruction were largely the result of the war's dislocations and her own internal difficulties. No part of the world was free from the impact of the catastrophe but outside Europe the forces of disorder were under more control.

The Japanese had borrowed their constitutional ideas from Bismarck's imperial Germany. This fact explains the frequent inconsistencies of Japanese policy; for the civil government, including the office of foreign minister, was only on a par with, and not in control of, the two branches of the military service. The prime minister, the minister of marine, and the minister of war were equals before the emperor. In the 1920's the civil administration fell more and more under the control of the liberals; the other two ministries remained firmly in the hands of the military caste. While things went reasonably well with the nation, the three offices could and did function more or less smoothly; when the crisis came after 1929, they often showed two faces to the world.


After the war the liberalizing influences seemed destined to transform the nation into a true liberal democracy. The schools had done their work well; illiteracy was wiped out. The rise of large industry seemed to provide a way of solving the country's economic problems. The press was free, labor unions were encouraged to protect the workers' rights, and in 1925 the granting of universal suffrage placed Japan

in the ranks of the democratic nations. The nationalists and militarists, who had opposed the Washington treaty and were anxious for a more vigorous policy in foreign affairs, allowed the liberals to control the destiny of the nation because, perhaps, the country was better off than it had ever been before. When economic distress replaced the promise of well-being, these men with long knives and authoritarian policies were able to seize control.

The basic postwar questions of Japan were difficult to solve. In 1872 she had had a population of thirty-five million; in 1909, fifty million; in 1935, almost sixty-five million. Japan is smaller than California, and only one-sixth of the land is arable. This means three thousand people to every square mile of arable land, or twice the ratio in China. But the worst was yet to come, for the population was increasing by three quarters of a million a year. Birth control information, which was freely disseminated, could not overbalance the effect of better medical care and public health.

This problem was heightened by the country's basic economic structure. Japan has very little coal, practically no iron, and no oil; and there are no other important natural resources to make up this lack. She could not, therefore, be dependent upon the outside world for both food and raw materials unless her exports could flow freely throughout the world. This meant that Japan had to be a nation of farmers. On tiny tracts, leased at exorbitant rates, almost half the population cultivated the soil. In the cities, too, there were difficulties. In 1914-1918 a great industry was built up, but the workers were never able to unite effectively either for political action or for collective bargaining. Poverty was common in both city and country.

There was one further, crowning economic question. Nearly 50 per cent of Japan's exports consisted of raw silk and silk cloth, while 25 per cent consisted of cotton cloth. Her prosperity, such as it was, depended upon textiles. At the same time two countries, China and the United States, consumed 65 per cent of her total exports. She depended upon two commodities and two customers to keep her industrial machine going. When the United States raised her tariffs in 1930, the liberals were forced from power; when China instituted her greatest boycott of Japanese goods in 1931-1932, Japan attacked Shanghai. It is impossible to miss the fact that Japan's "liberal era" in the 1920's was based upon a very shaky foundation; cheap cotton cloth and silk exports allowed her to buy the materials that kept her factories going. When the market for these commodities weakened, her basic problems became political as well as economic.



The United States: Back to Normalcy and Beyond

The United States of America emerged from the war of 1914-1918 physically unscathed. Indeed, in many ways she had profited greatly from it. Her industrial plant had been enormously expanded and she was not only largely free of the burden of debts that had formerly been owed to European capitalists, but Europe owed her government and her citizens billions of dollars. The war convinced Americans more firmly than ever that theirs was the promised land of milk and honey where everyone could become rich and happy. The twenties will go down in the history of the United States as a period of free spending and great prosperity, characterized by the phrase "two cars in every garage" and the assurance that the future held even greater wealth.

The liberal-democratic constitution and the system of free enterprise that had grown up in the nineteenth century was unchallenged, save by a few radical thinkers who were dissatisfied with the dominant ideas about the American way of life. The two big political parties resembled each other so much that it was hard to tell from election platforms or from speeches in the Congress which was which. There were as many political differences among men in the Republican or in the Democratic Party as there were between the two parties. Both were essentially in agreement upon all fundamental questions of policy. In 1924 a movement led by Senator LaFollette of Wisconsin attempted to split political life into conservatives and progressives, but his Progressive Party failed to alter the picture.

During the post-war period the decline in agricultural prices and land values produced a farm problem. It stemmed from the war years when demand for wheat had encouraged the plowing of the grasslands on the plains of the Midwest. High prices had skyrocketed land values and greatly extended the acreage under cultivation. When Russian and Danubian wheat returned to the market and Europe's farms again produced normally, there was too much wheat for the world to absorb. Cotton presented a similar problem. The introduction of rayon and the planting of cotton in Egypt, the Sudan, Brazil, and elsewhere, made great surpluses accumulate and prices drop. Cereals and cotton had been standard export crops for the United States in the nineteenth century; in the twentieth century the market, apparently, could not absorb the production. Many plans were considered, but the United States veered away from controls that would limit free enterprise. The farmers, however, knew about the depression before the rest of the country felt it in 1929.

On the other side of the economic picture, industry and commerce boomed as never before. The war had greatly enlarged the industrial plant of the nation, and in peace a seemingly endless flow of automobiles, farm machinery, typewriters, soap, textiles, and other manufactured goods poured into the market, where they found ready customers. It was an era of plant expansion and greater and greater company consolidation. From New York to Seattle, from Chicago to New Orleans and Dallas, the cities responded to the influx of business by building skyscrapers. New demands for good roads for trucks and passenger cars built concrete highways all over the country. There seemed to be no end to the demand for goods and services, even though in many agricultural areas the economy seemed to be in the doldrums. Churches, schools, private homes, factories, and office buildings were constructed in hundreds of towns and cities so that the building trades kept pace with industrial production on a broad scale. America was indeed the land where free enterprise was creating a new society.

Unfortunately there was a flaw that was never noted by the men in power either in Washington or in the business world. The structure was being built on a foundation of loans. In the international market around nine billion dollars were lent to governments and enterprises beyond the frontiers of the United States. Some of these loans may have been sound, but many were highly speculative. They greased the wheels of international commerce and allowed the United States to maintain a "favorable" balance of trade, for they provided the money with which foreigners bought American goods. The question of repayment did not seem to trouble anyone except that there were powerful interests resolved not to accept repayment in the form of goods; the tariff would prevent that. Thus the world, already in debt to the United States beyond its capacity to repay on account of the war, went deeper and deeper in debt to buy American goods and to secure credit. The most dangerous thing about these loans was the fact that many of them were short term or even call loans. European banks borrowed heavily from New York on short term contracts at low interest on the assumption that it would be easy to have the loan renewed at the end of thirty or ninety days. When this money was urgently needed in New York, the fallacy of such practices became clear, for the whole system broke down. European bankers could not get the money that they had lent to their creditors, and so they had difficulty paying the money in New York. That meant that banks in the interior of the United States had difficulty getting their credits from New York banks.

Not only was the international structure built on credit, but credit was also a basis for much of the internal prosperity. Churches and

schools were built by issuing bonds; industrial property was expanded by issuing bonds or borrowing on Wall Street; homes and office buildings were built with credits from banks or building and loan associations. The endless array of automobiles, washing machines, refrigerators, and radios was purchased on time-payment credit plans. If Germany could pay for the war in time installments, surely John Smith could buy his house, his car, and even his baby on the same basis. Not only that; easy credit allowed people to borrow money to speculate on the stock exchange. Short term loans were easily obtained at low interest; call money was even cheaper. It was possible, therefore, to buy stocks "on margin"; that is to say, the purchaser paid out only ten to twenty dollars on every hundred for his shares and the remaining eighty or ninety dollars were borrowed on the security of the shares. With the boom in industry the stock market was good: values increased so that a purchaser could buy stocks today, and tomorrow they would be worth more than he paid for them. Men all over the nation with a little ready cash could "play the market" and reasonably hope to become rich from their profits. The pressure on the available stocks sent their prices higher and higher because of competitive buying, until the market price had little or no relation to earning capacity. The summer of 1929 saw the market skyrocket; in the fall, it fizzled out. The underlying falsity of the situation became clear, and the wise ones sold their holdings. The market broke, and with it hundreds of thousands of speculators, little and big. Stocks were sold when the speculators' margin was wiped out by falling prices; men who had fancied themselves to be millionaires in July, 1929, were bankrupt by December. A new era in postwar history was about to begin, an era in which men asked themselves, "Why did it happen?" and "What can be done now?"

Obviously the crash on the stock market was merely the dramatic explosion that heralded the new era of depression; there had to be deeper causes in society. It is clear now that the total economic structure of the world was involved. The war and the postwar solutions of its economic problems had produced a few years of prosperity and then a crisis that ended only with another war. The United States of America was the principal source of the prosperity and the largest participant in it, and she was the first to announce the depression that followed it.

XVIII

Economic Depression and Political Repercussions

World-wide Repercussions of the Crisis

THE panic on the New York stock exchange in 1929 rudely exposed the underlying weaknesses of the postwar economic structure. When New York bankers called in their money and turned off the flow of credit to the trade of the world, there was consternation everywhere. The complex world economic machine slowed down and threatened to stop. Ships were tied up to docks, fires went out under boilers and forges, buildings under construction were left unfinished, orders were cancelled, and armies of workers in every country were left without employment. Germany, the weakest link in the system, was hardest hit because she owed money in all directions, but the United States was not far behind. The little state of Czechoslovakia, by losing four-fifths of her export trade, furnished a dramatic instance of the problem that faced the world. France, where reconstruction and the building of fortifications continued for still another year, was relatively unaffected until that work had to stop; then her economy collapsed just as the others had done all around her. The worst of the whole business was that no one knew what to do about it. The world looked to the United States for leadership. Her new president spoke hopefully about "prosperity around the corner," but Mr. Hoover and his advisers displayed no more assurance about solving the crisis than anyone else. In previous depressions governments and business had cut their losses, squeezed out the weaker economic units, and waited for recovery. But not even the crisis of 1893 had been on such a scale, and in no previous depression were the people so insistent that something be done and done quickly.

There were several reasons for the widespread clamor for government action. Undoubtedly the most important was the lesson of the war itself. Between 1914 and 1918 the great nations had given their peoples an almost incredible exhibition of what can be done with modern economy. The absolute needs of the state had stimulated more production than anyone had believed possible. Men reasoned that if goods could be produced for war and destruction, they could also be for peace. When millions were out of work, when factories were practically out of commission, and when everyone wanted goods of all kinds that the unemployed men and machines could produce, people grew impatient with slogans, dictated by free enterprise, which insisted the depressions were in the nature of things and would pass with time. The depression was causing as much misery as war; men could not see why it was not the business of government to deal with it just as government had dealt with the problem of war.

Another important factor contributed to the demands for action. Since the days when Bismarck committed the German Empire to a program of social security in the 1880's, most of the governments in Europe had also insured their workers against unemployment, old age, and sickness. But none of these programs had envisaged a catastrophe of the magnitude of the depression that overtook the world in 1929. Entire communities depended upon the state for support, and the unemployment compensation was barely enough to sustain life. In countries like the United States, where there was no such provision, public and private charity was taxed to the breaking point. The state and municipal governments in the United States, already heavily in debt by 1929, went deeper and deeper into debt to meet the demands for relief, and private charity agencies were overwhelmed with the demands upon their funds. To many people it seemed absurd that the millions dependent upon charity for a bare existence should not be allowed to care for themselves through their own labor. They wanted to work, but no work was available. When men turned to the bankers, industrialists, and entrepreneurs who had freely taken credit for the prosperity, to ask for a solution of the crisis, these people were discovered to be frightened men just like the rest of humanity. In the 1920's they had clearly voiced the dominant economic principles of the nineteenth century; that is, that free enterprise, government *laissez faire*, and a free market would automatically secure the best of all possible economic worlds. By 1930, however, economists were beginning to point out that unrestricted competition was the root of the evil facing the world. And in any case, they also had no solution. They, like the President of the United States, assured men that prosperity was around the corner. The

misery, however, was world wide, and no one wanted to wait to round the corner. Inevitably the economic discontent was translated into political discontent.

War Debts and Reparations

One of the first levels upon which the depression was attacked was the international. It was clear that the debt structure of the world was somehow related to the problem at hand; it was not so clear just what could be done. The bankruptcy of Germany, however, dramatically forced the world to consider ways and means of finding a solution.

Even when prosperity seemed an established way of life, there were a number of men who had insisted upon an examination of the basis of world economy. Dr. Schacht of the Reichsbank in Germany had protested that the reparations settlement laid down by the Dawes Plan was fundamentally unsound. At last a new commission of experts was appointed to prepare a "final" settlement for this question. This commission, headed by an American industrialist, Owen D. Young, prepared its report just before the bottom dropped out of the economic world in 1929. The Young Plan was written upon the assumption that the progress toward world recovery since 1924 would continue indefinitely. It reduced the reparations bill from thirty-three billion dollars to just over eight billions, and provided a schedule of payments which, if met, would have paid off the debt in fifty-nine years. To take reparations out of politics and facilitate the transfer of funds, the Young Plan recommended the establishment of a Bank of International Settlements. The bank was to act as trustee for the creditors of Germany, it was given discretionary powers to relieve Germany of some payments if necessary, and at the same time it was to act as a central credit agency for the several national central banks. The Young Plan was not finally accepted until the spring of 1930.

The crisis came to a head early in 1931. In an effort to find some relief for the economic problems of Austria and at the same time to gain a step toward the eventual unification of Austria and Germany, the two republics formed a customs union. Only a year before the French foreign minister had proposed a European customs union, but this Austro-German union looked too much like an attempt to circumvent the Treaty of Versailles to be acceptable in Paris. Everyone recognized that Austria was in dire distress economically, but the French could not admit that this should be an excuse for *Anschluss*.¹ Heavy withdrawals of foreign deposits and loans from the great Austrian bank, the Kredit-

¹ From 1919 to 1933 an overwhelming majority in both Austria and Germany wanted to unite the two countries. This *Anschluss*, however, was forbidden by the treaties of 1919-1920, and was the nightmare of the French Foreign Office.

anstalt, soon undermined the whole structure of the country. If the bank were to close its doors, half the financial institutions in Central Europe would go under. The threat was enough. There was a run on the German banks. In three weeks, the Reichsbank lost over 40 per cent of its total gold holdings. The panic was general and in crisis stage. The Austro-German customs union was dropped quickly, but the damage was already done. Germany could not possibly meet her reparations payment. Critics at the time blamed French "gold diplomacy" for detonating the mine; they overlooked the fact that it had to come soon anyway.

At this juncture, President Hoover stepped in to offer a solution: a moratorium on all payments for a year. Again the French were upset. The depression was just coming to France; if German payments stopped, it would be the last straw. A run was started on the American gold supply, but President Hoover invited Premier Laval to visit Washington and convinced him that the moratorium was necessary. But in July, 1931, when the moratorium was declared, a disaster overtook Germany: the Darmstadter Bank failed. It was one of the biggest banks in Europe, and when it went under all German banks closed their doors on government orders to prevent complete collapse. A conference was quickly called in London to deal with the new situation. Out of the conference and the report of a committee from the Bank of International Settlements came the so-called "standstill agreement" that froze all payments of every kind. In the meantime British financiers were also in such great trouble that England was forced off the gold standard, and with her half a dozen smaller countries. It was obviously a situation that could not be dealt with by temporary expedients.

In June, 1932, another reparations conference was held at Lausanne. Clearly the bankruptcy of Germany involved all Europe. At this conference, after three weeks of discussion the reparations figure was cut to \$714,000,000, and even this payment was made dependent upon the possibility of the sale of German bonds. If they were not sold within fifteen years, they were to be cancelled. This cancellation of Germany's debts was connected with a general repudiation of other war debts. The United States of America had stubbornly refused to recognize any relation between the debts owed to her by her late allies and the German payments, but the so-called "Lausanne Gentleman's Agreement" abruptly tied the two together. The Allied powers agreed not to pay the United States, at the same time that they freed Germany from her obligations. It was a case of "save yourself if you can," and, as many knew from the beginning, the American creditor was confronted with the refusal of his debtors to pay. The government in Washington by its tariff policy had made those payments improbable. The depression

made them impossible. The United States, however, refused to recognize the Lausanne agreement, and when the creditors defaulted, a law, the Johnson Act, forbade future loans to the defaulting states.

International Agreement as a Method of Solution

There were attempts to meet by international agreement the crisis resulting from the depression. One of the big problems that made the whole business tragic in the extreme was the fact that huge surpluses of cotton, wheat, corn, sugar, coffee, wool, and many other agricultural commodities began to pile up all over the world at the very time when men were hungry, ill-clothed, and out of work. Obviously these commodities, important items in international trade, could be organized rationally only on an international level. Dumping coffee into the sea, using corn for fuel, and allowing sugar to pile up in warehouses would not solve the problem of their distribution in the world economy. Furthermore, the waste of these commodities at a time when men everywhere needed them, shocked the conscience of the civilized world.

There were a number of conferences called to consider specific problems, but obviously the whole world economy was so completely tied together that no single item could be dealt with by itself. In 1933 Ramsay MacDonald, the British prime minister, made a desperate attempt to achieve world action on the question of international trade by a General Economic Conference. Actually by 1933 it was too late, for the nations were already more or less committed to nationalistic solutions. But MacDonald profoundly hoped that a conference might check the disruptive forces at work. The active participation of the United States was essential if this conference were to have hopes of achieving any real results. But in 1932 the United States had elected a new president. On the day that he took over the office from Mr. Hoover, a bank crisis gripped the whole American nation and dramatically pointed up the problems of American economy. In his inaugural address in 1933, President Roosevelt said, "Our international trade relations, though vastly important, are, in point of time and necessity, secondary to the establishment of a sound national economy. I favor . . . putting first things first." The New Deal was to be an internal policy. This meant the failure of the London Economic Conference, for it was called on the assumption that revived international trade would revive domestic economy.

It is probably unfair to blame American economic "isolationism" for the fact that the world crisis was not met on a world level. The year 1933 also saw the Nazi victory in Germany and the Nazi policy was

obviously based upon economic isolationism. In the preceding three years England, Japan, France, and the rest of the world had treated the crisis as a local issue. The fact stands out squarely that the depression was handled in each country more or less completely as a domestic problem. In Germany it produced a revolution; in the United States, the New Deal; in France, the Popular Front; in Japan, an attack on China; and so on all around the world.

The German Revolution of 1933

As we have seen, the depression worked havoc on Germany's economy. Her bankers, industrialists, and local as well as state and national governments had contracted debts both long term and short which became a source of embarrassment when the world credit structure collapsed. The moratorium and the Lausanne agreements helped, but they were not enough to solve the economic problems that overwhelmed the nation after 1929. Germany was dependent upon world trade for her prosperity; when it shrank to a fraction of its 1928 volume, she faced a severe crisis. Bankruptcy and closed factories paralyzed her economy so that her workers were without employment and her *bourgeoisie* were threatened with ruin. Lack of work soon was followed by lack of bread in whole areas where the wheels of industry had stopped turning. The nation looked to the government for relief.

The politicians in control of the republic were, like politicians everywhere, at a loss to know what to do. The government had to depend upon a coalition of Social Democrats, the Catholic Center, and the bourgeois Liberal Party for its mandate from the Reichstag. The Center and the Liberal Party had an economic program and philosophy not dissimilar to the one held by the Republican Party in Mr. Hoover's administration. They expected the depression to pass over as soon as the economic cycle reached the bottom and wiped out the weak units in the economy, and their policy was to wait and see what would happen. The Social Democrats were scarcely less unimaginative; their long association with the liberal democratic tradition had watered down their socialism and make them into merely a progressive liberal party. Even if they had had a strong program, it could not have been put into action because the government had to be a coalition in order to achieve a majority in the Reichstag. As the nation drifted deeper and deeper into the economic morass, with bank failures, unemployment, and business bankruptcies, this program of the Weimar Coalition became less and less acceptable to the nation. People who demanded action looked to the right (the Nazis) and to the left (the Communists) of the Weimar

groups for a solution. The Nazi solution was probably the only one that had a chance to capture anything like a majority of the votes.

To understand the German revolution of 1933 it is necessary to see how the German social and political structure was organized. In spite of Hitler's boasting that he saved Germany from communism, the nation's social structure probably precluded a communist revolution. Approximately one-third of the people were peasants, approximately one-third proletarian workers, and one-third white collar workers, business and professional men, and other *bourgeoisie*. The peasants and the *bourgeoisie* could be depended upon to oppose any communist solution of the problem; and of the workers, only the unskilled were ready recruits for communist propaganda since the skilled workers were largely organized behind the Social Democratic Party. Moreover about one-third of the Germans were Roman Catholics, to whom communism was anathema. In other words, the communists, Hitler to the contrary, probably could never have recruited a sizable section of the nation behind them unless the *bourgeoisie* and the peasants were ready to abandon all hope of a recovery that would assure their place in German society. Thus the social structure was a barrier to a radical solution from the left. There was one further factor which probably made that barrier absolute. From 1919 onward the communists and the Social Democrats were violent enemies. The communists considered the socialists as the "traitors" of the working-class movement, as social Fascists, and did everything in their power to undermine their position. The Social Democrats responded in kind and, what is most important, kept their following among the skilled laboring class and the powerful trade unions well disciplined and in line in spite of the communist propaganda. By thus splitting the working class in two parts, a working-class solution for German problems was probably out of the question.

The Nazi Party which rose to power from the right suffered fewer handicaps and enjoyed several real advantages. In the dark days following the war a rash of petty political movements broke out all over Germany. These parties had a number of things in common: violent nationalism based on the mystic concept of *Volk* (people, nation), hostility to all foreigners and Jews, a demand for a strong government based on "leadership," hatred for Marxism, and a desire to reverse the decision of the war. In 1920-1924 these many groups were not united in a common program, but they did extend from East Prussia to the Rhine and from the Baltic to the Alps. Adolf Hitler's National Socialist German Workers' Party was only one of many, but the unsuccessful Munich *Putsch* and Hitler's subsequent trial gave him and his immediate following national advertisement and made his party the natural

leader of all these discontented groups. In the period of prosperity and full employment that followed the Dawes Plan, the noise made by these radical totalitarians died down to a whisper. Hitler, in jail, wrote *Mein Kampf* and consolidated his right to be their leader; but by 1928, even though the leather-lunged Adolf was contemptuously released from prison as a harmless fanatic, the Nazis could not show more than a dozen deputies in the Reichstag. Less than half a million people in all Germany voted for them.

The party, however, was far from somnolent in this period. The years from 1924 to 1929 were a period of organization. Those who remained true to the movement were really fanatics. They were the men who refused to accept the defeat of 1918 as final; they were the men who had drunk deeply of the intoxicating waters of German nationalistic writing and were convinced of the "German mission" in the world; they were the men upon whom the lesson of war totalitarianism as an effective way to organize and control society was not lost. So long as times were good, they could not secure the support of any considerable number of their fellow citizens, but they did have the flag which countless numbers could rally to when the depression undermined living conditions.


The struggle for unity from 1806 to 1870, the patriotic propaganda in the public schools after Bismarck's empire was completed, and finally the violent forge of the war of 1914-1918 had affected Germans of all classes with the idea of nationalism. They were fiercely proud of their Germanism and profoundly confident of their strength. The humiliations of defeat were the more deeply resented because they saw in them the denial of their cherished belief in German superiority. Thus when the depression drove them to look for a radical solution to their problems, the communists with their internationalisms had no advantage comparable to those of the Nazis whose program of *Blut und Boden* (blood and soil) may have seemed silly to intellectuals but could easily be fitted into the preconceptions of simpler people.

The Nazi political principle, leadership, also fitted many German preconceptions. Democracy as it was practiced in the West was never firmly established in Germany. The failure of the liberal *bourgeoisie* to give Germany liberty in 1848 had unhappy results. Bismarck never tired of telling the people that unity was accomplished by strong leadership, not by a democratic movement, and the efficient government of the empire from 1871 to 1914 further convinced them that political decisions should be made by experts rather than by politicians. After 1849 the German poets and essayists cried out for "a man, a leader"; Bismarck had given them what they called for. In the World War Ger-


many again was in serious trouble. At the end of it Ludendorff became virtual dictator and the fact that he had kept Germany in the war against the world for four years, rather than the defeat of 1918, penetrated public consciousness. His dictatorship was a proof of the efficacy of strong government in times of crisis. When things got bad after 1929, it is not surprising to see the German people again yield to the benumbing proposition that they needed a strong man to handle their affairs.

The Nazi propaganda was especially well organized to attract the *bourgeoisie*; indeed by 1932 Hitler was the undoubted leader of the *Kleinbürgertum* (white collar class). The reason is not hard to find. These little people — white collar workers, petty shopkeepers, etc. — were the most conspicuous parroters of nationalistic slogans, and intellectually they were easy dupes for the leadership principle since they assumed their own limitations to be general. More important, perhaps, was their fear and resentment of the workers and their Marxist ideology. Class consciousness was strong in Germany, and the petty *bourgeoisie* were proud of their social superiority over men who worked with their hands. No one who reads Hitler's book can miss seeing that his own anti-Marxist bias developed from fear that he would lose his status and be forced into the proletarian ranks. So it was with the mass of the *Kleinbürgertum*. They had already suffered deeply from envy of the more wealthy classes; they resisted with all their spirit the economic pressure that would push them lower on the social ladder. The Nazis also gave them a marvelous protective coloring. Much of their humiliation in the past had arisen from the fact that they could not dress as well as their social betters; under the brown shirts of the Nazi storm troopers, all men appeared equal — the banker's son and the clerk in the hardware store. Thus while the Nazis could save them from identification with the proletariat, they could also associate themselves with those elements of the upper and middle *bourgeoisie* who had succumbed to Hitler's siren calls — and on terms of equality.


It is interesting to note that after 1929 the youth of Germany rather than the middle-aged and older people were the ones who rallied to either the Nazi or the Communist Party in greatest numbers. The old Weimar parties, even in 1933, held about the same number of voters they had had during the twenties; but the *new* voters and erstwhile *non-voters* cast their lot with the radical parties. The youth made up a considerable number of these new voters, and it is not difficult to see why they sympathized with revolutionary ideas. In the first place, their whole lives were dominated by the troubles of the era that began in 1914. Violence and disorder were not so repugnant to them as to the older generation since they had never known anything else. Most im-




THE CLOTH HALL AT YPRES, 1914



THE CLOTH HALL AT YPRES, 1918



THE KREMLIN, MOSCOW (Sovfoto)



portant of all, of course, was the fact that they had so few opportunities. The veterans of the war benefited most from the years of prosperity between 1925 and 1929; the boys and girls who came of age after 1920 found doors hard to open and after 1929 found them slammed in their faces. They could still go to school but they came out prepared for careers which did not exist. Their early formative years had been dominated by the patriotism whipped up by war; when they saw no opportunities open, it is not surprising that the party which mouthed those patriotic myths should get a hearing. Youth loves to throw itself into a "cause," and when the cause offers opportunities and flies banners that are familiar, it is easy for youth to become identified with it. That Hitler and his crew of malcontents were going to lead Germany and Europe to destruction was veiled from their eyes.

Curiously enough the Nazis were able to make some conquests among the workers after 1929. The party name advertised the participation of workers in it as well as its genuine socialistic tendencies. When the Social Democrats obviously became politically bankrupt, some workers drifted into the Nazi camp. This was also true of the peasants. The failure of the government to solve the terrible agricultural crisis led some of them to support the Nazis; they could not support the communists, and a Nazi vote did give them a chance to express their discontent.

The other group which supported the Nazis was made up of important business men. The industrialists cynically backed all political groups except the Marxists as a form of insurance against political storms. After 1929, when it became clear that Germany was going to have a crisis of some kind, the Nazis were able to obtain substantial contributions on the ground that they were front-rank fighters in the war against communism. Hitler, it seems, assured a group of business leaders that he would hold the "socialist" part of his "National Socialism" in check. At least once in the year before he became chancellor, his movement was saved from financial disintegration by contributions from a group of Rhineland industrial leaders.

The preceding analysis will indicate that the Nazis had a distinct advantage over the communists in their bid for popular support. They were able to reach all levels of German society. Their nationalistic song and dance stirred the springs of German emotional life; their attacks on the Treaty of Versailles appealed to men whose historical consciousness was limited to a decade; their assaults upon the Jews catered to prejudices buried deep in the European cultural soil and promised the greedy and avaricious freedom from Jewish competition as well as opportunities for loot. In a cartoon published in a German Catholic

newspaper in 1932 Hitler was depicted as the "Rat Catcher of Hamelin Town": he attracted the unthinking, the greedy, the maladjusted, the discontented in great numbers. And between 1929 and 1933 the disintegrating economy was every day creating new recruits to these ranks. By 1933 about 43 per cent of the voters were ready and willing to give the agitator with the Charlie Chaplin mustache a chance to try his scheme for recovery.

The revolution of 1933 itself was expedited by a plot in the circle around President von Hindenburg. In 1932 the government could no longer function as a truly parliamentary regime because the coalition of socialists, Catholics, and *bourgeoisie* could not agree, and the Nazis and communists, working together against the government, were able to break the front of the Weimar coalition. Under such conditions Dr. Brüning, the chancellor, ruled in part through the Reichstag and in part by decrees backed by the emergency powers of the president. But when Brüning decided to break up the great estates of the Prussian Junkers beyond the Elbe with the aid of Hindenburg's son, these gentlemen convinced the president that Brüning was an "agricultural Bolshevik." Brüning fell, and von Papen became chancellor. The army objected to von Papen's regime, and General von Schleicher became chancellor. He wanted to use the army and the trade unions as a base for his government, but he too became an "agricultural Bolshevik" and was dropped by the senile president. This was Hitler's opportunity. The Junkers' clique could not form a government without the aid of a strong party in the Reichstag. Hitler's Nazis were the largest single group. Hitler was made chancellor and two other Nazis entered the cabinet; the majority in the government came from the barons' clique.

Hitler, however, was not handcuffed by the barons. He insisted on an election, and on the eve of the election his men set fire to the Reichstag building. The communists were blamed, and tough Nazi storm troopers terrorized the elections. Even so, Hitler did not get a majority of the votes but by excluding the communist deputies from the new Reichstag, he had a majority in the parliament. At this point he obtained an "enabling act" from the deputies which allowed him to rule by decree. The Reichstag voluntarily abdicated its power; Hitler, the chancellor, became dictator. It was a signal for wild excesses on the part of the rabble that had followed him to power. A virtual reign of terror against communists and Jews broke out and in a few days all the efforts of the Weimar republic to re-establish German prestige in the world went for naught.

The House that Hitler Built

Hitler's first measures were aimed at his political rivals. Within one year he broke up the old parties and jailed those leaders who threatened to prove dangerous. The concentration camps which the American army uncovered in 1945 were started in 1933, and their first victims were Germans. Once the political parties were out of the way, the regime began the policy of "co-ordination." Co-ordination meant that every organized group in Germany, from the labor unions to the ladies' clubs, was reorganized under Nazi auspices. In some cases it was a legal method of pillaging. The labor unions, for example, lost their funds when they were destroyed, and the new *Arbeitsfront* started with a clean slate and an empty treasury. In all cases it meant coercion. Newspapers, periodicals, and the great publishing houses came under control; the universities and schools were forced into line; the cinema industry and the radio stations were put to Nazi uses. In short, all means of public education had to bow before the ideology of the Nazis. Liberals, Jews, communists, and other avowed anti-Nazis lost their positions and in some cases their liberty and even their lives. The economy of the nation, too, was put under control. On the one side all the workers were herded into the *Arbeitsfront* as the only legal union. On the other side the industrialists, businessmen, and even small shopkeepers were organized in associations that took orders from the government. Hitler did not destroy capitalism but he emasculated it by taking away from the entrepreneurs the right to control prices, production, wages, and distribution. The Rhineland industrialists who had given him money made many a wry face when they saw what was happening to them. Co-ordination under the Nazis meant that all interests in the state were directed from above. It also meant that the leaders had many opportunities to acquire rich booty.

No regime, however despotic, can rule without giving some satisfactions to the governed. Hitler's was no exception. He took over a Germany that was creaking from economic disorder, and promptly set out to start the machine going again. By a building program that included superhighways, art galleries, public buildings, houses for workers, and the like, he got industry back to work. At the same time a rigid control over wages and prices allowed him to keep price levels down so that these public works projects were achieved at depression prices. The same was true for the rearming of the German army, which began about 1935-1936. Rigid controls allowed the program to be completed at relatively small expense. Through the works program, labor went back into the factories and, with price controls on

consumers' goods, soon found itself fairly well off. This was especially true after 1935 when the demand for workers drew more than one breadwinner from each family into the economic machine. The per capita consumption of meat, milk, radios, and similar luxuries rose substantially so that the Germans had objective evidence of the efficacy of the dictatorship. They did not know that ten years later the same regime would end in a holocaust of destruction; they only compared it with the evils of the years 1929-1933.

The Nazi trade policy was an important factor in Germany's economic recovery. The machinery had been created before Hitler came to power; he used it to the fullest extent. German trade was based upon a new currency device. The government was afraid to leave the gold standard because the nation's experience with inflation had been so bitter that any such measure would be certain to arouse a storm of protest. So, ironically, the nation that had practically no gold at all, remained firmly attached to the gold standard. Such a policy, however, would have been fatal were it not accompanied by the cleverest financial trick of the period. It was expressly forbidden to export any currency or gold without government consent; the currency volume was thus under strict control. Then, while the mark rested "firmly" on the gold standard of eighty marks to the ounce, the government arranged to buy goods abroad through blocked accounts in Germany. For these purchases the mark assumed various values, anywhere from five to forty American cents, but the money paid for the goods imported could be spent only in Germany and sometimes only for specified commodities manufactured in Germany. Thus the entire Bulgarian tobacco crop was purchased at fire-sale prices, for the Bulgarians had two years' crops on hand and the sellers had to take German goods in exchange. Nearly all of central Europe and half of South America as well as many other countries made such barter contracts with Germany. Often the Germans paid prices above the market price in terms of purchasing power, but of course the purchasing had to be done in Germany. This system had an interesting result. The usual procedure is for the seller of manufactured goods to offer credit to the buyer; advanced economies usually lend to the so-called backward areas. The German system worked in reverse. Central banks in Rumania, Greece, Brazil, and elsewhere paid their own citizens for German purchases, and then carried the credits until they could get merchants to buy German goods and thus release the marks blocked in Germany. In effect, they loaned Germany money to allow Germany to trade with them. When the war of 1939 came along, the British adopted this same system. One of

the great problems of the present world is the unblocking of those accounts, so that England, for example, can supply Argentina, India, and other countries with goods for which they have already paid.

This system did much to develop Germany's trade with the world. Goods "made in Germany" again offered serious competition in world markets, especially in South America where the Germans cut deeply into British and American trade. With this system the Nazis could get the raw materials that they did not produce at home, and so keep their factories going. It was an important factor in the economic recovery which put the German workers back on their jobs and made them supporters of the Nazi regime.

Perhaps more important as a trend in German economy was the effort to produce everything possible within the country's frontiers. The memory of the blockade in 1914-1918 left a deep impression upon the Nazi mind. Their determination to overthrow the Versailles settlement could be realized only if they could circumvent the evils of such a blockade. To do this the scientific brains of Germany were concentrated on the development of *Ersatz* (substitute) commodities. From coal they made gasoline and rubber as well as hundreds of other articles; from wood they made cloth and plastics, and so on for item after item. Some of the *Ersatz* commodities were poor, others better than the natural article which they supplanted. All of them were aimed at freeing Germany from dependence upon world trade. This manufacture created new industries and thereby made new jobs. Although these jobs were obviously war measures, they also contributed to the re-employment of the workers and their families. The simple-minded German who visited the "Give Me Four Years" Fair ("Give me four years," said Hitler in 1933, "and I'll make a new Germany") in 1937 was proud of the ingenuity of his fellow countrymen who had put him back to work. He could see their victories over production problems. He probably missed the fact that a war economy had been brought into being.

Hitler also lulled his followers into submission by giving them low-cost vacations, low-cost theatrical entertainment, trade school advantages, and a host of other petty bribes through a branch of the *Arbeitsfront*. The famous *Kraft durch Freude* (Strength through Joy) organization operated hotels, Rhine steamers, bus lines, resorts, and even a fleet of ocean-going ships. With these services the little people of Germany could enjoy vacations, under somewhat crowded conditions, which they had never dreamed of having. Many an uncritical erstwhile communist, Social Democrat, and Catholic Center supporter de-

cided that Hitler was a great man, and the Nazis, political geniuses. Others who were able to buy at low cost a house and a half acre of ground in any of the innumerable "settlement areas" which sprang up like mushrooms around every city and town, were convinced that the Nazis were the saviors of the people.

Those who still remained unconvinced after the press, radio, schools, youth organizations, clubs, and societies had put over their barrage of propaganda, were induced to keep silent. The Nazis established a secret police, the Gestapo, as soon as they came to power, which undertook to oversee the consciences as well as the actions of the nation. This organization had absolute powers, and its long ears and long arms reached into every cranny. For those who did not swallow the propaganda, there was terror. The concentration camp, the bullying of the third degree, and the smokestack at Dachau were the realities of terror which held the unconvinced in check. At one time that terror broke out violently even against members of the party. In June, 1934, on the "night of the long knives" at least a hundred people were killed in a violent roundup which dragged in the leader of the storm troopers as well as a number of old political enemies of Hitler. These political murders, without a semblance of trial, were more shocking but not more real than the many murders that occurred without publicity from the brutal violence of Hitler's toughs. By 1935 the legal machinery of Germany had been so debased by authoritarian methods that political murder was almost legalized. The new law and the new courts gave the citizen practically no rights.

We need not in any way minimize statements about Nazi violence against the Jews, but it should be noted that Christians who were willing to oppose the regime — and there were a surprising number in view of the consequences of such opposition — also lived under terror. The Jews had to put up with humiliation and abuse as well as terror so that their lot was outwardly harder; but the rolls in the concentration camps, if they are ever called, will reveal a majority of purely German origin.

The Nazi regime outraged the conscience of liberal-democratic opinion in the West by its brutalities and its violence. It was not the internal policy, however, that resulted in an armed conflict between Germany and the Western powers. The Nazi trade policy and expansionist aggression, which threatened to undermine the commercial and military position of England and France, finally led to conflict. This story we reserve for the next chapter.

The Pauperization of Central and Southern Europe

The small states to the south and the east of Germany were almost as hard hit as Germany herself by the economic crisis. These lands, too, had suffered grievously in the war and in the revolutions of 1914-1920. Some of them had been battlefields; all of them had been deeply involved in the catastrophe of the war. The few years of prosperity from 1925 to 1929 were not enough to allow them to establish any inner economic stability before the depression overwhelmed them with problems. By 1931, when a conference of these small states met at Warsaw to look at their difficulties, it was clear that from Poland to Greece the whole countryside resembled a poor farm and the prospects for the future were even darker. The problem was no easy one to solve. These lands were the purveyors of foodstuffs and of agricultural materials and minerals for the factories of Europe. The factories were stopped and the people could not buy food at prices that would pay for its production. Surpluses of all kinds depressed the markets of the world, and farmers in Yugoslavia, Poland, and Hungary were in the same predicament as farmers in Kansas, Iowa, and the Dakotas. The depression threatened to make paupers of them all. Czechoslovakia, alone of these states, had a sizable manufacturing industry, and her plight was as bad as any for, to avoid dependence on Germany's markets, she had built up an overseas trade. After 1929 it melted away; she lost 80 per cent of her export markets.

Under such conditions it is not surprising that important political changes occurred in central and southeastern Europe. In the first place there was a serious weakening of the military potential of all these states. Agrarian Poland and Yugoslavia were affected as much as industrial Czechoslovakia. It was simply impossible for them to keep up a modern military machine in face of vanishing national incomes. Furthermore, France, the source of most of their loans, could not make up the deficits for she too was in serious trouble. The heart of the Continent was becoming a military vacuum, a fact which should have been a warning that the treaties of 1919-1920 were in serious danger, especially since the three powers most opposed to those treaties — Germany, Italy, and Russia — were growing stronger just when these small states were becoming weaker.

The depression heightened the minority tensions in each of these states. The treaties of 1919-1920 had been unable to unscramble the nationalist problem in eastern and middle Europe; in each little state, except Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria, there were sizable minorities of peoples whose race, language, and culture made them unstable citizens.

In the depression, when state aid became imperative, these groups almost universally reached the opinion that there was discrimination against them. This was particularly true of the German and Hungarian minorities against whom there undoubtedly was considerable discrimination for neither was regarded as loyal to the state. Not only Germans and Hungarians, but also Croats, Slovenes, Bulgars, Ruthenians, Slovaks, and others showed signs of restlessness and discontent which inevitably contributed to the weakness of the new governments. Particularly Poland, Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, and Rumania, the very states that were supposed to defend the *status quo*, were deeply creased with minority problems aggravated by the depression.

The trade policies of these states in the first decade after the war had been strongly protectionist. Each was anxious to build up its own economy at the expense of its neighbors. When the depression struck, the folly of these attempts at self-sufficiency became apparent. Fundamentally, agricultural Europe had to depend upon trade. Pigs, corn, wheat, beef, oranges, tobacco, and other commodities produced in these countries were useless to them if they could not be exchanged for machinery, textiles, chemicals, and other manufactured goods. When agricultural commodities became a drug on the market, these states faced disaster. One Greek orange crop was largely spoiled before it could be sold; one year's tobacco crop in Bulgaria could not be sold before the next crop was ready for the barns. Such examples could be multiplied over and over again. This fact made the little countries "ripe fruit" for the Nazi foreign trade policy. Germany would buy anything, so long as she could pay for it with German manufactured goods. By 1938 between 70 and 90 per cent of the entire foreign trade of Rumania, Jugoslavia, Greece, Hungary, and Bulgaria was tied into the German system. Nor was Germany always helpful in the payments. The carload of aspirin sent to Jugoslavia probably was necessary to cure some of the headaches caused by the fact that Germany told her customers what they could buy rather than asked them what they wanted.

Except in Czechoslovakia and Austria, liberal-democratic forms had little favor in these smaller governments. Poland was a military dictatorship; Rumania, Bulgaria, Jugoslavia, Hungary, and Greece were ruled by strong-arm methods in which the army played a predominant role. Curiously enough, in none of these old-fashioned authoritarian states did twentieth century democratic-authoritarianism as expressed in Fascism take root. There were Fascist parties in Hungary and Rumania, it is true, but they did not rule. In Austria, after 1934, a Fascist-type government did come to power, but the problem of *Anschluss*

made the situation unique. In Czechoslovakia there were two Fascist parties, one in Slovakia, the other in the Sudetenland, which contributed mightily to the disruption and partition of the republic. The only generalization that can safely be made about the impact of the depression upon the governments of these states is that in each of them the tendency was to increase the power of the group or man who had seized authority and to decrease the possibility of a liberal-democratic solution. It also can be safely said that the disruptive forces at work throughout the area were undermining the possibility of continued independence.

Russia's Iron Age

The world depression came just after the Soviet government had embarked upon its first Five-Year Plan for industrialization. The crisis did not produce unemployment and bread lines such as were found elsewhere but it did cause serious economic and political problems; for even though Russia was a communist state, she lived in a world dominated by industrialism. When that world became sick, no part of it could escape the consequences.

The first problem that affected Russia grew out of the purchases needed to implement the Five-Year Plan. It had been necessary to buy machinery of all kinds from the West, particularly from Germany and the United States. The government had expected to pay for this machinery by exports of wheat, fur, timber, flaxseed, and the like. When, however, the bottom dropped out of the prices of all these commodities, it became increasingly difficult to meet the payments. Two bushels of wheat were needed to pay for the goods for which only one bushel had been planned. The only solution seemed to be to export more wheat. This meant, of course, that Russians could not consume as much of their own wheat as usual and it also meant that more and more wheat and other goods were poured on a glutted market. Outside Russia the Soviet government was accused of "dumping"; within Russia, men understood that they were tightening their belts to pay for industrialization. How much the depressed prices for wheat, oil, furs, coal, and other exports slowed up the progress of the Five-Year Plan will probably never be revealed, for the Russian authorities are singularly uncommunicative. But there is no doubt that world market conditions had an unfortunate effect upon the Russian economy.

The Five-Year Plan, however, was not abandoned; indeed it was followed by a second and a third Plan as each successive one ran its course. The theory behind the Plans is simple. The communist state would, by careful foresight, create an industrial society. With bold determi-

nation the planners decided to build up heavy industry first. Steel and iron, electricity and chemicals, machinery and mining were placed on the top priority list while consumers' goods were neglected. This was in reverse order if the evolution of Western industrial society were taken as the pattern; but the Russians reasoned that light industry could easily be organized once the heavy industrial machine was complete. Also inherent in this scheme was the fact that the newly created heavy industry would greatly support Russia's military power. Indeed, it now becomes clear that the Red army was the chief beneficiary of the planned economy. As early as 1932 the results of the Plan were apparent in the equipment of the army; by 1935 it was the best equipped military force in Europe.

The concentration on heavy industry meant, however, that shoes, cloth, and petty luxuries were hard to get. The people were ill-clothed and lacked the comforts that had come to be standard for the rest of the Western world. But this was not all. The rapid growth of industrial plants necessitated an equally rapid growth in the towns and cities. Communities that had only a few hundred inhabitants became great industrial centers almost overnight. There was cement and structural steel for factory buildings but a wholly inadequate supply of materials for the construction of housing. Crowding became the pattern for Russian life; dozens of people for every house, indeed almost for every room, meant that no one, not even executives and party leaders, was adequately housed. The situation provided material for a number of plays and novels, but even though people could laugh at the shortage of dwelling space, it was a most serious problem.

When the necessity of securing credits to pay for machinery purchased abroad forced the government to export as much foodstuff as possible, and even to cut sharply into the amount of food available in Russia, another privation was added to the hard-pressed citizen. President Roosevelt said that one-third of the American people were ill-clothed, ill-housed, and ill-fed; had he looked to Russia in this iron age, he would have found a whole nation which literally fitted his formula.

Naturally there were repercussions. One of the first came from the peasants. To make agriculture more efficient, the Soviet government created state farms and organized collective farms. The theory behind collectivization was sound communist doctrine; it would make socialists of the agricultural workers and at the same time allow wider use of machinery in agriculture. Unfortunately, however, the enthusiasm of the party zealots moved faster than the delivery of agricultural machines and so many of the first collectives could not demonstrate the

advantages of mechanization. On the other hand, collectivization had little appeal to those peasants who had become well-to-do under the NEP. They saw it as an equalizing process which would deprive them of their wealth. Their first act was to slaughter their livestock. They decided to eat their cows, sheep, and pigs rather than to give them to the collective. This slaughter undid the work of ten years of rebuilding Russian herds; ten more years would be needed to replenish the losses.

Their second act was even more disastrous. In order to pay for machinery, the government grain tax took all the wheat it possibly could and exported it. The peasants, whose understanding of national economics was limited to the vision obtainable in the village, could see no advantage in harvesting grain if they did not get anything from it themselves. The next year's crop (1932) was not cared for; all over Russia grain was allowed to ripen and was not harvested. The peasants, as if by agreement, tried to sabotage the program by harvesting only the grain needed for their own use. This was rebellion. The government had either to submit or fight back. It chose the latter course. The grain tax was collected even if it took the last bit of grain that the peasants had put by for themselves. The next winter there was a famine. Russia exported wheat, but something over a million peasants died of starvation. The actual figure will probably never be known. It was a stern disciplinary method, but it broke the backbone of the revolt. By 1936-1937 the peasants, with more machinery at their disposal, came to see more clearly the advantages of collectivization; but many people felt that this utter disregard for human life was inexcusable.

The pressures of the iron age were also felt in politics. Stalin had successfully pushed his competitors from power but he had not silenced their opposition. It was not long before the necessities of the economic structure forced him into practices which were easy targets for Trotsky on the left, and Zinoviev and his friends on the right. Trotsky was exiled, first to Siberia, then to Turkey, whence he wandered to France, Norway, and finally Mexico. Zinoviev and most of the right wingers recanted and were given minor positions within Stalin's tightly controlled politico-economic machine. But criticism continued. Many of the old guard Bolsheviks did not like the "speed up" system in industry, the tight control over labor, the dictatorial organization that Stalin gave the party, and a host of other things. The iron age surely did not resemble the communist utopia these men had fought to attain.


The discontent was brought to a head in the assassination of one of Stalin's chief confidants, Comrade Kirov. The murder was an inside job, done by a communist in good standing. It became the signal for

one of the bloodiest purges in history. The OGPU, the secret police, went to work and systematically rooted out every kind of opposition to Stalin's regime. The purge extended to the army, the navy, the civil service, the party itself, industry, and the peasantry. There were a few dramatic trials, the true meaning of which has never been satisfactorily explained, in which a few chosen victims admitted their error but blamed everything on Trotsky and the Nazis. Striking as these treason trials were, they represented only a drop in the buckets of blood that were spilled. Most of the victims — and the number ran into the tens of thousands — were arrested and never heard of again. The purge included the heads of the army and the navy, a whole list of diplomats, important figures of the revolutionary era as well as countless men of lesser importance who simply disappeared. The revolution, contrary to Lenin's advice, was "eating its own sons"; and indication of the thoroughness of the job is to be found in the fact that the Old Bolsheviks Club, open only to pre-1917 Bolsheviks, was dissolved. There was hardly anyone left who had played an important part in the heroic days of 1917, except Stalin and his admirers. Trotsky, condemned by the trials, was murdered by a Soviet agent in Mexico.

In rooting out opposition, the secret police had a free hand. At one time they had over a hundred thousand political and class prisoners whose labor they used to build canals, cut forests, and the like. The cynical tone used in discussing this slave labor was shocking to the rest of the world, but no one in Russia dared protest. The terror stood over them all.

With the purge came a subtle change in organization and propaganda in the Soviet Union. The old Bolsheviks had preferred to be anonymous workers for the proletarian cause; as Stalin's dictatorship grew, Stalin began to be publicized as the great leader who would bring the nation through the crisis. A Byzantine tone of flattery crept into the press, and a sort of idolatry of Stalin became the pattern for everyone to follow. Parades with gigantic pictures of the leader and with sycophant speeches made it obvious that Hitler had no monopoly on the role of semi-divine political messiah. A new constitution introduced in 1936, on paper at least, made no provision for Stalin's obvious place in the nation; but when the so-called elections were held, it was clear to everyone that the new constitution did not alter anything. The Communist Party was supreme, and within that party Stalin was supreme. Any opposition would mean slavery or death.

By 1938-1939, however, the results of the planned economy and the rigors of despotism were becoming very apparent. Russian steel production pushed to third place, behind the United States and Germany



Political Structure of the U.S.S.R. after 1936

From *Europe since 1914* by F. L. Bennis. Used by permission of the publishers, F. S. Crofts and Company, Inc.

but ahead of England. Travelers were amazed to see teeming cities, overcrowded, dirty, and poorly built it is true, but cities which none the less had promise for the future. With each successive Five-Year Plan living conditions improved; there was a long way yet to go before material culture would reach that of the West, but Russia was obviously on the track and moving along. The program had worked wonders in educating the people to read and write, and it had already begun the creation of the technically trained masses necessary to man the growing industrial plant. The opposition might point to brutalities but the friends of Stalin could demonstrate real progress in almost every phase of life. The army stood in the forefront of the institutions that emerged from the Plan. It was now a weapon which could hope to stand off all attacks against the communist fatherland, and perhaps even strike a blow for Russian interests beyond the frontiers. After 1939 both the system of government and the Red army were to be tested in the forge of war and politics made by the second great war of the twentieth century.

Great Britain under the Conservatives

Ramsay MacDonald formed his second Labour government in 1929, just in time to have the full force of the depression overwhelm his efforts. Britain had not known real prosperity at any time since the war, but the depression aggravated all her economic problems. Like politicians elsewhere in the first year and a half of the crisis, the British cabinet lived from day to day in hope that the cycle would turn upwards, but by 1931 something drastic had to be done. In August, 1931, MacDonald made an agreement with the Conservative Party and, after reorganizing his cabinet, appeared before the nation as leader of a coalition government which presumably would tackle the problems of recovery.

In September, 1931, Britain left the gold standard. This momentarily gave a boost to British trade. English goods which had cost one pound still cost one pound, but when the pound cost only \$3.50 rather than \$4.86, those goods became a bargain. The next move was in the direction of a tariff. After almost eighty years of free trade, England again adopted protection. The first step came in November, 1931, with a law called the Abnormal Importations Bill which was supposed merely to prevent "dumping." In February of 1932 a frank tariff law raised a 10 per cent ad valorem duty against a long list of goods. The protective economists now had an illustration of their proposition that England adopted free trade when her economy was ahead of the rest of

the world technically and when the balance of payments was in her favor but she would adopt protection when these factors were no longer operative.

In the summer of 1932 at the Ottawa Conference this newly adopted tariff policy became an instrument for further linking the British Commonwealth of Nations into an economic unit by a preferential intra-empire trade agreement. The Dominion governments were more protectionist than Britain herself; they were glad to raise higher tariffs against competition outside the Empire but unwilling to lower existing duties against British goods. In general these intra-empire agreements helped the Dominions more than they did the government at home, for the preferential tariffs were deeply resented by Britain's good customers on the Continent while they did not greatly aid her trade in the Dominions.

The Conservatives also provided subsidies, notably for shipping, and at the same time established import quotas on commodities that competed too seriously with British goods, especially agricultural products. But the Conservative government refused to consider any Four- or Five-Year Plan or "New Deal" spending program. In their eyes, government should not spend money to create employment, but rather it should create conditions in which private capitalists could and would spend money economically. English Conservative leaders were unwilling to depart radically from the economic doctrines of their nineteenth-century *laissez faire* teachers. Their program of tariffs, subsidies, and monetary devaluation did improve conditions somewhat, but Britain did not end the problem of unemployment as a serious social disorder until the war of 1939-1945 called her men and women into the factories to produce guns instead of butter.

In 1935 George V celebrated his Silver Jubilee. It was somewhat less impressive as a display of strength than the celebration of Victoria's Jubilee at the turn of the century. Clearly Britain's position in the world had changed greatly since the days of "the Grandmother of Europe." At the end of George V's twenty-five years as king, England was no longer so wealthy, her navy was no longer relatively so powerful, and her rule was challenged in India, the Near East, and elsewhere in the world. It was not the fault of the king; he had not brought on the war, the rise of competing nations, nor the unrest in the empire. A month after the Jubilee, Ramsay MacDonald retired from the cabinet, and Stanley Baldwin, a perfect representative of Britain's Conservative Party, became prime minister.

In January, 1936, George V died and his eldest son, Edward, Prince of Wales, mounted the throne. Edward's speeches were troublesome to

the Conservative ministry. His interests had led him to investigate social problems in the depressed areas of South Wales where unemployment was having terrible consequences. It was even whispered that the new king was not satisfied with the titular role which recent tradition had given to the person of the monarch. Then another rumor blotted out the first. Edward was in love with an American divorcee and planned to marry her. English churchmen and Conservatives were shocked not so much by the fact that Mrs. Simpson was a commoner as that she was divorced. The small noisy Fascist Party in the country shouted, "My monarch right or wrong"; but the Church of England sternly refused to countenance the marriage. On December 10, 1936, probably under considerable pressure from the Baldwin government, Edward VIII abdicated the throne, and his brother, the Duke of York, became king. The new king was not a brilliant man, but his virtues were those which Englishmen expect to find in a monarch. In May, 1937, he was solemnly crowned at Westminster Abbey with all the color and pageantry of the historic coronation service.

After 1938 the pressing demands of foreign policy occupied much of Britain's attention. An unfortunate series of attempts to "appease" German demands and the final breakdown of international peace monopolized political effort and forced Britain to fight with her back against the wall.

The Woes of France

The depression came in France almost two years later than it had in Germany. Reconstruction work and the undervaluation of the franc in terms of other currencies gave France an appearance of prosperity at a time when her neighbors were in the throes of economic chaos. But she could not escape the world-wide catastrophe; she too was part of the industrial economy, and when that struck the rocks, she too had difficulties. With the tightening of world credit and the collapse of German reparations payments it became increasingly difficult for the French to continue work in the devastated areas. Then when Britain and a tier of smaller countries left the gold standard, the trade and tourist advantages which the cheap franc had assured disappeared. The final blow came when the United States left the gold standard in 1933. France, almost by herself, remained tied to gold in a sea of paper currency, and French prices were completely out of line in the world market.

The French phase of the depression struck with paralyzing force when it did come, partly because of the way it was handled. The government was afraid to cut loose from the gold standard because the prop-

ertied classes objected strenuously to any expedient that would further increase their losses. The failure of the Russian government to honor the czar's bonds and the inflation that followed in France and in most of the world after 1920 had already greatly depreciated the wealth of the *bourgeoisie*. They had accepted these losses, up to 80 or 90 per cent of their prewar holdings, but they did not want to accept any further reductions. Thus while England and the United States cut loose from gold and allowed their currencies to find their place in the world structure, the French government tried to deflate the economy so that reductions in wages and prices would eventually bring their economy into line with that of the rest of the world. It would make little difference to the tourist whether the twenty franc dinner continued to cost twenty francs if the franc were reduced in terms of the dollar, or if the franc remained expensive and the twenty franc dinner were reduced to twelve francs. But it made a great difference to French workers, shopkeepers, and others. To reduce French prices so that they could conform to world prices, meant that French wages had to drop, profits go down, and prices of raw materials and agricultural commodities decline. The bond holders would benefit by such an arrangement, for their income would remain constant.

The French government, however, could not wholeheartedly adopt a deflationary policy. Indeed, between 1932 and 1936, responding to pressures from all sides, it tried simultaneously to deflate and inflate the French economy; it got nowhere on any constructive program. The workers had just enough power to prevent deflation; the bankers had just enough to prevent inflation. For four years France remained almost at dead center. The confusion was outwardly manifested by the turnover of cabinets. Governments rose and fell in rapid succession.

The crisis broke in 1934. There was a scandal about a swindle in a government-controlled pawn shop. An adventurer, Stavisky, had been able to bribe his way to easy wealth; the swindle was uncovered, but delays in the prosecution of the case led people to suspect that there were "reasons" for not bringing him to trial. When Stavisky was murdered before the trial, these suspicions became convictions, and the rightist and Fascist press began baying at the heels of the government. It was a perfect setup for disorder in the streets, and the Fascist leagues for the moment coalesced to attack the parliamentary government. They accused the leaders of being implicated in the crime and assured France through their newspapers that Stavisky had been murdered so that he could not tell on his friends. A riot in Paris threatened to overthrow the regime while several "strong men" stood by to take

over and establish "order." But they had not counted upon the workers. At the height of the crisis socialists and communists dramatically buried their own differences and came to the support of the government. An aged politician was resurrected from retirement to become premier, and an all-party coalition took over the regime. This new government did not settle the crisis, but out of the situation the Popular Front came into existence as a bulwark against a Fascist *coup d'état*.

The elections of 1936 swept the Popular Front parties (socialists, communists, and radical-socialists) into power, and Léon Blum, the leader of the socialists, became premier. On the day he took the reins of government, a wave of strikes broke out all over France. The workers remained in the factories and announced that their "sit down" strike would continue until their grievances were heard. It was a dangerous situation for the new government; obviously the strikes were inspired by the communists, who had assured Blum of their support in the Chamber but had taken no posts in the cabinet. The strikes were settled by the so-called Matignon agreement; the workers received higher pay, shorter hours (a forty-hour week), and a number of other concessions. It was the first act of Blum's "New Deal."

The Popular Front had promised the voters a whole series of reforms. The Bank of France was to be thoroughly overhauled to break the grip of the "two hundred families that ruled France with their money," the armament industry was to be nationalized, and numerous social reforms were to be introduced. In the first six months of his ministry Blum pushed through legislation to implement this program and, contrary to the predictions of the conservatives, the skies did not fall nor did the *bourgeoisie* take to the barricades. The reforms, however, were not universally satisfactory. The forty-hour week, industrialists asserted, was a check upon production, and it did discommode customers of the department stores when the managers shut the doors in the middle of the week so that their clerks could enjoy the shorter hours. The reform of the bank was accomplished without a shock to the financial structure of the nation, but the nationalizing of armaments manufacture encountered difficulties which looked suspiciously like sabotage. Blum was also forced to take the franc off the gold standard; this had salutary effects on export and tourist trade for it gave France an opportunity to compete with English and American depreciated currencies.

Blum, however, soon ran into the chronic difficulties facing any French coalition cabinet. The communists wanted to push the reform measures more rapidly; the radical-socialists wanted to slow up the process to allow business a "breathing spell." Blum faced the same

conflict within his government that Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal faced in the United States: the radical wing wanted to advance, the conservative wing wanted to call a halt. Furthermore, French foreign policy was leading to a crisis over the civil war that had broken out in Spain. The radicals wanted to aid the loyalists; the conservatives wanted to aid Franco. For a moment it almost looked as if France might have its own civil war. In 1937 Blum retired to the position of vice-premier and allowed a radical-socialist to take the leadership of the government. The Popular Front "New Deal" came to the end of its progressive period without actually having had the chance to organize and consolidate its position.

After 1937 foreign affairs, in the shape of the aggressive Nazi Reich, occupied the center of the stage. Daladier became premier, and led France from appeasement at Munich to war in 1939. Even here France could not act in unity. The rightist and Fascist groups were pro-Hitler almost down to the declaration of war; while the leftist groups, spurred on by the communists, were anxious to stop Germany before it was too late. This conflict in the inner councils of the nation paralyzed the government in face of the political crisis just as it had been paralyzed in face of the depression.

The Weakness of France

After 1940, when France had shown herself to be a hollow shell easily broken by the German army, it became fashionable to blame her destruction upon one's political enemies. A whole library of books and articles has been published to prove that the Popular Front and Léon Blum, or the right and the French Fascists, or some other group was responsible for the disaster. Others have blamed the generals, or the industrialists, or the workers, while still others have placed responsibility upon the constitution of the Third Republic. All these conditions, in their turn, may well be pointed to as evidences of France's difficulties, but it is improbable that serious historical judgment will fix upon any one of them as the underlying cause of the nation's weakness.

There can be no doubt that France's inability to establish an industrial society capable of supplying a great power is a basic factor in her weakness. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries she lacked sufficient coal to supply her own needs, and therefore her industry, dependent upon expensive imported coal, was under a handicap in competition with foreign manufactures. This alone, however, does not explain the problem. French industrial genius from the sixteenth

century onward developed luxury, artistic, and specialty commodities rather than goods for the workaday world. This does not mean that France did not make steel and sulphuric acid, but rather that more emphasis was given to the production of items like perfume, ladies' fashions, and glass and china. France had some heavy industry, especially in the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, but nothing like so much as was to be found in Germany, Britain, Russia, and the United States. And she was unable to transform easily the industry that she had into a war machine.

This mediocre industrial foundation was badly suited to support French foreign policy. The post-1920 world saw the nation saddled with the responsibility for maintaining the peace of Europe and the *status quo* of the treaties of 1919-1920. Her alliances in central and eastern Europe emphasized this responsibility by making her army answer for the maintenance of the boundaries in Europe. Her armies met this task by the construction of a super trench, the Maginot Line, on the German frontier, and preparing for a war of defense. The Foreign Office undertook to defend the menaced frontiers of all Europe; the army prepared to defend the eastern frontier; and the economy was set up primarily for peacetime consumption and totally unprepared to supply the vast mountains of equipment needed for modern war. It is hardly surprising that France acted indecisively in the years of the crisis, and even less that she was no match for the German army backed by Germany's industrial power.

The New Deal in the United States

The world depression of 1929, dramatically opened by the crash on the New York stock exchange, struck sharply and deeply at the roots of the American economy. The United States had not suffered severely in the war, but she was destined to feel the full impact of the depression. Millions of her citizens were thrown out of work; millions of her farmers and merchants were threatened with bankruptcy. The government in Washington seemed powerless to do anything about it. Mr. Hoover had been elected to carry on the traditions of Mr. Coolidge; that is to say, to do practically nothing and to allow the bankers and businessmen full freedom of action. He and the Republican Party were totally unprepared for the crisis that overtook them. Mr. Hoover signed a higher tariff bill in face of the protest of practically every economist in the universities, but he and the Republican leadership in Congress could not seem to devise any constructive policy. Recovery, Hoover assured the nation, "is just around the corner." To make matters

worse, in the mid-term elections the nation repudiated the Republican leadership in Congress; the people voted the Republicans out for doing exactly the thing that they had voted them into office to do two years before. This meant that Mr. Hoover's last two years in the White House were difficult from every point of view. With a hostile congressional majority, it was impossible to form any policy that could realistically tackle the problem at hand. The bread lines lengthened, the veterans marched on Washington to obtain relief, farmers stopped sheriffs' sales, the nation seethed with unrest.

The result of the election of 1932 was a foregone conclusion. Mr. Hoover was unpopular personally, and the nation was resentful against the Republican Party. Mr. Roosevelt and the Democrats were swept into power on a landslide. No one was prepared for the political fireworks that followed. On inauguration day a banking crisis closed every bank in the land, and panic prevailed. The new president was in his element in the excitement, and people had to buy two or three newspapers a day to keep up with the rapid movements in Washington. Fundamental reforms and measures aimed merely at the alleviation of the crisis poured out of the new government in rapid succession. NRA, AAA, NYA, CCC, ECW, WPA, and a host of other such names overnight became household words as a bewildering array of agencies and new government boards appeared to regulate production, control labor contracts, organize industry, regulate the stock exchange, and perform a host of other functions. The unemployed were given work in building roads, schools, and other public buildings, improving parks, painting pictures, collecting records, planting trees, controlling erosion, and even raking leaves. The NYA made it possible for thousands upon thousands of young people to continue their education, while the CCC took equally large or larger numbers off the streets and gave them a chance to develop in healthful surroundings. The programs were so many and so diverse that some of them subsequently looked pretty thin; but in spite of objections and witticisms, the face of America was changed. From picnic areas to magnificent new university buildings, the New Deal left its indelible mark all over the nation.

More important perhaps were the longer range measures of reform. The social security legislation, for example, gave American workers their first guarantee against the hazards of old age and unemployment. It put the United States in line with the social legislation of the other advanced industrial nations of the world. The banking crisis produced a law insuring bank deposits. In view of the history of American banking, this was a much-needed reform, for bank failures had taken yearly tolls of savings ever since the United States came into existence. The

controls established over the stock exchange were aimed at preventing the abuses of the pre-1929 era and assuring a more orderly organization of the securities business. The Agricultural Adjustment Act was the first move in a serious attempt to solve the problems presented by farm surpluses. The extension of the powers of the Tennessee Valley Authority and the construction of a series of dams on America's river courses provided new sources of power, controlled flood waters, and definitely raised the standards of living for millions of Americans. All these measures were calculated to extend the influence and power of the federal government at the expense of local governmental agencies, but these latter were so demoralized by the depression that the federal government alone was able to act.

In due time many of the measures of the New Deal came up before the Supreme Court for judicial review. One of the peculiarities of the American form of government, not found elsewhere, is that the Supreme Court has power to declare acts of the executive and legislative branches of the government unconstitutional. The Court at this time was largely made up of men appointed by the preceding Republican administrations. It was conservative almost to the point of being reactionary. One by one the Court found many New Deal measures to be unconstitutional. Mr. Roosevelt, angered to see his program upset by "nine old men," turned on them with great vigor. He lost his first battle perhaps because he was unwilling to wait. Time, death, and retirement were soon to allow him to appoint men of his own choosing, who would not find his methods to be outside constitutional law.

The elections of 1936 gave the New Deal overwhelming popular support. President Roosevelt carried every state except Maine and Vermont. But after these elections the reforming spirit of the New Deal began to relax. Probably no president was ever more loved or more hated than Mr. Roosevelt. Eventually the hatreds began to be felt in Congress. After 1937 Congress no longer was willing to be so passive as it had been in 1933-1934, and bankers and businessmen began to emerge from the bomb shelters in which they had taken refuge in 1929. The New Deal continued to carry on the reforms, but there was increasing opposition to further adventures. At the same time the storm clouds that were gathering in Europe and the Far East began to disturb the American scene. By the time Mr. Roosevelt's second term was almost over, Europe and Asia were both at war, and Mr. Roosevelt, breaking all precedents, ran for a third term. The problems confronting the United States were now the problems of the war, and will be discussed in a later chapter.

The New Deal left a significant impression upon the political think-

ing of the American people. Heretofore government had been political administration, and government assistance had been largely limited to the granting of tariffs to industry, subsidies to railroad builders, the creation of roads and harbors, and the like. Government had provided capitalists and entrepreneurs of all kinds with a political environment in which they could develop and furnish employment for the people. Under the New Deal, government became intimately concerned with the interests of the "little" people of the land. It thought in terms of social service, and the nation responded by coming to see social service as a role of government. Mr. Roosevelt's New Deal was a significant revolution in the American political system, and it was accomplished without rejecting the fundamental liberal-democratic premises upon which the nation had been founded. The contrast between the New Deal and the Third Reich is striking. Hitler did many of the same things that were done by the New Deal but at the cost of any semblance of liberal democracy. The good things he achieved for Germany were eclipsed by the evils that accompanied them.

The Depression in Japan — Rise of a New Fascism

The world economic depression ended the liberal experiment in Japan as effectively as it destroyed the Weimar republic in Germany. The problems of Japan incident to the depression were aggravated in no small part because her two principal customers practically refused to buy from her. The rise in the tariff of the United States at the very time when American purchases were dropping off was a disaster. To it was added another Chinese boycott, the most effective ever to be tried, which originated in a series of difficulties over Manchuria. China and the United States were Japan's most important customers; when these markets dried up even more rapidly than those in the rest of the world, factories had to close and unemployment mounted.

These were the factors that brought the latent political problems of Japan to a point of crisis. Her poverty in natural resources could be overcome only by trade; if that trade failed, the nation was in difficulties. The form the political action took was conditioned by other important politico-economic facts. The first was that a minutely small number of families owned most of Japan. Eight families, for example, controlled 37 per cent of the bank deposits, 72 per cent of the trust properties, and 25 per cent of the liability reserves of the insurance companies. A few great capitalists owned everything and through their economic power controlled the government. The masses owned practically nothing. Eighty-five per cent of the people possessed less than

\$500 worth of property and had an income of less than \$400 a year. When the depression came, these people had little to fall back on.

The modern state, however, is not governed by money alone, and when the financial interests and the political leaders cannot find a way to solve the problems of government, some other agency naturally steps in. In Japan this agency was a combination of the army and the right wing of the labor movement, which spearheaded a sort of Fascist revolt against the established order. We call it Fascism for want of a better name; actually no "Fascist dictator" appeared and yet the results were about the same as those in Fascist Europe. The officers in the army were country boys whose economic background was anything but opulent. They were well trained and fanatically loyal to the emperor but, like army officers in many other parts of the world, they lacked both faith in parliamentary liberal-democracy and understanding of its mechanism. They became fertile ground for agitation against capitalists and politicians, and looked for the salvation of their country in terms of conquest. As they read the world's history, rich nations had become rich by conquest; they could see no reason why it would not pay dividends to Japan just as it had to others. In 1931 these officers received political support from the right wing of the Japanese Social-Democratic Party and from the Farmer Labor Party. These proletarians, suffering under the depression, were fearful of communism and distrustful of the parliament where they had failed to make any headway against the wealthy. They were willing to take their chances with national socialism, which was defined by Akamatsu, the Social-Democratic leader, as anticapitalist, antiparliamentarian, and national.

This combination of army and right wing proletarians took over the direction of affairs. Their road to power was easy because the constitution practically made the Ministers of War and Navy, who were always military men, independent of the premier. But they did not hesitate to soak that road to power with the blood of liberal politicians who happened to stand in their way. Their policy was simple and direct. They would create for Japan a sphere in the Far East that would assure her the right to live whether other nations bought her goods or not. The crisis in the nation could be solved by putting the people to work to arm the war machine, and the war machine would conquer a "prosperity sphere" in Greater East Asia. The demoralized state of the world in the 1930's seemed to indicate that they could achieve this conquest with a minimum of interference from abroad. In the first few years of their program, they encountered more opposition from the liberals in Japan than from foreign powers whose in-

terests were soon to be overrun. But the liberals were broken in February, 1936, on the morrow of an apparent victory at the polls. An army revolt in Tokyo seized the city and murdered a number of the most able and respected liberal politicians. The revolt subsided, but the lesson was clear. Within a year Japan was embarked definitely upon the policy of conquest in North China that was to merge with the war in Europe as the second world war in the twentieth century.

The Depression Elsewhere in the World

We have seen how the depression produced a revolution in Germany, an iron age in Russia, a New Deal in the United States, and political crises in each of the other great powers. It must not be supposed that the rest of the world was exempt from its impact. When the market prices for coffee, oil, meat, sugar, and other products of Central and South America dropped, there were political upheavals there as well as in Europe. South American revolutions came in waves from 1931 to 1936; they tended to fit the older pattern for revolution, namely, an army uprising and the creation of strong-arm regimes. Some of them were simply old-fashioned tyrannies; others vaguely resembled the Fascist movements of Europe in their emphasis upon social problems. From Cuba to Chile and Brazil, these revolutions followed in the wake of economic distress.

The colonial world, too, was shaken by the economic disorders. India, the Middle East, and the southeast corner of Asia seethed with unrest. The imperial powers of Britain, France, and Holland sat uneasily upon a social powder keg which threatened to destroy the whole system of the white man's domination east of Suez. In these lands nationalisms of all kinds were arising to challenge the right of the West to govern the East. The Arabs, united for the first time in centuries by the Jewish threat in Palestine, were stirring, from Egypt to India. Britain's control over the Middle East was gravely endangered when in Egypt and Iraq demands for independence were followed by demands that Britain should completely withdraw her forces. In India, Gandhi's civil disobedience and nonviolent resistance finally provoked the Round Table Conferences in London and, in 1935, the Government of India Act. Presumably this was the first step toward freedom, but the Indian nationalists were not satisfied. Just as in the Middle East, England was in serious difficulties in India.

The French in Indo-China and the Dutch in the East Indies (particularly Java) were also confronted with grave unrest among the native population as well as possible difficulties with the aggressive Japanese

power to the north. The ease with which the Japanese later overran all of southeast Asia with the exception of the Philippines was an indication of the natives' dissatisfaction with the government ruling over them. The natives under imperialist rule from Europe had the weight of the depression added to their natural dislike of the foreign governors who had exploited their lands for so many years. The second World War was to bring the whole problem of imperialism to a head and demand some kind of solution.

XIX

The Breakdown of the Settlements of 1919-1920

The International Crisis

THE havoc worked by the depression in the internal problems of the nations was inevitably translated into action in international affairs. The decade from 1929 to 1939 saw the disintegration of the arrangements made at Paris in 1919-1920 and the preparation of the world for a new and even more sanguinary outburst of violence than the conflict of 1914-1918. The depression weakened the political fabric of the world so much that the internal conflicts inherent in the treaties could no longer be held in check. First in Asia, then in Africa, and finally in Europe the disorder spilled over and prepared the way for the cataclysmic events of our day. In an effort to remake the world according to their own interests, a small group of fanatics, backed by unthinking masses, succeeded in wrecking much of the civilization which Western Europe and Asia had spent centuries in building. The depression brought a crisis in the liberal-democratic way of life and generated violent movements led by men who had little or no appreciation for the civilization which had emerged at the end of the nineteenth century. Like the French Revolution a little over a hundred years before, these new movements disregarded accepted values and aspirations and tried to establish a new order in the world.

The men and the nations holding to the old values and the older world order were also deeply afflicted by a moral crisis which made them doubt their own solutions for political problems. This fact is of paramount importance if one is to understand the 1930's. The whole world, Fascist, communist, and liberal-democratic, understood that the crisis of 1929 demanded a reorientation of political philosophy. It was not, therefore, until revolutionary upsurges threatened the balances of power in the world that men fully realized that Western civilization itself was on trial. When aggressive political action in Germany and

Japan obviously was destined, if unchecked, to disrupt the global balance of power, then there was no alternative to war.

Security and Disarmament

It has sometimes been said that between the years 1929 and 1933 Western civilization made its choice between a peaceful and a warlike solution of the problems facing the world. This statement, however, is too simple to explain the complexity of the events that led to war in 1939. In 1929 Briand called for a European customs union; a year or so later Mussolini asked for a four-power European pact to adjust political problems; and between 1931 and 1933 two disarmament conferences met to discuss problems of military security. Whether these measures, had they been successfully concluded, could have prevented the German Revolution of 1933 or could have solved the Far Eastern crisis satisfactorily to all parties concerned, is a matter of faith or opinion but not a proper subject for historical discussion. It seems now that the German Revolution and the crisis in Japan are important elements in the train that fired the powder keg of the second World War; but even that judgment is made too soon after the events to be given absolute credence.

As we have already seen, there was only a slim chance that the economic crisis could be met by international action. The economies of the world were all affected by the crisis, but in different ways; the statesmen all tried to grapple with the problems, but from widely separated points of view and with very different ideas of practicable solutions. A European customs union, in spite of the reception given to Briand's speech, was impossible as long as each of the European states wanted to gain advantages over her neighbors. In a world in which higher tariffs, import quotas, embargos, and preferential trade agreements represented the best economic thinking of the several states, it was utopian to expect that they would sink their troubles in a common tariff structure. They all feared German industrial supremacy too much for that, and Briand's France would have been the first to oppose it.

The fiasco of the disarmament conferences is of a different order. Fundamentally it came out of unhistorical thinking about the question of war and the weapons of war, and the clash inherent in the interests of the states concerned. The Washington Conference (1921) had set a limit to the construction of heavy battleships over ten thousand tons. The naval conference of 1927 failed to achieve any results. In 1931, a third conference met at London to deal with the problem. But it faced

an impossible dilemma. Italy asserted her willingness to reduce her navy to an equality with any other Continental power, but she would not agree to any treaty that set her in a position inferior to any other Continental power. France, on the other hand, demanded a navy larger than Italy's because she had the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, and widespread colonies to guard. There was no solution to this impasse for neither power would give in. Britain, with an Italo-French naval race in the Mediterranean to watch, insisted that her forces available for those waters equal the combined Franco-Italian power. This, of course, inevitably affected the United States and Japan, for they would not accept increases in Britain's navy without corresponding alterations in their own. In other words if the Franco-Italian problem was insoluble, there could be no naval ratio established.

The second problem arose out of Japanese unwillingness to accept the Washington Conference ratio of 5:5:3. This did not meet Japanese needs in the world of 1931. For a time it seemed that no treaty could be signed, but finally, as a face-saving device, the Conference did write a treaty in which one clause allowed any signatories to increase his naval construction merely by notifying the others of the fact. This "escalator" clause "saved" the conference, but made mockery of the idea of naval limitation. The Japanese ratio to the United States and England was increased to 10:10:7, but the treaty was no barrier to more extensive construction.

The general disarmament conference which met at Geneva under the auspices of the League of Nations a year later did not produce even a face-saving treaty. Ten years of work by the League's committee on disarmament was presented to the Conference, but it was a report that anyone familiar with the weapons of war could have written in a week. In place of quotas for each of the powers, there were blank spaces to be filled in at the Conference. The Conference broke down almost immediately on the issue between France and Germany. The German delegation demanded equality: let the other nations disarm to Germany's level, or let Germany arm to theirs. The French demanded security before they would consider equality. They wanted a police army to defend the *status quo*, and they were willing to have the French army fill that function. It was a deadlock. Mr. Hoover interposed with a suggestion for the abolition of all heavy weapons — large mobile rifles, tanks, bombing planes, and the like — that could be used for aggressive action. Curiously enough the suggestion was supported by Russia, Italy, and Germany. But it never had a chance of being seriously considered.

The situation, of course, was this. If Germany were given equality in

armaments, that fact would automatically make her the strongest power on the Continent. For in spite of much talk about the numbers of guns, tanks, and planes each nation should have, everyone knew that it was the industrial power *behind* the army that made an army strong. Germany's war potential in industry was approximately equal, if not superior, to all the rest of Europe put together. Her demand for equality was, therefore, a demand for superiority. On the other hand, the French talk of security, police forces, and the like was merely another attempt to freeze the arrangements of 1919 indefinitely. The French knew that no settlement ever lasted very long, and they were trying to assure themselves against changes that might be detrimental to their position as the leading power on the Continent. In the end the British moved closer to the French position. They were willing to see Germany rearm a little but they did not want to see her dominate the Continent.

The Conference began while Germany was still governed by democrats and liberals; it ended after Germany had fallen into the hands of the Nazis. When Hitler came to power in 1933, he reiterated the German offer to accept equality at any level of armament, but equality rather than inferiority. When it became obvious, as it had been from the start, that this demand had no chance of acceptance, he withdrew the German delegation and announced Germany's intention to quit the League of Nations. The orientation toward the West which was started by Stresemann at Locarno, came to an end. Germany was going to go her own way.

American Neutrality: A Warning and an Invitation

The gentleman's agreement at Lausanne, by which the debtor nations agreed not to pay their war debts to the United States, and the fiasco of the disarmament conference made a painful impression upon the American public. It was the last straw needed to complete the disillusionment of the nation. From 1920 onward, revelations of one kind after another had stripped from the eyes of the American public the blinders that war propaganda had created. The publication of the archival materials of the period 1871-1914 clearly indicated that the causes for the war were not just as they had seemed to be in 1917-1918. Serious monographs written primarily for scholars, as well as popular articles in the periodical press, stressed the same point. It seemed clear that America had been "taken in" by propaganda. To face such a fact was humiliating. The depression was objective evidence that she had been fooled again during the era of prosperity about the economic

"facts of life"; the Lausanne Agreement was convincing evidence that Uncle Sam had been a "sucker"; the disarmament conference showed clearly that Europe did not know how to keep the peace.

The Congress of the United States reacted to the Lausanne Agreement by passing the Johnson Act (1934), which forbade the floating of any loans in the United States by any power that was in default to the United States. The Act killed two birds with one stone: it punished the ungrateful European states, and it saved the money of American investors which might otherwise have been lost in future defalcations.

While the nation was congratulating itself upon the Johnson Act, a group of publicists "discovered" why the United States went to war in 1917. Their "findings" had been included in the lectures and books of practically every historian who had discussed the problem in the preceding ten years, but the professors had not known how to make their evidence popular. Actually, of course, the publicists seized upon only part of the story and built it up as news. The United States, it seems, had gone to war because our people loaned money to the Allied powers, made munitions for them, and believed their propaganda. But above all it was the munitions makers and sellers who were behind war. The "merchants of death" played the same evil role that Wilson had given to secret diplomacy in 1917. The thesis of historical causation was flimsy and cheap, but it was presented with great "authority" by books and magazine articles that caught the public imagination. Just as the "Junkers" in a later day were at the root of war, so the munitions maker in 1934-1935 occupied the place of dishonor. A senatorial committee under Senator Nye began an extensive investigation. The link between finance and fighting was forged from the testimony of the House of Morgan, along with the idea that England had "unloaded" the cost of the war on the United States *before* she had exhausted the reserves of the British Empire. The picture presented by the publicists was discovered to be the "true one," and the Congress of the United States passed the Neutrality Act so that Americans would not be taken in a second time.

The Neutrality Act of 1935 made it unlawful for the United States in time of war to sell "arms, munitions, or implements of war" to any belligerent or to any neutral for the use of belligerents. It further proclaimed, with an eye to the controversies over freedom of the seas, that American citizens and American shipping would enter war zones at their own risk. The President of the United States was empowered to proclaim the existence of a state of war and to warn Americans to stay away from it. This was a reversal of a time-honored American policy that had defended the rights of neutrals. The United States now freely re-

nounced the right of her citizens and shipping to enter war zones. Coupled with the Johnson Act of the year before, the Neutrality Act proclaimed to the world the United States' intention to stay out of the next conflict. Mr. Roosevelt, who signed these two Acts, and the Congress that wrote them, underlined the fact of American isolationism.

This legislation was carefully studied by those in Europe who hoped to upset the *status quo* in the world and establish a new order. It gave them renewed confidence in pursuing their designs. If the United States were to remain aloof from the rest of the world, the *status quo* could be altered as they desired.

The Crisis in the Far East, First Phase

On September 18, 1931, a bomb exploded on the track of the South Manchuria Railway a few miles north of Mukden. This incident provided the signal for the first significant breach in the treaty structure of the world; Japanese forces swarmed into southern Manchuria and occupied the country. The situation behind the invasion was, on the one side, the conviction of the military leaders in Japan that an imperialist adventure would remove the problems of the economic crisis in Japan; and, on the other, a combination of the Chinese boycott and the truculent attitude of the Manchurian war lord Chang Hsueh-liang who was trying to get out of Japanese control. By January, 1932, all organized resistance to Japanese ambitions was crushed, and in March, Manchuria was renamed Manchukuo, given a ruler, and declared to be a new independent nation. Henry Pu-yi, a descendant of the old Manchu dynasty, solemnly became regent, and looked about for recognition of his government by the other states of the world. The presence of a Japanese army and swarms of Japanese advisers made reasonable the assumption that the new state was a puppet of the empire of Japan.

The Chinese reacted to this aggression by appealing to the League of Nations and intensifying the boycott against Japan. While the League considered its action in a leisurely way, the Chinese in Shanghai attacked and killed a Japanese citizen and destroyed Japanese goods on the docks and in the stores. The Japanese navy responded by the traditional "gunboat" policy: the city was shelled, some 25,000 troops were landed, and after a five weeks' battle, the Chinese armed forces were expelled. In May of 1932 these troops were withdrawn, but the world had been shocked by the first publicized pitched battle fought by a great power since 1919 and thrilled by the heroic defense of the Chinese Nineteenth Route Army.



Northeastern Asia: The Sphere of Japan's Primary Interests

The big question, of course, concerned the action of the League of Nations, since this was the first significant test of that institution. In due time it dispatched a commission headed by Lord Lytton, former governor of Bengal and Viceroy of India, to investigate the situation in Manchuria and report to the League. The Lytton report was ready by October, 1932, thirteen months after the opening of the Manchurian incident. By that time, however, two other documents made it evident that there was some difference of opinion about the solution that should be found. In January, 1932, Mr. Stimson, President Hoover's Secretary of State, announced that the United States would not recognize any change in the government of Manchuria accomplished by military force. This "Stimson doctrine" was intended as a stiffening for the League policy. The United States, although not a member of the League, was obviously ready to back a strong League policy. A few days later, however, the British government announced that it did not find it necessary to follow the Stimson doctrine since Japan had given assurances that the open-door policy of Manchukuo would not be changed. In March, 1932, not waiting for the Lytton report, the League voted to apply the "non-recognition policy" suggested by

Washington, in spite of the hints from London. Japan, indignantly reproaching the League for following an "inapplicable formula," announced that she would withdraw from the League. The Lytton report, submitted months later (October, 1932), was full of weasel words; Japan was not seriously condemned even though, in the opinion of the commission, her military action was not justified as a defensive measure. The report described the new state as a puppet regime but at the same time suggested that China should recognize the autonomy of Manchuria. Nonrecognition was not a serious menace to Japan's control, and the League action stopped with nonrecognition. The lesson was obvious; the League was not able to adopt a program that would check Japan. The reason was, of course, that the powers upon whose shoulders the burden of carrying out a strong policy would fall, were themselves unwilling to act.

Manchuria was a rich prize, and its conquest raised the prestige of the men in Japan with a positive policy. General Araki, an apostle of antiforeign propaganda, announced that Japan must now "fulfill her natural destiny"; the idea of a Greater East Asia prosperity sphere was launched in world politics.

Disorders in China invited further aggression. Ever since his break with the communists, General Chiang Kai-shek had been at war with the Communist Party in China. A Chinese Red army appeared in the field against him, and after an epic march established itself in the Shensi provinces to the north. Chiang's constant attacks upon this army only strengthened the will of Chinese communists to resist, and weakened the fabric of China's national life. Since Chinese communism has been described only by its rabid enemies or its fervent friends, it is difficult for a Westerner to understand just what the movement actually is. None the less, the very fact that there was a Red China and a Nationalist China competing for the loyalty of the Chinese people by propaganda and by force of arms, invited the Japanese to expand the holdings they had acquired in the North.

It was one thing to detach Manchuria from the South; it was quite another to move on toward the Great Wall. Manchuria's relations with China had long had a semi-independent status. The provinces bordering the Great Wall were integral parts of the Chinese nation. Yet it was into that North China that Japan's armies moved. In 1933 they invaded Jehol province, brushed aside the ill-organized resistance of the Chinese irregulars, and established their control over the whole of the territory north of the Wall. Chiang, with the communist war on his hands, temporized and tried to appease the invaders. In spite of the fact that the Japanese had taken over control of the passes in the

Wall that opened into the rich lands between it and the Yellow River (Hwang Ho), as springboards for further aggression, he seemed to believe that it would be better to fight the communists and appease the Japanese. By 1935 the absurdity of this policy became apparent when the Japanese discovered a "separatist" movement in the Hopeh province, and again sent their armies on the march. A new puppet government in Hopeh and Chahar was duly recognized by the Chinese nationalist government.

The next year (1936) saw a shake-up in China that forced Chiang to change his policy. How it was done is a long story which probably cannot be fully understood for years to come. On December 12 there was a dramatic kidnaping of Chiang Kai-shek in which Chang Hsueh-liang, the ousted ruler of Manchuria, played an important part. When Chiang returned, it was explained that the communists had extended him hospitality to provide an opportunity for calm reflection on the question of a united front against the Japanese. The communists in China, like the communists elsewhere, were anxious to co-operate against the great dangers assailing communism and the communist fatherland, Russia. No one missed the fact that Japan's expansion menaced Siberia as well as North China. In 1937 the Far Eastern War began officially, although its existence was not "discovered" by Washington until 1941. Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Red army joined hands to meet the threat from Japan; it remained to be seen whether aid would come from the West in time to prevent Japan from crushing this resistance to her program.

The Dilemma of France

The utter failure of the League to act effectively in the Far Eastern crisis accentuated the anxiety of the French Foreign Office about security for France. When to this fiasco was added the rise of Hitler to power in Germany and the breakdown of the disarmament conference, France's position seemed perilous in the extreme. The system of alliances that had assured her against the dangers of revisionism in the 1920's seemed puny and insufficient, especially since the economic crisis was progressively weakening the small eastern and central European states to a point where they no longer constituted a serious force in the European balances of power. If Hitler actually should rearm Germany in spite of the Treaty of Versailles, the era of French hegemony would definitely be at an end. After 1933 it became clear that there were four powers that might claim military and political weight — Russia, Germany, Italy, and France — and three of these were not only not in the French alliance system but actually were menaced by it. Nor

was that all; at least two of them, Russia and Germany, had resources, population, and industry that made them more powerful than France.

As early as 1930 the French Foreign Office had begun to take steps to meet the possibility of Hitler's rise to power. The other nation obviously menaced by the brown-shirted German fanatic was the Soviet Union, and it was not unnatural for the two powers, France and Russia, to begin a rapprochement. It was not too easy to accomplish, first because conservatives in France regarded Russia with deepest suspicion and urged that the payments of the czar's bonds should precede any agreement. On the other hand, all through the 1920's bourgeois France was regarded as the very seat of anti-Russian activity by the men of the Soviet Union; they especially resented the activity of White Russians in France as a threat to the permanence of the revolution. None the less, the realities of the situation in Germany obviously dictated an understanding between the two states. Both Louis Barthou, the new French foreign minister, and Litvinoff, the Soviet commissar for foreign affairs, began to come together as soon as the storm clouds gathered in Germany.

The first move was the negotiation of a nonaggression pact between the Soviet Union and France. This was innocuous enough; Russia had been making nonaggression pacts with every power that would accept one, and there was no reason why she should not include France in the list. But before the Franco-Russian pact was signed, Barthou arranged for the making of similar pacts between Russia and France's allies in central and eastern Europe. To do this was not so easy. There was no love between Russia and Poland or Russia and Rumania, and neither Czechoslovakia nor Yugoslavia showed any friendly attitude toward Russia. The pacts, however, were eventually negotiated and ratified, shortly after Hitler became chancellor in Germany. Indeed in 1933 it almost seemed that it would be easy to keep Hitler from upsetting Europe. His Third Reich had no friends except perhaps Hungary, since it inspired only fear in practically every country of Europe.

The next move was to attempt to translate the nonaggression pacts into treaties of mutual assistance. Here again Barthou and Litvinoff led the way. France played godfather to the Soviet Union when Russia entered the League, and Litvinoff pointed to an article by Karl Radek, the leading Soviet publicist, in which he contended that Russia had become a power interested in defending the *status quo* and even the treaties of 1919. It obviously was a courtship which could lead to an alliance. But the French government wanted to bring Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia into the agreement so that her system of the 1920's would survive and give counterweight to Russia

within the new alliance. Although Poland and Rumania had swallowed the nonaggression pact, they choked on the treaty of mutual assistance. King Alexander of Yugoslavia may have been willing to lead his government into the pact, but he and Barthou were assassinated in the fall of 1934 by a Croat revolutionist. Czechoslovakia, alone, willingly followed the French lead.

The Polish reaction was almost astonishing. The Polish rulers apparently felt that they had to decide whether they hated Germany or Russia more. Romantically, they had taken on both their large neighbors as special enemies, but it seems that Russia was the more hated of the two, for Pilsudski, the Polish dictator, turned to Hitler in 1934 and made a ten-year treaty of friendship between Germany and Poland. The story is told that, after failing to secure French support for an immediate preventive war in 1933, Pilsudski asked Hitler whether he wanted peace or war with Poland. Since Germany was of course in no position for war at the moment, Hitler wanted peace. The ten-year treaty was the result. After Pilsudski's death, when Hitler was ready for war, he praised "the great Polish leader" whose vision was larger than that of the Poles of 1939.

Louis Barthou's death in 1934 brought Pierre Laval to the French Foreign Office. Laval was a shifty man who wanted to play all ends at the same time. He announced that he would continue Barthou's work in forwarding the understanding with Russia and he also declared his intention to bring Italy into the French alliance system. He would make France friends with everyone in Europe, even Hitler, and thereby guarantee her security. The pro-Italian leaning was popular in many sections of France. Italy, too, was a Latin nation; Mussolini was a hero to men who had bank balances and property in France. Furthermore in 1934 Italy entered the lists as an opponent of German expansion in Central Europe.

Italy appeared in the role of savior of Central Europe during the Austrian crisis of 1934. The rise of Hitler in Germany had serious repercussions in the little state of Austria. Before 1933 almost the entire population of Austria favored union with Germany; but after Hitler took over control, ruthlessly suppressed all other parties, started a *Kulturkampf* with Rome, and generally offended liberal opinion by the brutality of his treatment of minority groups, only the Nazi Party in Austria wanted *Anschluss*. The other parties showed a natural reluctance to press for a union which would deprive them of existence. The economic and political life of Austria was in near chaos and, as in Germany, it seemed inevitable that some "strong" government would emerge. In the winter of 1934 the Catholic Social Party and the *Heim-*

wehr (a private army with Fascist inclinations) staged a revolt. The Social-Democrats tried to fight back with guns but were speedily crushed. It was generally understood that the new government led by Dollfuss received subsidies from Italy. In the summer of 1934 the Nazis in Austria tried a *coup d'état*. Dollfuss was murdered, but the revolt failed. In the height of the crisis an Italian army assembled at the Brenner Pass, and Mussolini announced that if any foreign army (the German, of course) went into Austria, the Italian army would also move in at once. Thus Mussolini stood as the defender of Austrian "independence" against German aggression.

The importance of Italian action was not lost in Paris; the conservative press, long advocate of an Italian alliance, urged the government to come to terms with Mussolini. When Laval became foreign minister, one of his first acts was to visit Rome, where he saw both Mussolini and the pope. It is known now that he came to an agreement with the former. Italy was happy to co-operate with France, but in return Mussolini expected the French to agree to his program for expansion in East Africa. France and Italy had introduced Ethiopia into the League of Nations in the early 1920's when they thought Britain might take over that country to suppress the slave trade. Moreover, France, Italy, and Ethiopia were members of the World Court. These facts did not, however, interfere with an understanding whereby the French agreed not to interfere while Mussolini's armies occupied Ethiopia. A few months later, when Hitler announced the rearmament of Germany, British, French, and Italian statesmen met at Stresa to see what could be done about this violation of the Treaty of Versailles. The conference did little about Hitler, but apparently it was on this occasion that the British government expressed its willingness to let Mussolini take Ethiopia.

Thus Laval's move toward Italy gave the green light to Mussolini's expansionist policy. At the same time Laval continued the negotiations with the Russians. The treaty was described as an "eastern Locarno agreement" to guarantee the frontiers of eastern Europe just as the other Locarno treaty guaranteed the Rhine. This new description of the treaty did not make it any more attractive to either Germany or Poland, both of whom were asked to sign. In the end only Czechoslovakia was willing to join this mutual assistance agreement with Russia. Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Poland excused themselves. When the treaty between France and Russia was ratified (1936), it provided an excuse for Hitler to reoccupy the Rhineland, and shortly afterwards induced the Belgian government to seek a return to its pre-1914 neutrality. The Italian orientation ended in the Ethiopian crisis; the Rus-

sian orientation further weakened France's already feeble structure of alliances in central and eastern Europe.

The Ethiopian War 1935-1936

Laval's visit to Rome did not cause the war in Ethiopia; it merely gave Mussolini the assurance that his project would not be thwarted by France. The roots of the Ethiopian War go much deeper. When the great powers had scrambled for African empires in the 1880-1900 period, Britain and Germany both understood that Italy could take the "horn" of Africa as her share. It was a modest portion, nicely adjusted to the fact that Italy was not very important anyway. The seacoasts of Eritrea and Somaliland, two of the finest desert areas in the world, were duly occupied, and then the Italian armies started to take over the interior behind these conquests. This proved, however, to be too formidable a task for them. A local chieftain armed with French guns and advice, defeated the invaders and forced them to withdraw. It was the only unavenged defeat that black men had administered to white men in the conquest of Africa, and it assured the natives of Ethiopia independence from the white rule to which the rest of the continent succumbed. When Italy attacked again in 1935, there was much sympathy for the Ethiopian ruler and his people but the plain fact remains that Ethiopia did not benefit much from her independence. The so-called emperor was a tribal chieftain who maintained an uneasy hold over his vassals, and the concepts of civilization common to the West simply did not exist in the land. Poverty, misery, disease, dirt, and even slavery were commonplaces. None the less, the rulers, chieftains, and land owners, enjoyed a fierce feeling of freedom not found elsewhere in Africa. They did not want foreigners to take their places as exploiters of the land.

It was easy to find a point of dispute between Italy and Ethiopia. The frontier between Eritrea and Ethiopia bore some of the characteristics of the Indian frontier in the United States of the 1830's and 1840's; the tribes were used to customary law and paid little attention to boundary lines. Indeed, although maps existed to tell where the frontier was supposed to run, the surveys were sketchy and open to some question. If Italy wanted an excuse for war, it would be easy to manufacture one and that is just what happened. There was an "incident" at Walwal, a dreary, barren region without value to anyone but the miserable tribesmen who were unable to go anywhere else because the better lands were already occupied. In a fight over some wells, a handful of native Eritrean soldiers under Italian officers were killed. Italy

prepared "to defend her security, rights, and dignity" by sending troops and materials of war to East Africa. Walwal, like the thirty inches of the South Manchurian Railway line destroyed by a bomb, was obviously only an excuse for aggressive action.

Haile Selassie, the emperor of Ethiopia, had good advice and a strong moral position. There were plenty of people who wanted to test the League of Nations in the West to see if it could not retrieve the prestige lost in the Manchurian affair. A group of sympathizers joined the emperor in an appeal to the League, to the World Court, and to world opinion, and at each step heightened Ethiopia's moral position by exposing Mussolini's program for what it was, an act of aggression. It was embarrassing to Italy, to France, and to Britain. The latter two powers had agreed to Mussolini's conquest before they realized how skillfully the friends of the League could fight. Of course Mussolini did not intend to back down, but his supporters in France and Britain soon were anxious to find some formula which would allow them to satisfy him and to mollify the rising tide of public opinion at home.

The center of the storm shifted to Britain. The British people in 1935 were profoundly hopeful that war could be avoided in the future; their losses in the last war had convinced them that they must not fight another. The pacifist movement, in the shape of the Oxford oath "not to fight for king and country," swept through the youth of the land. When, however, the war clouds began to gather in East Africa, they became aware that war could not be stopped by mere speeches, and the idea of collective security through the League took firm root. Floods of letters began to pour into the press and into the mail of politicians from people of all walks of life urging that the time to stop war was now and the way to stop war was through the League of Nations. Liberal and Labour political leaders whipped up public opinion to a point where the government had to reconsider its policy.

The English Conservatives had never shown much confidence in the League of Nations or in collective security, and the government had indicated in a secret document that there was no reason to object to the Italian conquest. When that state paper came to light, through an indiscretion, to show that the problem had been considered by the government, there was a renewed outburst of public opinion. This time imperialistic-minded Conservatives joined the League-minded labor and liberal groups to attack the timeservers and opportunists who had blindly allowed Italy to attach herself to Britain's lifeline. These attacks led to a change in British policy. In June, 1935, Anthony Eden, the British representative on the League Council, tried to get Mussolini to accept a formula that would have given Italy a "mandate" over

Ethiopia, clothed of course in language that "guarded Ethiopian independence." Britain was ready even to cede a slice of her Somaliland territory to calm the storm. But Mussolini had already been assured that he could make the conquest; he had troops and munitions ready to go into Ethiopia when the rains stopped; he could see no advantage in saving face for the British Conservatives. When the rains stopped, the Italian armies invaded Ethiopia.

Sir Samuel Hoare, the British foreign secretary, made a speech in Geneva in which he indicated that his people and his government were ready, in the name of collective security, to stand up against this aggression. It was a speech overladen with idealism and full of hope for the men who wanted the League of Nations to become a barrier to future war. Unfortunately it was largely window-dressing for the British electorate, whose votes Sir Samuel hoped to win for his party; at the very time it was given he was prepared to make a deal that would sell out Ethiopia and the League. None the less the League did act, in a way at least. It applied financial sanctions, it forbade the export of guns and munitions to Italy (she made her own anyway, of course), and there was talk — only talk — of applying sanctions which would prevent oil from reaching the Italian war machine. Such sanctions might have stopped it. (Italy's oil, incidentally, came mostly from Russia in exchange for warships built for the Soviet Union.) At the same time the British fleet, with considerable publicity, moved into the Mediterranean Sea — and watched the ships of Italy carry men and supplies through the Suez to Eritrea.

France was caught on the horns of a dilemma. Her little allies in central Europe were anxious to have the League stop Italy. It would be a good precedent in case Germany should begin to move. And Britain, outwardly at least, was moving toward a position which might lead to real action against Italy. Laval's newly found friendship for Italy was indeed imperilled. Of course Britain was more important to France than Italy, but Laval wanted both of them for friends. While he skillfully dropped wrenches into the gears of the League machinery, he made the famous Hoare-Laval pact with Britain whereby Italy would get the substance of her conquest and yet preserve the dignity of the League. The plan did not leak out until after a British election had given the Conservatives a strong majority in the House of Commons, but when it did, it forced the resignation of Sir Samuel Hoare, and a month later Laval too was out of office. The speeches at Geneva, the promises of collective security, and the hopes of the peoples of the world were too strong to allow such backdoor dealing.

The conquest of Ethiopia went on rapidly. When the Italians first

began their march, the press of the world told how brave were the Ethiopians. Then it seemed that the lion and snake population would stop the Italians, just as the tigers were supposed to stop the Japanese in Malaya in 1942. But the Italian army had tanks, trucks, gas, planes, and guns. The Ethiopians were badly equipped. The results were, of course, what should have been expected. Italy marched in, and soon "vassals" of Haile Selassie were rallying to the invaders. As in the case of the earlier conquests in Africa, the European military superiority was overwhelming.

Tempers in the liberal world, however, were worn thin by the sight of Italian successes. Haile Selassie, driven from his country, grew in stature and moral prestige while the pussyfooting leaders of the great powers who had failed to use the League machinery were subjected to scathing criticism from their fellow citizens. In January of 1936 it began to look as if this criticism might force the hand of the British government and produce real intervention against Italian aggression. From Mussolini's growling speeches it became clear that even he was beginning to be worried. If Britain should actually move against Italy, the army in Eritrea and Ethiopia would be in a very exposed position. At this point, apparently, Mussolini turned to Hitler for aid, and from this point we can date the origin of that instrument of aggression, the Rome-Berlin Axis. When France could no longer assure protection of his flank, Mussolini had to be able to get aid elsewhere. Hitler, it seems, was willing to help—for a price. The price was Austria, which, as Hitler later jokingly remarked, became his "Ethiopia." The assistance came in the form of German reoccupation of the Rhineland. This act wrought confusion in the camp of Italy's opponents by distracting their attention from one aggressor to another. In the years to follow, Germany, Italy, and Japan learned to play the game of diplomacy by confusion so well that it almost seemed as if there was no way to check their moves.

The conquest of Ethiopia was over before the rains began again, and although Europe did not recognize it as legal until the appeasement era of 1937-1938, it was an accomplished fact which obviously could be undone only by a major military operation. This, added to the Manchurian episode, ended the prestige of the League of Nations. When the next great crisis broke in Europe, the Spanish Civil War, the League was not seriously considered as a political institution capable of dealing with it.

Rome-Berlin-Tokyo

When Hitler came to power in Germany, he was without friends in the world. In *Mein Kampf* he had indicated hostility to Russia and France and the advisability of an alliance or agreement with Britain and Italy. But his approaches to Britain were clumsy and ill-timed, and the fanaticism of his followers offended British susceptibilities. His visit to Italy in 1934 was followed by the shocking "night of the long knives" when, without semblance of trial, a wave of executions swept Germany, and a few weeks later by the first Nazi *Putsch* in Austria, which brought Italian troops to the Brenner Pass. Fundamentally, of course, Germany was without allies, not because of Hitler's undiplomatic behavior or the cruelty of his regime but because Germany was militarily weak. No power would be willing to be responsible for Germany so long as she had no army worthy of the name, for such an alliance would bring obligations without advantages. Only with Russia did Germany have an understanding which allowed German aviators to train in Russia and German field commanders to experiment with larger bodies of troops. In return the Russians received military and industrial instruction and aid. Significantly neither Hitler nor Stalin broke this agreement until several years after Hitler came to power.

After the fiasco of the disarmament conference, Hitler laid plans for rebuilding Germany's military power. There was great activity in the planning division of the *Reichswehr* and a great increase in the "sporting" clubs that sponsored aviation. The Allies in 1919 had given Germany an army of professional soldiers, and that army had attracted the best brains that had come out of the kaiser's war colleges in the years preceding the first war. These young officers, keenly aware of where Germany made mistakes in 1914-1918, spent the years after Versailles planning a new kind of army. When they found that Hitler was the man who would give them the chance to build that army, they backed him in spite of their prejudices against the Nazi rabble and the corporal who had become their ruler. Early in 1935 Hitler gave them the signal to go ahead and announced to the world that Germany, unilaterally, was breaking the Treaty of Versailles by rearming. Again he offered the German formula at the disarmament conference: Germany's willingness to accept equality as the basis for German armament.

The Western powers met at Stresa to discuss the crisis. Obviously Germany could be stopped if her neighbors were ready and willing to act. The *Reichswehr* was small, and the German air force even smaller. In spite of Hitler's brave words, their secret service must have told

them the condition of the German military organization. But the Western powers, morally and economically unnerved by the depression and the problems of 1935, replied to Hitler's action by scolding him verbally. Even that rebuke lost most of its meaning when, a few months later, the British government negotiated a naval limitation treaty with Germany which allowed the latter to discard the naval clauses of the Treaty of Versailles provided she built her navy no larger than one-third the size of England's. It was clear that no one would stop Germany from regaining her military strength and it was also clear that, once her army was strong, Germany would become worthy of an alliance with a great power.

The first dividends from Germany's new army came in 1936 when Hitler announced the reoccupation of the Rhineland. His generals had urged him to wait; the professional diplomats had urged caution. Germany's year-old army could not have stood up against a stubborn invasion from France. But Hitler's intuition or his political sagacity showed him that the time was ripe. He could not only secure the Rhineland but also detach Italy from the list of powers that opposed his schemes. He was right; the generals were wrong. As we shall see, the generals were wrong so many times in the next five years that they lost the prestige necessary to allow them to oppose their ruler. The Rhineland was occupied in spite of the statement of the French premier that France "would never allow Strasbourg to be under German guns." The French statesmen, like the German generals, were also wrong many times between 1936 and 1940. The British Conservative government, on the other hand, took the "sensible" attitude that the Rhineland was German territory and so, actually, no change had been effected in the *status quo* in Europe.

There was, however, a great change in the *status quo* of Europe. With a German army on the Rhine, it was possible to protect the industrial heart of Germany and, as soon as fortifications were built, to prepare for adventures in central Europe without too great concern for the country's safety in the West. Moreover, the first step was taken in the formation of the Rome-Berlin Axis that Mussolini so triumphantly announced in the fall of 1936. Hitler showed the Italians that their hopes could be realized if they would co-operate with their Fascist neighbor to the north. The price was that Mussolini must give up his protectorate over Austria. The *Anschluss* was delayed for two years, but there was other important work to be done before it could be carried to completion.

Upon the heels of the announcement that Rome and Berlin formed an axis in European affairs, came the signing of the German-Japanese

"anti-communist pact." *Mein Kampf* had not foreseen this Japanese arrangement, but Nazi propaganda soon made the Japanese into "Oriental Prussians" and at least "honorary Aryans." The pact itself was a mystic document aimed at no one in particular but at communism in general. For the Japanese it was a warning to Russia that they were not without friends on the other side of the Soviet Union, and an additional guarantee that Japan's conquests in China would continue unmolested. To the Germans it was a second treaty that brought them out of isolation and at the same time pointed a gun at the Soviet Union. Most people missed the fact that the same gun was also pointed at Britain, France, and the United States. The pact had one further advantage to both powers for it provided for the exchange of secret information valuable to each other. By 1937 a German "cultural" publication was called *Rome, Berlin, Tokyo*, and the concept of an Axis that spanned the Eurasiatic continent was familiar to all the chancelleries of the world.

The Spanish Civil War

The Ethiopian war had hardly reached its dreary conclusion before Europe was shaken by a ferocious struggle in Spain which threatened to involve the whole Continent. Spain had been intermittently plagued with internal disorder ever since the French Revolution. A number of factors in Spanish society were responsible for this situation. In the first place, Spain's basic economy, agriculture, was bound up with a semifeudal land-holding system that cried aloud for reform. The grandees and capitalists, many of them foreigners, who owned the land naturally were set against any alterations that would deprive them of their wealth. Secondly, industrialism was largely the work of absentee capitalists, foreigners who had invested in Spanish enterprises primarily because it was easy to exploit labor in Spain. There were strong Marxist parties that easily led the working masses toward some radical solution of the problem. Thirdly, the Roman Church, which was at once a source of unity and a center of dissatisfaction, presented serious difficulties. The church was a land owner and a property owner. It controlled public utilities in some cities and was inclined to identify its secular interests with those of God. The upper clergy were often recruited from the wealthier classes and strengthened the association between the church and the defenders of the *status quo*. The work of mercy and charity done by priests and nuns tended to be obscured by the unfortunate political alliance with the wealthy, so that Spain became a perfect example of Pope Pius XI's statement, "The scandal of the twentieth century is that the poor have abandoned God."

The other factor in the Spanish puzzle was the army. Its military skill was open to some question, but its interest in politics was pronounced.

On the other side of the picture there was an articulate and reasonably enlightened element which had been growing ever since the French Revolution. These men were democrats, anticlericals, and liberals; they resembled their counterpart in the French Center and Left-of-center parties. There were also a half dozen or so radical proletarian movements in Spain ranging from the strongest Anarchist Party in Europe to communists of the Trotsky school. Syndicalism was comparatively stronger than elsewhere in Europe, and the orthodox Social Democrats who played so important a part in the rest of pre-1933 western Europe were therefore comparatively weaker than might be expected. To add to this revolutionary confusion, the Catalonians in eastern Spain had developed a separatist movement with the obvious intention of gaining autonomy or even independence for their province. All these groups were opposed to the coalition of landlords, clergymen, and capitalists whose interests had prevented serious reform.

In the 1920's Spain was governed by a military strong man, General Primo de Rivera, whose inability to cope with the depression after 1929 made Spain, like the rest of the world, the scene of political unrest. The king was probably only intelligent enough to see that he could not indefinitely resist the demands for reform. In 1930 he withdrew his support from Rivera and allowed elections to be held. The next year he left the country and Spain became a republic. But the republic did not solve the problems any more effectively than the monarchy had done. There was a discouraging tendency for the republican liberal politicians to move to the right after they were elected and a Fascist party, the Falangists, appeared on the scene. Between 1932 and 1936 the political picture shifted to the left and back to the right several times. The prisons filled up with political prisoners no matter which party was in power. It was a disheartening scene of political confusion.

In 1936 the four years of uncertainty were suddenly climaxed by an armed revolt. The left, under the Popular Front banner, won a majority in the parliament and obviously proposed to act vigorously in an attempt to carry out a reform program. The ominous factor was that the moderately conservative parties lost heavily; the right that was elected was a strongly nationalist group anxious to adopt vigorous methods to solve the crisis. On July 17, 1936 the army in Morocco rebelled against the government and raised the nationalist banner.

The revolt, however, was not the work of hotheads. The uprisings that followed all across the north of Spain clearly showed that it was a deeply prepared scheme. The fact that the Fascist governments in Ber-

lin and Rome obviously knew about it before it occurred and subsequently sent aid to the nationalist forces under Franco made many believe that the Fascist dictators had started this Spanish war. Such an assumption is probably unwarranted; there were all the things necessary for a civil war apart from outside aid. The Fascist states were merely opportunistic in their support to Franco's armies.

Once the revolt was in progress, it was soon marked by all the brutality common to civil strife in Spain. Murder and pillage passed for patriotism, and political necessity was used to justify brutal executions. The fact that the communists were the best organized and the most militant of the loyalist forces, even though their political representation in the government was small, led the capitalist press to refer to the government forces as the "reds" or even "communists" while the rebel forces were called the "nationalists." This terminology tended to confuse the issue. The added fact that the radicals in loyalist Spain struck frightful blows at the church and committed atrocities against the clergy, the nuns, the churches, and the monasteries gave the nationalists a trump propaganda card to use in Catholic and conservative Europe and America. On the other hand wholesale and obviously unnecessary executions of workers and Radical Party members aroused the feelings of liberals and radicals all over the world against Franco and his army. The historians whose memories extended into the nineteenth century were horrified to find that both sides were re-enacting the tragedy of Spain's revolutionary past.

Spain, however, was not to be allowed to fight out her civil war as a family feud. Too many interests in Europe clamored for representation in the conflict. As we have seen, the Fascist states were aware of the plot before it broke, and very soon Italian planes and guns were at the disposal of the nationalists. The government forces, too, looked abroad for aid and found sympathetic audience in Russia and in the French left. The duly established government naturally assumed that it would be able to buy planes, guns, and munitions in the markets of the world for the purpose of putting down a revolt in its own land. France and Czechoslovakia were both prepared to sell the Spanish loyalists whatever they might need for this purpose. At this point, however, it became a nice question whether Europe could supply both sides with weapons and remain at peace. The Italians and Germans growled at the fact that the loyalists were getting aid; the Russians, at the fact that the nationalist rebels were getting aid. But it was in France that the dilemma became acute. Blum's Popular Front government naturally sympathized with the Spanish Popular Front, but the anti-Catholic outrages made more conservative Frenchmen

profoundly hostile to loyalist Spain and sympathetic to Franco. To add to this confusion, Mussolini seemed willing to mix in French affairs if necessary to prevent aid to the loyalists. Some formula had to be found to keep Europe at peace and France from a civil war.

The Blum government hurriedly conferred with the government in London. The British had had past experience with Spanish civil wars; they were profoundly disturbed by the communistic complexion of the armies fighting for the loyalists, and unwilling to face the dangers involved in Italo-German support to Franco. In past civil wars both sides had finally become exhausted and Spain had come to Britain for advice and money to reconstruct the country. British policy can best be stated thus: it wished to allow the Spaniards to fight out their difficulties, with the hope that neither side would win. In the end Britain would be able to impose terms in exchange for credits. This was little help to Blum. His government, pressed by the communists, wanted to give decisive assistance to the loyalists, but, with the danger of difficulties at home, he could not follow such a policy without the active support of the British. Blum did not feel strong enough to act alone in face of possible difficulties with the French Fascists and Catholics as well as the threat of involvement with Italy and Germany. Since he could not help his friends, he tried the next best thing, namely, to prevent any aid from reaching either party. If this plan were successful, the loyalists, with their control over the industrial areas, seemed likely to win. The outcome was the calling together of the Nonintervention Committee.

Loyalist Spain tried to get the League of Nations to act, on the ground that both Germany and Italy were sending supplies and men to the aid of Franco; but the League was powerless. Instead of using the League, the great powers, on Blum's invitation, formed the London Nonintervention Committee where those that were actively intervening in Spanish affairs could piously blame each other and pass regulations and rules they would not live up to. It was unquestionably a farce, but it did allow the blowing off of international steam and probably reduced some of the tensions among the powers. The committee "blockaded" Spain to prevent munitions from entering the country, and solemnly told the world that it was isolating the civil war. To support the committee, the United States added "civil war" to its neutrality legislation, and forbade the exportation of American equipment to Spain.

The farce of nonintervention was soon apparent. An Italian army, an Irish brigade, and a large section of the German air force operated for Franco. Russian airmen and military technicians, and "brigades"

from France, the United States, Germany (communists), and elsewhere operated for the loyalists. Spain was a testing ground for equipment and tactics, a foretaste of the "big show" to be played a few years later. At the trials at Nuremberg in 1946, Göring frankly stated that he sent his young aviators to Spain to "finish off" their training. The Russian airmen on the loyalist side were usually older men; perhaps the Russian air force did not want to risk its young fliers.

There were a number of tense moments in the course of the war. When a loyalist pilot dropped a bomb squarely on a German warship in the nonintervention patrol, the Germans reacted by shelling open loyalist cities from the sea. When submarines mysteriously began to sink shipping destined to loyalist ports, it was clear that they were not nationalist, for Franco had no submarines. The naval powers finally stopped such "pirate" sinkings by an "international" (actually British and French) antisubmarine patrol (Nyon Conference, September, 1937). These measures, however, did not check the flow of "agricultural machinery," "dry goods," and other such "commodities" that poured into Spain by sea and by way of the French and Portuguese frontiers. Nor did they stop the influx of "tourists" who arrived by land, sea, and air, some of them in full uniform, to enjoy the "beauties of the Spanish countryside." Franco enjoyed certain advantages in the "tourist" and "agricultural machinery" business. His friends were wholeheartedly behind his cause. The loyalists were continuously faced with the problem that resulted from the split in France. The French right was able to check and at times even stop the flow of munitions across the Pyrenees, and Russia was a long way from Spain and not too ready to part with her best equipment. In the end it was this fact, together with the introduction of officers from the German High Command in the planning councils of the nationalists, that broke the loyalist cause and gave Franco victory. It was not until April, 1939, almost three years after the war had started, that Franco finally won complete control of the country. In his victory parade over a hundred thousand Italian troops marched in the May rain.

The Program of German Expansion

As we have seen, the sensational rise of German industrial power in the last three decades of the nineteenth century disrupted the balance of power on the Continent. In that period, however, German expansion was directed into the world rather than into the European community. Colonies in Africa, Asia, and the islands of distant oceans were the natural targets for German ambitions as much because the acquisition

of colonies was the fashionable mode of expansion in that epoch as because the frontiers in Europe were apparently stabilized. The difficulty in absorbing Alsace-Lorraine pointed to the absurdity of acquiring more French territory. Austria-Hungary, a loyal ally, was the object of the aggressive ambition of the Pan-Germanists, who wanted all the German-speaking peoples in the German Empire, but no responsible German statesman would have considered an attack on Austria for the purpose of bringing this about. Russia, as Wilhelm II once said, was a potentially dangerous neighbor with whom Germany must try to be on good terms. Bismarck's Russian policy had too firm a hold on German thinking to direct expansionist ambitions toward Russia. Furthermore pre-1914 Germany had enough "Polish trouble" on its hands; there was no desire to add more to it. Thus German economic and military exuberance found expression beyond the seas in a drive for world empire. In time it came into conflict with Great Britain.

It was the World War of 1914-1918 that directed German power in on Europe. Curiously enough, it was not until the German armies had established dominion over the broad belt of territory between the Baltic and North Seas and the Mediterranean and the Black Sea that German empire builders saw the possibilities in a Middle European political complex. The railway builders in Turkey and Middle Europe had prepared the way; the war showed that a mighty empire could be built in the heart of Europe; the defeat of 1918 was not convincing evidence of its impossibility. The war had another very significant result. It destroyed the Hapsburg monarchy. For centuries the Hapsburg military power had defended Danubian Europe against all attacks — Turkish, French, German, and Russian. After 1919, instead of a military power of the first magnitude, there were half a dozen little states occupying central Europe, no one of them strong enough to defend the area against a concerted drive by a great military power.

The Treaty of Versailles disarmed Germany but it did not break her industrial power. Firmly grounded on the great coal deposits of Westphalia and Silesia, on the technical, scientific, and organizational genius of her people, and on her central geographical position, German industry survived the war as the most important in Europe. The loss of Lorraine iron did not cripple Germany. She obtained iron from Sweden and Spain and forced the French into a junior partnership in the European steel business. Thus while Germany after 1919 was stripped of the instruments of war, the realities of military and economic power were still in her hands. Of the three nations that might move into the vacuum left by the collapse of the Hapsburg monarchy, Germany was in a better position than either Italy or Russia.

The treaty, however, did interrupt Germany's tradition of an overseas empire. Colonial-minded propagandists might have clamored for colonies, but, without sea power and in a world dominated by the navies of England, the United States, and Japan, overseas expansion was out of the question. The Danube basin, on the other hand, beckoned to Germany, first because the area was weak; second, because there were German minorities scattered throughout the area; and third, because it offered rich rewards in trade and commerce. The Danube and the Balkans complemented Germany economically just as in the United States the industrial North and East are complemented by the agricultural and mining South and West.

Of course, this situation did not necessarily mean conquest by military force. Indeed, as early as 1937 it became clear that German industrial power could take over the areas of south central Europe effectively and peaceably by economic conquest. The system of economy based upon blocked accounts and barter trade that Dr. Hjalmar Schacht had introduced to save Germany's commerce from collapse when the gold standard and free economy no longer functioned, had worked wonders in bringing the whole area to the south into the German orbit. Germany was the natural source of supply for manufactured goods needed in this region, and the products of these little states found a ready market in Germany. Dr. Schacht was undoubtedly horrified when he discovered that Hitler meant to make the conquest by military force — a sufficient reason for his joining the conspiracy that sought to overthrow the Nazi fanatic. To a banker and an industrialist it was clear that these lands were ripe plums which would fall into Germany's lap anyway if she played her hand right. Hitler, however, saw the problem otherwise, and the weakness of France and Britain when he announced the rearmament of Germany (1935) and the reoccupation of the Rhineland (1936), encouraged him to believe that his view was correct.


Hitler was stirred by other considerations. In the first place, he himself came from the borderlands of the Reich. His fundamental political doctrine, from the first page of *Mein Kampf* to the last, is embodied in the sentence, "People of like blood belong in the same state." To the south there were about ten million Germans living under governments other than the Nazi Reich. To be sure, most of them were in German Austria, but there were fairly large minorities in each of the states that had inherited the Hapsburg realm. Furthermore Hitler, like most dictators, was not satisfied to control his neighbors by silken economic ties; he wanted controls that would preclude the possibility of any interference or treachery, and those could be surely established only

by military power. Lastly, he felt deeply the humiliation of the defeat of 1918. One has only to read his political document — and many people before 1939 had failed to read it — to see that the defeat left a deep mark on his soul. Apparently he believed that it could be erased only by blood. His mysticism was capable of such a rationalization. In any case, some time in 1936 he decided that his ambitions could be realized by armed force. It is clear now from evidence obtained in Germany since her defeat in 1945, as well as from the statistics available even before 1939, that toward the end of that year (1936), Germany turned to a war economy. The next year (1937) the officials around the Führer understood that the Nazi regime was aimed at an armed assault on Europe.

In spite of the evidence of the historical record, this decision is almost incomprehensible. We know now that many Germans also understood that to throw down the gauntlet to Europe was foolhardy. Indeed a plot, which eventually had ramifications in the army, the Foreign Office, the financial and industrial circles, and even in the innermost councils of the Gestapo, was apparently organized to overthrow Hitler and expose the recklessness of his project. The presence of Schacht, Beck, Schmitt (Hitler's personal interpreter), and dozens of others important in all phases of German life seemed to give the conspirators a good chance of success. By having members of the plot high in the secret intelligence service of both army and state, they were able at a number of crucial moments to avoid detection. But the trap could not be sprung until there was a dramatic opportunity to expose Hitler to the German people as a madman. His prestige was high. Had he not conquered the depression, rearmed the nation, and reoccupied the Rhineland? To overthrow him, the plotters would have had to unmask him just as he was leading Germany to ruin, or they could not count on popular support. Unfortunately his star was in the ascendancy. For the next three years Europe yielded to him, and continued to heighten his prestige without his drawing the sword prematurely. With each victory, his overthrow became more and more difficult to organize and many of the conspirators lost heart or were converted into his docile slaves.

1937 was the last year of peace that Germany was to know. It took about fourteen months to gear the industrial machine to war needs. By 1938 the industrial and the military apparatus was about ready, and the Nazis were on the march.

German Moves in Europe, March 1936 to September 1939



Anschluss: 1938

The Austrian state created by the treaties of 1919-1920 was political and economic nonsense. Vienna had for centuries been the financial and political capital of a great power. When it was cut off from the rest of the Danube basin to become the capital of a tiny republic, its economic and political structure tottered and threatened to fall. In a decade it lost a quarter of a million of its people, and those that remained were continually in difficulties. The gay capital of Johann Strauss became a city of empty rooms and harassed inhabitants. The smaller cities in Austria were similarly afflicted. Their industries had been built up to supply the Hapsburg monarchy; after 1920 tariff barriers stood between them and their former customers, and in the postwar world new customers were hard to find. It required several financial blood-transfusions to keep Austria alive at all; even then, the situation was precarious during the whole period from 1918 to 1938. To the politically wise of the day it was obvious that she must either rebuild the Hapsburg monarchy or join Germany where she could again operate in a larger economic sphere. Altering her economy so that she could be another Switzerland or Denmark would have been so drastic a remedy that it is questionable whether it could have been accomplished without terrible suffering.

From 1919 to 1933 the Austrians wanted to join Germany. The romantic among them saw such a union as the completion of the German unification movement of the nineteenth century; the economically minded saw it as the salvation of her economy. In that period cultural ties were forged, the legal structure was rebuilt to make the *Anschluss* as painless as possible, and the vast majority of the people assumed that the two countries would unite in the reasonably near future. From 1933 until 1938 these assumptions were no longer valid. The German Reich changed its legal structure to a pattern disapproved by most Austrian politicians; only the Austrian Nazi Party was anxious to effect the unification. It was in this period, as we have seen, that the Catholic Social Party and the *Heimwehr*, backed by Mussolini with money and guns, established a dictatorship with the intention of resisting any *Anschluss* with the Nazi Reich.

The Dollfuss-Schuschnigg regime, however, was not based on any large popular support. It had been initiated by a bloody attack on the Social Democrats, whose strength in Vienna and the industrial areas was and continued to be considerable. It survived a Nazi *Putsch*, but the Nazi Party in Austria remained very strong. Furthermore it was bigotedly Roman Catholic and introduced a whole series of offensive

clerical laws that alienated non-Catholics. Thus the dictatorship could not count upon a majority, and its failure to solve the pressing economic problems of the day deprived it of the possibility of reconciling its enemies. Accordingly, as Hitler's fame as a statesman grew and news of the prosperity in the Reich seeped across the frontier, it was the Nazi Party that made converts, not the regime in power.

After 1936, when Mussolini withdrew his support from the Schuschnigg dictatorship, Austria was ready for "picking" as soon as the international situation could be prepared to make the action acceptable. Schuschnigg was forced to sign a treaty in which he promised to rule Austria as "a German state," and was left on tenterhooks to await his doom. The Spanish war and the big armament program had to be "matured" before it was the time for *Anschluss*.

Early in 1938 Hitler was ready. We know now that many of his generals urged caution on the ground that the German army was not prepared for all possible contingencies. But Hitler, with a better understanding of the situation in France and Britain than his generals had, set their advice aside and ordered them to plan for military action. The situation in the Western liberal-democratic countries was perfect for Germany. In France the Popular Front governments had about run their course, and conservatives were again influential in public affairs. By 1938 the conservatives were convinced that communism was a real menace. They had already drawn the teeth of the Franco-Russian pact of mutual assistance, and their newspapers were painting Hitler and Mussolini as the men who would save Europe from communism. The support that the French right gave Germany from 1937 to 1939 is one of the fantastic stories of the period before the second World War. They were so frightened by the civil war in Spain and so hopeful that they too could find a Hitler or a Mussolini that they almost sold their souls and their nation. Hitler was right to expect that France would have divided councils and be unable to act when he took Austria.

Even more demoralized was Great Britain. The British had a bad conscience about the Treaty of Versailles for fifteen years before the second World War. It is astonishing to see the nation that produced Drake, Wellington, Palmerston, Rhodes, and Churchill worry about the justice of a treaty imposed upon a defeated foe. And yet a study of the magazine articles and books produced in England will show that they were deeply affected by arguments for revision. More important was the Conservatives' fear of communism, which amounted to an obsession in many influential quarters. And strangely enough these people completely swallowed Hitler's propaganda that "Nazism is the shield of Europe against communism."

The *Anschluss* was accomplished without any difficulties with Europe. Hitler invited Schuschnigg to his mountain chalet and showed him the plans for the occupation of Austria. The unfortunate man was forced to agree to include Austrian Nazis in his cabinet and prepare the way for the situation that he himself wished to avoid. When he returned to Vienna, Schuschnigg somehow got the idea that he might get help from abroad. In any case he tried to resist the inevitable by calling for a plebiscite. Hitler knew well what plebiscites are in authoritarian regimes; he knew that one held under Schuschnigg's auspices would end in a disaster for *Anschluss*. So, without further ado the German army occupied Austria. It met no opposition. The occupation was accomplished within a few days. The Austrian Nazis donned their brown shirts and raised their colors and in a few weeks alienated the sympathy of the liberal world by their program of terror against the Jews and other enemies. In due time a plebiscite was held not only in Austria but in Austria and Germany. As might have been expected, the vote was practically unanimously in favor of union. There was a place on the ballot for recording a negative vote but almost no one ventured to use it.

The Munich Crisis

After the *Anschluss*, the map of central Europe was objective evidence of the next problem that would have to be faced. Germany surrounded about half of Czechoslovakia, and the Sudeten Germans living in Czechoslovakia were sure that their turn to join the Reich had come. Furthermore the rest of the Czechoslovakian frontiers, except a small part, were bordered by either Poland or Hungary, and both of these countries, like Germany, had designs upon Czechoslovak territory. The "friendly visits" between General Göring, Colonel Beck (Polish Foreign Minister), and Hungary's foreign minister Goemboes, exchanged for the ostentatious purpose of shooting elk or wild boar, should have been a warning that all was not well. The German tiger had two jackals to help her with the kill. When the *Anschluss* placed Bohemia inside the "jaws" of the German frontier, it was only a matter of time until a crisis would arise.

The German problem in Czechoslovakia arose out of the fact that for over ten centuries the Germans and the Czechs had jointly occupied the province of Bohemia without either people losing its cultural and linguistic identity. During most of the last three hundred years the Germans had been the ascendant group. They were the urban population with money, skill, and articulate talent as well as the favor of the Hapsburg government. The Czechs who migrated into the cities

before the population dislocations caused by industrialism, were usually absorbed into the German community; many of the Sudeten German family names testify to this fact. But in the nineteenth century the process was reversed as industrialism brought more Czechs to the cities. Indeed, many half-Germanized Czech business and professional men re-identified themselves with the Czech language and cultural group. At the same time education reached the villages and with it ideas of nationalism. The Czechs were intelligent, thrifty, and able; they disliked the inferior status they occupied under the Hapsburgs. When the war came in 1914, they were disloyal to the Vienna government. They sabotaged and deserted; one of their most popular post-1918 books tells how their soldiers made total war impossible for Austria-Hungary. In 1919 Czechoslovakia became an independent state but, in an effort to make it strong, it emerged with over three million Germans (in a total population of fifteen million) living in compact masses on the German frontier. From 1919 to 1938 history repeated itself. This time the Germans were disloyal to the state. They wanted to be free from Prague, and they did everything possible to obtain that freedom. Naturally the Czechs reacted by not entrusting them with any important share in the government, economy, or military forces, if it could be avoided. For only four years, the prosperity years 1925-1929, was there comparative acceptance of the situation by either side. It is absurd to blame the Czechs for not being more generous to the Sudetenlanders; and it is to have a double standard of political morality to blame the Germans for their unwillingness to give up their nationalism.

In spite of difficulties and altercations, the Germans in Czechoslovakia were treated better than any German minority group elsewhere, but that fact did not stop them from flocking to the *Sudetendeutsch* (Nazi) *Partei* when election time came. After all, the Czechs had not been mistreated by the Hapsburgs in the five decades before 1914. These are the passions and prejudices of centuries that we are meeting, not simply the difficulties created in a decade. In 1938 the largest party in the parliament was the *Sudetendeutsch Partei*. While its leaders openly proclaimed their loyalty to the Czechoslovak state, its members were preparing for its disruption. It was not hard to make an "incident" when popular passions were aflame; and when those "incidents" came with clocklike regularity and in the most strategic places, it is hard not to believe that they were made to order. The temperature of Europe began to rise from the infection in Czechoslovakia in July, 1938; by the middle of September, when the Nazi Party congress was meeting in Nuremberg, it was at critical fever pitch. Europe trembled on the edge of war. The Munich conference "solved" the crisis.

The events of the crisis made future plans to overthrow Hitler more difficult. The Western powers were ready to give him great concessions to keep the peace. When the British government sent Lord Runciman to Czechoslovakia to get the "facts" at the onset of the crisis, it must have been understood that Britain was ready to admit alterations of the *status quo*. Runciman spoke German, but not Czech; he spent most of his time with a Sudetenland aristocrat friend of his and undoubtedly got a sympathetic picture of the German case. Then, when the pot seemed about to boil over, the British prime minister, Neville Chamberlain, dramatically flew to Berchtesgaden to negotiate with Hitler. He offered him everything that Germany could reasonably claim from the Czechoslovak republic. Several days later, at Bad Godesberg, he and the German chancellor met again. The Englishman had secured French acquiescence to the partition of Czechoslovakia; Hitler had added new demands. Hitler wanted the time of occupation speeded up, and the claims of Poland and Hungary recognized. Again the situation became tense, for Chamberlain felt that he had gone far enough. The British delegation went home; war seemed inevitable. At this point Mussolini intervened and invited Hitler to submit his case to a four-power conference. The Nazi leaders had just had a bad experience: their private test of the war spirit in Berlin showed conclusively that the little men in Germany were not anxious for war — indeed, the opposite was true. Chamberlain's German "fan mail" pointed to the same conclusion. Mussolini's suggestion was accepted, and Munich named as the meeting place of the four powers.

The Munich meeting produced a treaty that dismembered Czechoslovakia. To the Germans it was a dramatic reversal of the Versailles treaty. By the French and British it should have been recognized as the liquidation of the only power in Central Europe that had stood resolutely against Nazi pressure. In addition to the treaty of partition, Hitler and Chamberlain signed another treaty by which Britain and Germany pledged not to go to war with one another. Chamberlain brought this document back to London as a promise of "peace in our time"! Like the conference that had met in Versailles almost twenty years before, the Munich conference made Russia conspicuous by her absence, an ominous fact that boded ill. Munich was the high point in "appeasement"; the Western nations in their demoralization were unable to resist the pressures of the men who had seized power in Central Europe.

The Rise and Fall of Appeasement

Why did the British and French governments accept the Munich accord? And why did their peoples hail their ministers as great statesmen when they returned home with a victory for Hitler in their pockets? These are two of the most interesting questions of the pre-1939 era. The answer will go far toward explaining why Italy was able to exert so much pressure in the Mediterranean and Africa, why Japan was able to overrun, unopposed by the West, so much of China, and why Hitler's Germany was allowed to prepare for the conquest of Europe. At first sight the problem is almost inexplicable. Hitler's ambitions obviously menaced Britain, France, and Russia; combined, these three powers, with whatever aid they could pick up in Central Europe, should easily have been more than a match for Italy and Germany *before* Germany completed her war armament. Instead of stopping Hitler's drive for control, they actually assisted it by liquidating Czechoslovakia. If they wanted peace, the Munich accord was not enough; if they wanted to stop Hitler, it was far too much.

The policy known as appeasement has many roots in British and French political life of the 1930's. It was first of all based on a loss of nerve. The war had taken a terrible toll in both these countries and in the peace that followed their peoples were horrified as they surveyed the costs. The flower of a whole generation of youth had been killed; those who were left were determined that such a catastrophe must never happen again. The loss in treasure and material goods was also a terrible blow. Both countries had entered the war as rich nations; both came out of it as poor nations with tax loads that were almost insupportable. A tidal wave of pacifism had swept over both countries. Even the France which America thought to be militaristic in the 1920's, was profoundly moved by the feelings manifested by peace organizations and peace propaganda all over the nation. The future was darkened when both countries saw the prosperity they had hoped for melt away in the depths of the depression. Birth rates dropped below the replacement rate. In France an actual decline in population appeared in the official statistics; in England the decline in the death rate held the population momentarily steady, but the average age grew older. The nations that for the preceding two or three centuries had shown boundless confidence in their destiny, seemed to be losing faith in the future.

That loss of faith was accentuated when both Britain and France found themselves in difficulties in their colonies. In the old days of the empire builders it would have been a matter for infantry and artillery to settle, but in the postwar era many Englishmen and Frenchmen had

lost their trust in guns and even in the righteousness of their own position. The shades of the men who had conquered Indo-China and India would surely have been puzzled to see their descendants' policies in the world beyond Europe. It was not that force was not available or, indeed, not used. It was rather that there were also troubled consciences questioning the destiny of the ruling nations.

The policy of appeasement particularly commended itself to the conservatives and propertied classes in both France and Great Britain. To them communism, as established in Russia and spread abroad by means of the Communist International, appeared a grave menace. They were ready to accept much of Hitler's propaganda against communism and were thus oblivious of the danger which he and his Nazis presented.

At the other end of the social scale, nazism appeared as a menace. In part from the shocking behavior of the Fascists, in part from the prodding of communists and "fellow travelers," liberal and democratic leftist opinion concentrated its attention upon the Fascists as the great threat of the time. Neither they nor the conservatives proposed a positive program. "Stop Hitler," "Stop communism," were negative aims. And, unfortunately for the policy and safety of the two Western democracies, conflicting negative aims meant inaction. The French alliance with Russia is a case in point. It had been proposed almost as soon as Hitler came to power: it was ratified just when he started to build a war economy. With Czechoslovakia as a partner, it should have functioned as a deterrent to Hitler's program. But from the day it was ratified a large segment of the French press opposed it, and influential politicians undermined it. By 1938 neither Russia nor France had any faith in the paper that made them partners for mutual assistance. The moral crisis of the day paralyzed the institutions that had been formed to stop Hitler. The failure of Great Britain to check Italian aggression in Ethiopia and Spain, and her final recognition of the new role that Italy proposed to play in the Mediterranean illustrates the divided counsels that prevailed in the British government. The policies of both France and Great Britain seemed to justify the low opinion that Hitler came to have of them.

Appeasement reached its peak at Munich; after Munich there were signs of stiffening which finally resulted in a reversal of this policy and in the war of 1939. It was Hitler's bad faith that decided the British government to make a stand. The whole world heard Hitler say, "This is my last territorial demand in Europe," when he acquired the Sudetenland. Six months later his armies were again on the march. The "rump state" of Czechoslovakia was no danger to Germany. A month after Munich the Italian and German foreign ministers met at Vienna and

awarded Poland and Hungary each a slice of the unhappy country; what was left was a derelict in the political world, but the unprovoked attack that deprived it of independence could hardly be justified by that fact. Trouble rose in the Slovakian provinces, and the Fascist Party there appealed to Hitler. The president of Czechoslovakia was called to Berlin and forced to sign a treaty that placed his country under the protection of Germany. Thus Bohemia-Moravia was brought within the Reich, Slovakia became a dependency of Germany, and Ruthenia fell to Hungary. After all the talk of guaranteeing the Czechoslovak state by a four-power treaty, this unilateral action was evidence of gross bad faith.

Before the excitement of Hitler's march into Prague had died down, Lithuania was summoned to surrender Memelland to Germany, and the new German navy sailed into the harbor of Memel to receive the tiny strip of territory back into the Reich. Mussolini, either not to be outdone by his colleague in Berlin or anxious to take some of the adverse publicity upon himself, sent the Italian navy and marines into Albania to claim that bit of Balkan mountainous scenery. This opening act of 1939 suggested that the year would be a momentous one.

When Hitler returned to Berlin, he called the Polish ambassador to him to see what Poland had decided to do about his proposal, made in the early winter of 1938, that Danzig should return to the Reich and that Poland give Germany a corridor through the Polish Corridor. The Poles, whose role as jackal to the German tiger now seemed about to become that of victim, hurriedly cast about for aid. Aid of a kind was on the horizon, for Britain, apparently, was now ready to drop appeasement.

The Road to War, 1939

The British government responded to Hitler's new threat of aggression by guaranteeing British aid to Poland in case of a German attack. Rumania, Greece, and Turkey were also "guaranteed" a few days later. But Poland was now half surrounded by Germany, and the British navy, even if it could get into the Baltic, would have had considerable difficulty giving her much assistance in case Hitler should ignore Britain's warning. There was only one way to guarantee Poland: through an alliance with Russia. A British mission departed for Moscow amid much publicity to secure an alliance with Stalin. Once it got there, however, it proved somewhat difficult to reach the understanding that seemed so necessary.

The trouble was that Russia had no confidence in the Western powers. The Munich accord had been negotiated without her. Indeed, it

came in spite of Russian assurance that she would honor the Treaty of Mutual Assistance if France would strike the first blow. Rumor had it that both Chamberlain and Daladier had indicated Russia as a normal area for German expansion; whether that rumor reached Stalin is not known, but all he needed to do was to read the world press. Thus it is not surprising that the Russians were a little hesitant when the British asked them to join issue with the *Reichswehr* over Poland. Poland was a second reason for Russian hesitancy. There had been twenty years of bad relations between the Soviet Union and Poland, and the Polish state included a broad belt of territory that the Russians regarded as their own. Indeed, one of the big stumbling blocks to an Anglo-Russian accord was the fact that Russia was a revisionist state: she wanted to recoup the losses of the 1918 period just as Germany did. Neither Russia nor Germany had been at Versailles as a negotiator; both were dissatisfied with the present situation. The British were nonplussed at the suggestion that Russia should be given the Baltic states in return for the defense of Poland. The agitation for the "rights of small nations," which filled the British press at this time, would have been sadly affected if Russia took this action with the consent of Great Britain. Anglo-Russian negotiations seemed endless, and no immediate settlement was at hand.

In the meantime the "guarantee" of Poland was a red flag for Hitler. Tension on the Polish frontier mounted. The German minority in Poland seemed suddenly to produce "incident" after "incident," and each new "atrocities," some of which may even have been real, brought the German press to a new pitch of frenzy. The pattern of the Sudeten crisis was repeating itself in detail. Suddenly on August 21, 1939, the imminent conclusion of a Russo-German pact was announced at Berlin. Two days later Ribbentrop flew to Moscow for the ceremonial signing of the treaty that opened the way to the war of 1939-1945.

There had been some indication in the early summer that this dramatic event might occur. Litvinoff, the friend of the League and the Western powers, had been removed from office, and there had been visible calm in the German embassy even while the British mission talked of a speedy conclusion of its work. The Russo-German treaty has not been published in its entirety, but events give a plausible clue to its contents. Germany showed fewer scruples than Britain over the "rights of small nations." She had no difficulty in allowing the Russians to acquire territory from the Gulf of Finland to the Black Sea that Stalin wanted. In return Russian neutrality would guarantee Germany against the dreaded two-front war, and Russian assistance would simplify the reduction of Poland. The treaty was a shattering blow to the

hopes of English and French diplomats. Chamberlain bravely stated that he would not change his stand on the Polish guarantee, but there was considerably less bouyancy in this announcement than there had been in the plea for a Russo-English alliance earlier in the year. It was clear that the world was headed for a catastrophe.

The Polish crisis reached its height on August 29, when Hitler ordered the Poles to send an emissary to Berlin with full powers to negotiate. It was the same pattern that had been used before, ever since Schuschnigg's visit to Berchtesgaden. Whether or not the Polish government had time to send a negotiator before Hitler acted, is completely immaterial today; it is clear that the men in Berlin were resolved to use force to punish the Poles for their impertinence in summoning England to their aid. On September 1, 1939 the German air force bombed Warsaw, and the German army invaded Poland. The first act in the destruction of Europe had begun.

XX

The Second World War and Its Aftermath

The Polish Campaign

THE RUSSO-GERMAN treaty of 1939 was a "green light" for the opening of the Polish campaign. With Russia's assistance secured, it was possible for Hitler to attack Poland without fear of serious consequences to his army; for neither France nor Britain was in any position to throw against Germany the forces that would be necessary to break through the West Wall fortifications. The soldiers were brave, but they were not equipped with mechanized weapons of war and, with Russia at Poland's rear ready to move in for her share of the unfortunate country, the military risks involved in an assault to the east were small. It is clear now that Hitler and his associates firmly believed that once Poland was liquidated the Western powers would be willing to negotiate a peace, like the Munich agreement, that would leave eastern Europe to Germany and Russia.

The campaign itself was a startling exhibition of the power of modern military equipment. Poland's cities were paralyzed by bombing raids, her system of communications was wrecked, and her armies were left without support even before the German forces penetrated deeply into the country. The weight of overwhelming air superiority was so decisive that she was defeated before she started to fight. When the mechanized columns of German troops began to knife their way across the frontier, the world was given a lesson in armored warfare that was not fully assimilated for two years. The Polish forces were surrounded by fast moving columns of troops spearheaded by armored divisions. The tank and the dive bomber, closely co-ordinated, destroyed resistance at the head of the column, and the Poles, trapped inside the German pincers, were not only cut off from their bases but also forced to attack German defensive positions to escape annihilation. The Polish defenses were worthless, for the army had to try to fight its way out of the iron rings forged around it.

When the Polish army was routed and German columns ranged freely throughout western and central Poland, the Russian government sent its army into eastern Poland to give the *coup de grâce* to all resistance. The close co-operation between the two invading armies wherever their columns met was mute evidence that the Russo-German pact had prepared for just such an outcome of the campaign. The Poles fought bravely; indeed the last ditch defense of Warsaw was one of the most heroic, if futile, defenses of all times. But against the overwhelming power of both the *Reichswehr* and the Red army, there was no possibility of success. Neither France nor Britain could give any effective aid, and Poland was crushed.

The new Europe began immediately to appear. Both Germany and Russia annexed large segments of Polish territory adjacent to their frontiers, and Germany created the so-called Government-General of Poland to rule over the island of territory that was left. The German army regrouped and moved toward the Rhine, and the French army that had invaded western Germany in the belt between the French and German fortifications, withdrew to "new advanced positions." Hitler looked expectantly to Britain and France. Would they now be willing to accept the *fait accompli*, or must the war go on to see who really would rule eastern Europe?

The War of Nerves and the Finnish War

The British and French governments were not prepared to make peace nor were they able to make war. For months after the conclusion of the Polish campaign hostilities in the West seemed in a state of suspended animation. The war of 1914-1918 had demonstrated in the defeat of Germany the importance of blockade and attrition. It had demonstrated the superiority of the defensive position over an offensive attack. The Anglo-French strategy seems to have been based upon these lessons. The great fortifications in eastern France and the British navy were expected to smother Germany in the new war just as the trenches and the navy had done in the last one. The Germans, on the other hand, were under more aggressive leadership. Hitler's generals had difficulty persuading him to wait until spring to begin his assault on France; it was the weatherman rather than military advice that prevented him from ordering an all-out attack. The winter of 1939-1940 was one of the worst that Europe had seen in years.

On the front between the two armies a sort of Truce of God existed. There seemed to be no way to make the troops hate each other, and at the same time the leaders of both armies seemed anxious to do as

little damage as possible to their opponents. If it were not for the tragic sequel to the story, events on the front in that winter would seem a burlesque of war. So true was this that unthinking people called it "phony" and shouted for action.

On the other side of Europe there was action enough to satisfy even the more bloodthirsty of the neutrals. The Russo-German pact of 1939 continued to unfold. The foreign ministers of the Baltic states were summoned to Moscow and presented with treaties to sign that placed their countries under Russian "protection." Latvia, Esthonia, and Lithuania signed; Finland resisted. The result was the Russo-Finnish War of the winter of 1939-1940. The whole world watched the Finnish David fight the Russian Goliath and prayed that the biblical story would be repeated. Indeed for a time it seemed that it surely would be repeated, for the Finns proved themselves stubborn defenders of their independence. But in the end there was no escaping the fact that Finland was a little state and Russia a great power. Aid poured into Finland unofficially from Sweden, Italy, and elsewhere; but without full-fledged assistance from one of the other great powers Finland's predicament was impossible. Finally she was forced to surrender and grant the territory and bases that the Soviet Union demanded of her. The Finnish War was over in time for the world to give its full attention to the campaigns of 1940 in Norway, Holland, Belgium, and France.

The War in the West, 1940

Apart from war at sea between the navies and the air forces of the Western powers, the so-called "phony war" seemed to be only a pantomime. British bombers dropped pamphlets on Germany urging the people to revolt; German bombers took pictures of England and France. Neither nation opened the air war that had been so greatly feared, and the world was lulled into disbelief in its possibility. This lull, however, was not what it seemed to be, and when spring came in 1940 it became clear to everyone that the war was not "phony."

The first blow struck Denmark and Norway. Scandinavia is an air base from which either Germany or England can be attacked; Norway is a base from which the North Sea and the approaches to the Atlantic Ocean can be patrolled. Furthermore Norway was a source of important raw materials for both England and Germany. In 1914-1918 Scandinavian neutrality had been respected, but in 1940 the prize that Norway offered to her violator was so great that the Germans could not resist the temptation to try for a conquest.

The German sea-air assault on Norway was completely successful. By old Trojan horse tactics and newer aerial attacks, Norway was captured and occupied before the Western allies could organize any effective counteraction. The attack was expensive to German sea power, but Hitler's navy was expendable and Norway seemed to be a good investment. The British and French also landed troops in central Norway, but the Germans got the best harbors and had superiority both in men and in air power so that the expedition was quickly routed. In the North, at Narvik, the Allies had more success, but the invasion of France cancelled any advantage they won there and allowed Germany undisputed possession of Norway from one end to the other.

Norway was not completely conquered when the German army burst into Holland, Belgium, and France, and again Hitler's intuition and luck combined with the skill of Germany's soldiers to give victory. Holland collapsed under an assault from land, sea, and air. The impressive Belgian fortifications fell apart before the pressure of modern assault tactics, and the flower of the French and British armies was drawn from its post into Belgium to meet the same campaign strategy that the Germans had used in 1914. It was only after the Franco-British forces had been thrown off balance in Belgium that the German offensive was fully revealed. A column of German mechanized and armored troops broke through the center of the French line and, backed by enormous pressure, raced across northeastern France to the Channel. This cut the Allied army in two parts, disrupted its supplies, and exposed it to destruction by the superior German forces. It was the most colossal defeat any nation had suffered up to that time in the modern era. The British did rescue a considerable part of their army at Dunkirk, but the German army held France at its mercy.

The Germans quickly regrouped and began their march to the South. France was demoralized. A shake-up in the government and in the high command was not enough to save her from destruction. Premier Reynaud appealed to the United States for aid that could not possibly be given at that moment; prime minister Churchill proposed a unification of France and Britain to meet the German enemy. The Germans pushed on, outflanked the famed Maginot Line, took Paris, and probed into southern France with their air force and armored columns. When French defeat became inevitable, the Italians joined the war against the unfortunate nation to secure a share of the spoils. In despair the government asked for an armistice. Years later, when victorious American and British soldiers cleared France of her invaders, it seemed to many that this armistice was an act bordering on treason; but in June, 1940, it was not easy to see what would be happening in 1945.

History has yet to make a decision upon the men who signed the armistice with Hitler and governed France in the German-controlled Europe of 1940-1944.

The Germans, apparently, were as much surprised as the rest of the world at the speed with which they had destroyed the Anglo-French forces on the Continent. If there was a cue that they should have taken to end the war right then and there by an assault on Britain, they were either not prepared to follow it or they missed it completely. Just as after the Polish campaign, they looked expectantly to Britain for peace negotiations. Surely the British must know that the war was over! But Britain, with her back to the wall and no obviously available help anywhere, resolved to fight on. Perhaps Churchill did realize that the New World would eventually come to his aid; perhaps it was just the stubbornness of a people that could not believe in their own defeat. As long as the Channel was not crossed, they could fight on; and they did. It was a defense as heroic but not so futile a one as the Polish defense of Warsaw.

The New Balance of Power, 1940

The defeat of France was more than the humiliation of a proud nation; it was a political earthquake that shook the balance of power from old moorings and forced new adjustments. For twenty years the French army on or not far from the Rhine frontier had kept German power in check; as soon as that army no longer existed, the political structure based upon its watch of the Rhine showed yawning cracks that had to be filled. The crisis was even deeper because not only was French land power gone but also the other prop of the post-Versailles world, British sea power, was greatly endangered. With German airplanes winging death and destruction over England, the world had to face the possibility that the British Empire might be mortally wounded in its heart and then the whole complex of colonies, dependencies, and investments would become political derelicts ready for the first comer to try to seize and hold. The battle over the skies of England was more than a test of strength between rival birdmen; it was a contest of will for control of the world. Churchill well said of the British defenders that never had so few protected so much.


The political world, however, could not wait to see whether the British Isles would follow France into the stomach of the tiger; to wait might well mean that it would be too late to make arrangements. Italy was the first to move. She joined the tiger to play jackal in France and Africa. Her columns were hardly useful in the battle of

France; that fight was over before the jackal had a chance to show whether he could fight or not. In Africa, however, the Italians moved as quickly as they could. British and French forces in East Africa were either driven into the sea or disarmed when Mussolini's armies in Abyssinia moved into Somaliland. At the same time a poorly equipped and even more poorly led column of Italian troops pushed into Egypt only to be stopped by the sand, the lack of water and equipment, and a handful of British defenders. This was the first act of the battle for North Africa that was to arrest so much of the world's attention in the next few years.

Beyond Europe both the United States and Japan were stirred into action. In the United States the Congress passed the largest peacetime appropriation for war in the history of the nation. A new navy, superior to that of any other country, was ordered. The Congress also did an unprecedented thing: it passed a military conscription bill when the nation was at peace. Mr. Roosevelt's "five alarm fire" speech was hardly needed to make the nation understand that a new world of power politics was born when France collapsed. In the next few months, when it became evident that Britain would not buckle under the weight of German bombs, the Americans were ready to agree to "swap" destroyers for bases that gave England much needed warships and the United States additional bases on the approaches to the North American continent. By 1941 the Lend-Lease Bill was clear indication that the United States had become aware of the new power structure in the world and was taking measures to strengthen her own position.

Japan saw in the fall of France an awaited opportunity to extend her holdings in Asia. As long as France and Britain had strength in Europe, they could maintain forces in Asia to restrain Japan; with France broken and Britain fighting for her life, the balance in Asia shifted suddenly in Japan's favor. With the "consent" of Vichy France, Japanese forces moved into Indo-China and prepared for a military assault upon Malaya, the Philippines, and the Dutch East Indies by building up bases at the head of the South China Sea and by incorporating Siam in her march toward control of all East Asia. The British, responding to Japanese pressure, closed the Burma Road that allowed a trickle of supplies to flow into China. Obviously the hard pressed government in London hoped to bribe the Japanese into leaving their East Asia holdings at peace by helping the men from Tokyo to throttle the Chinese.

Russia, too, had to make more secure her hold on the borderlands that Hitler had assigned to her in 1939. She rapidly consolidated her hold upon the belt of territory from the Gulf of Finland to the Black




Germany's Bid to Win the War

Sea and then turned expectantly to Hitler to see what would happen next. The negotiations before and during Molotov's visit to Berlin after the fall of France are cloaked in darkness, but enough has been revealed to make it clear that Russia was willing to give active collaboration to the Germans if her interests in the Balkans, Turkey, Persia, and eastern Asia could be secured. Hitler felt the price was too high; the alternative was the contest of physical force that came the very next year.

Rising Tempo of War, 1940-1941

The German aerial assault on England failed, and Hitler's generals had no effective plan for crossing the Channel for a land invasion of Great Britain. Englishmen can never give too much credit to the gallant men and women and to the great, stubborn prime minister who met and defeated the German tiger. Churchill rose to his loftiest stature when England's chances seemed worst, and the R.A.F. was never more worthy of highest credit than in the days when defeat seemed almost inevitable. Men said in 1940 that air warfare was overrated because the German



The War in North Africa

air force failed to reduce England, but men in 1940 had not yet seen the ruined German and Japanese cities of 1945.

The failure of the Nazis at the Channel did not significantly weaken the German war machine, but it did turn it in new directions. In the Mediterranean area the Axis junior partner, Italy, came to grief in the winter of 1940-1941. Mussolini's two-pronged attack on Egypt failed at both of the points. The Italian army that tried to cross the Egyptian desert bogged down some seventy miles from the railroad that might have led it into Egypt. Even more catastrophic was Mussolini's other spear point at Egypt, the attack through Greece. The Italians attempted a winter campaign through the Greek mountains only to have their mechanized equipment rendered useless and their armies cut to pieces by the Greek defenders. When their plight in Greece was desperate to the extreme, a British army attacked Graziani's forces in Egypt and conquered over half of Italy's North African colony of Libya. Mussolini reminded his people that Great Britain was the largest empire in the world and asked Hitler for help.

Hitler, however, had wider plans. The failure of the Molotov mission to Berlin led him back to his original anti-Russian bias, and the failure to reduce Britain forced him to regard Russia as a possible British ally. We know now that there were many men in high places in the German army to whom a war against Russia seemed suicidal, but by 1941 Hitler's prestige as a soldier and as a planner of war had reduced his generals to mere technicians. He had been right, they had been wrong, time and time again. When he decided to make war on

Russia, the German army merely prepared the plans. Of all the "ifs" of war, this war on Russia in 1941 contains the biggest. The plans called for a campaign beginning in the spring and ending in the fall: European Russia, including Moscow, was to be conquered by November. The campaign from the first day to the day the Germans began their assault on Moscow was on schedule except for the fact that the first day was a little over a month later than it should have been. It will always be a nice question whether, if the Yugoslav and Greek campaigns had been avoidable and if the Russian campaign had started on time, could the Germans have crushed Russian resistance before they ran into the winter weather of 1941? It was the cold, for which the German army was unprepared, as well as the Russians, that stopped the campaign; if the Balkan War had not been necessary, could the German army have reached its goal before the November cold brought it to a halt? The answer to that question will probably depend upon the reader's nationality and his faith in military arrangements.

The Balkan campaign (March-June, 1941), however, was necessary. Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria joined the German war machine against the Allies; the Yugoslav government was prepared to join when a revolt in Belgrade reversed the decision and forced Germany to fight. The campaign from Yugoslavia to Crete was rapid, but it did consume a month that Hitler's officers had expected to use in Russia. The British tried to stop or at least to delay the campaign by landing troops in Greece. It was, however, a hopeless mission, for the Germans crunched through all opposition like a steam roller and even jumped over the British fleet to take the island of Crete by air. At the same time an expeditionary corps under the most colorful general Germany produced, General Erwin Rommel, took advantage of the fact that British troops had left Egypt for Greece and attacked the British advanced positions in Libya. The campaign in the Mediterranean was apparently a German victory. From Crete and the Egyptian frontier, the Germans menaced Egypt. But precious time had been gained by the Russians, for the campaign was not started until June 22, too late to reach Moscow in time.

In many ways the Russian campaign of 1941 is the most astounding military adventure in history. It was a battle of giants fought on a front that defies the imagination. From the Black Sea to the Gulf of Finland even as a crow flies is almost 900 miles: the front must have been from 1300 to 1400 miles long by October. It will probably never be known exactly what costs were exacted in this battle. The official communiqués of both armies were political documents rather than objective military statements; from them, however, it becomes evident

that this was a life-or-death struggle of tremendous magnitude. Had Germany been able to impose her will upon Russia, the second World War would undoubtedly have ended in a German victory at all points. The fact that the bulk of the German army had to fight for three years in Russia and that Russia consumed the weight of Germany's armament industry, indisputably decided the war's outcome as soon as Germany was forced to meet a threat from the West and the South. To say this does not detract from the effort made by British and American troops in Africa, Italy, and France; they gave the final blow to the German military machine. They might not have been able to do so if Germany had had the men and material that were used up in Russia.

The War Becomes a Global War, 1941-1942

While the German army pushed its way toward Moscow in the summer and fall of 1941, events moved rapidly to the climax that brought the United States into the conflict. There can be no doubt about the attitude of the United States; its government and its people profoundly hoped that it could remain neutral. In 1940 both major parties ran candidates for office on a platform containing an isolationist plank as well as one for national defense. The two rival "war committees" were agreed, at least publicly, that the United States did not want to enter the conflict: William Allen White's committee used the slogan "Aid to England short of war"; the America First Committee was completely isolationist. Even the tiny if somewhat noisy Communist Party urged neutrality — until Russia was invaded in 1941.

But the United States could not stay out of the war as completely as the die-hard isolationists wanted her to. American sympathies were all against Germany, and American interests were obviously bound up with those of Great Britain. Neither the government in Washington nor the man on Main Street could see any advantage in a German victory. Thus it was easy for the United States to fall into the pattern of the earlier war; namely, to become an arsenal for Britain. After Dunkirk shiploads of arms and munitions from the United States gave the British tools to fight the potential invasion, and the tempo of shipments of materials of all kinds tended to step up at a faster and faster pace. The "destroyer deal" provided for the transfer of American warships to the British navy in return for bases in the Western hemisphere, and finally Lend-Lease provided England with a "war subsidy" not dissimilar to those that had been granted by Britain to her allies in the wars of the eighteenth century. By 1941 the submarine war in the Atlantic induced the American government to order its warships to assist in the

convoying of Lend-Lease goods across the Atlantic. From an "arsenal" it was easy to become a partner in a shooting war.

At the same time President Roosevelt found more and more support for his anti-Axis policy. His speeches from 1939 to 1941 make interesting reading not only because of the excellence of his style but also as instructive signposts on the road to war. Opponents of his policy saw with dismay that the nation followed him, indeed perhaps preceded him, on the road leading to active intervention. High points along this route were the Proclamation of the Four Freedoms (January, 1941) and the Atlantic Charter (August, 1941). The latter document, signed by Mr. Roosevelt and prime minister Churchill, was an eight-point statement that might well be confused with Wilson's Fourteen Points were it not slightly more realistic than Wilson's program. Thus the United States not only became an "arsenal" against the Axis but also contributed mightily to the political and propaganda offensive that was aimed at the destruction of the Central Powers.

The actual crisis that brought the United States into the war, however, was fomented in Asia rather than in Europe. Japanese aggression in China, which had started in the early 1930's, became a full-fledged fighting war after 1937, but the difficulties of the terrain and the great distances in China made it impossible for the Japanese war machine to force a decision. Japan overran the best part of China in the North; she ruled the entire coast; she controlled most of the railroads; but she could not compel the Chinese government to come to terms. When the European War began, Japan saw wider opportunities opening before her; for with Britain, France, and Holland either occupied or fighting for life, the European powers were in no position to resist a Japanese thrust into southeastern Asia. Only the United States stood between Japan and control over the whole basin of the western Pacific. The Germans wanted their Japanese allies to temporize with the United States in order to keep the American government off balance, and to join Germany in the assault upon Russia. But the Japanese, probably pressed by navy statesmen, decided that their future could best be assured in the South since their German allies would probably destroy Russia for them without their aid. At present writing this cannot be definitely asserted as the reason for Japan's action, but it seems the most probable one. In view of what happened, Japanese policy seems short-sighted in the extreme; for as long as Russia remained a power, the Japanese could expect little aid from Germany. Perhaps they did not want German assistance in dividing the Asiatic spoils.

In any case from the fall of France onward Japan pressed into the south obviously preparing for a showdown with the Western powers.

The government at Washington responded quickly to these steps, and the exchange of notes between Tokyo and Washington became more and more tense. Japan well understood where America's sympathies were. America had given aid both in money and in material to China, she had broken trade relations with Japan, and her newspapers and statesmen had long since pointed accusing fingers at Japanese policy. The crisis mounted in the fall of 1941 when the United States tried to force Japan to give up her conquests. A special Japanese mission came to Washington to discuss the question, and the Japanese navy prepared to attack the American fleet at Pearl Harbor. The diplomatic mission was doomed to failure, for neither Japan nor the United States was in any mood for compromise. The plans of the navy, however, were crowned with great success. On December 7, 1941, the United States fleet in Pearl Harbor was given a crippling blow that assured the Japanese navy superiority in the whole of the western Pacific. At the very moment when the United States entered the war, the surprise raid on Pearl Harbor literally tied one hand behind her back. It was more than a full year before the effects of that blow were overcome.

Germany and Italy immediately ranged themselves with Japan against the United States. Brazil entered the struggle as an active ally of the United States, and most of the other Latin American countries broke off relations with the Axis powers. By 1942 the war had truly become a global struggle in which most of the world was deeply involved.

1942: The Axis Bid for Victory

The fortunes of war were strongly in the Axis favor during most of 1942. Indeed if victory were ever possible for Germany and Japan, it had to be won that year when the naval power of the United States was relatively weak and the American industrial machine not yet under full steam. The only hope the Axis might have for victory lay in the possibility that all the Eurasiatic continent would fall within its power. But neither Germany nor Japan had enough military and industrial might to accomplish this colossal mission.

The Japanese pattern of conquest showed itself from December 7, 1941, as an air-land-sea assault upon the Pacific possessions of the Western powers. The primary drive was to the south. The Philippines, Malaya, the Dutch Indies, and Burma were quickly overrun in a demonstration of modern warfare that clearly showed that white men had no monopoly of the technique. At the same time the Japanese thrust fanned out in the Pacific from the Solomons to the Aleutians in an attempt to control the island approaches to eastern Asia. The attack

Japan's Greater East Asia

U. S. S. R.

INDIA

CHINA

INDIAN OCEAN

PACIFIC OCEAN

HALEUTIAN IS.

MIDWAY IS.

HAWAIIAN IS.

WAKE IS.

MANCHURIA

KOREA

TAIWAN

FORMOSA

PHILIPPINE IS.

INDONESIA

MASSANIAN IS.

GUINEA

SOLOMON IS.

AUSTRALIA

First phase of Japanese expansion

Second phase of Japanese expansion

U. S. S. R.

PACIFIC
HAWAIIAN
IS.
OCEAN

INDIAN
OCEAN

First phase of Japanese expansion

Second phase of Japanese expansion

on the Hawaiian Islands was stopped by the battle of Midway, so that it proved impossible to push the American power back on the coast of the United States itself. This battle now appears as the decisive check upon Japan's bid to control the Pacific Ocean, but it may well be that future historians will explain that the difference in the productive capacities of the United States and Japan made such control impossible anyway. Island bases proved to be of little use once there was not enough naval power to supply them. Somehow the Japanese admirals misread Mahan. That great exponent of naval power had carefully explained the relationship between sea power and bases so that it should have been clear to the men in Tokyo that bases, even air bases, cannot stand up against sea power when they cannot be supplied by sea. Oversight of this fact proved to be crucial as soon as the American navy developed overwhelming strength.

The Japanese conquest everywhere except in the Philippines was aided by the attitude of the natives. British and Dutch imperialism had not built up any great bank of good will among the subject populations of southeastern Asia, and it was possible for the invaders to pose as "liberators" who were winning "Asia for Asiatics." In the Philippines, the American political policy paid good dividends in terms of native loyalty. True it is that there were opportunists who aided the invaders there just as in Malaya, Burma, and Java, but the bulk of the population apparently were anxious for the return of the Americans even though it entailed another battle in their islands. The natives in Java, Burma, and Malaya were much less anxious to see their former rulers return.

In Europe and Africa the German-Italian war machine also went into full gear. Rommel's North African army threatened to end the seesaw battles in Libya by invading Egypt and overthrowing the entire British power in the Levant. In June of 1942 he raced across the Egyptian desert and reached El Alamein just outside the big British base at Alexandria. For the moment the fate of the whole Near East was at stake, and the prospect of Germans meeting Japanese somewhere in India was less than a remote possibility. But Germany did not have either the men or the material to re-enforce the *Afrika Korps*, and Rommel's army was not strong enough to make the last necessary push that would deliver the Suez into his hands. About the same time the mighty German army in Russia tried to eliminate the Red army by a drive to the Caspian Sea. The battle of the giants that had ended in 1941 with both armies exhausted and needing rest and new equipment, reopened in 1942 with terrible vigor. But the Germans could not surround and capture the Red army. They conquered space, but

always before them were more Russian troops, and behind them longer and longer supply lines. At Stalingrad they reached the end of their tether and, on Hitler's personal order, tried to hold the territory that had been conquered. It was there that a great disaster overtook them. Stalingrad was the high tide of Hitler's invasion. The defeat and destruction of a large section of his army at Stalingrad broke the offensive power of the terrible *Wehrmacht*; from then on it was on the defensive, and total defeat was simply a matter of time.

The Axis campaign in Asia, Africa, and Europe was considerably assisted by a great naval battle fought in the Atlantic Ocean. As soon as Germany declared war upon the United States, German submarines appeared in American waters and took a heavy toll upon merchant shipping from the Caribbean Sea to England. At the moment the American navy was not equipped to meet this threat over thousands of miles of ocean. Thus much valuable equipment and many ships to carry equipment to the war theaters found a watery grave. This battle of the Atlantic in 1942 was probably as critical as any of the battles fought elsewhere, for had the submarine not been defeated, the production and man power of the United States could never have been added to the weight that finally crushed the Axis.

The setbacks of the Germans in Russia and North Africa were accompanied by the decisive defeat of the Axis submarine campaign in the Atlantic. Convoys, airplane defense, and a fantastic array of new weapons developed by modern science finally cleared the way for the "bridge of ships" that transported the military power of the United States across the Atlantic Ocean. When this was accomplished, the United States could turn with devastating effect upon Hitler's so-called "fortress of Europe."

Over-all Strategy of Victory

It is clear that by the fall of 1942 both of the great Axis powers had reached the limit of their aggressive capacity. The fact that they could not force their principal enemies to surrender made it imperative for them to defend a wide circle of outposts, and in the case of both Japan and Germany, the productive capacity of their factories and the transportation systems that backed up their military fronts were inadequate to meet the pressures against them. The war-making power of the United States was both immense and pitiless. By the opening of the year 1943 the factories, forges, and shipyards of the colossus of the western hemisphere literally crushed both Europe and Asia with military pressure that was irresistible. At the same time the rise of the

American army to military maturity, the American navy to the position of queen of the seas, and the American air force to an overwhelming superiority, completely upset the military balances in the world. The German army might have been able to hold its own against its European enemies, but it could not stand up against the additional thrust of men and materials from across the Atlantic. The Japanese probably could never have reasonably hoped to meet the overwhelming land, air, and sea power that the North American continent placed in the balance.

This does not mean, of course, that the years 1943-1945 did not present titanic military problems. The Axis was on the defensive and it fought with the vigor of a desperate, cornered animal. The landings in North Africa, in Sicily, in Italy, and in France were vigorously contested and required both military skill and preponderant material power. The same was true of the aerial warfare whereby the Anglo-American forces literally destroyed most of Germany's large cities and wrecked her transportation system. In the East, too, the Russian armies met stubborn resistance as they drove the Axis powers back over the battlefields of 1941-1942 and pressed on toward Vienna and Berlin, the cores of German administrative power.

For Russia and China there was little difficulty in finding a suitable place to fight against the enemy; the long lines of battle crisscrossed their lands and gave ample opportunity to come to grips with the foe. The Western allies, however, had no such easy solution. They were fighting on the outer circle of an armed ring both in Europe and in Asia. To attack Germany or Japan they had to establish beachheads and fight their way in from the sea. From the Aleutians to Burma, and from Narvik to El Alamein they were confronted with a fortress almost surrounded by an ocean moat. The advantage of the offensive was theirs after 1943, but both Germany and Japan still had great reserves of power that made their defensive positions formidable indeed.

The war against Germany was given priority, and the first attacks were made upon the German position in the Mediterranean area. By clearing that sea for Allied supply lines a tremendous saving could be made in shipping, for as long as Germany controlled the central Mediterranean, supplies had to go all around Africa before they could be used in the Middle East or sent to Russia via Persia.

The Mediterranean campaign began at both ends of that sea. The British attacked from Egypt; the Americans landed in French North Africa. The Vichy French officials in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunis either co-operated with the invasion or were quickly disposed of by the overwhelming power at the service of the Western allies. Rommel's



Pattern of Victory in Europe

army was driven across Libya into Tunis, and a large part of it was captured before it could escape to Italy. The next move was a land-sea assault upon Sicily. When the American forces landed and seemed about to crush all resistance, the Italian king surrendered; but the Germans regrouped and contested every foot of ground up the peninsula. The Allied armies fought their way to Rome, and at the end of the war had practically cleared Italy of the enemy. It was one of the most difficult operations of the war, for the country was admirably suited for defense and the Germans and the Italian Fascists took every advantage that topography had to offer them.

At the same time that this attack began in the south, the Anglo-American air forces stepped up their bombardment of Germany's cities and factories. This bombardment was costly in terms of men and material, but it did make a shambles of Germany by wrecking her factories



Pattern of Victory in the Pacific

and disrupting her communications. Advocates of air power were disappointed to learn that the aerial assault did not force the Nazis to sue for peace before a full-fledged invasion imposed peace upon them; but there can be no doubt that this bombardment did make the invasion easier and less costly in lives, for between 1943 and 1945 Germany's cities and Germany's transportation system were reduced to ruins. Both the Russian armies in the east and the Anglo-American armies that landed in France owed no small part of their successes to the work of the air forces that had wrecked much of Germany's war making capacity.

It was, however, the landings in France and the invasion from the east that crushed Germany's will to resist. Under the command of General Eisenhower, an Anglo-American army landed on the Norman coast of France on June 6, 1944. The much vaunted German "Atlantic

Wall " buckled and then broke under the weight of the Allied assault. By the last of August Paris was liberated, and the German army was in full retreat toward the Rhine. This last barrier in the west proved to be an obstinate one. It was not until March, 1945, that the Anglo-American forces finally broke through and raced across Germany to meet the Russians in the middle of the German Reich. The Russian forces had fought over Poland and Hungary to the Vistula and the Danube. In a mighty push the two armies broke through and met on the Elbe. Hitler, apparently, was resolved never to surrender and, with a multitude of his countrymen and the wealth of his nation, perished in the ruins of what had been the most populous and proud state in Europe. Like its opening hours, the closing hours of the war maintained the catastrophic tempo that had come near to destroying the civilization that Europe had created. The Germans surrendered on all sides, and finally German generals fixed their signatures to official papers that legally ended the fighting on May 8, 1945.

Victories in the Pacific

Even before the full weight of the anti-Axis power was brought to bear upon Germany, the United States forces assumed the offensive in the Pacific. Japan overreached herself in 1943; the decisive defeat of her assault upon the American position in the central Pacific at Midway pointed to the fact that she could not hope to extend her conquests and probably could not long hold the territory that she had occupied. The American offensive began in the Solomons, New Britain, and New Guinea. General MacArthur had promised to return to the Philippines; this was his first step. The fighting was hard and difficult. The Japanese soldier proved to be a tricky antagonist, and jungle warfare required the evolution of new tactics and material. None the less one year after the assault on the Solomons, the American forces had approached thirteen hundred miles nearer to Japan.

By the end of 1943 and the opening of 1944 the rising power of the new United States navy also began to enter the lists against Japan with decisive blows. The Japanese soon learned that island bases without adequate sea power to protect and supply them were vulnerable to assault. It was no easy task to clear the stubborn defenders out of Tarawa, Makin, the Gilberts, Kwajalein, Eniwetok, and the Marshalls, but with the new navy and the new amphibious tactics of the marines and the army, this road through the central Pacific fell into American hands. It was the most ambitious land-sea-air assault in history that finally brought the Marianas and the Philippines under the American flag.

Out of it evolved a new conception of the possibilities of sea power in this age of seaborne aircraft and other complex machines of war.

It was in the conquest of the Philippines that the Japanese navy received its final crippling blows. Submarines and airplanes had cut down Japanese sea power so that the Japanese could not hope to meet the American navy on equal terms. In the fighting around the Philippines, especially at the battle of Leyte, the Japanese sea power was practically erased. The American landings in the Philippines and the subsequent conquest of the islands then cut the supply lines of the forces scattered over southeastern Asia, and made their eventual surrender or destruction inevitable.

The Last Phase of the War in the Pacific

From the Marianas and from China it was possible to bomb the Japanese islands with the new superbombers, the B-29s. These raids upon her cities and harbors spelled the doom of Japan's dreams for a negotiated peace. No part of the country was safe from the probing fingers of American bombs, and Japanese air power was so weakened that it could not offer effective opposition. The absolute hopelessness of Japan's position was manifest when the American forces fought their way onto the islands of Iwo Jima and Okinawa in the winter and spring of 1945. The Japanese fought with fanatic zeal to break the American hold on Okinawa, our casualties rose and our ship losses were heavy, but there was such overwhelming power at the disposal of our forces that these losses only slowed up the inevitable conquest. Okinawa is in Japan's "back yard"; from there the American air forces, released from their work in Europe, could have wrecked every city and town in Japan.

The war in the East, however, was to end more dramatically than any in history. Throughout the war, scientists of all nations worked to apply their knowledge to the problems of war, and in the United States one group of scientists finally evolved the atomic bomb. Beside this weapon the rockets, the radar, and all the other sensational discoveries seem to pale and become relatively unimportant. Actually, of course, the whole war was a scientists' war; the atomic bomb was only the most sensational of the scientific discoveries. The first atomic bomb was dropped on August 6, 1945, at Hiroshima; the second, on August 9 at Nagasaki. On August 10, 1945, the Japanese surrendered unconditionally.

The surrender, obviously, would have come soon whether there had been an atomic bomb or not. The Japanese power was broken beyond

repair and Japan's strategic position had become impossible. Furthermore the Russian army in eastern Siberia was poised to strike as soon as it became evident that the fighting was practically over. The Russians declared war upon Japan two days before the surrender. The bomb, however, did give urgency to Japanese action and, in a way, was a face-saving device for her leaders. They could not be expected to fight on when their enemy had such a terribly destructive weapon. The occupation of the islands that followed the signing of the surrender went as smoothly as clockwork. Within a remarkably short time the Japanese forces were disarmed and the country came under the control of the invading army.

Framing the New World

Even before Japan surrendered, the representatives of the great coalition met in San Francisco to frame a new world organization. After the defeat of Germany, a program for a United Nations organization had been framed by Britain, Russia, and the United States, as architects of the victory. The name "United Nations" had been President Roosevelt's inspiration, but his death prevented his opening the conference that created this organization. At San Francisco, as at Geneva in the prewar era, it was no easy task to bring the interests of all the powers within a single frame of reference. The men who made the new international charter had to contend with the fears and suspicions that have always beset international conferences. They had to compromise the demands of the big and the little states, a problem always inherent in any confederation. The wisdom of their work and their compromises will be apparent only after time has tested their creation. None the less the civilized world was given hope for a better future when the nations of the world that had won the great war finally agreed to tie their interests to a common organization even if that organization may not have satisfied all the expectations.

The primary purpose of the U.N. is to prevent future wars, and men everywhere look to it as a buttress against the holocaust that atomic weapons would make in a future conflict. The enforcement of peace lies primarily in the hands of the Security Council, a committee of the five great powers and six smaller states. Unless one of the great powers interposes a veto objection, the Council can intervene in any international dispute and "recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment." This Council could develop into a vital institution that might well prevent the outbreak of warfare. In addition to the Security Council, there is the General Assembly that "may discuss any questions or matters within the scope of the . . . Charter." It may deal

with any question brought before it but of course it has no sovereign power with which to impose its will. The third great division of the U.N. is the International Court of Justice. Unfortunately the Court has no force beyond its moral prestige with which to enforce its decisions, but its very existence provides a bar of justice for problems of international law and it may well become the very core of the system of peace that the U.N. aims to provide for the world.


The accompanying chart shows the other institutions under the U.N. charter. Time alone will be able to tell which of them will develop and which will prove inadequate. It is clear, however, that they cover the whole field of international action and that, with good will on all sides, they could develop into a vital center for international co-operation.

The location of the U.N. in New York rather than in Switzerland dissociated it from the defunct League of Nations and emphasized the fact that it was truly a world, rather than a European, organization. Its successes will bring happiness to men; its failures might well spell universal disaster.

War Guilt and Reparations

The Treaty of Versailles imposed upon Germany responsibility for the war (war guilt) and for paying an enormous reparations bill to the victors. Both these provisions turned out to be political issues beclouding the post-1920 era, for the unilateral guilt of Germany could not be sustained in face of the historical evidence that became available, and the reparations bills proved to be far beyond her capacity to pay. Long before Hitler's armies were defeated, wise men urged the leaders of the anti-Axis coalition not to repeat these mistakes. The civilized world, however, was convinced that someone, somehow, was guilty of the crime that led to the terrible dislocation of civilization, and that someone must be punished for it. Furthermore the tales of atrocities and the actual evidence of the brutality of the German and Japanese systems cried aloud for action. The concentration camps and murder mills in Germany, the brutal treatment of prisoners and internee civilians in Japan outraged the sensibilities of the victors and demanded some kind of retaliation. War guilt and atrocity trials in the Philippines, at Nuremberg, and in Japan were held in response to this very natural demand.

It is a question, of course, whether these trials were "fair" in the Anglo-Saxon sense of that term. There could be no doubt that the offenses of the defendants, from the point of view of the accusers at least, were enormous, but there did linger a doubt about the advisability



THE STRUCTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

of condemning these defendants on the basis of international laws that did not exist when the offenses were committed. The trial and execution or imprisonment of generals of the enemy armies was a particularly questionable procedure in the minds of men trained in law and custom. None the less when one considers the shocking revelations that came out in the trials, the surprise is not that the defendants were condemned but rather that any of them were freed. The future implications of the trials, however, are still to be developed. If it works out simply that the victorious powers have the right to condemn and execute the leaders of their foes, these trials will have been a step backward in the direction of primitive society, for men of earlier ages caged or killed defeated leaders and enslaved the vanquished peoples. If, on the other hand, these trials really do establish the doctrine that war is a crime, they will become the basis for a new principle of international law.

The problem of reparations promises to be even more thorny. The destruction wrought by the Nazi and Japanese armies stands as mute evidence of the need for repair. Clearly this destruction should be made good by the men that accomplished it. None the less the one thing that the victors wish to avoid is the return of German industry as a competitor in international markets and a source for German military strength. If Germany is to pay a huge reparations bill, she must again become the mighty economic colossus in Central Europe and again dominate markets all over the world. Thus the dilemma is clearly a difficult one: Germany surely ought to pay a huge reparations account, but if she does actually do so, she will again become a great economic power. The Russians, whose rightful demands for reparations were greater than any other, felt that reparations could be collected by dismantling factories and other installations and shipping them into Russia.

This, too, turned out to hold new problems. First, Russia was unready economically to absorb the complex factory equipment found in Germany, and much of it seems destined to rust before it can be used. On the other hand, when the factory equipment was removed from Germany it only aggravated the problem of the occupying forces, for unless Germany can somehow again become an economic unit in which the population can make a living, the occupying powers will be forced to feed the Germans at their own expense. Thus the reparations question two years after Germany's surrender bristles with difficulties.

Framing the Peace

When the German army surrendered, there was no government left in the country that the victors would recognize. Germany was at the

mercy of her late enemies, and since there was no German government, no immediate peace treaty could be contemplated. The victors divided the country into four zones. Russia and her satellite Poland occupied eastern Germany, Britain the northwest, including the Ruhr, France the upper Rhineland and the Saar, and the United States, the rest of south Germany. The city of Berlin was also divided into zones and a high commission of the occupying powers was established to form over-all policy. Each zone, however, was governed independently of the rest so that by 1946 there were four Germanies, and the problem of solving any German question was becoming increasingly difficult. The United States occupation authorities, realizing that the problems they were facing could be solved only on a larger scale, began a vigorous campaign for the reunification of the country. Late in 1946, in an effort to meet this problem the British and American zones were united under a common government, and the Russians and French were invited to complete the economic unification of Germany by adhering to the Anglo-American agreement.

In Austria the same problems were even more acute. This little state was also divided into four zones by the victorious Allies. Austria, already a tiny country, presented the four occupying powers with economic and political tangles that seemingly have no solution.

In Italy and Japan the victorious powers did not destroy the entire machinery of government nor were these countries divided into separate zones for administrative purposes. The occupation forces kept in their hands a large measure of control. In Italy the royal government returned, but a general election decided that the king must go and Italy became a republic. In Japan the imperial government went through a large measure of democratization but the emperor remained on his throne. The government of the island empire seems to be the most efficient and the best model of the occupation governments. But like Germany and Austria, the future course of Italian and Japanese political and economic life is obscured by the momentous problems of reorganization and reintegration in the new age.

The over-all problem of making peace arose as soon as the Germans laid down their arms. The victors were in complete agreement upon the questions of the war, but they had somewhat divergent points of view upon the questions of peace. The Soviet state was anxious to consolidate its position on all its frontiers, either by direct annexation of territory or by the establishment of satellite states dependent upon Soviet power and responsive to Soviet policy. In Persia, Turkey, Greece, Trieste, and elsewhere, Russian interests clashed with those of Britain and the United States and made the problem of writing a peace

treaty more and more difficult. It required all the diplomatic skill and good will that could be found to keep the negotiations from breaking down. There were several preliminary conferences before the powers assembled in Paris in the summer and fall of 1946 to make definitive treaties with the lesser European Axis powers. The treaties of peace with the lesser Axis powers (Finland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania) were finally written in the early winter of 1946 for acceptance by the nations in 1947. The negotiations for these treaties moved forward with painful slowness. The conflict between the so-called Soviet group (Slav states) and the Western states flared up at almost every session so that the problem of writing a peace treaty for Germany became an impressive difficulty for the future.

PART FIVE

Trends in Modern Society

XXI

Economic Development

Economic Interdependence

AS late as the eighteenth century most countries were, in the main, self-sufficient. Their international trade was largely confined to luxury goods which could not be produced, or produced so cheaply, at home. The twentieth century finds all countries members of a single economic system and every corner of the globe made accessible for the exchange of needed commodities. When India came within the orbit of British interests, when China and Japan emerged from seclusion, when the lands of Africa and the islands of the Pacific were explored and partitioned among European powers, and when the Latin-American states were opened up after the attainment of independence, the industrial and commercial methods originating in Europe penetrated everywhere. No country can now provide itself with the requisites of modern life except by drawing upon the resources of many other countries. Each one needs imported foodstuffs and raw materials for its factories; each one needs foreign markets in which to sell its manufactured goods. Even for the United States, which is more nearly self-sufficient than any other leading country, commerce becomes increasingly important to dispose of its national surpluses. The economic interdependence of the world is inescapable and unalterable; it is the outcome of modern industrialism.

Commerce

The new machinery and the new technical processes made possible an enormous addition to the output of mines, farms, and factories. Macadamized roads, canals, steamships, and railroads reduced freight rates to a mere fraction of those once charged, while the telegraph, telephone, cheap postage, and newspapers facilitated the rapid spread of information relating to crops and markets. Improvement in the means of production and improved transportation and communica-

tion combined to bring about an extraordinary expansion of international trade. It is estimated that the commerce of the world (including backward as well as progressive countries) increased over 1200 per cent in the nineteenth century. It increased much faster than did population; the share of the average human being in it grew nearly sixfold during this period. This expansion continued into the twentieth century.

International trade has been promoted by the construction of ship canals. The Suez Canal shortens the maritime route from Europe to India by from four thousand to five thousand miles, while the Panama Canal cuts down the distance between Liverpool and San Francisco by about six thousand miles. The Corinth Canal, through the isthmus of that name, enables ships to avoid the long and stormy voyage around southern Greece. The Kiel Canal, completed shortly before the first World War, connects the North Sea with the Baltic. The peace treaty with Germany specified that it must be open without restriction to the mercantile marine of every country. The Welland Canal enables the largest Great Lakes vessels to go around Niagara Falls. Should a proposed waterway between the St. Lawrence River at Montreal and Lake Ontario be constructed, places as far west as Detroit, Chicago, Milwaukee, and Duluth will become deep-sea ports.

Much progress has been made during the past century in the internationalization of important rivers which separate or flow through two or more countries. The Congress of Vienna in 1815 decided that the Rhine should be freely open to the commerce of all nations and the Congress of Paris in 1856 made a similar decision regarding the Danube. A few years later Holland gave up her former privilege of levying tolls on the Scheldt, a privilege that had fettered Belgian commerce through Antwerp. The Peace Conference in 1919 internationalized the Elbe and Oder rivers, in order to provide outlets to the sea for the foreign trade of Czechoslovakia. The principle of free navigation has also been extended to such inland waters as the Black Sea and the Baltic. The rise of economic nationalism in the post-Versailles years, however, threatened to undo much of this work; Hitler's Germany re-established its control over the German waterways, and there were obvious tendencies in many other parts of the globe toward the restriction of trade on the highways of the world. It remains to be seen whether the world will develop international solutions for this problem or will revert to earlier patterns.

One of the causes of the War of 1812 between the United States and Great Britain was the irritation felt by Americans at the British action in searching their ships for deserters from the royal navy. The peace

treaty between the two countries said nothing about the right of search and impressment of deserting seamen, but the protest of the United States proved to be none the less effective. According to international law, a merchant vessel on the ocean remains under the jurisdiction of the country to which it belongs and whose flag it carries; consequently, any forcible visitation, molestation, or detention of such a ship constitutes an unfriendly act — indeed, an invasion of national territory. The general acknowledgment of this principle by maritime nations makes the high seas really free to all commerce in time of peace.

Something has been done also to protect commerce in time of war. The great powers assembled at Paris in 1856 to conclude the Crimean War took the opportunity to put forth the following declaration: "1. Privateering is, and remains, abolished; 2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war; 3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under enemy's flag; 4. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective, that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy." The rulings of the Paris conference received a severe shock in the first World War because modern total warfare makes it possible for any item of commerce to be listed as "contraband of war." Thus there were no goods that could claim freedom of the seas if they could be captured. This fact led to many severe exchanges between neutrals and belligerents in 1914-1918, but in 1939-1945 it was generally accepted without protest. The status of private property either on land or on sea in time of war has undergone such confusing changes between 1914 and 1945 that it would be difficult to discover any rights that could be categorically upheld in face of belligerent action.

Many obstacles to the exchange of goods in the Middle Ages gradually disappeared in modern times. Highway robbery and piracy were suppressed, while the burdensome tolls imposed on transport and travel from one district to another were reduced or no longer exacted. If domestic trade was thus promoted, foreign trade continued to be impeded by mercantilist restrictions, especially by the duties which every country levied on imports in the effort to protect its industries against competition. The development of this protective system was particularly associated with the French statesman, Colbert, who served under Louis XIV. Colbert regarded protectionism as only a temporary device, however, and called tariffs the crutches by the help of which manufacturers might learn to walk and then throw them away.

The growing industrialization of Great Britain in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century seemed to make free trade indispensable

to her economic development. By 1815 Great Britain enjoyed a virtual monopoly of large-scale production. Having no reason to fear the competition of foreign manufacturers, it was to her advantage to lower or abolish the duties on imports, especially of raw materials. William Pitt the Younger, influenced by Adam Smith's doctrine of mutual gain in commerce, began the work of tariff reform; Sir Robert Peel continued it; and Gladstone completed it. After 1860 Great Britain imposed no restrictions whatever on exports and levied import duties on only a few articles, such as coffee, tea, tobacco, alcoholic liquors, and sugar. Even these duties were purely for revenue. They did not encourage the production at home of anything that could be produced more cheaply abroad. "To buy in the cheapest market and sell in the dearest" was the British policy.


With this legislation went the repeal in 1846 of the Corn Laws, which had limited or entirely prohibited the importation of wheat or other grains in the interest of British farmers and landlords but at the same time made food dear for the working classes. Great Britain then proceeded to secure the bulk of her food abroad, from the fertile agricultural areas of the United States and the Dominions, and to pay for it with the products of her mines and factories. The Navigation Acts were repealed in 1849, after having been in force for nearly two centuries. Foreign ships were henceforth allowed to compete with those of Great Britain in the carrying trade. Competition resulted in lower freight rates and consequently in cheaper food for the British people.

The free-trade movement spread to the Continent, where it led to a general lowering of tariffs. Many liberal commercial treaties were negotiated; they usually included "the most-favored nation" clause, by which each contracting party agreed that if it should later make trade concessions to a third country these should be immediately granted to the other. The era of economic liberalism did not last long. France, Germany, and other countries sought by high import duties to build up their own "infant industries," in order to supply the home market and to compete with Great Britain in the markets of the world. The growth of nationalism and of international tension was in part responsible for this return to a protective policy.

The first American tariff was framed in 1789, its main purpose being to raise a much-needed revenue for the new government. The United States adopted protection on an extensive scale in 1816, as a means of keeping alive the industries which had sprung up in the country when the second war with Great Britain stopped all imports of foreign goods. Later tariffs have generally raised duties, except during a few decades before the Civil War.




EIGHTEENTH CENTURY WORKERS: AGRICULTURE
(From DIDEROT, *ENCYCLOPÉDIE*)





ASSEMBLY LINE (Courtesy B. L. Pickens, Wayne University)



TWENTIETH CENTURY WORKERS: IRON (Erwing Galloway)

The period since the first World War has been marked by rising trade barriers. Each nation has seemed intent on building at its frontiers a Chinese Wall to shut out foreign goods. In 1930 Congress enacted the Hawley-Smoot tariff, which raised import duties to heights never before reached in the United States and led to retaliatory high tariffs being imposed by other nations against American commodities. In 1931 Great Britain, so long a bulwark of free trade, also put up the umbrella of protection and imposed duties on a long list of manufactured articles imported. Besides high tariffs, other devices have been adopted to control imports and exports — quota restrictions, embargoes, licenses, government monopolies — all interferences with the free flow of goods from land to land. Since nations, in the long run, cannot buy when they cannot sell, the result has been a growing paralysis of international trade. This situation prevails at a time when the whole tendency of modern industry is toward mass production, which requires wider and wider markets in every part of the world. The need of selling national surpluses abroad led Congress in 1934 to pass the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, under which the United States has entered into arrangements with Great Britain, Canada, and other countries providing for mutual concessions and lowered tariffs on many commodities. The more widely such a policy is adopted by the great commercial nations, the sooner will the world emerge from economic doldrums.

Perhaps more important for the future development of international commerce and the exchange of goods is the fact that the post-Versailles world saw the development of a kind of barter economy in which the state rather than individual merchants made both the commercial policy and the trade contracts. In Soviet Russia the entire process of exporting and importing goods became a state function carried on by state trading agencies. Obviously the foreign policy of the nation and its economic relationships with the world must thereby become coordinated in a way undreamed of by the free-economy capitalist society of the nineteenth century. The Germans developed barter agreements to a high degree of efficiency. They exchanged goods for goods by a method of blocked accounts that made nations wishing to sell to Germany buy their manufactured commodities in Germany. Under the stress of war, Britain, too, adopted this method of trade, but, being unable to pay in goods because her factories were producing war equipment, she piled up accounts running into billions of dollars that could be collected after the war. This means that India, Argentina, and many other countries have credit in Britain for which they can demand English goods now that the war is over. It is difficult to see what the

final results of this barter economy will be. If it expands, the state will virtually control the entire course of trade and utterly destroy the whole fabric of pre-1914 international trade.

Commercial Organization

There is now so steady a flow of commodities from producers through wholesalers and retailers that the medieval system of weekly markets and semiannual or annual fairs has become all but obsolete. Distinctively modern are produce exchanges for trade in the great staples, such as wheat, cotton, wool, and sugar, and stock exchanges for the marketing of securities both domestic and foreign. Prior to the formation of the latter it was difficult to bring together the buyers and sellers of securities. For this reason London brokers used to meet in certain coffeehouses, while those in New York gathered under the shade of an old buttonwood tree in Wall Street. As the volume of transactions and the number of investors increased, it became necessary to adopt a formal organization, bylaws, and codes of practice. The first European stock exchange was established in London (1698) and the first American, in New York (1817).

The growth of exchanges almost from the start was linked with wild speculation, market booms, and their usual accompaniment, financial crashes. England early in the eighteenth century had its "South Sea Bubble," associated with speculation in the shares of the South Sea Company. In return for assuming the national debt, the company received a monopoly of English trade with South America. Its prospects seemed so enticing that investors paid extravagant prices for the stock. The collapse of the company ruined thousands of credulous stockholders. About the same time John Law, a Scotsman, promoted in France the disastrous "Mississippi Scheme." A speculative company for the development of the Louisiana territory was set up, and with its commercial activity was joined an attempt to finance the government by the issuance of paper money. The notes, not being convertible into coin, tended to depreciate, while the company made hardly any profits at all. Its shares sank in value even more rapidly than they had risen and its discredited notes went out of circulation, leaving both shareholders and noteholders bankrupt.

Produce and stock exchanges have become essential to the functioning of a capitalistic society. They provide marketing facilities otherwise unavailable; by means of these it is always possible to find a buyer — at a price — for what one wants to sell. Whatever increases the liquidity of an investment decreases the risk of making it. Through

the stock exchange, in particular, government securities and those of corporations are widely distributed. When bought by foreign investors, they make possible the transfer of idle funds to countries in need of capital.

If not excessive, speculation on the produce exchange by "bulls" and "bears" confers a benefit upon producers by safeguarding them against the risk of sharp fluctuations in prices; similarly, speculation on the stock exchange tends to raise depressed prices, and lower inflated prices, to a normal level. If, however, speculation results in an artificial scarcity of commodities or securities through "corners" and "squeezes," it becomes an economic evil. The difficulty, in practice, is to draw the line between legitimate speculation and simple gambling. It was to provide some regulation of stock exchanges in the United States that Congress, by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, brought them under the control of a government commission.

Another economic benefit, in view of the risks involved in most business undertakings, is the system of insurance. For a small sum the farmer insures his growing crops against hail or wind; the merchant, his goods against fire or theft; and the shipowner, his vessel against loss at sea. Marine insurance arose in medieval Italy, but since the middle of the eighteenth century it has been largely conducted by the company of Lloyd's in London. The first fire insurance policies were written in London after the great fire of 1666. Other forms of business insurance originated much more recently. The present tendency seems to be to insure against every possible misfortune that can be foreseen.

The first life insurance companies, based on a mathematical study of the mortality rate of a population, were formed in Great Britain and France during the latter part of the eighteenth century. Their recent growth, especially in the United States, has been quite extraordinary. The United States owns twice as much life insurance as all the other countries of the world combined. In 1932 the assets of American legal-reserve companies amounted to over twenty billion dollars, an increase of nearly 600 per cent in a quarter of a century. This immense sum, largely accumulated from premiums paid by policyholders, is invested in bonds, stocks, mortgages, and other securities. Life insurance companies are now our greatest private investors, our greatest "capitalists." Though theoretically controlled by the policyholders, actually the latter have little or no voice in the management, and the officers, entrenched behind proxies, exercise irresponsible power. The gigantic size and enormous resources of the larger companies would seem to make necessary their rigid regulation in the public interest.

Banking and the Credit System

A commercial bank, as distinguished from a savings bank or a trust company, may be defined as an institution which deals in money and credit. It attracts the deposits of many persons, thus gaining control of funds available for short-term loans with which factories are built, raw materials are purchased, and wages and salaries are paid. Such loans can be safely made on good security, provided a small reserve (usually about ten per cent) is kept to meet withdrawals by depositors. Banks do not increase the amount of producers' goods in a community, but they help to put these at the disposal of active businessmen; in other words, banks make capital fluid. Furthermore, bank notes, bank checks, drafts, and foreign bills of exchange provide a cheap and elastic substitute for coined money, so that through their use it is possible to discharge a large volume of indebtedness. Banking operations are based upon credit, a word meaning confidence — confidence that bank notes will always be convertible into specie, that checks and drafts will always be honored when due, and that the interest on loans, and ultimately the principal, will always be paid. Under normal conditions such has been the case.

The earliest medieval banks were the private establishments of moneyed men in Italian cities. Barcelona, Venice, and Genoa also founded public or state banks, and during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries similar institutions arose in many European capitals. The Bank of England owes its origin to the financial difficulties of the British government, during the reign of William and Mary, in carrying on an expensive war with Louis XIV. The revenues of the country at that time were small and the public credit was weak. In 1694 a group of subscribers, principally London merchants, made a loan to the government and received in return a charter granting them the right to accept deposits and lend money at interest. The Bank of England thus came into existence as essentially a private institution, but it acts as the chief depository of public money and as the agent of the Treasury in many financial operations. In 1946 it was nationalized by the Labour government which came to power. The Bank of France was the creation of Napoleon Bonaparte. The Imperial Bank of Germany (*Reichsbank*) dates from 1876. All the great European banks, as formerly the national banks of the United States, have the privilege of issuing redeemable notes which circulate in place of gold.

The ever greater scale of monetary transactions gave rise to a class of investment bankers controlling millions and even billions of dollars

deposited with them by insurance companies, business corporations, and men of wealth. In Europe the Jewish family of the Rothschilds for more than a century held a leading place in the financial life of London, Paris, Vienna, and other capitals. The private banking firm of J. P. Morgan and Company has long been similarly prominent in the United States. The enormous resources of such establishments enable them to make long-term loans to industrial concerns, to float issues of stocks and bonds, and, when companies become insolvent, to direct receiverships and reorganizations. Their influence over economic activities, particularly in the United States, is very great, for they largely decide into what channels capital investments shall flow and also determine, to a considerable extent, the character of securities offered for sale to the public. In contrast to commercial banking, investment banking is carried on with little or no governmental regulation.

International Finance

The world market for money enables investors in countries where wealth has accumulated and interest rates are therefore low to supply funds to other countries which offer, or seem to offer, profitable fields for business enterprise. It has been estimated that up to 1914 not less than twenty billion dollars had been invested abroad by Great Britain; of this sum about half went to the British colonies. French investments in Russia and other countries totaled about ten billion dollars, while those of Germany abroad also reached an impressively high figure. All through the nineteenth century the United States was a debtor nation because of the immense sums borrowed for the development of railroads, mines, farms, and factories. This situation changed with startling suddenness during the first World War, when the Allied nations purchased in the United States enormous amounts of food, raw materials, and munitions. The United States not only wiped off its indebtedness to Europe, but made Europe heavily its debtor. In consequence New York, rather than London or Paris, has become the world's money market and the center of international finance.

A Bank for International Settlements—more shortly, the World Bank—was established in 1930, with headquarters at Basel, Switzerland. The second World War broke out before this Bank had time to prove its worth, but it clearly pointed to the need for such an institution. As a result of the Bretton Woods Conference (1944), a new International Bank was founded to help cope with the financial problems of the contemporary world.

National Debts

A medieval sovereign who needed money for warfare or some other extravagance borrowed it temporarily at high rates of interest from Jews and other professional lenders. Instead of borrowing, he often debased the coinage and put the profit of debasement in his royal pockets. Modern governments, relying upon the will and ability of their citizens to pay taxes, create national debts. From the point of view of the investor these do not need to be repaid within a brief period, since so long as interest on them is promptly met they provide a safe and convenient form of employing idle funds. Indeed, so far as the investor is concerned, they need never be repaid, for the government bonds are always salable on the stock exchange. If citizens are ready to lend, governments are equally ready to borrow, and thus once instituted, national debts tend to grow by leaps and bounds. The first World War raised them to truly "astronomical" figures. Seven belligerents alone — Bulgaria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Portugal — owed in 1920 no less than \$128,000,000,000 as compared with \$14,000,000,000 in 1913. The debt of Great Britain in 1920 was \$40,000,000,000 or more than ten times what it was in 1913. The United States, before entering the war, owed little more than a billion dollars; at the end of the war it owed twenty-five times that amount.

The burden of indebtedness was lightened in many countries through monetary depreciation. Germany got rid of its internal debt, both public and private, by a wholesale inflation of the currency, until at length over four trillion paper marks were required to buy what a dollar (based on gold) would buy. This inflation caused the almost complete ruin of what had been the middle class of Germany. It was the same disastrous experience which the French revolutionists had with their *assignats*. The Russian debt, both internal and external, which had reached a high figure at the time of the Revolution, was repudiated by the Soviet government. As we have seen, the inter-Allied debts and the German reparations accounts were liquidated by the Lausanne "Gentleman's Agreement." It proved to be impossible to pay such enormous sums in a world in which there was so limited an exchange of goods and so much obstruction to commerce.

The world after the second great war of the century has an even more staggering debt structure. The United States alone has a public debt about three times as great as the combined indebtednesses of Bulgaria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Portugal in 1920, and almost ten times as great as the United States' debt of 1920. What

Britain owes in terms of blocked accounts, internal public debt, and lend-lease agreements probably is a greater per capita load than that carried by the United States, and only additional borrowing can allow Britain any hope of recovering her pre-1939 economic position in the world. It will be several years before we can know what the debt structure of our world will be, but the prospects are that it will be the great financial problem of the so-called "atomic age."

Crises and Depressions

Economic progress has been frequently interrupted during the past century by financial crises and business depressions. These have occurred at intervals of about eleven years. Arising in one country, perhaps as a result of bad banking, overissue of paper money, excessive speculation, unwise investments, or crop failures, they tend to spread widely and involve all industrialized countries. Those of 1837, 1857, 1873, 1893, and 1929 were most severe in the United States. What happens when a major shift from "good times" to "hard times" takes place is a familiar story. Capitalists refuse to invest in new enterprises; bankers will not lend money; merchants, unable to borrow and faced with declining sales, go into bankruptcy; and manufacturers, receiving fewer orders, either reduce their output or shut down their plants. Then follows a period of low prices, low wages, much unemployment, and widespread destitution, until, with a revival of confidence, the wave of prosperity again sets in.

The belief of many economists that these dislocations of trade and industry might be less severe and perhaps disappear altogether, as commercial organization becomes more efficient, has been rudely shattered by the experiences of 1929 and the following years, when practically the whole civilized world was involved in the worst crisis and depression ever known. Doubtless the principal cause is to be found in the great war, which resulted in the destruction of human life and property on a colossal scale. The world could not waste so many millions of lives and so many billions of dollars without paying the penalty in economic demoralization. The crisis and the depression in the United States were intensified by the uncontrolled speculation which reached its height in 1929; by the huge expansion of credit facilities; by the marked decline in the value of wheat, corn, cotton, and other agricultural staples; and especially by the rapid displacement of hand labor by the machine, resulting in great and growing unemployment. Such an "economic blizzard" as that of 1929 takes a heavy toll in human suffering and the loss of productive power. The prospect of new economic

depressions in the near future is one of the most important concerns of thinking men in every part of the world.

Industrial Organization; the Corporation

The mechanization of industry, which began in the eighteenth century and continued in the nineteenth, has proceeded at an accelerated pace during recent decades. Mass production becomes more and more characteristic of great industrialized countries; above all, of the United States. Its essential features are, first, the making of standard interchangeable parts by automatic or almost automatic machinery and, second, the assembling of these parts into the completed product — a motor car or a machine gun — with the minimum of hand labor. Economical of both time and human energy, it is the most rapid and consequently the cheapest way to produce commodities for which a large demand exists or can be stimulated by advertising. The introduction of “scientific management,” to eliminate waste and inefficiency, further aids in speeding up the productive process. Still another feature of industrial organization is the maintenance by private concerns of research institutes, in which scientists and inventors work constantly to improve old processes and devise new ones.

With the ever increasing scale of productive activities and the ever growing need of large amounts of capital, the corporation becomes the characteristic form of business enterprise. The corporation possesses the advantages of a legal personality and of a life limited only by the terms of its charter; by means of it business enterprise is made independent of the hazards of individual human lives. One generation of shareholders is succeeded by the next, but the corporation lives on and preserves a continuity of knowledge and experience. It is one of the most important social inventions ever made, but it is of comparatively recent origin.

Early corporations were mainly such organizations as the Bank of England and the East India Company, with few stockholders and with monopolistic privileges. Their great growth began after the middle of the nineteenth century, when the laws of Great Britain and other countries permitted the formation of the limited liability company, in which a shareholder is responsible for the company's debts only to the extent of his shares. Should the company become bankrupt, the most that he can lose is the amount he has invested in its stock, whereas, were he a private producer or a member of a partnership, he would be personally responsible for all debts incurred. Thus the corporation, with its limited liability feature, attracts the savings of countless investors

and affords them the opportunity to share in the profits, if also in the losses, of commercial and industrial undertakings.

As at present conducted, the modern corporation is open to grave criticisms. The shareholders usually take no active part in the management but, provided satisfactory dividends are declared, follow the directors like sheep. Few shareholders attend the annual meetings, and the business may be in a bad way before the state of its affairs has become known to those who own it. Most boards of directors are practically self-elected, since the shareholders, as a rule, send their proxies to be voted as those in control desire. Furthermore, in probably the majority of corporations the board members themselves have only a sketchy knowledge of the business they are supposed to direct, but rely upon the reports of the officers as long as things look rosy. When, as sometimes happens, a man may serve as director of as many as a hundred corporations, quite obviously he can have no more than a cursory understanding of each one. These unsatisfactory conditions are not irremediable; they must be remedied if the modern corporation is to retain its place and perform its proper function in a capitalistic society.

A characteristically American form of business enterprise is the holding company, which may be defined as any corporation which controls or influences materially the management of another corporation (or of several corporations) by virtue, in part at least, of its ownership of securities of the latter. Sometimes the company may possess little more than such securities; sometimes, also, it owns and operates various properties. Before 1888 few corporations in the United States had the legal right to acquire stocks of other corporations, but in that year New Jersey conferred the right upon corporations chartered under its laws, and since then many states have expressly authorized interstate stockholding. Such gigantic combinations as the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, the United States Steel Corporation, and the Pennsylvania Railroad system have been the outcome of this device for concentrating capital resources into ever larger units. By means of a pyramided series of holding companies, each one controlled by the next above it, a top holding company with perhaps an investment of only one million dollars may be able to control the underlying operating company with perhaps a billion-dollar investment. Because of the opportunities which holding companies offer for financial jugglery their regulation in the public interest has become an insistent problem.

The effects of the second World War upon business organization cannot as yet be gauged. The impact of government on business will undoubtedly alter the picture and it is probable that the future will

see new molds for the organization of both commercial and industrial enterprise.

Agriculture and Land Tenure

The agricultural system of the Middle Ages, with its backward methods and its scanty yield, began to be transformed at the approach of modern times. The Dutch were the first scientific farmers, and from them English farmers learned many secrets of tillage. Deeper plowing; more thorough pulverization of the soil; more diligent manuring; the rotation of crops from field to field, so that part of the land would not have to lie fallow every year; and the planting of new crops, especially clover and turnips, were some of the improvements to be gradually introduced. The weight of cattle and sheep was also much increased through careful selection in breeding. It is significant of the revived interest in agriculture that George III, "Farmer George," contributed articles to a farm journal and that Washington, in his quiet retreat at Mount Vernon, invented a plow and a rotary seed drill.

Since 1800 the improvements in agriculture have extended to every progressive country. Machinery more and more replaces hand tools and back-breaking labor. Cheap artificial fertilizers make profitable the cultivation of poor lands formerly allowed to lie idle. Scientific engineering reclaims marshes and arid wastes. Finally, steam navigation enables a country to import foodstuffs from the most distant regions, with the result that the specter of famine, so common in the Middle Ages, has well-nigh disappeared from a very large part of the world of today.

The old "open-field" system, whereby the same person tilled many small strips in different parts of the agricultural land, was so wasteful of time and labor that farmers began to exchange their scattered strips for compact holdings which could be enclosed with hedges or fences and cultivated independently. This enclosure movement continued in western Europe during the modern period, until in the nineteenth century open fields had been practically abandoned in favor of separate farms and individual tillage.

Enclosures meant better farming everywhere, but in Great Britain they also helped to create the large estates so characteristic of that country. The lord of the manor, not content with enclosing his own (demesne) lands, often managed to enclose the meadows and forests which had been previously used by the peasants in common. The small farmer, in consequence, found it harder than ever to support a family on his petty holding. Moreover, he did not have sufficient capital to invest in necessary improvements and to buy the agricultural machinery

rapidly coming into use, while the decay of the commission system deprived him of a supplementary income from household manufacturing. Under such circumstances he was often forced to sell out to a large landowner. Many dispossessed farmers drifted to neighboring towns and became factory workers; many went abroad to the British colonies or the United States; still others remained on the land as day laborers. The result was the almost complete disappearance, by the middle of the nineteenth century, of the old British yeomanry, or class of peasant proprietors. Each landlord parcels out his property among a number of tenant farmers, who work the soil themselves with the aid of agricultural day laborers.

A considerable part of the agricultural land of France was owned by the peasants even before the Revolution. Their possessions increased in the revolutionary era, as the result of legislation confiscating the estates of the crown, the church, and the emigrant nobles. France has now little farm tenancy; the countryside belongs to small peasant proprietors.

The agrarian reforms of the French Revolution spread to Belgium, Switzerland, western Germany, and northern Italy, where peasant proprietorships have long been common. In many other parts of Europe the land continued to be monopolized by the nobility throughout the nineteenth century. Outside of Russia proper, there were six of these landed aristocracies in 1914: in Spain and Portugal; in eastern Germany, where serfdom disappeared only in the Napoleonic era; in Austria-Hungary, where it disappeared during the disorders of 1848-1849; in the Baltic provinces controlled by nobles of German origin; in Poland and Lithuania; and in Rumania. It now seems probable that among the consequences of the revolutions after the two World Wars there will be a breaking-up of the vast estates into small farms for the peasants.

The abolition of Russian serfdom by Alexander II in 1858-1861 was followed by measures establishing a new system of land tenure. The nobles were required to sell a part of their estates to the peasants; in this way about half of the agricultural area of European Russia changed hands. Except in Poland and certain other regions where individual ownership prevailed, the farming land was entrusted to the entire village (*mir*) for redistribution at intervals among the inhabitants. All that the peasant really possessed in his own right was a house and a garden plot.

This system of land tenure did not long survive the Russian Revolution. One of the first acts of the revolutionists was the confiscation of the huge imperial domains, together with many estates of the nobility, for partition among the peasants and individual ownership. Now, how-

ever, the Bolsheviks have "collectivized" land as they have "collectivized" industry. Farms are either managed by government officials or they are worked co-operatively by the peasants. In the latter case the government supplies the necessary equipment and takes a share of the produce. These state and co-operative farms seemingly spell the doom of private ownership of land in Russia, where seven-eighths of the people live mainly or wholly by agriculture.

The Economy of the Postwar Era

The second war in the twentieth century has disrupted the economy of the world so greatly that it is still impossible to see the full extent of the resultant changes. The European continent will need considerable time to rebuild its cities and factories and to restore its economic structure. In the Orient, too, prewar standards will not be quickly reached again. On the other hand, the war was a stimulant as well as a destroyer. New commodities, new institutions, and new methods were devised for the emergency. Many of these can be adapted to current needs and may simplify the re-establishment of a peacetime economy, especially if the general political situation is not disarranged too long.

Although the immediate prosperity of the United States is obviously not universal, it is possible that this country may furnish the economic pattern for much of the world in the future. In such case, effort will be directed to the production of consumers' goods, and there will be a continuation of the tendency toward improvement of the economic status of individuals. In the last hundred and fifty years we have gradually evolved a society in which commodities are cheap and human labor is expensive. It is inconceivable that even so great a catastrophe as the war could permanently deflect that trend and return our civilization to the less advanced social structure of earlier epochs.

XXII

Social Betterment

Humanitarianism

THE brotherhood of man was taught by the Hebrew prophets, by the Stoic philosophers of Greece and Rome, and by the early Christians, and the medieval church always preached the natural equality of all men, if not on earth at any rate in heaven. But no previous age approaches ours in sympathy for the oppressed of every race and creed and class. The humanitarianism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries springs directly from that of the eighteenth century, from the reforms in the human lot advocated and forwarded by the great thinkers of the Enlightenment. Humanitarianism has developed and continues to develop with the growth of democratic sentiments, the abolition of class privileges, the spread of popular education, the increase of wealth, and all the improvements in transportation and communication which conquer space and time. Increasingly the world's peoples feel themselves to be "members one of another," as they draw together into a common life commensurate with the earth which they inhabit.

One hundred and fifty years ago the slave trade was generally regarded as a legitimate business. Hardly anyone thought it wrong to kidnap or purchase African Negroes, pack them on shipboard, where many died in the stifling holds, and carry them to the West Indies or the American mainland to be sold into bondage. It is estimated that more than three million Negroes, chiefly from the Guinea coast of Africa, were brought to the New World and that at least a quarter of a million more perished on the way thither. The traffic reached its greatest proportions after the English had begun to encroach upon the West Indies and to develop, far more thoroughly than the Spaniards had done, the cultivation of cotton, tobacco, and sugar cane in the islands. The Brazilians also demanded large and regular shipments of slaves to work their sugar and coffee plantations.

Agitation for the prohibition of the slave trade began toward the

close of the eighteenth century. Denmark in 1792 was the first country to declare it unlawful, a step not taken by Great Britain and the United States until 1807-1808. The British action was largely due to the reforming zeal of Thomas Clarkson, whose interest in slavery and the slave trade had been aroused when he was an undergraduate at Cambridge. The Congress of Vienna pronounced against the traffic which had so long desolated Africa and degraded Europe, and the Continental nations agreed that it should cease to enjoy the protection of their flags. It was not suppressed for many years, however, and then only after the West African coast had been blockaded by British cruisers and many slave ships had been captured in Atlantic waters. Since the last decade of the nineteenth century the European powers have also taken concerted measures to stamp out what remains of the slave trade in the interior of Africa.

The French revolutionists abolished slavery in the colonies of France, but Napoleon restored it. Great Britain in 1833 freed the slaves in the British West Indies, paying twenty million pounds to their former owners as compensation. This action is a monument "more durable than brass" to the labors of William Wilberforce, one of Clarkson's associates, who devoted his wealth and powerful oratory to the cause of the oppressed Negroes. Slavery subsequently disappeared in the colonial possessions of France, Portugal, and Holland. In the New World the former colonies of Spain took the lead in the movement for emancipation. Brazil did not abolish slavery until 1888, but in that country it had a far kindlier aspect than elsewhere, owing to the absence of color prejudice among the Portuguese settlers.

The prospects for emancipation at first seemed bright in the United States. Slavery proved to be an economic failure in the North, and one state after another abolished it. There was a general belief that it would also die out gradually in the South. Whitney's cotton gin, which so enormously increased the cultivation of cotton, revived the waning institution. During the first half of the nineteenth century Southern slavery became an industrial system, so firmly entrenched that it could be destroyed only at the cost of civil war. In 1862 President Lincoln, as commander in chief of the Federal armies, issued the famous proclamation by which, on January 1, 1863, slavery should cease to exist legally in any state or part of a state that remained in rebellion. The validity of Lincoln's act never came before the Supreme Court for decision because of the adoption in 1865 of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution.

The abolition of slavery and of the "trade in men" on which it rested was accomplished in spite of all the obstacles raised by selfish

interests. A conviction of the wrongfulness of slavery and the slave trade finally put them both under the ban of the law. It is an impressive instance of the development of a social conscience in regard to matters which not long ago were quite outside the realm of morals.

The growth of the new social conscience has also been evident in better treatment of the criminal class. The work which the Italian jurist Beccaria began so well was continued by the revolutionists in France and in Great Britain by many reformers under the leadership of Sir Samuel Romilly. The number of capital offenses in the savage British code was steadily reduced, until only high treason, piracy, and murder remained. One consequence of the reforms was a marked lessening of serious crimes, although judges and other conservative persons had predicted just the opposite. Since the middle of the nineteenth century the death penalty has been abolished by a number of European countries and by most of the Latin-American countries (including Brazil) without any resulting increase in the homicide rate. While only a few states in this country do not have capital punishment, most of them follow a compromise policy which permits the judge or the jury to decide whether the penalty shall be death or imprisonment. The humanizing of the penal law is also seen in the almost complete abandonment of corporal punishment, such as branding, flogging, and bodily mutilation, for offenses less than homicide. A growing refinement makes people averse to the use of surgery in the administration of justice.

The system of imprisonment for debt continued in Great Britain and other countries well into the nineteenth century. The British legislation repealing it was not enacted until 1869, and even now a debtor may be imprisoned when the court is satisfied that he acted fraudulently or could discharge his indebtedness if he tried to do so. A somewhat similar situation prevails in the United States, where debtors are sometimes committed to jail for failure to meet their contractual obligations or to pay fines levied on them by the courts.

Much has been done to improve sanitary conditions in prisons, to abolish striped clothing, the lock step, and other humiliating practices in the treatment of prisoners, to institute liberal (sometimes too liberal) parole systems, and, by means of juvenile courts and reformatories, to separate first offenders from hardened criminals. Even as regards the latter, the idea now is to make confinement less a punishment than a means of developing the convict's self-respect and self-confidence, so that he may return to free life as a useful member of society. Prison reform in the various countries has been much advanced by international congresses of penologists.

Idiocy and insanity once found an explanation in the theory of possession by demons, and even when that primitive idea was abandoned mental and nervous diseases were not regarded by the general public as diseases at all. In seventeenth-century England people visited Bedlam, the London madhouse, to amuse themselves with watching the antics of chained lunatics. Nowadays the mentally defective are no longer regarded with amusement or contempt, but are rather considered as pitiful victims of heredity or of circumstances for which they are often not responsible. Every civilized country provides asylums or sanatoria for their proper care under medical supervision. There are also special schools for the benefit of the blind and of the deaf and dumb.

Indifference to animal suffering was characteristic of public opinion in Europe until quite recent times. The British Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals was founded in 1824. Ten years later parliament abolished bull-baiting and cock-fighting, which had long been favorite amusements of the lower classes, and prohibited cruelty to all domestic animals. Similar legislation has been generally enacted on the Continent, as well as in the United States.

The medieval judicial duel, or wager of battle, stripped of its legality and of its religious sanction, survived as the modern duel of honor. This first developed in sixteenth-century France, where it flourished until the time of the Revolution but afterward degenerated into usually harmless encounters. Dueling was also a common custom in Great Britain and the United States until the early nineteenth century. It has become practically extinct in an industrial, democratic, and unromantic age.

During the war of 1914-1918 a number of European countries limited the consumption of alcoholic liquors, and since the war public regulation has continued in one form or another. Great Britain retained the licensing system, but follows a policy of reducing the number of "public houses" and of restricting the hours of sale. Sweden and Norway put the manufacture, importation, and distribution of liquor (including beer and wine) under the control of companies whose profits are definitely fixed by the government. Soviet Russia has established a complete state monopoly of the liquor traffic. In Canada governmental control takes the form of a monopoly of retail sales, with a resulting marked decline in the per capita consumption of spirits.

Total abolition of the liquor traffic in the United States was long agitated by the Prohibition Party, the Woman's Christian Temperance Union (under the presidency of Miss Frances E. Willard), and the Anti-Saloon League. Maine was the first state to adopt legal prohibition, and its example was followed by many states in the Middle West

and the South. Prohibition sentiment continued to increase, and in 1918-1919 a constitutional amendment forbidding the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors throughout the country and their importation into it was ratified by more than three-fourths of the state legislatures. This Eighteenth Amendment went into effect a year after ratification. Opposition to prohibition, the political corruption which marked its enforcement, and the desire to secure additional revenue for the government were the principal reasons leading to its repeal in 1933 by the Twenty-first Amendment.

Charity and Philanthropy

Throughout the Middle Ages the church built hospitals, asylums, and poorhouses, supported them, and controlled them. Much of this activity has now been taken over by the secular authorities, inspired by humanitarian motives which in former days found no expression in governmental action. Private efforts to relieve poverty and distress have also produced charity organization societies, associations for improving the condition of the poor, "community chests," dispensaries, free clinics, free hospital wards, anti-tuberculosis leagues, fresh-air funds, and numberless other philanthropic agencies.

In 1884 an English clergyman, S. A. Barnett, founded Toynbee Hall in the wretched Whitechapel district of London. It was the first of some six hundred "social settlements" to be established in Europe and America, where young men and young women, often from the universities, live among the working classes and devote themselves to the community welfare—to improving conditions of sanitation, health, education, recreation, housing, and industry. Hull House in Chicago, long directed by Jane Addams, is perhaps the best known of these institutions in the United States. The missionary work of William Booth, a Methodist minister, among the slum dwellers of London, gave rise to the Salvation Army. This organization, which seeks to better both the physical and the spiritual lot of those who are not reached by other religious bodies, has spread throughout the world. Another worldwide organization, the Young Men's Christian Association, was founded in Great Britain in 1844 by George Williams. The Young Women's Christian Association dates from 1884.

The Red Cross owes its inspiration to a native of Switzerland, Henri Dunant, who saw the battle of Solferino in the Austro-Sardinian War. His experience of this murderous blood bath prompted him to urge the formation of relief societies for the care of sick and wounded soldiers. The result was an international gathering at Geneva in 1864 and an

agreement to lessen the horrors of modern warfare. The ten states which originally ratified it have since been joined by practically all the civilized powers. To carry out the Geneva Convention the International Red Cross Society was formed, with headquarters at Geneva and branches in the various countries. Henri Dunant's name is little known, but the organization which he did most to found has now become an institution for the relief of all suffering, whether caused by war or by pestilence, floods, earthquakes, or other great natural calamities. It has brought the nations beyond self-interest to a common work in the service of all; it has given a shining example of what might be accomplished for human welfare by concerted effort in a peaceful, federated world.

Princely and more than princely benefactions for charitable and educational purposes have been made by men of wealth, particularly in the United States. Andrew Carnegie devoted to public purposes over \$350,000,000. His largest endowment was for the Carnegie Corporation, which exists for the "advancement and diffusion of knowledge and understanding" among all the peoples of the English-speaking world. The gifts of John D. Rockefeller, Sr., exceeded \$500,000,000. The Rockefeller Foundation, established "to promote the well-being of mankind throughout the world," was his most extensive endowment. The Rhodes Scholarships at Oxford, endowed by Cecil Rhodes, and the Nobel Prizes, provided by Alfred Nobel, are also typical of the great international benefactions of our time.

Emancipation of Women

Woman's position in European society a century and a half ago was what it had been during the Middle Ages, a position of dependence on man. She received little or no formal education, seldom engaged in any gainful occupation, and for support relied before marriage on her father, and after marriage on her husband. In Great Britain she could neither make a will nor enter into a contract without her husband's consent. All her possessions belonged to him. Any money that she earned or inherited was his and might be taken to pay his debts. The law even deprived her of control over her own children. Similar disabilities rested upon Continental women. St. Thomas Aquinas, greatest of medieval thinkers, explained them all in a single sentence: "Man is the beginning of woman and her end, just as God is the beginning and end of every creature."

The humanitarian sentiments evoked by the French Revolution freed slave and serf, but stopped short of freeing woman. The National

Assembly, which had framed the Declaration of the Rights of Man, paid scant attention to a Declaration of the Rights of Woman proposed by a few of that sex. Napoleon's code, so enlightened in many respects, continued the legal subordination of wives to their husbands. Yet this period saw the publication of Mary Wollstonecraft's pioneer work, *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman* (1792), protesting against the assumption that woman formed only the plaything of man and entering a plea for equality of education so that intellectual companionship might become the chief and durable happiness of marriage. Nowadays her book would be thought conservative in character, but at the time it seemed a radical pronouncement, and its author was referred to in polite circles as a "hyena in petticoats" and a "philosophizing serpent." Far more influential at a later date was the *Subjection of Woman* (1869) by John Stuart Mill, an eminent English philosopher and economist, who argued for complete equality of opportunity for both sexes.

The movement for emancipation received a powerful impetus when modern industrialism provided new employments for woman, outside the home, in factories and offices, and thus lessened her economic dependence on man. Perhaps the invention of the typewriter did more than anything else to open to her the doors of business life. Her educational opportunities have also steadily widened, making it possible for her to enter the professions. The pioneer colleges for women in the United States were Mount Holyoke Female Seminary (now Mount Holyoke College) in Massachusetts, founded by Mary Lyon and chartered in 1836, and Wesleyan College in Georgia. Oberlin College (1833) was the first private institution and the University of Iowa (1856) was the first state university to adopt coeducation. The higher educational institutions of many European countries now permit women to hear lectures and receive degrees on practically the same terms as men.

Before the first World War the movement for woman suffrage had made little headway in Europe. During or shortly after the war women received the vote in most Continental countries, France, Italy, and Spain being conspicuous exceptions. The Equal Franchise Act passed by the British parliament in 1918 gave the vote to women over thirty years of age. This age limit has since been lowered to twenty-one years, to accord with that for male electors. Australia, New Zealand, and Canada have woman suffrage, as well as Mexico and Brazil. The second World War has extended suffrage to women in France, in the Balkans, in Japan, and many other places.

As far back as 1869, when the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, granting the suffrage to Negroes, was before

Congress, Miss Susan B. Anthony and her associates appealed to the legislators for recognition of women as well. The appeal was denied. The women then organized the National Woman Suffrage Association and began a campaign of education to convince thinking people of the justice of their cause. Wyoming, when admitted to statehood in 1890, gave the ballot to women, and fourteen other states followed the example thus set. Finally the constitutional amendment for woman suffrage, which had been constantly before Congress for forty years, received the approval of that body and was speedily ratified by three-fourths of the states in 1920.

Marriage and Divorce

The divorce laws of the Christian world exhibit much variety. Some Catholic countries in Europe preserve the religious conception of marriage as a sacrament and therefore do not recognize divorce under any circumstances. The same is true of most Latin-American countries. Those adhering to the Greek Church allow divorce. Those governed or influenced by the *Code Napoléon*, in particular, France, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, and Germany, do the same. In Great Britain divorce, though allowable, is rare. The laws of the United States present no uniformity, and some states grant divorce on much easier terms than others. While conservative thought still favors its prohibition or its limitation to cases of adultery, legislation among the Western nations tends to treat marriage as a civil contract and to permit the contract to be broken for desertion, failure to provide, immorality, cruelty, habitual drunkenness, and serious crime, that is, for such behavior of one party to the other as makes married life unbearable. John Milton, arguing in the seventeenth century for divorce on the general ground of "incompatibility," anticipated the modern attitude.

Emancipation of Children

Among the early Romans the father's control of his offspring was all but absolute, and their welfare was often sacrificed to his despotic rule. While the abuses of the *patria potestas* were checked in late republican times and under the empire, nevertheless the Roman notions of paternal rights and filial duties survived in medieval Europe and still linger in Latin countries. By the law of France, for instance, a son under twenty-five and a daughter under twenty-one may not marry without the consent of their parents. Until the nineteenth century children in Europe

and the United States had little protection against the dominant male head of the family for any ill treatment or cruelty short of actual death. Gradually there has been built up, in one country after another, a legal recognition of the right of the child to proper maintenance, education, exemption from premature work, and protection against neglect of any sort. This "children's charter" is demanded, not only on the plea of humanity, but also because of the paramount interest of the state in the proper nurture of its future citizens.

Popular Education

One result of the Protestant movement was the introduction into the Puritan colonies of New England of elementary schools maintained by general taxation. The free public school system spread throughout the United States during the nineteenth century and became entirely secular in character. No one did more to advance it than Horace Mann of Massachusetts. He established at Lexington in 1839 the first normal school for the training of teachers, and in his annual reports as secretary of the state board of education he argued persuasively that common schools are the pillars of democracy.

The first American high school (for boys only) opened in Boston in 1821. The Massachusetts legislature, six years later, passed the first law requiring the establishment of high schools in cities and towns. Outside of this state great difficulties were met in setting up a high school system. Secondary education was expensive and, in the opinion of many persons, was unnecessary. Why should taxes be levied to teach children "to make x's and pothooks and gabble parley-vous"? In spite of all obstacles, the high school movement has spread everywhere in the United States, and now there are many thousands of such schools offering a four-year course and freely open to both boys and girls. The establishment of junior colleges extends the high school course to six years by adding to it various subjects of collegiate grade.

The British government neglected popular education; the Anglican Church opposed it as being secular; and members of the upper and ruling class saw no need for it on the part of those who must always remain hewers of wood and drawers of water. Besides, popular education nourished revolutionary ideas. "If a horse knew as much as a man, I should not like to be its rider," declared a peer in parliament when voting against an appropriation for educational purposes. The extension of the suffrage to the working classes brought the question to the fore. "We must educate our masters," it was said. In 1870 Gladstone's government set up a national system of elementary education,

free, compulsory, and secular. Many parents prefer, however, to send their children to private institutions under the control of the Anglican Church. National and private schools together have well-nigh abolished illiteracy in Great Britain.

The French revolutionists prepared an elaborate scheme for public schools, but never carried it into effect. Napoleon's efforts to provide for them were handicapped by lack of funds and of experienced teachers, and at the close of the Napoleonic period the majority of children still attended private schools conducted by the church authorities. France waited until the eighties of the last century before securing a national system of public education such as Prussia and other German states had long possessed. Illiteracy is now practically nonexistent in both France and Germany. The percentage of illiteracy is still high in Italy and even higher in Spain, Portugal, and the Balkan states, while in Russia, until recently, most of the peasants were too ignorant to sign their names. The Soviet government has set itself resolutely to the task of extending school facilities to its many millions of subjects. Thus Europe comes more and more to agree with the United States that at least the rudiments of education are the birthright of every child.

Along with the spread of popular education there has been a corresponding improvement in its methods and content. A German-Swiss, Pestalozzi (1746-1827), building on the best in the earlier work of Rousseau, may be said to have created the modern elementary school. He insisted that things were to come before words in teaching; this principle led to the introduction of new subjects, such as drawing and geography, in the curriculum. He also advocated the elimination from the schools of severe discipline and of cruel and degrading forms of punishment. The German, Froebel (1782-1852), stimulated by Pestalozzi, gave his attention to the education of very young children. His whole method aimed to enable the child to adjust itself easily to the world about it; for this purpose he provided social training through co-operative games and other activities. Froebel organized the first kindergarten. The institution has spread widely, particularly in the United States, where there is scarcely a city of any size that has not incorporated it in the public school system. Nursery schools for children who have not reached the kindergarten age are a still more recent development.

The Higher Learning

State universities, public, secular, and free, are an American contribution to education. Previous to their establishment private denominational colleges prepared men for the ministry and a few other learned

professions. The first public university was the University of Georgia, chartered in 1785, but the most notable early example was the University of Virginia, chartered thirty years later. The latter owed everything to Thomas Jefferson, who designed its buildings, chose its teachers, and impressed upon its organization his liberal principles. A curriculum without required subjects; the absence of religious tests and practices; the equality of all faculty members, under an elective chairman; and the honor system for students in both examinations and discipline made the university doubtless the most liberal institution of learning in the world at that time. State universities or colleges are now found throughout the United States, with the exception of New York. Their work is supplemented by public city colleges and by private colleges and universities numbering over eight hundred. The rapid growth in student enrollment and the enormous increase in endowments are features of recent educational progress in the United States. The demand for a wider diffusion of knowledge and ampler opportunities to acquire it has also resulted in the foundation of new universities abroad, many of them since the first World War.

Separation of Church and State

The church in the Middle Ages controlled, or tried to control, the state. The Protestant Revolt, in those countries where it succeeded, merely substituted a number of separate national churches for the one Roman Church. To Roger Williams and William Penn in the seventeenth century belongs the distinction of having founded in Rhode Island and Pennsylvania respectively the first political communities where religious matters were entirely divorced from the civil government. The ideas of Williams and Penn found expression in the first amendment to the Constitution, which forbids Congress to make any law "respecting an establishment of religion." This restriction does not bind the several states, but most of their constitutions repeat the Federal prohibition. Religion in the United States is thus free, but the law neither promotes nor restrains it. The public schools may not teach religion, but there must not be any interference with its teaching by the churches or with their right to set up schools, at their own expense, where it is taught. Such was the American solution of an age-old problem, one that has worked well and been an example to the world.

Church and state are separate in Mexico, Chile, Brazil, and a number of the smaller Latin-American republics. The constitutions of the four British Dominions — Canada, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand — likewise provide for the separation of church and state. The

Liberal Party under Gladstone disestablished the Anglican Church in Ireland and under Lloyd George disestablished it in Wales. In England Anglicanism remains the official and state-supported religion. The French revolutionists disestablished the Roman Church, but Napoleon's Concordat restored it in 1801. The Concordat was repealed in 1905, and now Catholic as well as Protestant bodies depend upon voluntary contributions for support. The Russian revolutionists in 1917 disestablished the Orthodox Church as being an ally of the old czarist regime. Italy continues to recognize Catholicism as the state religion, but grants religious toleration to Protestants and other non-Catholics.

The Roman Church

After the unification of Italy Cavour wanted the pope (Pius IX) to adopt the principle of "a free church in a free state"; that is, to give up his temporal power and wield only a spiritual sway over Catholics everywhere. The pope preferred to keep the States of the Church, which after 1860 included only Rome and its neighborhood. He lost even these possessions ten years later when Italian troops occupied Rome. The relations of church and state in Italy were henceforth defined by the Law of Papal Guarantees, enacted in 1871. It allowed the pope to enjoy the use, but not the ownership, of the Vatican and Lateran palaces in Rome, to hold a court, and to receive diplomatic representatives from foreign states. The government also reserved to the pope an annual subsidy as a recompense for the loss of his estates. This legislation was never acknowledged as valid by Pius IX. He refused to recognize the new kingdom of Italy, declined to accept the financial grants, and shut himself up in the Vatican.

The hostility between the papacy and the Italian government continued until the signing in 1929 of the Lateran Treaty, the joint work of Pope Pius XI and Mussolini. Its essential point was the recognition of the absolute sovereignty of the Holy See over the newly created Vatican City, consisting of the Vatican Palace and the adjacent land and buildings. Only about one hundred and nine acres in extent, it is the smallest independent state in the world. The pope, on his side, recognized the Italian kingdom, with the city of Rome as its capital and the House of Savoy as the reigning dynasty. The "Roman Question" thus reached a solution.

The pontificate of Pius IX was marked by the meeting of the Vatican Council (1869-1870), the first general council of the Roman Church since that of Trent three centuries previously. The prelates who assembled in Rome from all parts of the world had for their principal

task the making of a decision, once and for all, of the vexed question of papal infallibility. For medieval theologians the pope was not infallible; he might err in the faith; conceivably, he might even be condemned as a heretic. After much debate and after a number of dissidents had quitted the council, five hundred and thirty-five prelates affirmed that when the pope speaks *ex cathedra* ("from the throne"), or in virtue of his supreme apostolic authority, on matters of faith and morals, he cannot err. His decisions are binding, therefore, upon all believers. Catholic doctrine had always maintained the conception of an inerrant church. The necessity for an unequivocal location of the voice of the church produced the dogma of papal infallibility. This formal declaration of the pope's spiritual power was made at the very moment when he lost what remained of his temporal power.

The most significant new departure of the Roman Church in the twentieth century has been the development of a Catholic social doctrine. Popes Leo XIII and Pius XI particularly forwarded the teaching that economic life and Catholic conscience must be interrelated. In the period between the two wars this Catholic social policy made many converts, especially among the working classes of France and Belgium and among the Catholic intellectuals throughout Europe. In the politics of post-1945 Europe, the Catholics give promise of becoming a vital political force largely because of the new economic doctrines they have developed.

Protestantism

The multiplication of sects, the logical outcome of the Protestant assertion of the right of private judgment in religion, has gone on rapidly in modern times. Seventeenth-century England produced the Baptists, whose name was derived from their insistence on total immersion of adults as the only proper form of baptism. The Society of Friends, or Quakers as they are popularly called, also arose in England at this time. Their founder was George Fox, a weaver's son. The Quakers have no ceremonial of worship, no set creed, no priests; to them the great thing in religion is the "inner light," the divine spirit dwelling in the human heart and speaking as the voice of conscience. Though never numerous, the influence of the Quakers has been great and pervasive. They were among the first to work for religious toleration, for the separation of church and state, for woman's equality with man, for popular education, for prison reform, for the abolition of slavery, and for ending war.

The Methodists (so-called from their methodical ways) continued in eighteenth-century England the Puritan tradition. Their founder was an Anglican clergyman, John Wesley. He and his associates worked among the common people and won a large following by the fervor of their preaching and the piety of their lives. The Methodists finally separated from the Anglican Church and became an independent denomination. The Unitarians gained followers, especially in Great Britain and the United States, during the nineteenth century. As set forth by Ralph Waldo Emerson, for instance, Unitarianism appealed to intellectual people who cared not at all for dogma or ritual but a great deal for social and moral questions. Other sects, including the Seventh Day Adventists, who combine the observance of the seventh day (in place of Sunday) with the millenarianism so characteristic of first-century Christianity; the Universalists, who believe in the final harmony of all souls with God; the Disciples of Christ; and even new religions, such as Mormonism, Spiritualism, and Christian Science, have originated in the United States and spread thence to Europe.

Catholic and Protestant Missions

After the failure of the crusades the propagandist spirit of the Roman Church took the form of persuasion rather than of reliance on the mailed fist for the winning of converts among "infidels." Catholic missionaries, chiefly monks and friars, addressed themselves to the task of converting the heathen peoples of Africa, Asia, and, after the maritime discoveries, of America. In this work the Jesuits, members of the Society of Jesus, from the first establishment of their order, were conspicuously active. St. Francis Xavier (1506-1552), one of Loyola's original disciples, labored with such success in the Portuguese colonies of the Far East as to gain the title of "Apostle to the Indies." He also introduced Christianity in Japan, where it flourished until extinguished with fire and sword. Catholic missionaries won large populations to the Christian faith, notably the Indians of Canada and Latin America and the Filipinos. Several Protestant denominations founded missionary societies in the eighteenth century, and by the middle of the nineteenth century almost every branch of Protestantism had representatives throughout the non-Christian world.

Christian missionaries establish schools and colleges, introduce scientific medicine and sanitation, practical inventions, and discoveries, and often stamp out cruel practices and superstitions. No praise can be too great for the work of thousands of obscure heroes who have devoted their lives to the relief of suffering, the removal of ignorance, the aboli-

tion of evil customs, and the protection of their charges against ruthless exploitation by Europeans. Native converts, in turn, carry on this uplifting work among their own people. The effect of missionary enterprise is therefore profound, even when conversions are relatively few. Christian missionaries have been well described as the "advance guard of modern civilization."

Fraternal Orders

A feature of the age has been the formation of numerous fraternal orders having mystic signs of recognition, initiatory ceremonies, and various grades of dignity and honor. The oldest and most widespread order is that of the Freemasons, whose origin some would trace to Oriental cults connected with Solomon and Solomon's Temple and even to the secret societies of primitive peoples. The sober historian finds no certain evidence of Freemasonry, in its present form, before the foundation of the Grand Lodge of England in London in 1717. This was a union of several pre-existing lodges, which, in turn, had developed from the guilds of operative masons so important during the medieval period of cathedral and monastery building. Once organized, Freemasonry grew rapidly in Great Britain and the British colonies. Among the distinguished members in America were Franklin and Washington. Those who take the Masonic vows bind themselves to honor the ideals of human brotherhood, political liberty, and religious freedom. Each member may continue to practice his special religion, but all initiates must recognize the existence of the "Great Architect of the Universe," the God of eighteenth-century deism.

Freemasonry has spread to Continental Europe, but in Catholic countries it has encountered the opposition of the Roman Church. There are now thousands of lodges and several million members, chiefly in the English-speaking and Protestant world. They admit Christians of all shades of belief, Jews, and even Buddhists and Moslems; only avowed atheists are excluded. The order of Odd Fellows, founded in London in 1745, resembles that of the Freemasons in its secret organization and benevolent and social purposes.

The Jews

For eighteen hundred years the Jews have been a nation without a national home, a people without a country. Their lot in medieval Europe was one long martyrdom, especially from the era of the crusades, when fanatical hatred could be as readily aroused against them as against the Moslems. Edward I drove them from England and his

contemporary, Philip the Fair, drove them from France. After the capture of Granada in 1492 Ferdinand and Isabella issued an edict expelling them from Spain. By this time the whole of western Europe was closed to Jews, except northern Italy, where the popes, more tolerant than the secular rulers, continued to receive them. They fled to Poland, to Turkey, and to the Moslem countries bordering the Mediterranean. The few allowed to remain in the West were confined to ghettos, excluded from practically every occupation except trade and finance, subjected to special taxes and exactions, and from time to time pillaged and massacred.

In the seventeenth century Calvinist Holland and Puritan England readmitted Jews and granted them a measure of toleration; in the eighteenth century Prussia and Austria, under those enlightened despots, Frederick the Great and Joseph II, took the first steps to remove the disabilities which had so long rested upon them. Their legal emancipation in France was the work of the revolutionists, and Napoleon furthered it in the countries which submitted to his rule. They gradually emerged from the ghettos, entered occupations previously closed to them, intermarried with gentiles, and finally acquired full rights of citizenship, as in Great Britain.

Anti-Semitism in the past was directed against the Jews because of their religion, and a Jew could always escape persecution by accepting Christianity. In Nazi Germany anti-Semitism of the most vicious kind grew like an ugly plant and poisoned the wells of European conscience. The idea of superior and inferior races and the whole pseudoscientific system worked out by the Nazis made the life of the European Jews insecure before 1939 and intolerable after Germany became the ruler of Europe between 1940 and 1944 and began an inhuman assault upon them. The mass murders of this period probably provide the most gory story in the annals of mankind. The miserable survivors of this pogrom as well as the victims of the murder camps cry out for the sympathy of the civilized world. Indeed one of the most unfortunate political facts of our era lies in the chaos that Hitler created for the harassed Jews of Europe. It has created a Jewish problem, and posited it for the whole world just at the time when there should have been hopes that medieval intolerance would die a natural death.

Amelioration of Human Relations

Social betterment in the past has been undertaken by religious bodies, by guilds, trade unions, and similar associations, by governments, and by prophets, philosophers, and preachers working alone or with only

small groups of their followers. Our own time is notable for the creation of numberless organizations, some local, some national, and some international in character, all having as their object the amelioration of human relations.

Efforts for social betterment rest on the belief that society can be improved through conscious and intelligent action by its members. If the abolition of the slave trade and slavery; the lessened severity of the penal code; the condemnation of dueling, piracy, torture of witnesses or criminals, cruelty to lower animals, and drunkenness; the multiplication of charitable and philanthropic agencies; the acceptance of the economic and political equality of women; the relaxation of paternal power over children; the spread of popular and secular education for both sexes; the separation of church and state; and the extension of missionary enterprise — if these things constitute social betterment, then that has taken place among the most advanced peoples during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

XXIII

Secular Culture

Scientific Advance

THE extraordinary advance of both pure and applied science in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has been due, in part, to the use of that inductive method whose claims were first convincingly argued by Sir Francis Bacon. Criticizing the scholasticism of the Middle Ages, with its exaggerated reverence for the written word, Bacon proposed instead that we gather our knowledge from the book of nature. The scientist should collect, tabulate, and analyze as many facts as possible, with a view to detecting the relations between them and to discovering what are "causes" and what are "effects."

But no modern scientist relies exclusively upon induction, for facts are infinite in number; he cannot choose them all; he must exercise his judgment in choosing only those which seem significant to him. This is where the scientist makes use of the deductive method. He frames some hypothesis to explain the phenomenon under investigation, draws out the logical consequences of the hypothesis, and then compares them with the facts as learned by observation and experiment. If agreement is found, the hypothesis will be so far confirmed; if nonagreement, it may require modification or perhaps may have to be abandoned altogether. The Darwinian theory of organic evolution by means of "natural selection" is an example of a scientific hypothesis in biology. In astronomy an example is Laplace's nebular hypothesis (1796), according to which our own and other solar systems have been produced by the condensation of nebulous matter once diffused through space. Patient, plodding investigation by no means forms the whole of science; a place exists in it for the highest flights of the scientific imagination; it thrives on "daring generalizations."

The advance of science is largely dependent on the improvement of apparatus. The giant telescope enables the astronomer to measure the movement of stars so remote that their light rays which we now see started earthward thousands, hundreds of thousands, and even millions

of years ago. The spectroscope, by analyzing the light from the stars, shows that most of the chemical elements in them are identical with those in the earth and thus establishes the unity of the universe with respect to its fundamental substances. The compound microscope opens up a whole new world of the infinitely little, thus making possible the study of bacteriology and the conquest of disease. The scientific possibilities of the photographic camera, especially of the moving-picture camera, have only recently been realized. Science now depends upon the use of precise instruments of research as much as industry depends upon machinery.

Physical Science

Astronomy, oldest of the sciences, has gone far since the time of Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler, and Newton. Eighteenth-century astronomers found beyond Saturn a new planet, Uranus (1781); computed the distance between the earth and the moon; and showed that our solar system as a whole is moving with a speed of about twelve miles a second in the general direction of the constellation Hercules. Nineteenth-century astronomers found another planet, Neptune (1846); measured the distances of some of the nearer stars; and began the colossal task of photographing and mapping the heavens. Twentieth-century astronomers have found still another planet, the little Pluto (1930).

A great deal has been learned about the temperature of the stars as indicated by their different colors — red, orange, yellow, and bluish-white; about the size of the stars, which range from “giants” and “supergiants” (the latter from five thousand to sixty thousand times as large as the sun) to “dwarfs” much smaller than the sun; about the incredible number of the stars, now reckoned by many billions in our universe alone; and about their equally incredible remoteness. They are so distant that even the nearest ones seen through the largest telescopes have no visible dimensions; they are so distant that astronomers use for a celestial yardstick the “light year,” the space which light, traveling at a speed of about 186,300 miles a second, covers in a year.


The Milky Way, the galactic system to which the sun and its planets belong, is considered to have a flattened, watch-shaped figure with a diameter (100,000 light years) about five or six times as great as its thickness. The sun seems to be extremely far away from the center of the galaxy in the constellation Sagittarius. Outside this collection of stars are countless other galactic systems — “island universes” — most of them so remote that they cannot be seen through the telescope but are revealed only by the photographic lens. Considering the immense

extent of space and the amount of matter which it contains, the sun, a million times as big as the earth, may be likened to a grain of sand on the seashore and the earth to a millionth part of one such grain of sand.


Physicists in the nineteenth century carried forward the study of light, heat, and electricity, proved their equivalence, and calculated exactly the length of their waves of motion. By the last decade of the nineteenth century all the fundamental laws operating in the natural world seemed to have been firmly established. These culminated in the greatest generalization of science, the principle of the conservation of energy, which means that in all physical changes there is neither creation nor destruction of energy. That generalization remains unshaken, to the grief of seekers after "perpetual motion," but the corresponding principle of the conservation or permanence of matter has gone by the board.

A new era in physics began in 1895, when W. K. Röntgen discovered accidentally that an electric discharge through gases generates radiations which penetrate many substances opaque to light. Not knowing the character of these radiations, he called them X rays. Röntgen's discovery led to research in radioactivity, and in 1896 Henri Becquerel was able to show that uranium emitted rays which would affect a photographic plate. Becquerel suggested to Pierre Curie and his Polish wife, Marie Skłodowska, that they follow up the investigation and find out what was the substance in uranium possessing this power. They did so and in 1898 announced the discovery of radium. Radium was obtained from pitchblende, a mineral consisting largely of uranium oxide. Radium is the most intense producer of the X rays, yet it wastes away so slowly that about seventeen hundred years are required for it to lose half of its mass. It breaks down finally into a kind of lead. Physicists have found other radioactive substances and have proved that radioactivity is a sign that the atoms of a chemical element are undergoing spontaneous transmutation.

We know now that an element can be changed into another by the process of radiation. This is the modern scientific alchemy, which agrees with the unscientific alchemy of the Middle Ages in denying the fixity of the elements. We know, further, thanks to the work of Sir J. J. Thomson, Lord Rutherford, and other eminent physicists, that the atom is not the ultimate form of matter, "indivisible, impenetrable, immutable, and imperishable," but that it has a structure and can be disintegrated (by bombardment in the laboratory) into particles of electricity. The atom is believed to contain negatively charged electrons in concentric rings and a nucleus composed of protons (positively



ATOMIC EXPERIMENT, BIKINI *(Joint Army-Navy Task Force Photo)*





GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS AT FLUSHING, NEW YORK (Press Association)

PLATE XVI

charged) and neutrons (without a charge). Almost the entire mass of the atom is concentrated in the nucleus. We know, finally, that the transformation of matter into energy probably goes on in the interior of the sun and the hotter stars, under conditions of high temperature and enormous pressure. Thus matter, which to nineteenth-century physicists seemed permanent, passes away as radiation into the depths of space. It was the application of this knowledge to the problem of war that led to the manufacture of the atomic bomb.

Chemists had long realized that matter exists in a solid, liquid, or gaseous state according to the degree of heat to which it is subjected, and had concluded that it consists of atoms bound together by a force of attraction. These are so infinitesimal that were a drop of water magnified to the size of the earth the constituent atoms would be about the size of footballs. Early in the nineteenth century the Englishman John Dalton formulated the atomic theory; that is, the theory that all atoms of a particular element have a uniform size and weight and unite with atoms of other elements according to fixed proportions, as when in the burning of coal one carbon atom unites with two oxygen atoms to form a molecule of carbonic-acid gas ($C + O_2 = CO_2$). This simple theory, or rather fact, marks one of the great advances in the development of chemistry. It converted the vague atomic conception of Greek philosophers into a scientific generalization and explained the constancy in the chemical composition of substances.

Ninety-two elements, ranging from hydrogen, the lightest, to uranium, the heaviest, are recognized, and all but two (No. 85 and No. 87) have been discovered and isolated in pure form. Only about thirty elements (silver and gold, for instance) occur on the earth uncombined with other elements, but it is probable that in the sun and the hotter stars all elements are present in the uncombined condition.

The work of the Scotch geologist James Hutton, in the eighteenth century, was continued in the nineteenth century by the Englishman Sir Charles Lyell. His *Principles of Geology* (1830-1833) finally disposed of the belief that a succession of violent convulsions, or catastrophes, ending in the Noachian Deluge, was responsible for the formation of the earth. Lyell, in opposition to the Catastrophists, explained the changes which have produced mountains, valleys, plains, lakes, seacoasts, and other natural features as the result of the contraction of the globe and of erosion by water, glaciers, frost, wind, and other forces operating in the past and still operating in the present. This uniformitarian theory vastly extended the age of the earth beyond the few thousand years once supposed to have been its age.

The epochal discovery that radium-bearing substances break up at a known rate every year into other elements, with a final residuum of radium lead, enables us to measure with some degree of accuracy the duration of geologic time. It is generally believed that about two billion years ago a filament was ejected from the sun by the gravitational pull of a large star passing close to the sun's surface. The subsequent liquefaction and solidification of the detached mass of glowing gas formed the primeval earth. Eventually its outer surface cooled down, a crust appeared, and the superficial temperature was henceforth maintained almost wholly by the sun's radiation. Research is now directed toward acquiring some knowledge of the earth's interior and especially of its iron or nickel-iron core. Paleontology, that branch of geology which deals with fossil plants and animals, has accumulated much evidence to demonstrate the succession of life on the earth, from the simplest organisms to the most complex forms, through the eras, periods, and ages of the geologic clock.

Biological Science

Early in the seventeenth century, as soon as the first microscopes became available, observers had found the minute bodies called cells, but had not understood their nature or activity. In 1838-1839 two German scientists, the botanist W. J. Schleiden, and the zoologist Theodor Schwann, showed that every living thing is composed of cells, the bricks out of which plant and animal structures are built up. The lowest organisms are single cells; the egg itself is a cell, and the tissues of multicellular organisms develop from it by a process of repeated fission. In man there are about twenty-six trillion cells. Later investigators proved that the cell substance — the transparent, colorless, and almost jellylike protoplasm — is practically identical in plant and animal cells. The cell theory reduced all vital phenomena to a common denominator and created the science of life in its modern form.

The studies of another German, August Weismann, culminating in 1892 in his book *The Germ Plasm*, emphasized the fundamental distinction between reproductive (germ) cells and body (somatic) cells. The fertilized egg from which an individual starts is a union of two germ cells, egg and sperm. It divides into numerous cells, some remaining germ cells and passing on to the next generation and others becoming somatic cells which die with the individual. The germ cells are "potentially immortal" and the bearers of heredity. Biologists have also identified within the nucleus of the cell the threadlike bodies called chromosomes; those in the germ cells are specially concerned with the

transmission of hereditary characteristics. Just as the atom is known to have a very complicated structure, so, we learn, has the cell which holds the secret of life.

Organic Evolution; Darwinism

Several hundred thousand species of plants are known; the species of animals must be far greater, for of insects alone about half a million have been described. The idea that existing species, instead of being fixed and definite, have evolved from earlier forms goes back to Greek philosophers, particularly to Aristotle, but it was first clearly set forth in the eighteenth century by Buffon. The seed which he sowed soon bore fruit, and in 1809 another French naturalist, the Chevalier de Lamarck, explained organic evolution as the outcome of influences which bear upon the individual from without, affect its habits, lead to use or disuse of some organs, and so to "acquired characteristics" transmitted by the individual to its descendants. Thus the ancestors of the giraffe, by continually stretching for leaves on branches just beyond their reach, got longer and longer necks and forelegs; these characteristics, so acquired, would produce in time a new species. In spite of Lamarck's arguments, the idea of organic evolution gained little headway in the scientific world until 1858, when Charles Darwin and his friend A. R. Wallace jointly set forth the theory of natural selection which each had arrived at in ignorance of the other's work. The following year Darwin published a complete exposition of the theory in his famous book, *The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection*.

Darwin pointed out, as had Wallace, that many more individuals of each species are born than can possibly live to produce offspring; that, in consequence, a constant struggle for existence takes place between them; and that the "fittest," those with characteristics giving them a superiority over their competitors, survive, secure mates, and leave descendants. Such characteristics, handed down by heredity, tend to become more and more marked in succeeding generations, until at length entirely new species arise. Natural selection also operates between different species, weeding out the less fit and awarding the palm of survival to those best adapted to the old, or to a new or a changing, environment. Nature's selective process may be compared with that artificial selection practiced from time immemorial by horticulturists and fanciers to produce, not new species, but new varieties of plants and animals.

Darwin's arguments, based upon protracted observation and experiment, converted biologists to the doctrine of organic evolution; however, eighty years of investigation since *The Origin of Species* appeared

have not resulted in any general agreement among them as to the method by which that evolution has taken place. Natural selection, that is, Darwinism, seems to be an inadequate explanation.

The Mysterious Universe

The knowledge gained in less than half a century about radioactivity and the structure of the atom has had the effect of totally altering the scientific outlook on the universe. From Newton's time to 1895 the universe had seemed to be solid and substantial, a mechanism all of whose parts smoothly performed their allotted tasks according to natural laws capable of being formulated with exactitude. How differently it is viewed today! Matter becomes indistinguishable from radiant energy of various wavelengths, these ranging from miles to minute fractions of an inch, but all traveling with the speed of light. Electromagnetic (radio) waves, infrared, ultraviolet, and X rays, and even the recently discovered cosmic rays, which bombard the earth from all directions and whose origin is unknown, seem to be of the same type as light. Radiant energy does not leave atoms steadily and gradually, but by jerks, so to speak, and in certain *quanta*, or packets (the quantum theory of Max Planck). Acceptance of this theory involves giving up the idea that the atomic universe is a "smooth, majestic continuum." Both the position and the motion of an electron, the ultimate particle of electricity in an atom, cannot be calculated at a given time; hence we cannot assert that the state of an atom at any instant is the necessary result of its previous states (Werner Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy or uncertainty). To accept this principle is to abandon in the atomic universe the idea of causality. Thus in the realm of the infinitely little the classical physics breaks down.

It breaks down also in the realm of the infinitely great. Albert Einstein's relativity theory (1905, 1915) denies the possibility of measuring space and absolute time, for both are relative to the observer. They must be so connected that the velocity of light is always constant, however measured; hence the universe must be conceived as four-dimensional, time being accepted as the fourth dimension, along with length, breadth, and thickness. In such a universe gravitation would be explained as the effect of a warping or strain due to the presence of matter in the region of space-time and not as a real force acting between any two bodies at a distance from each other. By Einstein the universe is considered to be continuous like any sphere, but yet of finite size. It cannot spread out without limit; it must come back on itself and close

up again. Light, traveling onward from a star, will return after millions and millions of years to that star. The theory of relativity has already been confirmed to some extent by experiment. It is purely mathematical, a set of equations. All this newer work in physical science indicates that the phenomena of nature, whether on a small scale or on a large scale, are really inaccessible to human intelligence; no final explanation of them is possible; the more we learn the more mysterious appears the universe.

And what of the mystery of life? Life is inconceivable in the stars and in the dark, frigid interstellar spaces; it can exist only on planets. We know, however, that most of the stars have no planets. Many stars are "doubles," two suns revolving about each other with an attractive power which no planet could overcome. Many stars, again, are too thin and gaseous to maintain planets. As to the others, the accident which could produce them must be indeed rare. Compared with the immense number of the stars, the planets are certainly few; fewer are those on which life is possible under such conditions of air, water, and temperature as prevail on the earth; and still fewer are those in which there can be intelligent life, the life of man. His place in the scheme of things may seem a lowly one, his career cosmically without significance, but as the investigator and would-be interpreter of the phenomena of nature perhaps he does stand before the celestial throne, "sharing with the archangels the vision of God."

Applied Physics and Chemistry

During the past century applied physics has created the Age of Electricity. Some connection between electricity and magnetism had long been suspected; in 1819 a Copenhagen professor, H. C. Oersted, discovered accidentally that a wire carrying an electric current exerts a force on a magnet, thus producing a magnetic field. The principle of the relationship between electricity and magnetism was then worked out in detail by the Frenchman Ampère, who suggested that the effect of the current might be used for signalling at a distance. Meanwhile, Oersted's discovery was taken up by one of the greatest investigators the world has known, the Englishman Michael Faraday, and in 1831 he produced an electric current by rotating a copper disc between the poles of a magnet. The result was the invention of the electric dynamo; reversed in action this became the electric motor. Then followed the amazing developments which have made it possible to transmit electric power for long distances to light our cities, draw our trains, and run our factories.

Wireless telegraphy (radiotelegraphy) depends fundamentally on the researches of the Cambridge physicist James Clerk Maxwell, who demonstrated mathematically the existence of electromagnetic waves propagated through space with the speed of light. His treatise *Electricity and Magnetism* (1873) ranks as one of the most purely intellectual achievements of man. In 1888 the German H. R. Hertz showed how the "Hertzian waves" might be detected and generated. Marconi's inventions, beginning in 1896, made wireless telegraphy commercially available. Wireless telephony (radiotelephony), telephotography, and television mark still more recent advances in long-distance communication.

Illuminating gas, friction matches, dynamite, nitroglycerine, and other explosives, Portland cement, ethyl, artificial fertilizers, artificial silk (rayon), artificial wool, artificial rubber, stainless steel, wood-pulp paper, and beet sugar are some of the innumerable creations of applied chemistry. Others are the derivatives of coal tar, a by-product of coal when the gas is removed from it. This black, sticky substance, touched by the chemist's fairy wand, has become the source of aniline dyes, perfumes, flavoring extracts, drugs, carbolic acid, naphtha, and saccharine. The chemist, by combining molecules of matter in proper proportions, now creates in his laboratory innumerable substances which had never existed before or else had been produced only by plants or in the bodies of animals. He imitates nature and goes beyond nature; he is the modern magician.

The second great war of the twentieth century might well be called the scientists' war, for the magic of the laboratory was transported to the battlefield with devastating results. The war in the air, on the land, on and under the sea, was waged with precision instruments and scientific tools to a degree almost unbelievable. Teams of scientists produced radar in its many manifestations, new airplanes, new submarines, new mines, new guns, rockets, and finally the atomic bomb. The scientists, taken by surprise at the awful destructive capacity of their laboratories, now realize that their work is changing the face of the world not only physically but also morally and politically.

Mendelism

Insect pests are combated and the diseases of plants and animals are counteracted by the researches of the biologists. There has also been a steady improvement of domesticated plants and animals as the result of careful selection in breeding. Luther Burbank, who worked for fifty years at Santa Rosa, California, produced numerous improved

varieties of fruits, flowers, and vegetables; among his creations was the spineless cactus, useful for feeding cattle in arid regions.

Plant-breeders and animal-breeders formerly followed "rule of thumb" methods; now the laws of heredity begin to come into the ken of science. An Austrian monk, Gregor Mendel, showed by experiments on the hybridization or cross-fertilization of edible peas that the transmission of hereditary characteristics, such as tallness and dwarfness, proceeds by definite laws and not by chance. The results of his investigations were published as early as 1866, but only in 1900 did they become generally known to students of genetics. The Mendelian laws have since been shown to apply to many hereditary characteristics in plants and animals — in man, for instance, to such abnormalities as color blindness, deaf-mutism, and the "Hapsburg lip." Our knowledge of heredity is still not great, but we are gradually learning why the child should be a chip off the old block.

Eugenics

Plato and other Greek philosophers had proposed that human matings should be regulated by the state, in order to encourage the union of persons of sound stock and discourage the union of those unfit in mind or body. After the publication of *The Origin of Species* eugenics, the science of being "well born," was revived by Darwin's cousin, Sir Francis Galton, the inventor of fingerprinting. Eugenics has been deeply influenced by Weismann's studies. Weismann and other biologists have made it fairly certain that acquired characteristics are not transmitted, since they fail to affect the germ cells; the blacksmith does not transmit his muscular power, or the musician his dexterity, to his children. This being so, clearly "nature" is more important than "nurture," heredity more important than environment, in the production of finer breeds of men. The individual can be benefited by better conditions of life; the race can be improved only by natural selection or by artificial selection in accordance with the prescriptions of eugenics. The conclusion is repellent to optimistic social reformers, who have supposed that by the right sort of mental and moral training the tough-fibered human race might be quickly and permanently made over into something superior to its present representatives.

Medicine and Surgery

One by one the causes of infectious and contagious diseases have been searched out and means have been devised for curing them or

for immunizing human beings against their ravages. Louis Pasteur (1822-1895) was the first to show that fermentation is the work of minute organisms and that they are always present in the atmosphere, instead of being spontaneously generated. His studies of the diseases of silkworms, of anthrax in cattle, and of chicken cholera firmly established the germ theory and wrought a veritable revolution in medicine. Pasteur has probably saved more human lives than the world conquerors have sacrificed, merely by his advocacy of "pasteurization" — of heating milk and other liquids until the germs in them are destroyed. Roux, Pasteur's assistant, discovered the diphtheria bacillus; Robert Koch, a German doctor, isolated the germs producing tuberculosis and Asiatic cholera; and another German, Neufeld, showed that pneumococcus is the family name for more than thirty kinds of germs responsible for pneumonia. The germ origin of typhoid fever, erysipelas, tetanus (lockjaw), bubonic plague, and other dread scourges has been demonstrated within recent years. Rudolf Virchow (1821-1902) discovered that the white corpuscles of the blood are able to engulf poisonous substances and make them harmless.

Efforts to control smallpox by inoculating the human subject with the virus of smallpox itself had been made early in the eighteenth century. It was not until 1798, however, that an English physician, Edward Jenner, announced to the world his discovery that this dread and very prevalent disease could be avoided by inoculating persons with the attenuated virus of cowpox. Jenner reached his results by practical observation; Pasteur and Koch later worked out the scientific procedure of inoculation. Pasteur's successful treatment of rabies in dogs and hydrophobia in man was one of the triumphs of this method. Another step in medical progress has been the discovery that certain diseases are spread in some particular way. The bite of one variety of mosquito causes malaria and that of another, yellow fever; lice transmit typhus; the tsetse fly causes sleeping sickness; and fleas on rats and other animals convey the bubonic plague to man.

All this new knowledge makes the control, and ultimately the elimination, of infectious and contagious diseases well within the power of every civilized community, as yellow fever has been banished from the United States by anti-mosquito measures and typhoid fever by proper sanitary and drainage systems. Given public support and public money, medical science can accomplish wonders.

Recent scientific work in medicine begins to throw light on the functions of the so-called ductless glands in animals and human beings. Extracts from these glands produce powerful and sometimes valuable

results, as when in 1922 a Canadian, Frederick Banting, obtained insulin from the pancreas of sheep and used it successfully for the alleviation of diabetes. Recently, also, has come the discovery of vitamins, those minute chemical substances present in a large variety of fresh foods but usually absent from preserved foods. There are seven well-known vitamins, and a regular supply of them seems to be essential to normal health and body growth. Their discovery gives point to the German saying, *Mann ist was er isst* ("Man is what he eats").

If physical pain be considered one of the worst, or the worst, of all evils, then the discovery of anesthetics ranks among the greatest advances in the history of mankind. In 1800 Sir Humphry Davy, experimenting with nitrous oxide ("laughing gas"), found that when inhaled it would relieve local pain; and in 1818 Faraday found that the inhalation of the vapor of ether produced a similar effect. These observations remained scientific curiosities until 1842, when a Georgia physician, C. W. Long, performed the first operation under ether. His work attracted no attention, and it remained for Dr. W. T. G. Morton, a Boston dentist, following a suggestion of Dr. C. T. Jackson, to make the practice of anesthesia by ether known to the world in 1846. The following year anesthesia by chloroform was introduced at Edinburgh by Sir James Simpson. The use of these pain-killers at first met bitter opposition, on the ground that pain was a punishment or a natural condition and that it was cowardly, if not wicked, to evade it. They have made possible the triumphs of modern surgery.

Surgical operations were still exposed to great risk of infection until 1867, when Joseph Lister, an English surgeon, showed that carbolic acid applied to wounds would exclude atmospheric germs and prevent putrefaction. In addition to antiseptics, surgeons now pay a great deal of attention to asepsis, that is, to methods of keeping their instruments and dressings free from germs and other harmful organisms. Another advance in surgery has come with the use of the X rays, which reveal the presence of foreign substances in the body and the condition of the bones and internal organs. Miss Florence Nightingale, who devoted herself to the relief of sick and wounded British soldiers during the Crimean War, introduced many improvements in hospital management, sanitation, and nursing, and from Great Britain these have spread over the world. In the twentieth century the chemists, biologists, and medical research scientists have added one "miracle" after another to the achievements of the healing arts. Sulfa drugs and penicillin are only two of the more dramatized drugs that mark the history of man's conquest of illness.

"Scientific Humanism"

The scholars of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries renewed acquaintance with the long-neglected classics of antiquity, regarded them as the true "humanities," and made them the basis of a purely literary culture. Nowadays, when science so profoundly affects the thoughts and actions of men, we need a scientific culture as well. Thanks to modern science, the curtain of ignorance veiling nature is being lifted and there rise before us vistas — illimitable vistas — of knowledge never even glimpsed before. Newton said: "I do not know what I may appear to the world; but to myself I seem to have been only like a boy playing on the seashore, and diverting myself in now and then finding a smoother pebble or a prettier shell than ordinary, whilst the great ocean of truth lay all undiscovered before me."

Development of Modern Mathematics

Contrary to a popular conception, mathematics is a growing subject, and never has it grown more rapidly than during the last two hundred years — after logarithms, analytic geometry, and the calculus were given to the world. Modern mathematics includes many new branches such as differential equations, the theory of functions, and various non-Euclidean geometries, which do not assume the axioms and postulates taken by Euclid to be self-evident. All this work makes it the indispensable tool of the physical sciences; by its aid the stars are weighed and the molecules in a drop of water are counted. In fact, one may truly say that the amount of real science to be found in any particular investigation is usually to be measured by the amount of mathematics which it contains.

Scientific explanations necessarily tend to become mathematical because science tries to show that the phenomena of this ever shifting universe can be treated as examples of a few general principles called laws, as both the fall of an apple and the motion of a planet around a sun are examples of the law of gravitation. But laws must be so described that they hold good everywhere and at all times. Only the abstractions of mathematics will provide such a description. The universe is thus reduced to a mathematical system; as Pythagoras declared, "all things are numbers."

Development of Modern Philosophy

The old questions of philosophy, debated since the time of the Greeks, continue to engage the attention of modern thinkers. The philosophers give very different answers to the questions which they raise, but they agree in exalting the reason as the guide of life and thus part company from medieval thinkers, to whom speculation was based on, and subordinate to, revealed religion. German philosophy after Kant had its most eminent representative in G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831), an idealist, who taught that the universe is "penetrable to thought," that it is knowable through and through, and that nature and mind are not two distinct or parallel realities, but a single reality, the Absolute. Hegel was one of the most difficult of philosophers.

Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) was a thinker whom the man in the street could understand. He expressed an unalloyed pessimism. The world is very evil; life is a welter of painful strivings and unsatisfied cravings; positive happiness is a delusion; like the Buddhists, therefore, let us extirpate the will to live by ascetic practices and meditation on the futility of existence. For Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) also the world is very evil, but so far from accepting Schopenhauer's remedy of self-renunciation, he preached the gospel of the strenuous life. "Live dangerously." Nietzsche thought that in time evolution would produce supermen, lords of creation, a race as much superior to us as we are to the apes. He foresaw the wars and revolutions of the twentieth century and welcomed them as making possible the masculinization of the world and the creation of a strong ruling class to replace democracy, for him the rule of the mob.

Two other European thinkers exerted a wide influence on their age. The Frenchman Auguste Comte (1798-1857) founded Positivism, the philosophy which reduces all knowledge to the positive knowledge yielded by the senses. What is beyond human observation and experiment is unknowable, therefore negligible. We should rather undertake the tasks that are within our limited power, especially the pursuit of scientific truth and the work of social betterment. Positivism, for Comte and his followers, became a kind of religion, its deity a glorified humanity. In intellectual history Comte recognized three stages: first, the theological, when everything is explained as the work of gods created in the image of men; second, the metaphysical, in which the gods are replaced by abstract ideas or principles; and third, the positive or scientific, on which we have just entered.

The Englishman Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) built up a philosophic system based on evolutionary conceptions. The ten volumes of his

Synthetic Philosophy form an ambitious attempt to explain the development of the universe as a whole, from the atom to the nebula, from the amoeba to man and human society. Spencer admitted that there is an ultimate reality behind the observed phenomena of nature — he was not a materialist — but for him as for Comte that reality was unknowable. Among more recent philosophers of world-wide reputation are William James, John Dewey, George Santayana, Alfred N. Whitehead, Henri Bergson, and Benedetto Croce.

Psychology

As a study by introspection of one's own mental processes, psychology is a very old subject, a branch of philosophy. Being philosophical, Comte found no place for it in his classification of the sciences. Psychologists nowadays attempt a scientific treatment of the human mind by experimental methods. In their laboratories they investigate the sensations, impulses, and emotions — in short, the bodily processes — which underlie, if they do not explain, human behavior. The sharp distinction between mind and body is no longer recognized. The "behaviorists" even discard consciousness entirely, as something which cannot be subjected to exact tests. All that anyone really knows about another person comes from observation of his actions, of his responses to different sorts of stimuli. Obviously, this attitude must be taken in studying animal psychology. The animals are dumb, and if they introspect they cannot communicate their introspections. The psychology of children and of the mentally defective is studied in the same objective manner.

Another novel development has been the increasing vogue of psychoanalysis, under the leadership of the Viennese, Sigmund Freud. It began as a device for treating hysteria and other "nervous" disorders; it became an elaborate theory stressing the significance of impulses and motives that are below the level of consciousness. The mind Freud likened to an iceberg, which floats with only one-ninth of its bulk above water. Psychoanalysis has certainly enlarged our knowledge of human nature, has demonstrated the importance of the dream as the symbolical fulfillment of a wish, and has made "inferiority complex," "repression," "libido," and "sublimation" counters of everyday speech. Another comparatively new development is social psychology, which the sociologists also claim as their preserve.

The Social Studies and History

The name "sociology" was originated by Comte and popularized by Spencer in his *Principles of Sociology* (1876-1896). It has been condemned as a barbarous compound (Latin, *socius*; Greek, *logos*), but nothing better has been suggested to denote the general science of society. Sociologists try to show how languages, laws, moral codes, religions, institutions, and customs arise and develop by group action and how the individual is affected at all points by the group or groups to which he belongs. The various social studies, including economics, politics, jurisprudence, historical ethics, and comparative religion, are usually treated as departments or subdivisions of sociology.

These subjects received little attention before the eighteenth century and only in recent years have they begun to attract much interest, as the result of the complex problems presented by an industrial and world-wide civilization. They are not sciences in the strict sense of that word, for rarely does the student of society have access to controlled experimentation in a laboratory and he lacks instruments of precision such as the astronomer, the physicist, and the chemist possess. Moreover, human actions cannot usually be interpreted according to mathematical laws; man is a highly variable animal. The student, nevertheless, can amass data, collect statistics, and perhaps frame a few generalizations, in the hope that some day he will know enough about the working of society to make his knowledge socially useful.

Sociology and the social studies, economics most of all, have widened the scope of history until it now embraces every aspect of the life of humanity. With the development of archaeology the annals of mankind have been pushed back for thousands of years to periods for which no literary evidence exists, periods no longer properly described as "prehistoric," because the spade of the excavator tells us so much about them. With the development of anthropology the culture of primitive peoples comes within the historian's ken, to complete his knowledge of mankind as a whole and make plain the steps in human progress from savagery through barbarism to civilization. At the same time, there has been a notable improvement in historical method; the historian tests his sources of information more critically, and interprets them more cautiously, than ever before. He would write without prejudice or passion and relate only "what actually occurred."

Yet it does not suffice to gather facts, sift and appraise them, and then present them as fairly as possible. The facts of history are innumerable; no one can give a complete or wholly true account, let us say, of the French Revolution; and he will give the best account who, having

weighed the evidence, has the most imaginative and constructive power, the most understanding of man. That is why such older historians as Carlyle, Macaulay, and Green in Great Britain and Prescott, Parkman, and Motley in the United States are still widely read. History, certainly great history, continues to be what it was when first written — a form of literary art.

Literature

During the first half of the nineteenth century men of letters in western Europe broke away from the artificial rules, the close attention to form, the cold common sense, and the intellectualism of the Enlightenment. The new literary movement has been called "romanticism," as contrasted with the "classicism" which preceded it. Romanticism expressed the same desire to escape from the hampering traditions of the past that was felt in the world at large; it owed much to Rousseau and other revolutionary spirits. The romantics depicted natural scenery, analyzed human passions, stressed the imaginative, glorified the sentimental; in general, they appealed to sensibility rather than to understanding. Some of them were medievalists, who took renewed delight in the chivalry, the legends, and Catholic glamour of the Age of Faith.

With the growth of science and growing industrialism, romantic literature seemed less and less adequate to voice the spirit of the times, for dreams were giving way to facts. Men of letters sought, therefore, to bring their work into closer accord with modern life and to describe as faithfully and objectively as possible every aspect of the "human comedy." The second half of the nineteenth century was an age of realism in literature. Of course no absolute partition separated the romantic from the realist, and the same author might, in different moods, be now the one and now the other. Many an author did good work without attaching himself to either literary school; if informed that he was a romantic or a realist he would have been as much surprised as was M. Jourdain in Molière's comedy, who learned from his professor that he had been talking prose all his life.

The composition of great epic poetry would seem now to be a lost art. Milton was the last master of that mighty organ music. But what an outpouring in the nineteenth century of lyric and narrative poetry! It was represented in Britain by Scott, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Byron, Shelley, Keats, Tennyson, Robert Browning, Mrs. Browning, Matthew Arnold, William Morris, Algernon Charles Swinburne, and the Rossettis; in France by Béranger, Lamartine, Victor Hugo, de Vigny, and de Musset; in Germany by Goethe, Uhland, and Heine; in Italy by

Leopardi and Carducci; and in America by Bryant, Longfellow, Lowell, Poe, and Whitman. The twentieth century has not yet produced any poets of world-wide renown, save possibly the Italian, Gabriele d'Annunzio and the Hindu, Sir Rabindranath Tagore. Some contemporary authors compose "free verse," which disregards the rules of prosody and other poetic conventions. The more free it is the less like verse it seems.

The romantic drama in France began with that literary Titan, Victor Hugo, who freed it from many restrictions derived from the classical tragedians, Corneille and Racine, in the seventeenth century. His famous *Hernani* (1830) was followed by several other plays, which, however, had no conspicuous success on the stage. Edmond Rostand, the author of *Cyrano de Bergerac* (1897), *L'Aiglon*, in which Sarah Bernhardt played the principal role, and *Chantecler*, achieved an international reputation. Another dramatist of genius, the Norwegian Henrik Ibsen, in *A Doll's House* (1879), *Ghosts* (1881), and later plays, dealt with the problems of modern society in a pitilessly realistic manner that influenced many younger playwrights, such as George Bernard Shaw and the Germans, Sudermann and Hauptmann. In the hands of Ibsen and his followers the drama became a means of propaganda and an agency for social reform.

It is the novel, however, that ranks as the most popular form of nineteenth-century and twentieth-century literature. Beginning with *Waverley* (1814), Sir Walter Scott produced a long series of romantic tales dealing with the picturesque side of the Middle Ages and later centuries. Jane Austen, Dickens, Thackeray, George Eliot, Trollope, Hardy, and other story-tellers made the novel a picture of contemporary English life. Among them all Dickens, whose *Pickwick Papers* (1837) took the reading world by storm, stands foremost. The titles of his novels are as familiar as those of Shakespeare's plays; indeed, he ranks with Shakespeare in inventiveness, narrative power, and knowledge of the human heart. On the Continent some of the most celebrated authors of the past hundred years have been novelists. It is sufficient to mention a few only, whose fame has gone out into many lands: the Frenchmen, Balzac, Hugo, Dumas the Elder, Flaubert, Zola, and Anatole France; the Russians, Gogol, Turgeniev, Dostoevsky, and Tolstoy; the Pole, Sienkiewicz; the Italian, Manzoni; and the Spaniard, Ibáñez. More recently such writers as Arnold Bennett, John Galsworthy, and H. G. Wells in England, Thomas Mann in Germany, and Marcel Proust in France have exerted a considerable influence on the development of the contemporary novel. One wonders what will be the future of fiction, at least of great fiction, when "all the love stories

have been told and all possible detective plots planned." But perhaps the novelists can go on forever.

Common schools, free libraries, cheap printing, and improved illumination have produced a great expansion of the reading public. Aside from newspapers and the ever thickening cloud of periodicals, fiction has become the chief mental pabulum of the multitude, as an inspection of the shelves of any public library will show. It is quite true that most of the matter now published is ephemeral and that the new books lauded to the skies in the weekly reviews of literature will mostly be forgotten before the year is out. Yet as education spreads more widely and hours of leisure multiply, we may hope and perhaps believe that there will be an increasing body of readers of the "books of all time." And to this outcome the art of translation, making the world classics available to everyone, will contribute.

The Fine Arts

The architecture of the nineteenth century may be fairly described as imitative rather than original in character. Graeco-Roman models were followed; for example, in the monuments with which Napoleon embellished Paris and in the Capitol and Treasury buildings in Washington. There was a Gothic revival; it did not last because the spirit behind the medieval Gothic was lacking, but it produced the imposing Houses of Parliament in London, as well as many fine churches, notably the Anglican cathedral in Liverpool and the Protestant Episcopal cathedral in New York, both still under construction. The Romanesque style found some favor, especially in the work of the American, H. H. Richardson, whose Trinity Church in Boston is a monument to his genius. The Italian Renaissance style was widely followed, outstanding examples being the Imperial Museums in Vienna, the Grand Opera House in Paris, and the Boston Public Library. Even the Byzantine style was not without imitation, as in the Roman Catholic cathedral of Westminster in London.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century there was a growing use of steel girders in construction, and the idea arose of supporting the walls of a building, as well as the floors, on a steel frame riveted throughout and re-enforced by stone or concrete. It thus became possible to erect skyscrapers of any height, and the improved elevator, together with better lighting, better plumbing, and high water pressure, made it possible to live comfortably in them.

The skyscraper, an American contribution to world architecture, has brought about the most important revolution in the art of building

since the days of the Gothic cathedrals and has led to the development of a new architectural style, that of "functionalism." The appearance of a building ought to be adapted to its actual use; beauty should be equated with truth — away with superfluous decorative detail; for effect, depend on stark simplicity. So the functionalists argued. By no means all their productions have been successful, and the new architectural style is sometimes justly criticized as being only "engineering with a stone veneer." But it can be very impressive and dignified — for example, in such structures as the town hall of Stockholm, the railway station at Helsinki (Helsingfors), Finland, the Empire State Building in New York City, and the Nebraska state capitol (designed by Bertram Grosvenor Goodhue). At its best it fitly expresses the spirit of an industrial and scientific age.

In sculpture the nineteenth century was well advanced before imitation of Greek models began to yield to a more original and truly modern style. The work of such excellent craftsmen as the Italian, Canova (1757-1822) and the Dane, Thorvaldsen, though highly praised in their day, is less appreciated now; it seems to our eyes cold and formal. Houdon, their French contemporary, struck a more lifelike note in his portrait busts of Voltaire, Rousseau, Mirabeau, Franklin, Jefferson, and other famous men; his fine statue of Washington stands in the state capitol of Virginia. The credit for shaking off the trammels of classicism belongs especially to later French sculptors, among whom Auguste Rodin (1840-1917) ranks as the most eminent. During recent years sculptors have begun to seek inspiration in the archaic statuary of ancient Egypt, Assyria, and Greece, and even in primitive African and Polynesian carvings. Still more recently they have produced highly "modernistic" work, which to the uninstructed layman often seems utterly absurd and even grotesque. It shocks him because it departs so widely from the canons of beauty which seemed to be firmly established. What will be the outcome of this movement for artistic freedom the uninstructed layman can only guess.

Painting in the nineteenth century was responsive to the movements of the age; in general, it became increasingly realistic in its choice of subjects and mode of treatment. The artists excelled in portraiture. Some of them, including Constable and Turner in England and Millet and Corot in France, also produced landscapes which unquestionably surpass the best work of the "old masters." Easel painting flourished especially in France, which held the primacy of this art throughout the century. Toward its close Edouard Manet, Renoir, and other French painters developed "impressionism," a sort of "pictorial stenography," which strives to render the immediate sense impression of the artist and

hence does not seek photographic exactness in details. The reaction against the camera style of painting has gone further — much further — with the postimpressionists, who begin where the impressionists leave off; with the cubists and their geometrical contortions; with the futurists, disdainful of everything traditional in painting, whether classic, romantic, or realistic; and, finally, with the primitivists (as they might be called), infatuated by the art forms of barbarous peoples. All these ultra-modern tendencies are perhaps best exemplified in the work of the contemporary Spanish artist Pablo Picasso, whose pictures of things that look like fantastic machines, of weird animals, of violently stylized nudes, of streamlined forms challenge the principal convention of earlier European art — that all pictures should have a recognizable subject. The productions of Picasso and his followers appeal especially to artists interested in the solution of technical problems; the average man, it must be confessed, finds them too often meaningless. And that, no doubt, is the misfortune of the average man.

Secular Music

The nineteenth century was, indeed, the musical century. It began with Ludwig van Beethoven (1770–1827), whose symphonies, string quartets, and sonatas for the piano entitle him to rank as perhaps the greatest, and certainly the most influential, of composers. He was followed by the other great Germans, Schubert, Mendelssohn, Schumann, and Brahms. But Germany and Austria had no monopoly of eminent musicians. Chopin, a Pole; Tschaikevsky, a Russian; Dvořák, a Bohemian; Liszt, a Hungarian; Grieg, a Norwegian; Sibelius, a Finn; and Debussy, a Frenchman, must be included among the masters of chamber music, orchestral composition, and lyric song during the century.

Italy had been the original home of operatic music, but the operas composed there during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are never produced now. Later Italian grand opera is represented by Verdi (1813–1901), whose famous works include *Aida*, *Rigoletto*, *Il Trovatore*, and *La Traviata*, and by the scarcely less popular Puccini, composer of *La Bohème*, *La Tosca*, and *Madame Butterfly*. German grand opera began with Weber, composer of *Der Freischütz*. Its leading figure was Richard Wagner (1813–1883), whose *Tristan und Isolde*, *Tannhäuser*, *Lohengrin*, *Parsifal*, and the tetralogy, or series of four operas, forming the *Ring of the Nibelungs*, were based on old Germanic legends. Wagner created the musical drama, which unites music, poetry, and acting into a harmonious whole. At Bayreuth, where a theater was

built for him, he gave much attention to scenery and stagesetting, in order to heighten the dramatic effect. Wagner's work was worthily continued by Richard Strauss. Comic opera has been composed by Rossini (*The Barber of Seville*) and by the British collaborators, Gilbert and Sullivan (*H.M.S. Pinafore*, *The Mikado*, and other lively productions).

The "modernist" spirit, revolting against the traditional and the conventional, has found some expression in music as well as in sculpture and painting. The compositions of the Austrian, Schönberg, and the Russian, Stravinsky, contain many innovations in melody, harmony, and rhythm, innovations which have yet to stand the test of time. Musical modernism, at the lower end of the scale, is illustrated by jazz, of American Negro origin and popular enough to become an item of export to foreign lands. Another development, more encouraging to the music lover, has been the remarkable growth of orchestras in the United States within recent years.

Cosmopolitanism

Powder, gold lace, wigs, pigtails, three-cornered hats, knee breeches, silk stockings, and silver-buckled shoes passed away in revolutionary France with the other "follies" of the Old Regime and the loose coat and long trousers of the working classes became the accepted style for men's apparel not only in France but in all civilized countries. Women's apparel varies more greatly, in obedience to the decrees of fashion, but the new styles, starting in Paris, London, or New York, are speedily copied in San Francisco, Melbourne, and Tokyo.

The inconveniences resulting from the diversity of languages were never greater than today, when travel is a general habit and when nations read one another's books and profit by one another's discoveries and inventions. Latin was the speech of learned men in Europe throughout the Middle Ages and French has been the speech of polite society and diplomacy for more than two centuries. What is needed, however, is a universal language which can be readily mastered. Of the many attempts to produce such an artificial idiom the most successful has been Esperanto, the creation of a Polish scholar, L. L. Zamenhof. Meanwhile, the spread of English-speaking peoples throughout the globe seems destined to make English, in some sort, a universal secondary language. In spite of an often arbitrary spelling, accentuation, and pronunciation, English, with its few inflections and simple sentence-order, is more easily learned than any other of the great languages of the world.

A universal system of weights and measures is provided by the metric system. It goes back to revolutionary times in France, when the French established the meter, or one ten-millionth of the distance from the pole to the equator, as a unit of distance. A unit of volume was taken in the liter (a cube with sides measuring one-tenth of a meter) and a unit of weight in the gram (one-thousandth of the weight of a liter of water at 4° Centigrade). There are thus only three units in the metric system. Its convenience and accuracy have led to its wide adoption, but in the English-speaking world it has not ousted the old weights and measures for ordinary use.

The Egyptian solar calendar was adopted for the Roman world by Julius Caesar, who improved it by instituting leap years. His reform made the year eleven minutes and fourteen seconds too long. By 1583 this difference had amounted to nearly ten days. Pope Gregory XIII directed that these days should be suppressed in the calendar and that the leap day should be omitted from all centenary years except those that are multiples of 400. The Gregorian reckoning, or New Style, has come into use throughout the Christian world, even including Soviet Russia.

The French revolutionists, desiring to abolish a calendrical system bound up with the Christian religion, established in 1793 a Republican Calendar in which the seven-day week was replaced by the "decade" and the year was divided into twelve months of thirty days each, according to the old Egyptian arrangement. Five intercalary days came at the end of the year (six days at the end of every fourth year); they were dedicated to Virtue, Genius, Labor, Opinion, and Reward and were observed as holidays. Napoleon Bonaparte restored, however, the old calendar in France. Since then various proposals have been made for its reform, particularly by the adoption of thirteen months of twenty-eight days each. There would be four seven-day weeks in each month, and every day in the week would come at a regular time in the month. Not only weeks and months but also quarters and half periods would be equal and comparable for statistical purposes. This simple and practical "fixed calendar," or something like it, may in time win general acceptance by the civilized world.

The idea of a universal exposition, to which all countries should send the products of their industry and art, first took shape in the Crystal Palace Exhibition held at London in 1851. To the men of that time it seemed to announce the dawn of a new age of prosperity, peace, and plenty. Since then European expositions have been numerous, each one larger than its predecessor. The United States began with the Philadelphia Centennial of 1876. This was followed by the World's

Fair at Chicago in 1893 and by the more recent expositions in several other American cities.

Co-operation between the nations has been provided by such inter-governmental organizations as the Universal Telegraph Union, the Universal Postal Union, with a central office at Bern, the International Bureau of Weights and Measures at Paris, and the International Institute of Agriculture at Rome. Conventions have been made for the common use of the metric system, for the protection of patents and trade marks in different countries, and for uniform copyright laws. The world congresses of scientists, men of letters, historians, and social reformers; the universal expositions; and the revived Olympic games (from 1896) are among the numberless private agencies contributing to the formation of the "international mind."

Close of Geographical Discovery

Half the globe was still unmapped in 1800. Canada, Alaska, and the Louisiana territory were so little known that a geography published at that time omits any reference to the Rocky Mountains. South America, though long settled by white men, continued to be largely unexplored. Slight information existed about the Pacific islands and Australia. Much of Asia remained sealed to Europeans. Accurate knowledge of Africa did not reach beyond the edges of that continent. The larger part of the Arctic realm had not yet been discovered and the Antarctic realm had barely been touched.

The nineteenth century saw much accomplished toward filling in the map. The great African rivers were traced to their sources in the heart of what had once been the "Dark Continent." In Asia the headwaters of the Indus and the Ganges were reached; the Himalayas were measured and shown to be the loftiest of mountains; Tibet, the mysterious, was penetrated; and the veil of darkness shrouding China, Korea, Indo-China, and other Asiatic countries was lifted. Explorers penetrated the deserts of inner Australia and finally crossed the entire continent. The innumerable islands of the Pacific were revealed in all their tropical beauty. The journeys of Alexander von Humboldt in the Amazon and Orinoco valleys (1799-1804) inaugurated the systematic exploration of South America, while those of Lewis and Clark (1804-1806) opened up the Louisiana territory. Still later Alaska, the Northwest Territories of Canada, and Labrador began to emerge from obscurity. Even Greenland was crossed by Fridtjof Nansen, a Norwegian, and its coast was charted by Danish geographers and the American, Robert E. Peary.

Voyages in search of the Northwest Passage had already revealed the labyrinth of islands, peninsulas, and icebound channels north of the American continent. After many heroic and fruitless attempts had been made to reach the North Pole, Peary finally got there in 1909. No land exists in the north polar region. The south polar region is a land mass of continental dimensions. First approached by Captain Cook on his second voyage, it has since been visited by many explorers. They traced the course of the great ice barrier, discovered mountain ranges, and found lofty volcanoes belching forth lava amidst the snows. Roald Amundsen, a Norwegian, reached the South Pole in 1911. He was soon followed by Captain R. F. Scott, but this gallant Englishman and his four companions died of cold and starvation on the return journey. Richard E. Byrd, who in 1926 flew from Spitzbergen to the North Pole, has also the renown of being the first to fly to the South Pole. The flight was made in 1929 from "Little America," on the ice barrier, where Byrd and his companions had established themselves in order to make an aeronautical exploration of Antarctica.

Considerable areas of the earth's surface still await scientific investigation. The Antarctic continent, Greenland, and the enormous basin of the Amazon offer many problems to geographers. Very little knowledge exists of the interior of New Guinea, next to Greenland the largest of islands. Australia has not been completely explored. There is much information to be gained concerning the central plateau of Asia, the Arctic coast of that continent, inner Arabia, and equatorial Africa. But the great age of geographical discovery draws to a close; man at length knows his home.

XXIV

Cultural Trends

The Shrinking of the World

CIVILIZED man, until less than one hundred and fifty years ago, continued to use the conveyances which had been used by uncivilized man before the dawn of recorded history. Travel and transport were still on the backs of animals or in litters, wheeled carts, rowboats, canoes, and sailboats. Various improvements produced the sedan chair, the stage coach, and ocean-going ships, without finding, however, any substitutes for muscles or wind as the motive power. The steamship and the steam railway in the nineteenth century and motor cars and aircraft in the twentieth century revolutionized ways of travel and transport and opened up the uttermost corners of the earth. Equally revolutionary in breaking down isolation was the development of the new means of communication which began with the electric telegraph and ocean cable, continued with the telephone and "wireless," and now seem to have reached a culmination with broadcasting and television. When a flight has been made from Hawaii to Cairo in thirty-nine and a half hours, and when a radio signal has been heard flashing three times around the globe in half a second, it may be said that distance and time have been annihilated.

The Filling-up of the World

If we deduct the space occupied by the oceans, lakes, rivers, polar ice sheets, deserts, mountains, and marshes, the regions of the globe capable of supporting human beings scarcely exceed one-fifth of its entire surface. The habitable area is filling up rapidly. During the nineteenth century the population of Europe rose from about 175,000,000 to 400,000,000; by 1930 it had reached 500,000,000. The population of the continental United States increased from about 4,000,000 in 1790 (when the first census was taken) to nearly 132,000,000 in 1940. According to estimates made by the statistical institute of the League of

Nations, the population of the world in 1930 was about 2,000,000,000, and since then the net gain in numbers has been nearly one hundred thousand persons a day. What the impact of the second war in this century will be upon the growth of population, is still to be seen. The war killed millions of people; the disease and famine that are following in its wake will kill millions more; but it is too early to say what will be the full effect of this carnage. The French revolutionary and Napoleonic wars were terribly destructive of life and property; they were followed by great growths in population. Probably the conditions of life in the next twenty-five years will decide whether the trends observable until 1939 will continue or not.

Population Problems

Man shares with the lower creation an irresistible urge to multiply up to the limit of the available supply of food. That was scanty enough when hunting and fishing formed the only means of livelihood, so that originally the human denizens of the earth must have been few and scattered over wide areas. With the adoption of the pastoral life and especially with the introduction of tillage, many more people could be supported, but war, pestilence, famine, infanticide, lack of sanitation, and ignorance of medicine operated to check unlimited breeding and bring about a rough correspondence between the number of mouths to be filled and the wherewithal to fill them. The increase of population during recent times has been partly due to economic changes making possible the greater production of food in some regions and in other regions of commodities which can be exchanged for food. Industrialized Belgium and Great Britain, with only a limited agriculture, support more inhabitants to the square mile than any other countries, while the population of such industrial states as New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Massachusetts far exceeds that of the agricultural commonwealths of the Middle West. The increase of population is also directly related to the falling death rate, itself a consequence of public hygiene and preventive medicine.

The scientific study of population problems is particularly associated with the work of an English clergyman and professor, T. R. Malthus, whose *Essay on the Principle of Population* appeared in 1798 and in a greatly enlarged edition in 1803. Malthus concluded, on the basis of such statistics as were available to him, that a given population might double every twenty-five years except for the fact that the food supply could not possibly be doubled in the same time. The tendency of the human species, he thought, is to increase at a geometrical ratio, while

subsistence can be increased only at an arithmetical ratio. Such being the hard facts, overpopulation is prevented by the operation of "positive" checks and "preventive" checks. The former include war, pestilence, famine, and whatever else shortens the natural duration of life; the latter, under the general heading of "moral restraint," include celibacy, premarital continence, deferment of marriage, and prudence in begetting children before there is certainty that they can be supported. According to Malthus, the positive checks, which had alone operated in the past, were likely to continue to do so in the future. He had little faith in the capacity of mankind to limit its number by any form of "moral restraint."

The arithmetical ratio which Malthus postulated for the growth of the food supply is fallacious, as the economic history of the world during the last century and a half has amply proved. Nevertheless, the essential validity of Malthusianism remains unshaken by criticism. The constant tendency of man to increase beyond the nourishment available is only overcome by the operation, at all times and in all places, of the powerful checks which Malthus enumerated. But to these must now be added birth control.

The decline of the birth rate among some European peoples and their descendants has become very marked within recent decades. In western and northern Europe and in the United States, it now tends to fall below the twenty births per thousand necessary to maintain the population at the existing level. In Great Britain the birth rate in 1938 was only 15.1 per thousand; it was more than twice that figure half a century before. At the present time nearly 60 per cent of the married couples in the United States have no children, while only 10 per cent have more than two children. Unless this tendency is reversed, perhaps by government encouragement of parenthood, a stationary and then a declining population will shortly be reached in Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Holland, the Scandinavian countries, and the United States. The recession of the human tide in countries which have been so long dominant economically and politically first became apparent about half a century ago and now goes on at an accelerated pace. As it proceeds, there must be a smaller proportion of children and young persons and a larger proportion of the middle-aged and the old in the population. In the United States, during the period from 1900 to 1930, the proportion of persons over sixty years of age nearly doubled — increasing from 4 to 7½ per cent of the population. The changes in the age distribution will have, necessarily, profound effects upon society at large.

The chief reason for the fall in the birth rate is the desire of European

peoples and their descendants to maintain the higher standard of living made possible by modern industrialism. To maintain this standard and to raise it means later marriages and fewer offspring to a marriage, means bringing into the world only those who can be reared well and given a good education. The power to control the birth rate — to determine that no more children are to be born than are desired before conception — has been recently secured by man. How will man use this power, the newest factor in human evolution and one of the first magnitude? Will he use it so selfishly as to bring about a general "retreat from parenthood" or so wisely as to preserve the family, the nation, and the race?

The greatest human migration ever known occurred in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century. Between 1820 and 1930 the United States received about thirty-nine million immigrants, nearly all from Europe, while millions more went to Canada, Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand. The migration became most marked after the facilities for ocean travel had been greatly multiplied and cheapened. The mass movement of Europeans has now nearly run its course, because of the adoption of restrictive and selective legislation, such as the Immigration Act of the United States (1929). The United States and other new countries no longer open their gates freely to all the world. There seems to be little likelihood of any voluntary reversal of this policy by the new countries which are becoming old countries.

Urbanization

At the opening of the nineteenth century western Europe was still mainly rural, as eastern Europe is today. Europe as a whole had fourteen cities of more than one hundred thousand inhabitants in 1800; in 1900 it had one hundred and forty such cities. London, which in 1800 contained under a million inhabitants, now counts over eight millions within its borders, while Paris contains more than five times as many people as shortly before the French Revolution. In such industrialized countries as England, Belgium, and Germany a majority of the people are city dwellers. Turning to the United States, one may compare the six cities of over eight thousand inhabitants in 1800 with more than six hundred cities which, according to the census of 1940, had a population of ten thousand or more. More than half of the American people now live in urban territory; that is, in places with a population of twenty-five hundred or more.

This growth of cities has taken place largely at the expense of the countryside. It must be so, since urban birth rates do not much exceed

urban death rates. With the advent of the Machine Age the capitals, the factory towns, and the ports offered employment and a chance for better living to vigorous, energetic youth. The best blood of the land began to feed, and continues to feed, the arteries of city life.

Such a huge sprawling metropolis as London, Paris, or New York has been well called a "megalopolis," a community afflicted with gigantism. Unquestionably a limit exists to the size of cities, if they are to meet man's needs for light, for air, and for freedom of movement. Decentralization becomes increasingly possible with the development of rapid transit systems and the widespread use of the automobile. The "commuter" works in the city; he lives with his family in the suburbs or even in the country. At the same time, long-distance transmission of electricity permits many industries to be carried on efficiently in rural districts and small towns. There seems to be a distinct trend toward smaller urban units.

Nationalism

While the present age has seen such a contraction of space and time as to produce an international mind (if not an international conscience), never before has nationalism been so dominant and so aggressive. The sense of nationality did not exist among the Greeks, for whom the city-state formed the political unit, or among the Romans, who created a dominion embracing many diverse peoples. It found no expression during most of the Middle Ages. Only toward the close of the medieval period did it arise in western Europe, particularly in England, France, and Spain. It long remained rudimentary. Even in the eighteenth century the thinkers of the Enlightenment exalted, not national feeling, but cosmopolitanism. Samuel Johnson called patriotism the "last refuge of a scoundrel"; for Voltaire it was a mixture of self-love and prejudice; and Lessing and Goethe thought of themselves as citizens of the world rather than as Germans.

Modern nationalism really dates from the French Revolution, which inspired Frenchmen with passion for the unity of the republic, "one and indivisible." When an attempt was made to crush the revolutionary movement, they rose as one man, and to the inspiring strains of the *Marseillaise* drove the invaders from the "sacred soil" of France. Not satisfied with defending the revolution at home, the French started to spread it abroad. They regarded themselves as liberators of other peoples from subjection to monarchs and aristocrats; very speedily they proved to be subjugators. A republican general, Napoleon Bonaparte, transformed their citizen levies into professional soldiers devoted to his


fortunes, and led them to victory on a score of battlefields. The revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, having become wars of conquest, aroused throughout Europe a popular resistance against rule by foreigners and stirred up in the hearts of the conquered the same patriotic sentiments which the French had been the first to express.

Beginning as a protest against the overlordship of one people by another, nationalism has developed into the doctrine that political boundaries should coincide with national populations and that, as far as possible, the national state should become economically independent of the rest of the world. This insistence on unity and exclusiveness has in it something of primitive tribalism, harking back, one might say, to the allegiances and loyalties that existed when the world was young. There is point in the definition of a nation as a group whose members are united "by a common error as to their origins and a common hatred of their neighbors." A nationalism promotive of suspicion, enmity, and warfare has nothing to commend it. That is the dark side of the shield.

The shield has another and brighter side. Whereas in former days a man's altruistic sentiments were confined to his family, clan, tribe, or city, with the rise of the nation they are attached to "his own people," a much larger group. It is conceivable that altruism will continue to expand, as the world continues to shrink, and that the ideal of human brotherhood will appeal to mankind much more potently than now or ever in the past. Increased intercourse between the nations, by dispelling ignorance of one another, may soften their antagonisms and teach them the lesson of mutual toleration. Whatever the outcome, it seems certain that the sense of nationality is ineradicable and that for a long time to come nationalism will be a powerful force in modern civilization.

Imperialism

Nationalism—love of country—often stands for a feeling well described as love of more country. As a matter of fact, the imperialistic policies of European powers during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have been to a considerable extent an outcome of their nationalist fervor. Pride of nationhood impelled whole peoples to extend their dominion abroad, until at last no more regions are left for peaceful penetration or forcible occupation. The globe is staked out. There may be shifts of ownership, transfers from one bearer of the "white man's burden" to the willing shoulders of another, but the long process whereby Europe has imposed itself upon so much of the world approaches an end.



(After J. De Morgan.)

When, four centuries ago, the peoples of Europe began their expansion overseas, they went chiefly to other parts of the temperate zone. This was true, above all, of English-speaking peoples, who found in the United States and Canada, and later in South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand, vast regions with a climate and productions similar to those of the homeland and not too thickly populated by the native inhabitants. The few whites settling in the tropical and subtropical parts of Africa, Asia, and Oceania are soldiers, officials, and businessmen. They seek, not new homes, but the profits of trade or rule. Even in the tropical regions of America the European element (Spanish and Portuguese) is numerically far inferior to the Indians, Negroes, and mixed breeds.

Science has wrought wonders in ameliorating some of the evils of a tropical environment and has proved that yellow fever, malaria, and other plagues can be conquered by the elimination of insect carriers, proper sanitation, and medical treatment. Nevertheless, much doubt exists whether white men can long thrive in the hot, moist climate of equatorial countries or perform hard, continuous labor under such conditions. It seems probable that, while whites may continue to control tropical lands, they will not settle them in large numbers. The Caucoid race is a temperate-zone race.

Racial Relations

The Negroid and Mongoloid races have not remained within their continents of origin during the last four hundred years. The forced migration of black men ended with the abolition of the slave trade and slavery in the nineteenth century, but the voluntary migration of yellow men shows a marked tendency to increase. There is a heavy overflow of the teeming populations of China, Indo-China, and Japan to the Malay Archipelago, the Philippines, and the islands of the Pacific.

Though the temperate zone contains much unsettled territory, its English-speaking inhabitants limit or entirely prohibit Oriental immigration. This attitude is defended on the general ground that yellow men do not readily assimilate with whites and on the special ground that their lower standard of living enables them to displace whites in the labor market and thus reduces wages or creates unemployment. The assumed menace of the "yellow peril" led the United States to exclude Chinese in 1882 and Japanese in 1924. Similar action has been taken by Canada, the Union of South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand.

White overlordship has been excused, and even advocated, on the ground of the supposed natural inequality of the races of man. Since a "superior" race had the ability, it also had the right to impose its rule upon "inferior" races. Such was the justification — when justi-

fication was attempted — for wars of conquest, physical or economic slavery, and, in general, the exploitation of one people for the benefit of another. We now begin to realize that this notion of race inequality is only an extension to mankind at large of the antipathy which the inhabitants of every country exhibit toward foreigners. Thus the Jews regarded themselves as the “chosen people”; the Greeks described non-Greeks as “barbarians”; and the Chinese called outsiders “foreign devils.” Such expressions reflect the instinctive feeling that what we are or what we possess must necessarily be superior to what others are or possess. Ethnocentrism is a plant of long and hardy growth; it will not soon be eradicated.

Political Organization; Democracy

Democracy — the word is from the Greek — and the things associated with democracy, such as constitutions, parties, legislative assemblies, elective magistracies, citizen suffrage, the ballot, and forensic oratory (and demagogues) are of Greek origin. The democracy of Greece was something absolutely new in human history. Nothing like it had existed in either the Far East or the Near East during antiquity. All Oriental governments exhibited the same unvarying pattern of hereditary despotism, and the Oriental peoples never had any idea of political liberty. Greek democracy, being that of city-states, was exclusive. Slaves, a very considerable element of the population, freedmen, resident aliens, and, of course, women possessed no rights of citizenship. In Athens, for instance, the law restricted citizenship to those free men who were the sons of an Athenian father (himself a citizen) and an Athenian mother. Rome, having conquered Italy, granted citizenship to the Italian peoples. That step was not taken until the last century of the republic, and with the fall of the republic popular rule came to an end in the ancient world.

Graeco-Roman democracy and that of the city-republics of medieval Italy, Germany, and Flanders required the direct participation of all citizens. This was possible only in small communities. Direct democracy survives in some of the Swiss cantons, where every year the male citizens meet in open-air assemblies and by a show of hands elect officials, levy taxes, and give their sanction to proposed laws. The New England town meeting affords another example of such primitive “folkmoths.”

The great discovery of the representative system came in the later Middle Ages, when Spain (Castile and Aragón), Poland, Sweden, the Netherlands, France, England, and some other countries established

legislative bodies representing the three estates of clergy, nobility, and commons. Most of these assemblies afterward declined in importance or disappeared, but the English parliament continued to lead a vigorous existence. Representation, so firmly established in England, furnished a model for imitation by the American colonies of England, and with the bursting storm of the French Revolution it reappeared in Continental Europe as a panacea for the evils of despotism and an expression of the "natural rights" of man. The successful revolt of the Latin-American colonies was followed by their adoption of the representative system. The steady stream of historical development has now carried it once more from its English home to the self-governing Dominions.

The representative system made possible the extension of democratic institutions on a scale undreamed of; without it self-government could never have functioned in great modern states. It is a device which works, but none too well, now that legislators are faced with so many problems. In the United States these are complicated by the existence of the numerous pressure groups, standing for different economic interests and all striving to secure legislative action in their favor, which seem to provide the American counterpart of European occupational representation.

The epidemic of dictatorships, breaking out on the morrow of a war waged to make the world "safe for democracy," has led to much criticism of the whole democratic theory. Such criticism is nothing new. Plato's ideal commonwealth, the "Republic," was to be ruled by philosophic statesmen carefully trained for the task of government, and not by the common people without any special qualifications for the exercise of political power. In our time onslaughts against democracy have been delivered by such thinkers as Carlyle and Nietzsche: most men are fools or at least incapable of attaining real distinction; how absurd to entrust them with the control of society.

In truth, democracy never looks well until we consider its alternatives, one-man rule or the rule of a few, and the possibilities of oppression which both so amply provide. The believer in democracy urges that its failures should be compared, not with an impossible perfection, but with what can be expected of men in the mass. The believer in democracy looks to the spread of education for the creation of an enlightened public opinion which will demand the services of experts in government, as we now demand expert service in business, scientific research, and the professions. He re-echoes the words of the English statesman John Bright: "An instructed democracy is the surest foundation of government, and education and freedom are the only sources of true greatness and happiness among any people."

Liberalism

Though often confounded, democracy and liberalism are not the same. The majority in a democratic country can be as tyrannical in its treatment of the minority as any divine-right monarch or modern dictator. Conversely, the great liberal principles — equality of all men before the law, separation of church and state, religious toleration, free speech, a free press, free assemblage, free association — can exist to the highest practicable degree under a nonpopular government, as in India today. It is true, nevertheless, that the system of political freedom accords best with the system of civil and religious freedom, so that the most striking advance toward liberalism has been made by the democracies of western Europe, the British Dominions, and the United States.

Economic Organization

The state continues to extend and tighten its control of private enterprise. State intervention received a great stimulus during both World Wars, when government took over the means of transportation and communication, restricted imports and exports, operated munition works and other industries, settled labor disputes, determined working hours and wages, limited profits, and fixed wholesale and retail prices. Modern warfare calls for mobilization on the home front as well as on the firing line, in order that the entire resources of the nation may be thrown into the struggle. Even under peaceful conditions the state tends to play increasingly the role of fairy godmother to the citizens. Government ownership or regulation of public utilities, subsidies to farmers, protection of investors against fraud, unemployment relief, and social security legislation are some of the forms which the New Deal has taken in the United States alone.

The rapid growth of population, the massing of men in cities, and the onrush of the Machine Age have so multiplied the responsibilities and duties of governments as to make the policy of *laissez faire* seem hopelessly antiquated. How far collectivism, or "associated living" as some prefer to call it, can proceed without the submission of men's lives to an omnipotent (though not omniscient) state; how far economic welfare can be secured without the sacrifice of personal liberty — these are grave questions. Nothing is more certain than that a social system which offers no reward for extra accomplishment, which provides "equal returns for unequal earnings," which encourages a dull level of mediocrity for all, must inevitably, sooner or later, succumb to the competition of more virile societies.

The Progress of Science and Invention

There is no reason to conclude that the growth of civilization is associated with a parallel increase of intelligence; in other words, with an improvement in the mental caliber of the individual man. The evidence of both archaeology and recorded history indicates that, at least from late Paleolithic times, the human brain has registered little, if any, demonstrable advance. Nor do existing primitive people seem to be markedly inferior to ourselves in intellectual power. The growth of civilization depends, rather, upon the accumulation of useful knowledge acquired by scientific investigation and made available by technical skill. This is the accomplishment of an immense number of trained workers, each of whom profits by the labors of his predecessors and of his contemporaries. What one generation discovers and invents the next generation receives, enlarges, and in turn transmits. At the same time, the means of communication permits discoveries and inventions to spread quickly and widely, thus becoming the property of all peoples. These conditions, essentially new, go far to explain the rapid rate at which the store of useful knowledge is now heaped up.

That the present tempo of advance is destined to continue indefinitely would be too much to assume. A time may come when our instruments of precision, our telescopes and microscopes, will have reached a limit beyond which it is impossible to improve them, or when our researches will have brought us to a point in our knowledge of the external world beyond which the human mind is impotent to pass. We live in a mysterious universe. Aside from such considerations, it is well to remember that, just as science and invention stagnated and finally became inert less than two thousand years ago, so may they again if the hosts of magic and irrationalism once more gain the upper hand. Deeply ingrained fears, prejudices, taboos, and superstitions, our inheritance from savagery, are always present and always powerful. No historical justification exists for considering as permanent the extraordinary progress of science and invention which has now gone on without interruption for three or four hundred years. Another "ice age" may settle down upon the human mind.

But the immediate promise of science and invention is incalculably great. It is in their power to create an entire new world. Regardless of flags or geographical boundaries, science and invention would unite the races and the nations on the basis of mutual respect and mutual helpfulness. They bid men everywhere to look upon civilization as a co-operative undertaking and upon its achievements as a common possession.

Nevertheless, they also provide the means whereby civilization may commit suicide. Their gifts can be prostituted to base uses: dynamite, T.N.T. and now atomic energy for bombs, steel for sixteen-inch guns, radium for gun sights, gases and sprays to suffocate the inhabitants of great cities, disease germs to pollute the water supply of whole areas, blight to destroy crops, anthrax to slay domestic animals, and plagues to sweep away entire populations. In our time the airplane, by exposing noncombatants to hideous slaughter, has brought about the most fundamental innovation in warfare since the introduction of gunpowder; "the dream of Daedalus has become the nightmare of the twentieth century." One may ask whether man can be safely entrusted with that power over natural forces given him by science and invention. "Man," said Pascal, "is an incomprehensible creature."

Social Change

The idea that civilization has moved, is moving, and will continue indefinitely to move in a desirable direction, the idea, that is, of social progress, is deeply implanted in the popular consciousness. The idea is little more than two centuries old. It found no expression in classical antiquity, although some of the poets, especially Aeschylus and Euripides, and, above all, the Roman Lucretius, pictured man's gradual advance in the arts of civilized life. Even Lucretius, however, did not anticipate a steady and continuous ascent of man in the future. The general opinion, entertained by poets and philosophers alike, was that their age was one of degeneration, contrasting with a blissful Golden Age in the remote past. The Golden Age would return in the distant future, but fate and human frailty would again bring degeneration, so that the course of history appeared as an endless series of cycles. The Jews likewise regarded the present as a period of degeneration, accounting for it, however, by Adam's sin in an idyllic Eden and the consequent "fall" of man. Regeneration would come when the Messiah appeared to set up (for the chosen people only) the eternal kingdom of God upon earth. The early Christians, who saw in Jesus the Messiah of Jewish hopes, also placed the Golden Age in the future, when Christ the Lord would accomplish the deliverance of the righteous from sin and death and reign gloriously over them in the heavenly Jerusalem.

The Christian doctrine of salvation prevailed as long as the authority of the church remained unquestioned. The doctrine was first explicitly challenged by some thinkers of the Enlightenment, who substituted for the idea of a utopian existence in another life that of an earthly utopia to be made by man's own efforts. They looked forward to the constant

improvement of humanity; thus Voltaire in the eighteenth century felt sure that, were superstition (including religion) and warfare abolished, mankind was capable of indefinite perfectibility. In the nineteenth century this optimism seemed to be justified, not only by the marvelous discoveries of science and the triumphs of invention, but also by the revelations of archaeology, which showed that man had made his way upward from a condition lower than the lowest known savagery.

Material progress, resulting in a great increase in the human population of the world and in the health, comfort, and physical well-being of multitudes of men has occurred, and its occurrence affords hope, if not certainty, of its continuance. In all that concerns man's mastery of nature the fact of progress is writ large. As regards nonmaterial progress, meaning progress in the fine arts, literature, philosophy, morals, and religion, the historian cannot speak, for these are concerned with valuations, judgments, and ideals about which no general agreement exists. All the historian can recognize is the fact of social change, proceeding now slowly now more rapidly as the generations come and go — social change during a past of unknown but prodigious length and in an immeasurable future. "What is past is prologue."

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Index

- A. F. of L. *See* American Federation of Labor
 Abdul Hamid II, 296
 Abnormal Importations Bill, 494
 Absolutism, growth of, in Europe, 53-54
 Abyssinia. *See* Ethiopia
 Academies, establishment of scientific, 136
 Acadia, French settle, 109; England acquires, 116
 Act of Abjuration (1581), 60, 120
 Act for the Better Government of India (1858), 304
 Act of Supremacy (1534), 42
 Adams, John Quincy, 356
 Adams, Samuel, 124
 Addams, Jane, 593
 Addison, Joseph, 155
 Adowa, battle of, 337
 Aeschylus, 644
 Afghanistan, 323, 324, 374, 432
 Afghans, 95, 303
 Africa, Portuguese exploration in, 9-10; Jesuits in, 47; Mediterranean, 328-332; opening of, 332-334, 338-339, 629; partition of, 334-337; conflicts in, 337; Union of South Africa, 337-338; World War II in, 549, 551, 552, 557
 African Association, 333
Afrika Korps, 557
 Agadir crisis, 375
 Agricola, 134
 Agricultural Adjustment Act, 502
 Agricultural machinery, production of, 246
 Agriculture, after World War I, 403; development of, 586-588
 Aguinaldo, Emilio, 325
 Airplane, development of, 250-251
 Aix-la-Chapelle, Peace of (1668), 83
 Aix-la-Chapelle, Treaty of (1748), 94
 Akbar, Mogul Emperor, 107
 Alaska, purchase of, 342
 Albania, 297, 376
 Albany Congress (1754), 116
 Albert, King of the Belgians, 380
 Albert, Lake, 334
 Albigenses, 34
 Alchemy, decline of, 149
 Alcock, John, 250
 Alexander, King of Yugoslavia, 422, 517
 Alexander I, Czar of Russia, 187, 189, 229, 294
 Alexander II, Czar of Russia, 230-231, 291, 587
 Alexander III, Czar of Russia, 231, 291, 292
 Alexander VI, Pope, 14, 33
 Alfieri, Vittorio, 156
 Algeria, 217, 329
 Alliance system, in European politics, 365-370, 374-376
 All-Union Congress of Soviets, 464
 Alsace-Lorraine, 84, 227, 284, 372, 388, 392, 442-443. *See also* Lorraine
 America, discovery of, 14; Jesuits in, 47
 America First Committee, 553
 American Federation of Labor, 260
 American Revolution, 96, 117-122, 418
 American Telephone and Telegraph Company, 585
 Ampère, André Marie, 612
 Amsterdam, 61, 106
 Amundsen, Roald, 631
 Anabaptists, 46
 Anarchists, 276-277
 Anatolia, 395
 Anatomy, 134, 135
 Anglican Church, 600; rise of, 42-45; in Thirteen Colonies, 113
 Anglo-French Entente, 372-373
 Anglo-Russian Entente, 373-374
 Annam, 306
 Anne, Queen of England, 279, 281
 Annunzio, Gabriele d', 446, 623
Anschluss (1938), 534-536
 Anthony, Susan B., 596
 Anti-Saloon League, 592
 Anti-Semitism, 603-604
 Appeasement, rise and fall of, 539-541
 Aquinas, St. Thomas, 41, 48, 594
 Arabs, union of, 505
 Araki, General, 514
 Archangel, 92
 Architecture, Baroque and Rococo, 160-161; modern, 624-625
Areopagitica (Milton), 149
 Argentina, 346, 348, 349
 Aristarchus, 130
 Aristotle, 130, 132, 137, 140, 611
 Arkwright, Richard, 238, 242
 Armada, Spanish, 58, 60, 61-62

- Armament, improvement in, 363-364.
See also Disarmament, Warfare
- Art, sculpture, 161, 625; painting, 161-163, 625-626; modern, 624-626
- Articles of Confederation (1781), 122
- Ashley, Lord, 261
- Asia, medieval exploration in, 4-8; early trade with, 10-11; modern exploration in, 629. *See also* Far East and countries individually
- Assembly of Notables, Richelieu organizes, 73
- Associated living, 642
- Astrolabe, 7
- Astrology, decline of, 149
- Astronomy, development of modern, 130-131, 607-608
- Atlantic, battle of (1942), 558
- Atlantic Charter, 554
- Atlantis, early legends of, 11-12
- Atlas Mountain, 328
- Atom, structure of, 608-609
- Atomic bomb, 563; theory, 609
- Augsburg, League of, 84
- Augsburg, Peace of, 40-41, 65
- Australia, 125, 127, 248, 326-327, 418, 629
- Austria, Napoleonic wars, 180, 184, 186, 187; at Congress of Vienna, 188-189; reaction in, after 1815, 200; Revolution of 1848, 212-213; in Crimean War, 219; Austro-Sardinian War, 221-222; Austro-Prussian War (1866), 223, 225-226; customs union with Germany, 474-475; crisis of 1934 in, 517-518; Nazis occupy, 534-536; in World War II, 568
- Austria-Hungary, formation of, 228; problems of, 1866-1914, 289-290; and origins of World War I, 376-379; after World War I, 393, 395
- Austrian Succession, War of the, 94, 116
- Austro-German Treaty (1879), 367
- Austro-Prussian War (1866), 223, 225-226
- Austro-Sardinian War (1859), 221-222
- Authoritarianism, European, after 1815, 200-202
- Automobile, 249-250
- Averroës, Ibn Rushd, 138
- Avignon, papacy at, 31
- Axis powers. *See* Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis
- Aztecs, 20; Cortés overthrows, 17
- Baber, founder of Mogul Empire, 107
- Bach, Johann Sebastian, 164
- Bacon, Sir Francis, 136, 154, 155, 606
- Bacon, Roger, 11
- Baden, 225, 226
- Bagdad Railway, 302, 374, 375
- Baker, Sir Samuel, 334
- Baldwin, Matthias, 249
- Baldwin, Stanley, 495
- Balkan alliance (1912), 296-297
- Balkan States, problem of, 366, 368; and origins of World War I, 376-379
- Balloon, 251
- Baltimore, Lord, 112
- Bank of England, 580, 584
- Bank of France, 182, 498, 580
- Bank of International Settlements, 474, 475, 581
- Banking, growth of, 240, 580-581
- Banting, Frederick, 616-617
- Bantus, 332
- Baptist Church, 601; in colonial America, 113
- Barnett, S. A., 593
- Barter economy, 577-578
- Barthou, Louis, 516, 517
- Basle, Council of, 32
- Bastille, fall of, 175
- Bauer, Georg, 133-134
- Bavaria, 225, 226
- Beccaria, Cesare Bonesana di, 146, 591
- Bechuanaland, 338
- Becquerel, Henri, 608
- Bedlam, 592
- Beethoven, Ludwig van, 626
- Behaim, Martin, 12
- Belgium, 60, 425; independence of, 205-206; industrial progress in, 258; in World War I, 380-381, 392; in World War II, 547
- Bell, Alexander Graham, 252, 253
- Benedict XV, Pope, 388
- Bengal, British acquire, 109
- Bentley, Richard, 159
- Bering, Vitus, explores Arctic, 127-128
- Berkeley, George, 138-139
- Berlin, Revolution of 1848 in, 211
- Berlin Conference (1879), 296, 329, 366
- Berlin Congress (1884-1885), 336
- Bernhardt, Sarah, 623
- Bernini, Giovanni Lorenzo, 161
- Bessarabia, 231, 294, 424
- Bessemer, Henry, 245
- Bethmann-Hollweg, Theobald von, 375, 380, 381
- Bible, translation of, 35, 38, 41; Catholic and Protestant attitude toward, 44; Authorized Version, 155

- Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, 159
 Bill of Rights, British, 79, 278; of United States Constitution, 125
 Biological sciences, rise of modern, 134-135, 610-611
 Birmingham, 256
 Biron, Marshal, 71
 Birth rate, decline of, 634-635
 Bismarck, Otto von, 225-227, 270, 284-286, 296, 336, 449, 479; political system of, 365-369
 Bismarck archipelago, 325
 Black, Joseph, 253
 Black magic, decline of, 150-151
 Black Sea, 92, 93, 219, 294
 Black Shirts, Italian Fascists, 446
 Blaine, James G., 359
 Blake, William, 155
 Blanc, Louis, 275
 Blum, Léon, 260, 498-499, 527-528
 Boccaccio, Giovanni, 158
 Bodleian Library, 160
 Bodley, Sir Thomas, 160
 Boer War, 371
 Boers, 337, 338, 370
 Bohemia, 35, 58, 536, 541; Jesuits in, 47; Revolution of 1848 in, 212
 Boleyn, Anne, 42, 61
 Bolívar, Simón, 346, 359
 Bolivia, 346
 Bolsheviks, 420; revolution of, 458-460
 Bonaparte, Joseph, 344
 Bonaparte, Napoleon. *See* Napoleon I
Book of Common Prayer, 44, 76
Book of Ser Marco Polo, The, 6
 Booth, William, 593
 Borgia. *See* Alexander VI, Pope
 Bosnia, 296, 366
 Boston Tea Party, 120
 Botany, 134
 Boulanger crisis, 289
 Boulton, Matthew, 244, 255
 Bourbon dynasty, 64
Bourgeoisie, rise of, 101, 169-171; in European society, 271-273; objections to, 273-275
 Bourses, development of, 240
 Boyle, Robert, 133, 149
 Boxer uprising, 312
 Brandan, St., 12
 Brandenburg, Elector of, 86, 87
 Brazil, 342, 343, 346, 348, 349; Portuguese in, 11, 15; in World War II, 555
 Breitenfeld, battle of, 69
 Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of, 460
 Bretton Woods Conference (1944), 581
 Briand, Aristide, 427, 428 508
 Bright, John, 641
 British Commonwealth of Nations, 416-420, 495
 British East Africa, 338
 British East India Company, 94, 108, 303, 304, 584
 British Guiana, 356
 British Museum, 160
 British-North America Act of 1867, 418
 British West Indies, 590
 Brook Farm, 274
 Brown, A. W., 250
 Brüning, Dr., 482
 Bucharest, Treaty of (1913), 297
 Buddhism, 315
 Buffon, Georges Louis de, 134, 611
 Bukharin, Nikolai, 464, 465
 Bulgaria, 296, 297, 366, 488; in World War I, 382, 385, 393, 395; in World War II, 552, 569
 Bulgars, 488
 Bülow, Chancellor, 369
 Bundesrat, German, 284
 Bunyan, John, 155
 Burbank, Luther, 614-615
 Burke, Edmund, 120
 Burma, 306, 309; in World War II, 555, 557
 Burma Road, 549
 Burns, Robert, 155
 Business institutions, growth of, 238-240
 Byrd, Richard E., 631

 C.I.O. *See* Congress of Industrial Organizations
 Cabinet system, in Great Britain, 280-281
 Cable, submarine, 251-252
 Cabot, John, 18-19
 Cabral, Pedro, 11
 Caesar, Julius, 628
 Calderón, Pedro, 156
 Calendar, development of, 628
 Calvin, John, 41, 63, 137
 Calvinism, 44-46; spread of, 41, 44, 59, 63, 65-66
 Cameroons, 336
 Camoëns, Luis, 153-154
 Canada, 258, 418; French in, 18, 104, 109-110; British acquire, 117; Dominion of, 353-355
 Canada Act (1791), 354
 Canals, 247
 Canning, George, 356
 Canova, Antonio, 625
 Canton, 308

- Cape Colony, 107, 125, 337, 338
 Capetown, 187, 336, 338
 Caravel, development of, 7
Carbonari, 203
 Carlyle, Thomas, 274, 277, 641
 Carnegie, Andrew, 594
 Carnegie Corporation, 594
 Carnot, Lazare Nicolas, 179, 180
 Carol, King of Rumania, 422
 Carolinas, settlement of, 112
 Carpine, Pian de, 4-5
 Cartier, Jacques, 18
 Cartwright, Edmund, 243, 253, 255, 265
 Castlereagh, Lord, 189
 Catalonians, 526
 Catastrophists, 609
 Catherine of Aragón, 42, 44
 Catherine II (the Great), Empress of Russia, 92-93, 96, 97, 103, 294
 Catholic Center Party, German, 450, 477
 Catholic Reformation, 46-50; in Germany, 65-66
 Catholic Social Party, Austrian, 517
 Catholicism, Bible under, 44; in colonial America, 113-114. *See also* Papacy, Roman Church, States of the Church
 Catholics, in Weimar Republic, 450-451, 454
 Cavaliers, in Puritan revolution, 76, 78
 Cavendish, Henry, 133
 Cavour, Count, 221, 222, 223, 295, 600
 Censorship, abolition of, 148-149
 Central America, 350
 Cervantes, Miguel, 154
 Chamberlain, Neville, 538, 542, 543
 Chambers of Reunion, Louis XV establishes, 84
 Champlain, Samuel de, 109
 Chang Hsueh-liang, 512, 515
 Chang Tso-lin, 433, 434
Chantecler (Rostand), 623
 Charles VI, Emperor of Austria, 89
 Charles I, King of England, 76-77
 Charles II, King of England, 77-78, 85-86
 Charles X, King of France, 204-205, 329
 Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor, 8, 38, 59; empire of, 39, 56; opposes German Protestantism, 39-41; abdicates Spanish crown, 49
 Charles I, King of Spain (Holy Roman Emperor Charles V), 15
 Charles II, King of Spain, 85-86
 Charles Albert, of Sardinia, 221, 223
 Chartism, 203, 213-214
 Chemistry, development of modern, 133, 609, 614
 Chiang Kai-shek, 313, 434, 435, 514, 515
 Children, emancipation of, 596-597
 Chile, 346, 348
 China, Jesuits in, 47; penetration of, 306-309; foreign powers in, 309-311; reform movement in, 311-313; Japanese encroachments on, 410-411; revolution in, 433-435; Japan invades, 514-515, 554
 Chippendale, Thomas, 165
 Christian Science, 602
 Church, Christian, in 16th century, 32-33. *See also* Religion
 Church of England. *See* Anglican Church
 Church and State, Protestantism accepts union of, 44; in 16th century, 52; separation of, 599-600
 Churchill, Winston, 547, 548, 550, 554
Civil and Moral Counsels (Bacon), 154
 Civil War, American, 214
 Clark, William, 629
 Clarkson, Thomas, 590
 Classicism, in literature, 153
 Clemenceau, Georges, 387-388, 391-392, 405, 408
 Clergy, laxity of, in 16th century, 32
 Clericalism, French, 443
 Cleveland, Grover, 356
 Clive, Robert, 95, 109
 Coal, production of, 245, 269, 283, 286
Code Napoléon, 181, 200, 220, 596
 Coffee, 165
 Colbert, Jean Baptiste, 82, 104, 159, 575
 Colbertism. *See* Mercantilism
 Colet, John, 42
 Collectivism, 642
 Collectivization, in Soviet Union, 490-491
 Collins, William, 155
 Colombia, 346, 347
 Colonies, under mercantile system, 105
 Colonies, British, in North America. *See* Thirteen Colonies
 Colossus of the North, 358
 Columbus, Christopher, discovers America, 11-14, 17
 Combination Acts, British, 259, 261
 Comenius, Johann Amos, 151-152
 Commerce, growth of, in 16th century, 52; development of international, 573-578
 Communication, development of, 251-252, 632
 Communism, imposed in Russia, 462-465,

- 492; in Germany, 478, 480; in France, 498; in China, 514-515; in United States, 553
- Communist International. *See* International, Third
- Communist Manifesto*, 275
- Compass, 7
- Comte, Auguste, 619, 620
- Conciliar movement, in Catholic Church, 31-32
- Concordat, Napoleon executes, 182, 600
- Condé, Prince de, 82
- Confucianism, 315
- Congo Association, 336
- Congo Free State, 336
- Congo River, 333, 334
- Congregationalism, 45; development of, 111; in Thirteen Colonies, 113
- Congress of Industrial Organizations, 260
- Connecticut, settlement of, 112
- Conservative Party, British, 78, 214, 438-440, 494, 495, 520
- Constable, John, 625
- Constance, Council of, 31, 35, 36
- Constantinople, Turks capture, 93
- Constitution, United States, 123-125, 144, 147, 148; British, 278-279
- Constitutional Democrats, Russian, 457
- Continental Congress, 120, 122
- Continental System, Napoleon's, 344
- Contraband of war, 575
- Cook, Captain James, 127, 326, 631
- Coolidge, Calvin, 407, 500
- Cooper, Peter, 252
- Co-operative movement, 263
- Copernicus, Nicholas, 129-130
- Copley, John Singleton, 163
- Corinth Canal, 574
- Corn Laws, repeal of British, 576
- Corneille, Pierre, 157, 623
- Cornwallis, Lord Charles, 121, 303
- Coronado, Francisco Vázquez de, 18
- Corot, Jean Baptiste, 625
- Corporations, growth of, 239-240, 584-585
- Cort, Henry, 245
- Cortes, Spanish parliament, 74
- Cortés, Hernando, conquers Mexico, 17
- Cosmic rays, 612
- Cosmopolitanism, spread of, 627
- Costa Rica, 350
- Cotton, 403
- Cotton gin, invention of, 243
- Cowper, William, 155
- Craft guilds, disappearance of, 258
- Cranmer, Thomas, Archbishop of Canterbury, 42, 44
- Credit system, growth of, 580-581
- Crete, 296; in World War II, 552
- Crimea, 93, 294
- Crimean War, 217, 218-220, 295-296, 575
- Crises. *See* Depressions
- Cristofori, Bartolommeo, inventor of pianoforte, 164
- Croats, 289, 290, 422, 488
- Crompton, Samuel, 242-243
- Cromwell, Oliver, 77, 104
- Crusades, 4, 7
- Crystal Palace Exhibition, 628
- Cuba, 14, 353
- Cunard, Samuel, 247-248
- Curie, Pierre, 608
- Curtiss, Glenn H., 250
- Curzon, Lord, 324
- Customs Union, German, of 1834, 225, 258, 283, 285; Austro-German, 474-475
- Cuvier, Georges, 134
- Cyprus, 296, 330, 366
- Cyrano de Bergerac* (Rostand), 623
- Cyrenaica, 330, 331-332
- Czechoslovakia, 395, 421-422, 424, 472, 574; depression in, 487, 488; Fascist parties in, 489; dismemberment of, 536-538, 540-541
- Czechs, 212, 289, 290; in Revolution of 1848, 212
- Daimler, Gottlieb, 249
- Daladier, Edouard, 499, 542
- Dalton, John, 609
- Danish West Indies. *See* Virgin Islands
- Dante, 7, 11
- Danton, Georges Jacques, 178, 179
- Danzig, 392
- Darmstadter Bank, 475
- Darwin, Charles, 611-612
- Darwinism, 606, 611-612
- Davy, Sir Humphry, 245, 617
- Dawes Plan, 406-407, 427, 453, 474
- Debts, national, 582-593
- Declaration of Independence, 120, 122, 172
- Declaration of the Rights of Man, 177, 595
- Deere, John, 246
- Defoe, Daniel, 155
- De Forest, Lee, 252
- De re metallica* (Agricola), 134
- Deism, 142-143
- Delaware, settlement of, 112, 113
- Delhi, 305

- De magnete* (Gilbert), 132
 Demarcation Line, 14-15, 104
 Democracy, growth of, 203-204, 640-641; European, after 1848, 215
 Denmark, 392, 590; Lutheranism in, 38, 45; in Forty Years' War, 69-70; in World War II, 546
 Denominations, Protestant, 44-46
 Depression(s), 583-584; of 1929, 472-476; in United States, 470-471, 500-503; in central and southern Europe, 487-489; in Great Britain, 494-496; in Japan, 503-505; in Middle East and Asia, 505; elsewhere in world, 505-506; aftermath of, 507-508
 Descartes, René, 137, 138
 De Soto, Hernando, 18
 Dewey, Admiral George, 311, 325
 Diaz, Bartholomew, 10
 Diaz, Porfirio, 350, 351-352
 Dickens, Charles, 623
 Dictatorship, 641
 Diderot, Denis, 145
 Diesel, Rudolf, 248
 Diet, Hungarian parliament, 74
 Directory, rise and fall of, in France, 180-181
 Disarmament, failure of, 508-510. *See also* Armaments, Warfare
 Disciples of Christ, 602
Discourse on the Method (Descartes), 138
 Discovery. *See* Exploration
Discovery of Witchcraft, (Scot), 151
 Disraeli, Benjamin, 214
 Divine Right, theory of, 54-56, 75
 Divorce, 596
 Dodecanese Islands, 332
 Dollfuss, Engelbert, 518
Doll's House, A (Ibsen), 623
 Domestic System, 236-237
 Dominican order, 37, 49
 Dominican Republic, 353, 358
Don Quixote (Cervantes), 154
 Drake, E. L., 245
 Drake, Sir Francis, 19, 62
 Drama, modern European, 156-158, 623
 Dreyfus affair, 289
 Dryden, John, 155
 Dual Alliance (1894), 370, 377
 Dueling, 592
 Duma, Russian parliament, 293, 456-457
 Dunant, Henri, 593
 Dunkirk, British defeat at, 547
 Duplex, Governor General of Pondicherry, 94-95, 108-109
 Durham, Lord, 354
 Dutch East India Company, 106-107; 238, 333
 Dutch East Indies, 324-325, 505; in World War II, 555
 Dutch West India Company, 107
 East Africa. *See* Tanganyika
 East Indies, early trade with, 8, 10-11; Jesuits in, 47; Dutch, 324-325, 505, 555
 East Prussia, 392
 Eastern Question, 93, 295, 296
 Ebert, Friedrich, 453, 454
 Economics, growth of, 141-142
 Ecuador, 346, 347
 Eden, Anthony, 520
 Edict of Nantes, 63, 64-65, 72-73, 147
 Edict of Toleration, 66
 Edison, Thomas A., 253
 Education, in colonial America, 114; growth and reform of, 151-152, 597-598; higher, 598-599
 Edward I, King of England, 603
 Edward VI, King of England, 43, 61
 Edward VIII, King of England, 496
 Edward, Prince of Wales (Edward VIII), 495-496
 Egypt, 419, 505; Napoleon subdues, 180; British rule in, 330-331; World War II in, 549, 551, 552, 557, 559
 Eighteenth Amendment, 593
Ein' Feste Burg ist Unser Gott, 163
 Einstein, Albert, 612-613
 Eisenhower, General Dwight D., 561-562
 Elections, in 19th century Europe, 272-273
 Electoral College, United States, 124
 Electricity, 613-614
Electricity and Magnetism (Maxwell), 614
 Elizabeth, Queen of England, 44, 61, 74, 75
 Elizabeth, Empress of Russia, 95
 Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 602
Émile (Rousseau), 152
Emilia Galotti (Lessing), 157
Encyclopaedia Britannica, 159
Encyclopedia, edited by Diderot, 145
 Engels, Friedrich, 274-275
 England, in North America, 18-19, 104, 109, 110-112, 116-117; rise of Anglican Church in, 42-45; Spanish Armada attacks, 61-62; in Forty Years' War, 69-70; rise of central authority in, 74-76; Puritan revolution, 76-77, 184;

- Restoration, 77-78; Bill of Rights and Toleration Act, 79; Revolution of 1688-1689, 80, 84, 184, 281; limited monarchy in, 80; colonial rivalry with France, 94-96, 116-117; rise of Indian Empire, 107-109; growth of Thirteen Colonies, 112-116; American Revolution, 117-122; Napoleonic wars, 180, 183, 184, 186, 187. *See also* Great Britain
- English Succession, War of the, 84
- Eniwetok, 562
- Enlightened Despots, theory of, 101-103
- Enlightenment, Period of, 129, 137, 148
- Entente system, in European politics, 372-376
- Entrepreneurs, rise of, 236
- Episcopal Church. *See* Anglican Church
- Equal Franchise Act, British, 214, 595
- Erasmus, Desiderius, 33, 34, 37, 38, 42, 47
- Erfurt, University of, 36
- Eritrea, 332, 337, 519
- Ersatz commodities, 485
- Esperanto, 627
- Essay concerning Human Understanding* (Locke), 138
- Essay on Crimes and Punishment* (Becaria), 146
- Essay on the Principle of Population* (Malthus), 633-634
- Estonia, 546
- Ethiopia, 9, 337
- Ethiopian War, 518-522
- Eugene of Savoy, 86
- Eugenics, 615
- Eugenius IV, Pope, 32
- Euripides, 644
- Evolution, organic, 611-612
- Exchanges, growth of, 240, 578-579
- Exploration, in Middle Ages, 4-8; early trade with Africa and the Indies, 8-11; Portuguese, 8-11; discovery of America, 11-14; Spanish, 13-18, 19-21; results of, 21-23; circumnavigation of the globe, 14-17; French and English, 18-19; of Pacific Ocean, 125-126; in nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 629-631. *See also* Geography
- Fabians, 277
- Fables* (La Fontaine), 155
- Factories, early European, 255
- Factory Act, British, 261
- Faerie Queene* (Spenser), 154
- Fair Labor Standards Act, 262
- Falangists, 526
- Far East, early exploration in, 6; early trade with, 8, 10-11; after World War I, 410-413; after Washington Conference, 433-435; crisis in, 512-515; World War II in, 562-564. *See also* countries by name
- Faraday, Michael, 254, 613, 617
- Farmer Labor Party, Japanese, 504
- Fascism, in Japan, 504
- Fascist Party, in Italy, 445-449
- Fashoda, 339, 372
- Faust* (Goethe), 157-158
- Federal Convention, meets at Philadelphia, 122, 124
- Ferdinand of Aragón. *See* Ferdinand and Isabella
- Ferdinand, King of Bohemia, Emperor of Holy Roman Empire, 66, 67
- Ferdinand and Isabella, 8, 13, 14, 49, 604
- Ferdinand VII, King of Spain, 200, 204, 344, 346
- Ferrara-Florence, Council of, 32
- Feudalism, decline of, 51-53
- Field, Cyrus W., 252
- Fielding, Henry, 158
- Fifteenth Amendment, 595-596
- Finance, international, 581
- Financial institutions, growth of, 238, 240
- Finland, 231; war with Russia (1939-1940), 546; in World War II, 569
- Five-Year Plans, in Soviet Russia, 465-466, 489-494
- Florida, 112, 117, 121; purchase of, 342
- Food, 165
- Ford, Henry, 250
- Foreign trade, development of, 105-106
- Formosa, 310, 320
- Forty Years' War, 66-70
- Four Books of Architecture* (Palladio), 160
- Four Freedoms, Proclamation of, 554
- Fourier, Charles, 274, 275
- Four-Power Pact (1921), 412
- Fourteen Points, Wilson's, 388, 392
- Fox, George, 601
- France, in New World, 18, 109-110, 116-117; religious and civil wars, 62-65; in Forty Years' War, 66-70; rise of royal authority, 70-74; under Louis XIV, 81-87; colonial rivalry with England, 94-96; Indian possessions, 107-109; in American Revolution, 121; French Revolution, 171-179; Napoleonic era, 180-186; Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, 184-185; Revolution of 1830, 205, 206;

- Revolution of 1848, 209-211; Second Empire, 215-218; Crimean War, 218-220, 295-296; Franco-Prussian War, 226-227, 365; industrial progress in, 258; trade unions, 259-260; after 1871, 286-289; African empire, 329-330, 339; Anglo-French Entente, 372-373; in World War I, 382, 386; problem of security for, 420, 515-518; backs Little Entente, 421-426; reconstruction, 1919-1929, 440-444; depression years in, 496-499; weakness of, 499-500; in World War II, 545-546, 547-549, 568
 Franche Comté, 84
 Francis I, King of France, 8, 18, 39
 Francis Ferdinand, Archduke, murder of, 290
 Francis Joseph, Emperor of Austria, 212, 219, 226, 228, 290
 Franco, Francisco, 527-529
 Franco-Prussian War, 226-227, 365
 Frankfort parliament, 212
 Frankfort, Treaty of, 227, 287
 Franklin, Benjamin, 113, 116, 122, 133, 147, 155, 172, 251, 603
 Franz Ferdinand, Archduke, assassination of, 376, 377, 378
 Fraternal orders, 603
 Frederick, Prince of the Palatinate, King of Bohemia, 66, 67
 Frederick the Wise, Elector of Saxony, 36, 38
 Frederick I, King of Prussia, 87
 Frederick II (the Great), King of Prussia, 55, 89, 94, 97, 604; in Seven Years' War, 95-96; an enlightened despot, 102; upholds religious freedom, 147; supports freedom of the press, 148
 Frederick III, Emperor of Germany, 285
 Frederick William, the Great Elector, 87
 Frederick William I, King of Prussia, 87, 89
 Free Corps, German, 450, 452-453
 Free trade, 575-576
 Freemasons, 603
 French Academy, 159
 French East India Company, 94, 108
 French and Indian War, 95, 116-117
 French North Africa, 329-330
 French Revolution, 122; causes, 171-174; collapse of Old Regime, 175-177; republic proclaimed, 177-178; Reign of Terror, 179; fall of the Directory, 180-181; Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, 184-185
 Freud, Sigmund, 620
 Friends, Society of. *See* Quakers
 Froebel, Friedrich, 598
 Fronde, revolt of, 74
 Fulton, Robert, 247, 248
 Gadsden Purchase (1853), 342
 Gainsborough, Thomas, 163
 Gale, L. D., 251
 Galen, Claudius, 135
 Galilei, Galileo, 130-132, 134
 Galton, Sir Francis, 615
 Gama, Vasco da, 10, 153
 Gambetta, Léon, 287, 365
 Gandhi, Mahatma, 419, 505
Gargantua (Rabelais), 154
 Garibaldi, Giuseppe, 223
 General Assembly, of United Nations, 564-565
 General Confederation of Labor, French, 260
 General Court of Massachusetts, 115
 General Pact for the Renunciation of War, 428
 General Security Act, under Napoleon III, 217
 Geneva, 41
 Geneva Protocol, 420
 Genghis Khan, 4
 Genoa, 187, 188
Gentlemen's Magazine, 159
 Geography, in Middle Ages, 3; rise of modern, 134. *See also* Exploration
 Geology, rise of modern, 134, 609-610
 George I, King of England, 281
 George III, King of England, 119, 120, 127, 586
 George V, King of England, 495
 Georgia, settlement of, 112
 Georgia, University of, 599
Germ Plasm, *The* (Weismann), 610
 German Confederation, 187, 188, 219, 222, 224-225
 German Middle Africa, 339
 Germany, Protestant Revolt in, 36-41; Catholic Reformation in, 65-66; in Forty Years' War, 66-70; in Napoleonic wars, 185; nationalism in, 202-203; Revolution of 1848, 211-212, 213; disunion in, 224-225; unification of, 225-228; industrialization, 258, 283, 286, 360-361; trade unionism in, 260; after 1871, 283-286; Bismarck's political system, 365-369; new policy in, 369-370; in World War I, 377, 378-379, 380-381, 382, 384, 385-386; after World War I,

- 392-393, 429-430; reparations payments, 403-407; republican government in, 450-454; customs union with Austria, 474-475; revolution of 1933, 477-482, 508; expansion under Hitler, 483-486, 523-525, 529-538, 540-541; attacks Poland, 543, 544-545; occupies Norway, 546-547; western campaign, 1940, 547-548, 550-551; invades Russia, 551-553, 557-558; Balkan campaign, 552; North African campaign, 549, 551, 552, 557; Allies invade, 560-562; after World War II, 567-568. *See also* Prussia
- Gestapo, Nazi secret police, 486, 532
- Thosts* (Ibsen), 623
- Gibbon, Edward, 158
- Gilbert, William, 132
- Gilbert Islands, 562
- Giorgione, 161
- Gladstone, W. E., 214, 576, 597, 600
- Globe Theater, 157
- Glorious Revolution. *See* Revolution of 1688-1689
- Gluck, Christoph von, 164
- Goethals, George W., 357
- Goethe, Johann Wolfgang, 157, 636
- Gold Coast, 336
- Golden Age, 644
- Goldoni, Carlo, 156
- Goldsmith, Oliver, 155
- Goodhue, Bertram Grosvenor, 625
- Goodyear, Charles, 246, 253
- Government, theories of, 140-142, 169-171; divine right, 54-56, 75
- Government ownership and regulation, 642
- Goya, Francisco, 162
- Grand Monarch. *See* Louis XIV, King of France
- Grant, Captain, 334
- Grant, Ulysses S., 356
- Gravitation, Newton's law of, 131
- Gray, Thomas, 155
- Great Britain, parliamentary government in, 206-208, 271-272; extension of suffrage, 213-214; Crimean War, 218-220, 295-296; industrial development, 242-243, 255-256, 278; trade unionism in, 258-259, 282; labor legislation, 261-262; co-operative movement in, 263; government of, 278-281; cabinet system, 280-281; economic position, 281-283; Opium War, 308-309; sea power challenged, 360, 361-362; crisis in policy of, 370-371; Anglo-French Entente, 372-373; Anglo-Russian Entente, 373-374; in World War I, 380-381, 382, 385; Commonwealth of Nations, 416-420; economic troubles, 1919-1929, 437-440; depression years in, 494-496; in World War II, 545-546, 548, 549, 550, 552, 568; tariff reform in, 575-576. *See also* England
- Great Didactic, The* (Comenius), 152
- Greco, El, 162
- Greece, 376, 488; becomes independent state, 204, 295; joins Balkan alliance, 296-297; in World War I, 382, 395; in World War II, 551, 552
- Greeley, Horace, 274
- Gregory XIII, Pope, 628
- Greuze, Jean Baptiste, 163
- Grey, Earl, 207-208
- Grey, Sir Edward, 378, 381
- Guadelupe Hidalgo, Treaty of, 351
- Guam, 342
- Guatemala, 350
- Guise, Henry, Duke of, 64
- Guizot, F. P. G., 206
- Gulliver's Travels* (Swift), 155
- Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden, 69
- Habeas Corpus Amendment Act, 78
- Hague Peace Conferences, 364-365
- Hague Tribunal, 415
- Haile Selassie, 520, 522
- Haiti, 14, 17, 342, 353, 358
- Halley, Edmund, 149
- Hals, Franz, 163
- Hamilton, Alexander, 122
- Handel, Georg Friedrich, 164
- Hanover, 225
- Hanseatic League, 22
- Hapsburg dynasty, 56, 66, 67, 421; Spanish branch, 39, 56; in 17th century Germany, 65-66; Austrian branch, 89, 201, 289
- Harding, Warren G., 409
- Hargreaves, James, 242, 253, 265
- Harvey, William, 135
- Hawaiian Islands, 127, 311, 342, 557
- Hawley-Smoot tariff, 577
- Hawthorne, Nathaniel, 274
- Hay, John, 311
- Haydn, Joseph, 164
- Hegel, G. W. F., 619
- Heisenberg, Werner, 612
- Helgoland, 363, 393
- Henry, Joseph, 254
- Henry, Patrick, 124
- Henry the Navigator, 8-10

- Henry VII, King of England, 8, 42, 74, 75
 Henry VIII, King of England, 56, 61, 74, 75; breaks with Roman Church, 42-43
 Henry II, King of France, 40
 Henry III, King of France, 64
 Henry IV, (Henry of Navarre), King of France, 64, 71
 Heresy, rise of, 33-34; Albigensian, 34; Waldensian, 34-35; Wycliffe, 35
Hernani (Hugo), 623
 Hertz, H. R., 614
 Herzegovina, 206, 366
 Hesse, Grand Duchy of, 226
 Hindenberg, Paul von, 450, 452, 453-454, 482
 Hiroshima, 563
 History, eighteenth-century, 158; increased scope of, 621-622
History of Ancient Art (Winckelmann), 161
History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (Gibbon), 158
 Hitler, Adolf, 454; attempts *Putsch* in Munich, 453, 454; rise of, 478-482; becomes dictator, 483-486; rebuilds German military power, 523-525; German expansion under, 531-538, 540-541
 Hoare, Sir Samuel, 521
 Hoare-Laval pact, 521
 Hobbes, Thomas, 140
 Hoe, Richard M., 252
 Hogarth, William, 163
 Hohenzollern dynasty, 87
 Holding companies, growth of, 239-240, 585
 Holland, colonial empire of, 106-107; at Congress of Vienna, 187, 188; in World War II, 547. *See also* Dutch East Indies, Netherlands
 Holland, J. P., 248
 Holy Alliance, 189-190
 Holy Roman Empire, 51; Napoleon dissolves, 185, 224
 Holy Synod, Peter the Great establishes, 92
 Honduras, 350
 Hong Kong, 308, 309
 Hooke, Robert, 135
 Hoover, Herbert C., 428, 472, 475, 476, 500-501, 509
 Hôtel des Invalides, 160
 Houdon, Jean Antoine, 625
 House of Burgesses, Virginia establishes, 115
 House of Commons, British, 279-280
 House of Lords, British, 279-280
 Howard, John, 146
 Howe, Elias, 243
 Hudson, Henry, 107
 Hudson's Bay Company, 355
 Hughes, Charles E., 412
 Hughes, Howard, 250
 Hugo, Victor, 623
 Huguenots, 63, 64-65, 69, 70, 72-73, 147
 Hull House, 593
 Humanism, 153; scientific, 618
 Humanitarianism, growth of, 145-147, 589-593
 Humboldt, Alexander von, 629
 Hundred Years' War, 62
 Hungary, 228, 424, 488; Jesuits in, 47; Magyars establish republic of, 212; after World War I, 395; depression in, 487; in World War II, 552, 569. *See also* Austria-Hungary
 Hus (Huss), Jan, 36, 37
 Hutton, James, 134, 609
 Huygens, Christian, 132
 I. G. Farben, 239
 Ibsen, Henrik, 623
 Iceland, Lutheranism in, 38
 Immigration Act, United States (1929), 635
 Imperial Bank of Germany. *See* *Reichsbank*
 Imperialism, background of, 299-303; growth of modern, 637-639
 Impressment, 575
 Incas, 17, 20
 Index, Catholic, 48, 130, 148
 India, 258, 418, 419; Jesuits in, 47; France and England in, 94-95, 107-109; British conquest of, 303-306; unrest in, 505
 India Act of 1919, 419
 Indian Mutiny, 303-304
 Indo-China, 217, 309, 325, 505; Japan occupies, 549
 Indulgences, sale of, 36-37
 Industrial Revolution, 254
 Industrialism, rise of, 235-236, 254-255, 269-270; organization under, 236-240; inventive process in, 241-246, 253-254; British, 242-243, 255-256, 278; transportation and, 246-251; improved communication, 251-252; printing and typesetting, 252-253; progress of, 255-258; in Germany, 258, 283, 286, 360-361; trade unionism, 258-261; labor legislation, 261-263; co-operative movement, 263; state enterprise, 264;

- mechanization in, 264-266; growth of Russian, 291-292; and imperialism, 300-302; after World War II, 402-403; economic independence and, 573
- Inferno* (Dante), 7, 11
- Innocent III, Pope, 34, 51
- Innocent VIII, Pope, 150
- Inquisition, 49
- Institutes of Christian Religion* (Calvin), 41
- Instrument of Government, Cromwell accepts, 77
- Insurance, development of, 240, 579
- Inter-allied war debts, 407-408
- Interchangeable parts, 237-238
- Inter-Imperial Relations Committee, 419
- International Bank, 581
- International Bureau of Weights and Measures, 629
- International Conference of American States, 359
- International Court of Justice, 565
- International Institute of Agriculture, 629
- International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, 414
- International Labor Office, 262, 414
- International Peace Conference (1907), 308
- International Red Cross Society, 594
- International, Second, 276; Third, or Communist, 431-432
- International trade, growth of, 573-578
- International Workingmen's Association, 276
- Invention, progress of, 241-246, 643-644; process of, 253-254
- Ionian Islands, 294
- Iowa, University of, 595
- Iraq, 324, 505
- Irish Free State, 418
- Iron, production of, 235, 245, 278, 283
- Isabella of Castile. *See* Ferdinand and Isabella
- Ishii, Viscount, 411
- Ismail, Khedive of Egypt, 330
- Italian Confederation, 187
- Italian North Africa, 331-332
- Italo-Austrian Treaty (1882), 367
- Italo-German Treaty (1882), 367
- Italy, in Napoleonic wars, 180, 187-188; nationalism in, 203; disunion in, 220-221; unification of, 221-223; problems of, 1870-1914, 290-291; empire, 331-332, 337; in World War I, 382; after World War I, 430-431; Fascist revolution, 444-449; Ethiopian War, 518-522; in World War II, 547, 548-549, 551, 560, 568
- Iwo Jima, 563
- Jackson, Dr. C. T., 617
- Jacobin Club, in revolutionary France, 178, 205
- Jahn, Father, 203
- James I, King of England, 55, 66, 75-76, 151
- James II, King of England, 78; 84, 86
- Jameson Raid, 370
- Janizary Corps, 99, 100, 294
- Japan, expansion of, 309-310, 320-321; described, 313-315; Chinese culture in, 315; feudalism in, 315-317; opening of, 317-320; revolution in, 318-319; in World War I, 382, 385, 390; after World War I, 410-413, 466-467; aggressions in China, 433-435; depression years in, 503-505; occupies Manchuria, 512-514; joins Axis powers, 524-525; in World War II, 549, 554-557, 562-564, 568
- Java, World War II in, 557
- Jefferson, Thomas, 120, 124, 144, 147, 599
- Jena, battle of, 185
- Jenner, Edward, 616
- Jerusalem Delivered* (Tasso), 154
- Jesuits, 47, 317, 602
- Jews, 58, 370, 603-604, 640; Nazi violence against, 486
- John XXXIII, Pope, 31
- Johnson Act (1934), 476, 511, 512
- Johnson, Samuel, 159, 636
- Joliet, Louis, 109
- Jones, Sir William, 159
- Jonson, Ben, 156-157
- Joseph II, Emperor of Austria, 102, 147, 604
- Juárez, Benito, 351
- Jugoslavia, 395, 422, 424, 430-431; depression in, 487-488
- Julius II, Pope, 36, 50
- July Revolution, 205, 206
- Junkers, German conservatives, 285, 482
- Kamchatka, 321
- Kant, Immanuel, 139
- Kapital, Das* (Marx), 275
- Kapp, Dr. Wolfgang von, 453
- Kaunitz, Count, 95
- Kay, John, 242
- Kellogg, Frank B., 428

- Kenya Colony, 338
 Kepler, Johann, 130-131
 Kerensky, Alexander, 457, 458, 459
 Kiaochow, 310
 Kiel Canal, 363, 574
 Kiev, 420
 King George's War, 94
 King William's War, 84
 King's Evil, 54
 Kirov, Comrade, 491-492
 Koch, Robert, 616
 Königgrätz, battle of, 226, 227
 Korea, 310, 320, 323
 Kornilov, General, 459
 Kossuth, Louis, 212, 228
Kraft durch Freude, 485
 Kreditanstalt, 474
 Kruger, Paul, 337, 370
 Kuang Hsu, Emperor of China, 311, 312
 Kublai Khan, 6
Kulturkampf, 285
 Kuomintang, Chinese People's Party, 313, 434-435
 Kuprilis, Turkish leaders, 99, 100
 Kwajalein, 562

 Labor, legislation, 261-263; growth of trade unionism, 258-261
 Labour Party, British, 438-440
 Lafayette, Marquis de, 172, 174, 205
 La Follette, Robert M., 469
 La Fontaine, Jean de, 155
L'Aiglon (Rostand), 623
Laissez faire, policy of, 141-142, 261, 384
 Lamarck, Chevalier de, 611
 Lamartine, Alphonse de, 210
 Land tenure, 586-588
 Lander, Richard and John, 334
 Langley, S. P., 250
 Languages, development of vernacular, 52-53
 Lansing, Robert, 411
 La Pérouse, Jean François de, 127
 LaPlace, Pierre Simon de, 606
 La Rochelle, siege of, 73
 La Salle, Robert de, 109
 Las Casas, Bartholomew de, 20
 Lateran Palace, 600
 Lateran Treaty, 600
 Latin America. *See* South America
 Latvia, 546
 Laud, Archbishop, 76
 Lausanne, reparations conference at, 475-476, 510-511
 Laval, Pierre, 475, 517, 518, 521
 Lavoisier, Antoine Laurent, 133
 Law, John, 578
 League of Augsburg, War of the, 84
 League of Nations, 262, 389, 392, 408, 409, 413-416, 427-428
 Leeds, 256
 Leeuwenhoek, Anton van, 135
 Legion of Honor, Napoleon establishes, 182
 Leibnitz, Gottfried Wilhelm von, 137, 138
 Leipzig, battle of, 186
 Lend-Lease Bill (1941), 549, 553
 Lenin, Nikolai, 276, 387, 431, 432, 445, 458, 460, 462, 464
 Leo X, Pope, 32, 37
 Leo XIII, Pope, 277, 370
 León, Ponce de, 17
 Leopold II, King of the Belgians, 336
 Lepanto, battle of, 58
 Lesseps, Ferdinand de, 357
 Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim, 157, 636
Letter concerning Toleration (Locke), 148
Letters (Sevigné), 155
Letters of Obscure Men, 33
 Levant Company, 238
 Lever Brothers, 239
Leviathan (Hobbes), 140
 Lewis, Meriwether, 629
 Lexington and Concord, battle of, 120
 Leyden jar, 132-133
 Leyte, battle of, 563
 Liberal Party, in Great Britain, 214, 282, 438-440, 600; German, 477
 Liberal-democratic system, 436-437
 Liberalism, rise of modern, 169-171, 202-203, 215, 272, 642
 Liberals, in British Parliament, 78
 Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, 184-185
 Libraries, growth of, 159-160
 Libya, in World War II, 551, 552, 557, 560
 Liebknecht, Karl, 276, 450
 Limited liability companies, growth of, 238-239
 Lincoln, Abraham, 590
 Lindbergh, Charles A., 250
 Linnaeus, Carolus, 134
 Linotype, 252-253
 Liquor traffic, regulation of, 592-593
 Lister, Joseph, 617
 Literature, classicism in, 153; sixteenth-century, 153-154; in seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 154-158; drama, 156-158; history and fiction, 158; modern, 622-624

- Lithuania, 392, 541, 546
 Little Entente, 421-425
 Litvinoff, Maxim, 516, 542
 Liverpool, 256
 Livingstone, David, 334
 Lloyd George, David, 389, 391-392, 405, 600
 Loanda, 336
 Locarno, Pact of, 426-428
 Locke, John, 138, 140, 145, 148, 152, 171
 Locomotive, 248-249
 Lollards, 35, 42
 Lombardy, 187, 220, 222
 Lombardy-Venetia, 212
 London Company, settles Virginia, 110, 111
 London Economic Conference (1933), 476
 London Nonintervention Committee, 528
 Long, C. W., 617
 Lorrain, Claude, 163
 Lorraine, 283, 405; ceded to Germany, 227. *See also* Alsace-Lorraine
 Louis IX (St. Louis), King of France, 6
 Louis XIII, King of France, 65, 70, 72
 Louis XIV, King of France, 65, 70, 74, 255; reign of, 81-83; wars of, 83-87
 Louis XV, King of France, 172
 Louis XVI, King of France, 73, 102, 172-173, 176, 177, 178
 Louis XVIII, King of France, 187, 200, 204
 Louis Philippe, King of France, 205, 209-210
 Louisiana territory, purchase of, 341-342; opening of, 629
 Louvois, Marquis de, French Minister of War, 82
 Louvre, 160
 Loyola, St. Ignatius, 47, 602
 Lucca, 220
 Lucretius, 644
 Ludendorff, General, 453, 454, 480
Lusiads (Camoëns), 153-154
 Luther, Martin, 137; revolts against Catholicism, 36-38
 Lutheranism, 38, 40, 44-46, 59, 65
 Lützen, battle of, 69
 Luxemburg, Rosa, 450
 Lyell, Sir Charles, 609
 Lyon, Mary, 595
 Lytton, Lord, 513-514
 McCormick, Cyrus H., 246
 MacDonald, J. Ramsay, 259, 439, 476, 494, 495
 Macedonia, 296, 297
 Machiavelli, Niccolò, 53, 215
 Machine Age, 254-255
 Madison, James, 122
 Madras, French capture, 109
 Madrid, Treaty of (1880), 329
 Magellan, Ferdinand, 15-17
 Magenta, battle of, 221
 Maginot Line, 425, 547
 Magna Carta, 278
 Magyarization, 290
 Magyars, 228; in Revolution of 1848, 212
Maid of Orleans, The (Schiller), 157
 Makin, 562
 Malaya, in World War II, 555, 557
 Malpighi, Marcello, 135
 Malthus, T. R., 633-634
 Manchester, 256
 Manchukuo, Japanese occupy, 512-514.
See also Manchuria
 Manchuria, 310, 323, 433. *See also* Manchukuo
 Manchus, 306
 Manet, Édouard, 625
 Manly, C. M., 250
 Mann, Horace, 597
 Manners and customs, 164-165
 Marconi, Guglielmo, 252, 614
Maria Stuart (Schiller), 157
 Maria Theresa, 89, 94, 97
 Mariana Islands, 562, 563
 Marie Antoinette, Queen of France, 172-173, 176, 177, 179
 Marlborough, Duke of, 86
 Marlowe, Christopher, 156
 Marne, battle of the, 382
 Marquette, Jacques, 109
 Marriage, 596
Marseillaise, 163, 179, 636
 Marshall Islands, 562
 Marshall, John, 123
 Martin V, Pope, 31
 Marx, Karl, 274-275, 276
 Marxism, 275
 Mary, Queen of England, 44, 56, 61
 Mary, Queen of Scots, 75
 Maryland, settlement of, 112, 113
 Mass production, 584
 Massachusetts, colonization of, 111-112; education in colonial, 114
 Massachusetts Bay Company, 112
 Massacre of St. Bartholomew's Day, 63

- Mathematics, development of modern, 136-137, 618
 Matignon agreement, 498
 Matter, transformation of, 608-609
 Maximilian, Archduke, Emperor of Mexico, 217-218, 351
 Maximilian of Bavaria, 67
 Maxwell, James Clerk, 614
 Mayas, 20
 Mayflower Compact, 111
 Mazarin, Cardinal, 74
 Mazzini, Giuseppe, 203, 220-221
 Mechanization of industry, 264-266
 Medici, Catherine de', 63
 Medici, Marie de', 71-72
 Medicine, advance of, 615-617
 Mehemet Ali, Khedive of Egypt, 330
Mein Kampf (Hitler), 479, 523, 525
 Memelland, 392, 541
Memoirs (Saint-Simon), 154-155
 Mendel, Gregor Johann, 615
 Mendelism, 614-615
 Mercantilism, in sixteenth century, 52; rise of, 104-106; in Thirteen Colonies, 117-118
 Mercator, Gerhard, 134
 Merchant-manufacturers, rise of, 236-237, 238
 Merchants Adventurers, 106
 Mergenthaler, Ottmar, 253
 Methodists, 601-602
 Metric System, 628
 Metternich, Prince Clemens, 187, 189-190, 201, 211, 215, 220, 224
 Mexican Cession (1848), 342
 Mexican War, 351
 Mexico, 258, 343, 350-352; Spanish conquest of, 17, 20; Napoleon III intervenes in, 217-218
 Michelangelo, 161
 Microscope, 610; invention of, 134-135
 Middle East, 323-324
 Midway, battle of, 557, 562
 Militarism, growth of European, 362
 Mill, John Stuart, 595
 Millet, Jean François, 625
 Milton, John, 149, 155, 596
 Mineralogy, rise of modern, 133-134
Minna von Barnhelm (Lessing), 157
 Minuit, Peter, 107
 Mirabeau, Count, 174, 176
 Missionaries, 302
 Missions, spread of Catholic and Protestant, 602-603
 Mississippi River, discovery of, 18; French explore, 109-110
 Mississippi Scheme, 578
 Modena, Duchy of, 188, 220, 222
 Mogul Empire, 107
 Mohammedans, 58
 Moldavia, 219
 Molière, Jean Baptiste (Poquelin), 157
 Molotov, V. M., 550, 551
 Moltke, Count von, 225, 226
 Monasteries, Henry VIII suppresses, 42-43
 Mongolia, 306
 Mongoloid races, migration of, 639
 Mongols, 90
 Monroe Doctrine, 355-357
 Monroe, James, 356
 Montaigne, Michel de, 154
 Montcalm, General Louis Joseph, 117
 Montenegro, 296, 297, 376, 379
 Montesquieu, Baron de, 143-144, 171
 Montgolfier brothers, 251
 Montreal, French post at, 109; British capture, 117
 Moratorium of 1931, 475
 Moravia, 541; Revolution of 1848 in, 212
 Morgan, J. P., and Company, 511, 581
 Mormonism, 602
 Morocco, 329-330, 372, 376
 Morse, Samuel F. B., 251, 254
 Morton, Dr. W. T. G., 617
 Mount Holyoke College, 595
 Mozambique, 336
 Mozart, Wolfgang Amadeus, 164
 Munich, Hitler's *Putsch* at, 478; conference at, 538
 Murillo, Bartolomé, 162
 Muscovy Company, 238
 Music, development of modern, 163-164; secular, 626-627
 Mussolini, Benito, 337, 430, 431, 445-449, 517, 518-522 *passim*
 Mutual Assistance, Treaty of, 420
 Nagasaki, 563
 Nanking, Treaty of, 308-309
 Nansen, Fridtjof, 629
 Napier, John, 137
 Naples, 223; Austrians occupy, 204
 Napoleon I, 224; rise of, 180-181, 220; First Consul, 181-182; Emperor, 182-183; fall of, 183-186; Continental System of, 344
 Napoleon III, 211, 286, 287, 295, 351; Emperor of the French, 215-218; in Austro-Sardinian War, 221-223; and Franco-Prussian War, 226-227
 Naseby, battle of, 77

- Natal, 337, 338
Nathan the Wise (Lessing), 157
 National Assembly, in revolutionary France, 174-175, 176-177, 178
 National Convention, replaces National Assembly in France, 178-180, 181
 National Labor Relations Act, 262
 National Security Act, 262
 National Socialist German Workers' Party. *See* Nazi Party
 National Woman Suffrage Association, 596
 National Workshops, 210
 Nationalism, growth of, 171, 188, 636-637; European, after 1815, 202-203; after 1848, 215; in Italy, 220-223; after World War I, 390; German, 479; in eastern and middle Europe, 487-488
 Nationalist Party, Chinese, 313, 434-435; Indian, 419
 Naval Conference (1927), 508
 Naval disarmament, 409-410, 412-413. *See also* Armaments, Disarmament
 Navigation, ocean, 247-248
 Navigation Acts, British, 118-119, 576
 Nazi Party, rise of, 453, 478-482; controls Germany, 483-486
 Near East, early exploration in, 4
 Near Eastern Question, 100
 Nebular hypothesis, 606
 Negroes, American, 214; emigration of, 639. *See also* Slavery
 Nepal, 306
 Nepotism, in sixteenth-century church, 32
 Netherlands, rise of, 59-61; in Forty Years' War, 67, 70; Louis XIV attacks, 83-84. *See also* Dutch East Indies, Holland
 Neutrality Act of 1935, 511-512
 Neutrality, American, 510-512
 New Amsterdam, Dutch found, 107
 New Britain, 562
 New Deal, 476, 500-503, 642
 New Economic Policy, in Russia, 463, 465-466
 New England, British colonization of, 111-112; spinning and weaving industry in, 243; industrial progress in, 258
 New France, settlement of, 109-110
 New Guinea, 562
 New Hampshire, settlement of, 112
 New Jersey, settlement of, 112
 New Netherland, 107, 112
 New Orleans, French found, 109
 New Testament, translation of, 35, 38
 New York, settlement of, 112, 113
 New Zealand, 125, 127, 258, 327, 418
 Newfoundland, 104, 116, 418
 Newton, Sir Isaac, 131, 132, 137, 618
 Nicaea, Church council at, 48
 Nicaragua, 350, 358
 Nice, 217, 221, 223
 Nicholas I, Czar of Russia, 206, 212, 213, 229, 295
 Nicholas II, Czar of Russia, 292, 364, 456
 Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 274, 277, 619, 641
 Niger River, 333, 334
 Nightingale, Florence, 617
 Nihilism, 230
 Nile River, 333, 334
 Nimwegen, Treaty of (1678), 83
 Nine-Power Open Door Treaty, 413
 Nineteenth Route Army, Chinese, 512
 Nobel, Alfred, 594
 Nobel Prizes, 594
 North America, Spanish exploration of, 17-18; French explorations in, 18-19, 104, 109-110, 116-117; British in, 110-117
 North German Confederation, 226, 228. *See also* German Confederation
 Northwest Passage, search for, 18-19
 Norway, Lutheranism in, 38, 45; in World War II, 546-547
 Nova Scotia, French settle, 109; England acquires, 116
 Novel, development of modern, 158, 623-624
 Nyasa, Lake, 334
 Nyasaland, 338
 Nye, Senator, 511
 Nyon Conference (1937), 529
 Oberlin College, 595
 Odd Fellows, 603
 Oersted, H. C., 613
 OGPU, Soviet secret police, 492
 Okinawa, 563
 Old Bolsheviks Club, 492
 Old Regime, collapse of, in France, 169-171, 175, 186
 Old Testament, translation of, 35, 38
On the Revolutions of Heavenly Bodies (Copernicus), 130
 Open Door Policy, 311
 Opium, 308
 Opium War, 308-309
 Orange Free State, 337, 338
Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection (Darwin), 611-612

- Orlando, Vittorio, 430
 Ortelius, Abraham, 134
 Ottawa Conference (1932), 495
 Ottoman Turks, 32; in western Europe, 39; decline of, 93, 99-100; repulsed from Vienna, 89, 93, 100; empire described, 293-294; empire dismembered, 294-297. *See also* Turkey
 Owen, Robert, 274, 275
- Pacific Ocean, exploration in, 125-128
 Painting, 161-163; modern, 625-626
 Palaeontology, 610
 Palatinate, War of the, 84
 Palestine, 410; Jewish threat in, 505
 Palestrina, Giovanni da, 163
 Palladio, Andrea, 160
 Panama, 350, 358
 Panama Canal, 274, 353, 357-358, 362, 574
 Panama crisis, 289
 Pan-American Congresses, 359
 Pan American Union, 359
 Pan-Americanism, 358-359
 Pan-Germanists, 530
Pantagruel (Rabelais), 154
 Pantheism, 138
 Papacy, decline of, 31-33; reformation of, 46-50; loses temporal power, 223. *See also* Catholicism, Roman Church, States of the Church
 Papal Guarantees, Law of, 600
 Papen, Franz von, 482
Paradise Lost (Milton), 155
Paradise Regained (Milton), 155
 Paraguay, 346, 347
 Paris, rebuilding of, 217; Exposition of 1855, 217; in World War I, 386
 Paris, Congress of (1856), 574, 575
 Paris, Pact of (1928), 428-429
 Paris, Peace of (1856), 219, 296; (1919, *see* Versailles, Treaty of)
 Paris, Treaty of (1763), 96, 117; (1783), 121; (1814, 1815), 186-187
 Park, Munro, 333
 Parliament, British, 75, 279-280
 Parliament Act of 1911, 280
 Parliamentary government, 271-272
 Parma, Duchy of, 188, 220, 222
 Pascal, Blaise, 137, 644
 Pasteur, Louis, 616
 Paul III, Pope, 47, 48, 49-50, 130
Pax Britannica, 305
 Pearl Harbor, 555
 Peary, Robert E., 629, 631
 Pedro I, Emperor of Brazil, 346
 Pedro II, Emperor of Brazil, 346
 Peel, Sir Robert, 576
 Peking, 309
 Penal codes, reform of, 145-146, 591
 Penang, British at, 324
 Penn, William, 112, 599
 Pennsylvania, settlement of, 112, 113
 Pennsylvania Railroad, 585
 People's Party, Chinese, 313, 434-435
 Perfectibility, theory of, 644-645
 Permanent Court of Arbitration, 378
 Permanent Court of International Justice. *See* World Court
 Perrault, Charles, 155
 Perry, Commodore Matthew, 318
 Persia, 323, 324, 374, 375, 432
 Peru, 343, 346, 347; Spanish conquest of, 17, 20
 Pescadores Islands, 310
 Pestalozzi, Johann Heinrich, 598
 Peter, St., 45
 Peter I (the Great), Czar of Russia, 90-92
 Peter II, Czar of Russia, 95-96
 Petition of Right (1628), British Parliament enacts, 76, 79
 Petroleum, production of, 245-246
 Philadelphia Centennial, 628
 Philip IV (the Fair), King of France, 604
 Philip II, King of Spain, 49, 56-58; annexes Portugal, 11; marries "Bloody" Mary, 44; Netherlands revolt against, 59-61; fails in attack on England, 61-62
 Philip V, King of Spain, 86
 Philippines, 325-326, 342; Magellan takes possession of, 15; Jesuits in, 47; in World War II, 555, 557, 562-563
Philosophes, in eighteenth-century France, 143-145
 Philosophy, development of modern, 137-139, 619-620; rationalism, 139-143; *philosophes*, 143-145
 Physical sciences, development of modern, 129-134, 607-610
 Physics, development of modern, 132-133, 608; applied, 613-614
 Physiocrats, in eighteenth century, 141
 Physiology, 135
 Pianoforte, invention of, 164
 Picasso, Pablo, 626
Pickwick Papers (Dickens), 623
 Piedmont, 187, 188, 204, 220
 Piedmont-Sardinia, Kingdom of, 213
 Pilgrims, settle in New England, 111

- Pilgrim's Progress* (Bunyan), 155
 Pilsudski, Józef, 57
 Pisa, 31
 Pitt, William, the Elder, 117, 120
 Pitt, William, the Younger, 576
 Pius IX, Pope, 600
 Pius XI, Pope, 525, 601
 Pizarro, Francisco, conquers Peru, 17
 Planck, Max, 612
 Plassey, battle of, 109
 Plato, 11, 137, 140, 615, 641
 Pluralism, in sixteenth-century church, 32
 Plymouth, Pilgrims settle at, 111-112
 Poetry, nineteenth-century, 622-623
 Poincaré, Raymond, 379, 441
 Poland, Jesuits in, 47; partitions of, 55, 97-98; at Congress of Vienna, 187; after World War I, 392, 395; attacks Russia, 420; depression in, 487, 488; makes treaty with Hitler, 517; in World War II, 541-543, 544-545
 Poles, in Austria-Hungary, 289, 290
 Polish Corridor, 392
 Polk, James K., 350
 Polo, Maffeo, 6; Marco, 6, 12; Nicolo, 6
 Pondicherry, 108
Poor Richard's Almanac (Franklin), 113
 Pope, Alexander, 155
 Popular Front, French, 260, 498-499, 535; Spanish, 526, 527
 Population, growth of European, 270; trend and problems of, 632-636
 Port Arthur, 310, 323
 Port Royal, French at, 109
 Portugal, 204; colonial empire, 10-11, 19-20; in Napoleonic wars, 184; in World War I, 382
 Positivism, 619
 Poussin, Nicolas, 163
 Pragmatic Sanction, 89
Praise of Folly (Erasmus), 33
 Predestination, 46
 Presbyterian Church, 45; in Thirteen Colonies, 113
 Press, freedom of, 148-149; periodical, 159; in nineteenth-century Europe, 272
 Prester John, 4, 9
 Pretoria, 338
 Priestley, Joseph, 133
 Princes, rise of, 51-53
Principia Mathematica (Newton), 131
Principles of Geology (Lyell), 609
Principles of Sociology (Spencer), 621
 Printing and typesetting, 252-253
 Prison reform, 145-146, 591
 Progress, idea of, 152; social, 644-645
 Progressive Party, in United States, 469
 Prohibition, 593
 Prohibition Party, in United States, 592
 Protestant Episcopal Church, in Thirteen Colonies, 113. *See also* Anglican Church
 Protestantism, rise of, 33-36, 599; in Germany, 36-41; in Switzerland, 41; in England, 42-44; denominations of, 44-46, 601-602; in Thirteen Colonies, 113
 Prussia, rise of, 87-89; Seven Years' War, 95-96, 116-117, 298-299, 303; in Napoleonic wars, 184, 185-187; at Congress of Vienna, 188-189; Austro-Prussian War (1866), 223, 225-226; forms Customs Union, 225; and unification of Germany, 225-228; Franco-Prussian War, 226-227, 365. *See also* Germany
 Psychoanalysis, 620
 Psychology, development of, 620
 Ptolemy, 3, 7-8, 12, 130
 Puerto Rico, 342, 353
 Puritan Revolution, 76-77, 184
 Puritans, revolt in England, 75-77, 184; settle in Massachusetts, 23, 112
 Pu-yi, Henry, 512
 Pyrenees, Treaty of the, 58, 66, 70
 Pythagoras, 618
 Quadruple Alliance, 189-190
 Quakers, 601; in colonial America, 23, 113
 Quantum theory, 612
 Quebec, French post at, 109; British capture, 117
 Queen Anne's War, 86
 Quesnay, François, 141
 Rabelais, François, 154
 Racial relations, 639-640
 Racine, Jean Baptiste, 157, 623
 Radek, Karl, 516
 Radical Democrats, rise of modern, 170-171
 Radical Socialists, French, 444, 498
 Radicalism, European, after 1815, 202-203
 Radio, 252
 Radioactivity, 608, 612
 Radium, 608
 Raeburn, Sir Henry, 163
 Railroads, 248-249
 Raleigh, Sir Walter, 19
 Raphael, 161

- Rappalo Treaty, 426, 432
 Rationalism, rise of, 139-143
 Realism, in literature, 622
Realpolitik, 215
 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (1934), 577
 Reconstruction, after World War I, 403-406; Dawes Plan, 406-407; Young Plan, 407, 474
 Red Cross, 593-594
 Red Revolution, in Russia, 454-457
 Red Sunday, massacre of, 293
 Reform Act (1832), 206, 207-208, 279; Second (1867), 214; Third (1884), 214
 Reformation, 23, 30. *See also* Catholic Reformation, Protestantism
Reichsbank, 284, 475, 580
 Reichstag, 228, 284, 449, 454; burning of, 482
 Reinsurance Treaty, 368, 370
 Relativity, theory of, 612-613
 Religion, in colonial America, 113-114, 116; rationalism in, 142-143; growth of toleration, 147-148. *See also* Catholicism, Protestantism, Roman Church, and various denominations
 Rembrandt, 162-163
 Remington and Sons, 253
 Renoir, Auguste, 625
 Reparations, after World War I, 403-407, 474-476; World War II, 567
 Reparations Commission, 404
 Representative government, 271-272
 Republican Party, in United States, 500-501
Rerum Novarum, 277
 Restoration, of Stuarts in England, 77-78
 Revolution of 1688-1689, in England, 80, 84, 184, 207, 281
 Revolutions, European, 1820-1823, 204; 1830-1832, 204-206; 1848, 208-213
 Reynaud, Paul, 547
 Reynolds, Sir Joshua, 163
 Rhineland, struggle for, in Forty Years' War, 67; problem of, 405-406, 453, 568; Germany reoccupies, 522, 524
 Rhode Island, settlement of, 112, 113
 Rhodes, Cecil, 337, 338, 594
 Rhodes Scholarships, 594
 Rhodesia, 338
 Ribera, José, 162
 Richardson, H. H., 624
 Richelieu, Cardinal, 65, 67, 69, 70, 72-74, 83, 159
Risorgimento, 220
 Rivera, Primo de, 526
 Roads, 246-247
 Robespierre, Maximilien, 178, 179
Robinson Crusoe (Defoe), 155
 Rochdale Equitable Pioneers' Society, 263
 Rockefeller Foundation, 594
 Rockefeller, John D., Sr., 594
 Rodin, Auguste, 625
 Roemer, Ole, 132
 Roman Church, in New World, 20, 22-23; authoritarian reaction in, after 1815, 201-202; in Spain, 525; in nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 600-601. *See also* Catholicism
 Romanov dynasty, 229
 Romanov, Michael, 90
 Romanticism, 201, 622
 Rome, 223
 Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis, 522, 524-525
 Romilly, Sir Samuel, 591
 Rommel, General Erwin, 552, 557, 559-560
 Romney, George, 163
 Röntgen, W. K., 608
 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 476, 490, 501-503, 549, 554
 Roosevelt, Theodore, 321
 Roses, Wars of the, 74
 Rostand, Edmond, 623
 Rothschild family, 240, 581
 Rotterdam, 106
 Round Table Conferences, London, 505
 Roundheads, in Puritan revolution, 76-77, 78
 Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 144-145, 152, 170, 171, 177, 344, 598, 622
 Royal Society of London, 136
 Rubber, production of, 246
 Rubens, Peter Paul, 162
 Ruhr, 406, 453, 568
 Rumania, 219, 289, 290, 296, 297, 367, 421, 422-424; in World War I, 382, 385, 395; depression in, 488; in World War II, 552, 569
 Runciman, Lord, 538
 Rurik, founder of Russian dynasty, 90
 Ruskin, John, 277
 Russia, rise of, 90-93; designs on Turkey, 100; in Napoleonic wars, 184, 185, 186, 187; at Congress of Vienna, 188-189; Crimean War, 218-220, 229-230, 295-296; autocratic government in, 229-231; expansion of, 291-293; Russo-Japanese War, 292, 320-321, 323, 362; war with Turkey (1877), 296, 366; in Far East, 321-323; in Middle East, 323-324;

- Anglo-Russian Entente, 373-374; in World War I, 376-377, 378-381, 382, 386; Red Revolution in, 454-457; Bolshevik revolution, 458-460; Communism introduced in, 462-465; signs treaty with Hitler, 542-543; invades Finland, 546; in World War II, 549-550; Germany invades, 551-553, 557-558; demands of, after World War II, 568-569. *See also* Soviet Union
- Russian (Orthodox) Church, 92
- Russo-Finnish War (1939-1940), 546
- Russo-Japanese War, 292, 320-321, 323, 362
- Ruthenia, 541
- Ruthenians, 422, 488
- Rutherford, Lord, 608
- Ryswick, Treaty of (1697), 84
- Saar Valley, 442, 568
- Sabotage, 277
- Sadler, Michael, 261
- Sadowa, battle of, 226, 227
- Sahara Desert, 329
- St. Paul's Cathedral, 161
- St. Peter's, Rome, 36
- St. Petersburg (Leningrad), Peter the Great builds, 92; general strike in, 293
- Saint-Simon, Duc de, 154-155
- Saint-Simonians, 274
- Salic law, 89
- Salvador, 350
- Salvation Army, 593
- Samoa, 311
- San Francisco Conference, 564
- San Martín, José de, 346
- San Stefano, Peace of, 366
- Sanctions, in Ethiopian War, 521
- Santa Anna, General, 350
- Santo Domingo, Spanish occupy, 17
- Saratoga, battle of, 121
- Sardinia, 219, 220, 223; in Napoleonic wars, 180, 187, 188; in Crimean War, 217, 218, 295; Austro-Sardinian War, 221-222
- Savoy, Duchy of, 217, 221, 222
- Savoy, House of, 446
- Saxony, 225; at Congress of Vienna, 187
- Scaliger, Joseph, 158-159
- Scapa Flow, 409
- Schacht, Dr. Hjalmar, 474, 531
- Schiller, Friedrich, 157
- Schleicher, General von, 482
- Schleiden, W. J., 610
- Schmalkaldic League, 39, 40
- Schneider-Creusot, 239
- Scholarship, modern, 158
- Scholasticism, medieval, 137
- Schopenhauer, Arthur, 619
- Schuschnigg, Kurt von, 534-536
- Schwann, Theodor, 610
- Science, progress of modern, 129, 606-607, 643-644; physical, 129-134, 607-610; biological, 134-135, 610-611; research, 135-136; mathematics, 136-137, 618; evolution, 611-612; radioactivity, 612; relativity, 612-613; applied physics and chemistry, 613-614; Mendelism, 614-615; eugenics, 615
- Scientific management, 584
- Scott, Reginald, 151
- Scott, Captain R. F., 631
- Scott, Sir Walter, 623
- Sculpture, 161, 625
- Sea power, British, 360, 361-362
- Search, right of, 575
- Second Empire, French, 215-218, 287
- Sects, Protestant, 44-46, 601-602
- Secular power, growth of, 51-53
- Securities Exchange Act (1934), 579
- Security Council, of United Nations, 564
- Senegal, 339
- Separatists, in Holland, 111
- Serbia, 289, 295, 296, 297, 366, 422; and origins of World War I, 376-378
- Serbs, 289, 290
- Serfdom, 587; abolished in Russia, 230
- Sermon on the Mount, in Waldensian teaching, 35
- Sevastopol, fall of, 296
- Seven Cities of Cibola, 18
- Seven Years' War, 95-96, 116-117, 298-299, 303
- Seventh Day Adventists, 602
- Sevigné, Madame de, 155
- Sewing machine, invention of, 243
- Seymour, Jane, 43
- Shakespeare, William, 155, 156-157
- Shanghai, 308, 309; Japanese shell, 512
- Shantung, 411
- Shaw, George Bernard, 277
- Sheffield, 256
- Sheraton, Thomas, 165
- Shidehara, Baron, 433
- Shinto, 314-315
- Shipbuilding, medieval, 7
- Shogunate, Japanese, 316
- Sholes, C. S., 253
- Shop system, 237
- Siam, 549
- Siberia, 127, 229, 321, 322
- Sicily, 223; in World War II, 560

- Sieyès, Abbé, 174, 181
 Silesia, 55, 89, 283
 Simony, in sixteenth-century church, 32
 Simpson, Mrs., 496
 Simpson, Sir James, 617
 Singapore, British at, 324
 Singer, Isaac M., 243
 Sinkiang, 306
 Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), 320, 362
Skeptical Chemist, The (Boyle), 149
 Skłodowska, Marie, 608
 Skoda works, 424
 Slave trade, 589-590
 Slavery, in colonial America, 115; agitation against, 146-147
 Slovakia 489, 541
 Slovaks, 289, 422, 488
 Slovenes, 289, 290, 422, 488
 Smith, Adam, 22, 142, 237, 264, 576
 Smuts, Jan C., 395
 Sobieski, John, King of Poland, 93, 100
 Social contract, theory of, 140-141
Social Contract (Rousseau), 145, 344
 Social Democratic Party, German, 450, 452, 453, 454, 477, 478, 481; Japanese, 504; Austrian, 518, 534; Spanish, 526
 Social Democrats, 274, 275
 Social security, 473
 Social settlements, 593
 Social studies, advance of, 621-622
 Socialism, European, after 1815, 204; growth of, 275-278; in Germany, 285, 286; in France, 444, 498
 Society, industrial and agricultural, in Europe, 268-271; bourgeois, in Europe, 271-275; socialist, 275-278
 Society of Friends. *See* Quakers
 Society of Jesus. *See* Jesuits
 Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, British, 592
 Socinians, 46
 Socinus (Sozzini), Faustus, 46
 Socrates, 34
 Solferino, battle of, 221
 Solomon Islands, 325, 562
 Somaliland, 332, 337, 339, 519, 521, 549
Some Thoughts concerning Education (Locke), 152
 South Africa, 187, 418; Dutch colonize, 107
 South African War, 338
 South America, Columbus discovers, 14; Spanish conquest of, 17-18; colonization of, 342-344; independence of, 344-346; political conditions in, 346-348; economic and social conditions in, 348-349; depression years in, 505; in World War II, 555; exploration in, 629
 South Sea Company, 578
 Southwest Africa, 336
 Soviet Union, 431-433; political machinery of, 464; Five-Year Plans, 465-466, 489-494; signs pact with France, 516-517. *See also* Russia
 Spain, colonial empire, 17-18, 19-21; Catholic Reformation in, 49; decline of, 56-58; Netherlands revolt against, 59-61; Armada fails in attack on England, 61-62; in Forty Years' War, 66-70; War of Spanish Succession, 85-86; English and French encroachments on, 94; in Napoleonic wars, 184, 185, 186; Spanish-American War, 310-311, 325-326, 357, 362; colonial system of, 343-344; civil war in, 525-529
 Spanish-American War, 310-311, 325-326, 357, 362
 Spanish Inquisition, 49
 Spanish Succession, War of the, 85-86, 116
Spectator (Addison and Steele), 155
 Speke, Captain, 334
 Spencer, Herbert, 619-620
 Spenser, Edmund, 154, 155
 Spinoza, Benedict, 138
Spirit of the Laws (Montesquieu), 143
 Spiritualism, 602
 Stalin, Josef, 464-465, 491, 492
 Stamp Act, British, 119
 Standard Oil Company, 239
 Stanley, Henry M., 334, 336
 State enterprise, 264
State of the Prisons in England and Wales, The (Howard), 146
 States of the Church, 32, 212, 220, 222, 223, 600. *See also* Catholicism, Papacy, Roman Church
 States-General, 73, 74; Louis XVI convokes, 173-174
Status quo, 272, 365-366
 Statute of Westminster (1931), 419
 Stavisky scandal, 497
 Steam engine, invention of, 243-244
 Steamboats, 247-248
 Steel, production of, 245
 Steele, Sir Richard, 155
 Stein, Baron vom und zum, 224
Stenographische Berichte, 285
 Stephenson, George, 248-249
 Stevens, James, 247
 Stimson, Henry L., 513

- Stock companies, creation of, 238-239
 Stradavari, Antonio, 164
 Stresemann, Gustav, 427, 454
 Strike, general, in St. Petersburg, 293
 Stuarts, accession of, to British throne, 75-78
Subjection of Women (Mill), 595
 Submarines, 248
 Sudan, 331
 Sudeten crisis, 489, 536-538
 Suez Canal, 274, 294, 330, 574
 Suffrage, demand for, in Europe, 204; extension of, in Great Britain, 213-214; in France, 216; woman, 595-596
 Suleiman the Magnificent, Sultan of Turkey, 39, 99
 Sully, Duc de, 71
 Sun King. *See* Louis XIV, King of France
 Sun Yat-sen, 312, 412, 434
 Superstition, decline of, 149-151
 Supreme Court, United States, 123, 502
 Surgery, advance of, 617
 Suttee, 305
 Sweden, Lutheranism in, 38, 45; in Forty Years' War, 69; Peter the Great defeats, 92, 93; co-operative movement in, 263
 Swift, Jonathan, 155
 Switzerland, Protestant Revolt in, 41
 Syndicalism, 276-277, 526
Synthetic Philosophy (Spencer), 620

 Taft, William Howard, 326
 Taiping rebellion, 309
 Talleyrand, Charles Maurice de, 187
 Tanganyika, 334, 336, 338
 Tarawa, 562
 Tariff, after World War I, 402; British, 494-495; protective, 575-577
 Tasman, Abel, 125
 Tasmania, 125, 327
 Tasso, Torquato, 154
Tatler (Addison and Steele), 155
 Technological unemployment, 265
 Telegraphy, 251-252
 Telephony, 252
 Ten Hours' Act, British, 261
 Ten Tribes of Israel, 4
 Tennessee Valley Authority, 502
 Tennis Court Oath, 174
 Tetzl, Friar, 36
 Texas, 350-351; annexation of, 342
 Textile industry, invention of machinery for, 242-243
 Thanksgiving Day, 113

Theory of the Earth (Hutton), 134
 Theses, Luther's, 37
 Thiers, Adolphe, 287
 Third Estate, rise of, 51
 Third French Republic, 288
 Third Section, Russian secret police, 229, 230
 Thirteen Colonies, growth of, 112-114; economic conditions in, 114-115; political development of, 115-116
 Thirteenth Amendment, 590-591
 Thirty Years' War, 63, 66-70
 Thomson, Sir J. J., 608
 Thorvaldsen, Albert Bertel, 625
 Three Emperors' League, 365-366, 367, 368
 Three Henrys, War of the, 64
 Tibet, 306, 374, 629
Times, London, 159, 252
 Timor, Portuguese in, 324
 Tintoretto, 161
 Titian, 161-162, 165
 Tobacco, cultivation of, 111, 165
 Togo, African colony, 336
 Toleration, religious, 147-148
 Toleration Act, British Parliament passes, 79, 147; re-enacted in American colonies, 113-114
Tom Jones (Fielding), 158
 Tories, 78, 207, 208
 Torricelli, Evangelista, 132
 Townshend Acts, 119
 Toynbee, Arnold, 254
 Toynbee Hall, 593
 Trades-Union Congress, British, 259, 440
 Trade unionism, 258-261
 Trading companies, rise of, 105-106
 Trafalgar, battle of, 361
 Transportation, development of, 246-251, 632
 Trans-Siberian Railroad, 323
 Transvaal, 337, 338
 Transylvania, 424
 Travelers, medieval, 4-6
 Trent, 223; Council at, 48
 Trials, war guilt and atrocity, 565-566
 Trieste, 223
 Triple Alliance (1667), England, Holland, Sweden, 83; (1879, 1882), Austria, Germany, Italy, 367, 370; in World War I, 382
 Triple Entente, 375, 378, 382
 Tripoli, 330, 331-332, 376
 Troppau, Congress of, 189
 Trotsky, Leon, 458, 459, 464-465, 491
 Tudor dynasty, 74-75

- Tunis, 329, 366, 430, 559, 560
 Turenne, Viscount Henri de, Marshal of France, 82
 Turgot, Anne Robert Jacques, 141, 173
 Turin, 223
 Turkey, in Crimean War, 218-220, 295-296; war with Russia (1877), 296, 366; in World War I, 376, 382, 393, 395; after World War I, 432. *See also* Ottoman Turks
 Turner, J. M. W., 625
 Tuscany, Duchy of, 188, 220, 222
 Tutuila, 342
 Twenty-first Amendment, 593
 Two Sicilies, Kingdom of the, 212, 220, 223
Two Treatises on Government (Locke), 140-141
 Typewriter, invention of, 253
 Tzu Hsi, Empress-Dowager of China, 311-312
- Uganda Protectorate, 338
 Ukraine, 420
 Unemployment, technological, 265
 Union of South Africa, 337-338
 Unitarian Church, 46, 602
 United Colonies of New England, 116, 122
 United Nations, 564-565
 United States, Declaration of Independence, 120, 122, 172; foundation of, 122-123; Constitution of, 123-125, 144, 147, 148; trade unionism in, 260; expansion of, 311, 341-342; in World War I, 382, 385; and inter-allied debts, 407-408; rejects Versailles Treaty, 408-409; 1919-1929, 469-471; New Deal in, 500-503; in World War II, 549, 553-555, 558-559, 562-564
 United States Steel Corporation, 585
 Universal Postal Union, 629
 Universal Telegraph Union, 629
 Universalists, 602
 Urbanization, 635-636
 Uruguay, 346, 348, 349
 Utopian socialists, 274
 Utrecht, Peace of (1713), 86, 94, 116
 Utrecht, Union of (1579), 60
- Vail, Alfred, 251
 Valdes (Waldo), Peter, 34-45
 Valois dynasty, 63, 64
 Van Dyck, Sir Anthony, 162, 165
 Vatican City, 600
 Vatican Council, 600-601
- Vauban, Marquis de, Marshal of France, 82
 Vega, Lope de, 156
 Velásquez, Diego, 162
 Venetia, 187, 220, 222, 223
 Venezuela, 346, 347, 348, 358
 Veronese, Paolo, 161
 Versailles, 82, 160
 Versailles, Treaty of (1783), 121; (1919), 262, 395-396, 408-409, 425, 429, 452
 Vervins, Peace of, 64
 Vesalius, Andreas, 135
 Vespucci, Amerigo, 14
 Veverka brothers, 246
Vicar of Wakefield, The (Goldsmith), 155
 Vickers-Armstrong, 239
 Victor Emmanuel II, King of Italy, 221, 222, 223, 295
 Victoria, Lake, 334
 Victoria, Queen of England, 213, 282, 304
 Vienna, Turks defeated at, 89, 93, 100; Revolution of 1848 in, 211
 Vienna, Congress of (1815), 187-189, 574, 590
 Vinci, Leonardo da, 129, 133, 161
Vindication of the Rights of Women, A (Wollstonecraft), 595
 Virchow, Rudolf, 616
 Virgin Islands, 342, 353
 Virginia, English settlement of, 19, 104, 109, 110-111
 Virginia Company, 111
 Virginia, University of, 599
 Vivaldo, Ugolino and Guido di, 6
 Vladivostok, 323
 Volta, Alessandro, 133
 Voltaire, François Arouet de, 144, 158, 181, 636, 645
- Waldenses, 34-35
 Wallace, Alfred Russel, 611
 Wallachia, 219
 Wallenstein, General von, in Forty Years' War, 69
 War of 1812, 574-575
 Warfare, changing modes of, 51-52, 82-83, 363-364; in World War I, 384-385; in World War II, 544
- Warsaw, 420
 Washington Conference (1921), 412-413, 508
 Washington, George, 122, 123, 147, 586, 603; in French and Indian War, 95; commands colonial forces, 120

- Waterloo, battle of, 186
 Watt, James, 244
 Watteau, Jean Antoine, 163
Waverley (Scott), 623
Wealth of Nations (Smith), 142
 Webb, Sidney and Beatrice, 277
 Weimar Republic, 450-452, 477-478
 Weismann, August, 610, 615
 Welland Canal, 574
 Wellington, Duke of, 207, 208, 213
 Wells, H. G., 277, 623
 Wesley, John, 602
 Wesleyan College, 595
 West, Benjamin, 163
 West Indies, 352-353, 590; discovery and occupation of, 14, 17, 20
 Westphalia, Treaty of, 66, 87, 101
 Wheat, 403
 Whigs, 78, 207, 208
 White man's burden, 302
 White Mountain, battle of (1620), 66, 67
 White, William Allen, 553
 Whitney, Eli, inventor of cotton gin, 238, 243, 253, 590
 Wilberforce, William, 590
 Willard, Frances E., 592
 William of Rubruck, 4-5
 William the Silent, Prince of Orange, 60
William Tell (Schiller), 157
 William III (of Orange) and Mary, King and Queen of England, 78-79, 84, 281
 William IV, King of England, 208
 William II, Emperor of Germany, 285-286, 369-370, 449, 451
 William I, King of Prussia, 225; becomes German Emperor, 228, 285
 Williams, George, 593
 Williams, Roger, 113, 599
 Wilson, Woodrow, 387, 388, 391-392, 395-396, 405, 413
 Winckelmann, Johann Joachim, 161
 Wireless telegraphy, 252
 Witchcraft, decline of, 149-151
 Wittelsbach, House of, 65
 Wittenberg, 38
 Wittenberg, University of, 36
 Wolfe, General James, 117
 Wollstonecraft, Mary, 595
 Wolsey, Cardinal, 42
 Woman's Christian Temperance Union, 592
 Women, emancipation of, 594-596
 World Bank. *See* Bank of International Settlements
 World Court, 415
 World War I, 381-386; origins of, 376-381; background of peace, 386-391; writing of peace, 391-392; treaty terms, 392-395; Peace of Paris, 395-396; aftermath of, 399-403; debts and reparations, 403-408, 474-476
 World War II, beginning of, 541-543; Polish campaign, 544-545; in western Europe, 546-548, 550, 559; African campaigns, 549, 557, 559-560; in Far East, 549, 554-557, 562-564, 568; Germany invades Russia, 551-553, 557; Balkan campaign, 552-553; Mediterranean campaign, 559-560; Allies invade Germany, 560-562; war guilt and reparations, 565-567; problem of peace, 567-569
 World's Fair, Chicago, 628-629
 Worms, Diet of, 38
 Wren, Sir Christopher, 161
 Wright, Wilbur and Orville, 250
 Württemberg, 225, 226
 Wycliffe, John, 35, 42, 54
 X rays, 608, 617
 Xavier, St. Francis, 602
 Yankee Imperialism, 357
 Yellow peril, 639
 Yorktown, British surrender at, 121, 303
 Young Italy, 203, 220
 Young Men's Christian Association, 593
 Young, Owen D., 474
 Young Plan, 407, 474
 Young Turks, 296
 Young Women's Christian Association, 593
 Zambesi River, 333, 334
 Zamenhof, L. L., 627
 Zeppelin, Count Ferdinand von, 251
 Zinoviev, Gregory, 464, 490
Zollverein. *See* Customs Union
 Zoology, 134
 Zwingli, Huldreich, 41, 137